Mr. Chairman You moved the adjournment,
Mr. Higgins, so you have the floor.
Mr. Higgins Thank you, sir. Before adjournment on Friday, I had been elaborating at some
length on the value of our strategical, geographical position, and its particular
value to the two
countries immediately adjoining us, the United
States and Canada. I am going to go on from
there.
I stated that Canada is as yet, politically, an
immature country. It is only slowly realising its
own individuality. It is not therefore to be expected that it would have as clear-cut
a policy as
has the United States. Until June, 1940 it was
impossible to secure much attention to arguments
urging that Canada should assume responsibility
for Newfoundland; it was too remote for the
average Canadian to know much about, and since
it was part of the Empire, there was no need to
worry about it. Canada's failure to take any part
in the effort taken in 1933 to put this country on
its feet springs in a large measure from this cause.
So too, in the American bases deal. A nation
conscious of itself and jealous for its future would
have been ready to undertake the complete job in
Newfoundland, rather than to have even the
friendliest of neutrals do it, with political results
still to be determined. Things were moving
quickly in the summer of 1940, and there was a
suggestion of panic about. But even so, the grant
by Great Britain of what is virtually territorial
sovereignty in an island adjacent to Canada,
which was once close to entering the Canadian
confederation, and which administers an important area of the continent (Labrador)
that had
been handed over to it by Canada's acquiescence
in a decision of arbitration (1927) largely because
it was all in the family, was a rather extraordinary
proceeding. It was only to be defended because
of the exigencies of the moment, and because it
was felt at the time that the United States was also
one of the family. The Canadian government has
since attempted to recover the situation by the
protocol it secured to the bases agreement of
1941. Paragraph 1 of this protocol is as follows:
"It is recognised that the defence, and as such is
a matter of special concern to the Canadian
Government".
I wish at this time to draw your attention to the
answer received by Mr. Hollett to this question
submitted on December 2. The question was as
follows:
I give notice that I will on tomorrow ask
His Excellency the Governor of Newfoundland to seek clarification from the
Government of the United Kingdom for the
benefit of this Convention on the following
point: that is to say, that whereas under the
Lease Bases Agreement 1941, it was stipulated that upon the resumption by Newfoundland
of the constitutional status held by
it prior to the 16th February, 1934, the contracting parties to said agreement would
be
the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Newfoundland.
Now, therefore, what would the position
should Newfoundland enter into confederation with Canada?
Would the contracting parties under said
agreement be the Government of the United
States of America, and the provincial government of Newfoundland, or otherwise? And
if
otherwise, to inform this Convention as to the
real position which will exist.
To which he received the following reply:
It is assumed that the question is based on
the text of notes exchanged between Mr.
Churchill and Mr. Winant at the time of the
signature of the Leased Bases Agreement of
1941 (Cmd. 6259). It was then agreed between the United Kingdom and United States
governments that "upon resumption by Newfoundland of the constitutional status held
by
it prior to February 16, 1934, the words 'the
Government of the United Kingdom'
wherever they occur in relation to a provision
applicable to Newfoundland in the said
agreement shall be taken to mean, so far as
Newfoundland is concerned, the Government of Newfoundland, and the agreement
shall then be construed accordingly". The
wording of this note did not cover the position which would arise in the event of
Newfoundland entering into confederation, but in
1102 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
that event the present function of the United
Kingdom Government in relation to Newfoundland under the terms of the agreement
would devolve upon the Government of
Canada.
By confederation Canada is again attempting
to recover the situation in which it finds itself as
a result of the grant of the United States bases,
and as you will appreciate fully, by confederation
the Canadian government takes the place of the
United Kingdom government in its dealings with
the United States arising out of the bases deal.
Canada further attempted to repair the damage
done by the grant of sovereignty of part of Newfoundland to the United States, by
the appointment of Mr. Charles Burchell K.C. as High
Commissioner to Newfoundland, constituting
the first political or diplomatic connection
Canada has had with the island. This office is
being continued and we still have here a High
Commissioner for Canada, as well as a Trade
Commissioner. One of Mr. Burchell's first acts
was the securing of a 99-year lease to the areas at
Goose Bay, and in the same year, 1941, the title
to the land required for the airport at Torbay. I
will say, in fairness to Mr. Burchell, that the
leased land at Labrador is under an entirely different agreement than this bases lease...
As far
as Goose Bay is concerned Newfoundland customs duties apply, and I think we have to
thank
Mr. Burchell for that. Gentlemen, that is the
position of the strategic importance of Newfoundland.
Mr. Smallwood Point of order. Is it in order for
a member of this Convention instead of in a
speech, offering his own words, to copy words
out of a book and read them as though they were
his own? Because I have here in front of me the
very book from which Mr. Higgins in his speech
was quoting word for word, without saying he
was quoting from a book, without naming the
author as he did on Friday. I can quote the words
from page 488, in a book by Mr. MacKay
[1].... The
point of order, sir, is this: is Mr. Higgins permitted to parade in the verbal clothing
of another
man, without telling the house and the country
that what he is doing is using another man's
words as his own speech?
Mr. Chairman Just a moment, Mr. Higgins,
please. The fact that Mr. Higgins used language
identical, or substantially identical, with that
employed by Dr. MacKay may be sheer coincidence, or it may be plagiarism. I do not
know,
and I don't think I should be called upon to
decide.
Mr. Chairman Except this, that if you are quoting the language of somebody else, Mr. Higgins,
it would be your duty to quote it so that I can rule
whether it is in order.
Mr. Higgins I did not quote it exactly, but I did
use some extracts, sir.
I am not prepared to say that such a union
would not be a good thing for Newfoundland, but
I do say that before Newfoundland should decide
on such a union the matter would have to be much
more thoroughly investigated than it has been up
to the present time. I believe the delegation that
went to Ottawa has gone a long way in its exploratory talks, but I am far from convinced
that
it has gone sufficiently far, or was sufficiently
competent to make a recommendation to the
people that federal union with Canada is the best
solution for Newfoundland. I say that quite sincerely, because if I was convinced
that confederation was the best solution for
Newfoundland, no matter what my personal feeling would be, I would vote for it. At
the present
time all I can say is that it has sufficient promise
to bear further investigation. Now as I said earlier, and at the expense of repetition,
1. The union of Canada and Newfoundland appears to have prospects of good for Newfoundland.
2. Unless and until the idea has been given a full
and careful exploration by a competent body, it
would not be wise to make a decision to have
federal union.
3. The only way that this matter should be accomplished is by an elected government
having
full powers, and with all the assistance, both
technical and clerical, necessary for such an important matter.
I have given this whole idea very careful consideration, as I know all you gentlemen
here
have, and I am honestly and sincerely convinced
that the best interests of Newfoundland require
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1103
that an elected government of Newfoundlanders,
pledged to undertake this investigation into confederation, is the only proper solution
of the
confederation issue. That is my advice to those of
you who feel that confederation is the best solution for Newfoundland. However, I
want to say
quite emphatically, that I am far from convinced
that we can't do a better job running our own
affairs. You hear the oft-repeated question, "Oh,
we have not the men, where are we going to get
the leaders?" That is nothing else but pure poppycock. The more contacts I have had
with
people outside Newfoundland, the more it makes
me realise that we have in this country ample
material to provide the type of men to do the job
properly. Remember, if we had federal union
with Canada, we would have to provide the men
to go to Ottawa, and to man the provincial parliament here, and if we have to get
that number of
men, surely we can get the number of men required to run responsible government. I
see no
reason at all why we have to enter confederation.
We are self-supporting at the present time, we all
admit that, and it is up to us as a people to
continue to be self-supporting. We have been told
that under confederation there would be great
advantages to Newfoundland. That may be so,
but you gentlemen are old enough to know that
you never get something for nothing, and that for
this country to continue its present standard of
living, and to increase that standard, is dependent
primarily on the resources of the country itself.
That is one inescapable fact. If our own resources
are unable to produce a good livelihood for the
people of Newfoundland, then no form of
government is going to do so. That is one basic
fact that nobody can dispute, nobody in this Convention or out of it. It may be true
that some of
our services would be improved, but essentially
the country itself must provide for the people of
the country, and all over the world today you have
people fighting for the right to govern themselves. Here in Newfoundland some of us
are fighting against the right to govern ourselves. What
manner of people are we at all? Have we lost the
courage of our forefathers, have we forgotten the
value of our country? Do we want to be pensioners, to live off the charity of some
other
country? Someone has to provide a living for us,
and this at a time when our country is in the
strongest position it has ever been. To my card
playing friends I say we are sitting with a pat
hand, and people want us to throw in the hand and
get a new deal. What absolute nonsense!
Gentlemen, it would be the worst form of madness, and the most arrant cowardice on
the part
of the people of this country if we don't agree to
assume our own rightful obligation of governing
ourselves. I don't believe the fact can be repeated
too often that the arrangements made with the
British government, by the inauguration of the
Commission government, was that responsible
government would be restored to Newfoundland
when we were self-supporting, and upon request
of the Newfoundland people. Is this not the first
step? With all my heart and mind I recommend
you to the adoption of that course.
Once again I would refer you back to that
Atlantic Charter signed August 12, 1941, by the
Prime Minister of Great Britain, at that time
Winston Churchill, and the President of the
United States, the late Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Quoting that paragraph: "They respect the right
of a people to choose the form of government
under which they live, and they wish to see
sovereign rights and self-government restored to
those who have been forcibly deprived of them."
Well, if we have not been forcibly deprived of
self-government, we went very close to that particular point. There is an old Latin
tag that I
remember, "Wrong is done by force or fraud". If
we did not lose our government by force we lost
it by the wrong of fraud.
I would have you consider, in closing, an
article by the late Sir William Allardyce, who was
Governor of Newfoundland in 1924, an article
which is pertinent today:
Those who know Newfoundland well
believe that she has a great future ahead of
her. It is a land of wonderful possibilities and
undeveloped resources. The story of the
colony is a thrilling record of hardships endured, dangers defied, difficulties overcome,
and if the present generation will only to
themselves be true the Newfoundland of the
future will not only be the oldest jewel in the
Empire's coronet, but will be one of the most
brilliant.
And so Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of this
National Convention, I say to you in the words of
George Washington at the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787: "Let us
raise a
1104 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
standard to which the wise and honest can repair.
The rest is in the hands of God." (Applause)
Mr. Bailey Mr. Chairman, in Mr. Smallwood's
reply to Mr. Hollett's speech of some time ago, I
don't seem to agree with him. As regards the
budget he said: as regards municipal and provincial taxation ... but. before proceeding
with this
question there is one thing I would like to bring
before the Convention. See Black Book, Volume
1, page 115:
Federal Taxation. The federal government has authority under the British North
America Act to levy direct taxes, and sole
authority to levy indirect taxes. At the time
of confederation the former field of taxation
was quite unimportant, but the introduction
of the income tax in 1917 greatly increased
its importance as a source of revenue, until
today the federal government collects about
30% more revenue through direct taxation
than through indirect.
I don't know what you think about that, but it
appears to me that that is the official lie of official
liars, or something like that. You will find out
from 1946 and 1947 the direct taxes of Canada
were $1,155,000,000, and the indirect were
$1,045,000,000. Where does the 30% come in?
There's another answer to this question. I made
a statement standing here over a year ago that we
were signed, sealed and delivered, and that a 5
cent stamp or a taxi fare could bring the terms
into this house.
If we will go back to 1946-47 we will find that
the direct taxes of Canada were $1,436,000,000,
and the indirect were $1,122,000,000. I have the
lot, the 1945-46 taxes were $1,453,373,000, and
indirect $821,485,000. I will skip the others, and
we will go back to 1942-43, and we find that the
direct taxes of Canada were $1,378,000,000,
while the indirect taxes were $758,677,000. Now
I don't know much about percentages, when the
time was for me to learn percentages, I was given
a haul hook to try to get a few logs out of the
woods so that I could eat, but there is the position.
This summer, when the Ottawa delegation came
back, mention was made of the lot of work they
had done, and the amount of stuff they brought
back; but if the Black Book is right on the 30%
business, it goes a lot further back because the
difference of $110 million today between the two
don't work out together. I am not going to say any
more, but I am going to leave it to you gentlemen
here. I think you have got savvy enough to
remember this: that this was got ready for us, and
the whole thing was worked out so that we would
fall right into the trap. Now I am going to quote
Prime Minister Winston Churchill: "I wonder
what manner of men they think we are". Is it
possible that they can push that stuff in print and
shove it down our throats and expect us to believe
it? I said it here to my own men who believe in
responsible government, that it was preposterous, and it could not be, but it was
and is so.
Now referring back to our first subject —
taxes that our sister provinces are paying today
(if we become a sister province) — that is something that I have been trying to get
a hold of, so
that I could tell the people of this country the kind
of taxes we are going to get up against when we
change over from what we are today. Now don't
think I am against the kind of taxes they have in
Canada. One thing we found out since we came
here is that the economy of our country is around
$80 million. I don't think it is any more, and I
firmly believe that if our economy were doubled
to $160 million, I would consider this confederation very quick, because I think their
form of
taxation could be worked on the people, and the
service that it calls for could be given to the
people today.
We were brought in here and, as it were, the
confederation issue was thrown into our lap —
everything that would make us understand, a
generation of men without a big lot of schooling,
everything should be put before us so that we
could understand the system of confederation
and what it means. Instead of that we have got up
and painted a rosy picture of "marching up to
Zion" — everything all right. The poor people
don't know anything more about confederation
today than when we came in here. I have been
trying to get it ever since I came in, and thank
God I have got it. This is confederation.
Mr. Chairman, I shall have to refer to localities
in Newfoundland in comparison with localities
in Canada, to bring my point out, and I hope in
this way to establish a foundation for what I am
trying to bring before the house. It has been said
that we can run this province on so much per
head, $43 per capita. This leaves me in a fault...
Let us review the situation like we should. This
island today is 42,742 square miles, I believe, and
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1105
Labrador 110,000, and we have to spend money
on that too now, with the work started and not
finished; we are going to do this on $14 million
when it is costing us today $30 million. I am not
including today what Canada is going to take
over. What is left to us will cost us $30 million.
What is wrong with everything? I can't remember Mr. Smallwood, or any other Newfoundlander
having any experience in provincial
or municipal taxation or spending, so I must look
for it in those provinces that have had it for nearly
100 years, and no doubt through trial and error
have found out the best way to apply it in the way
that will cost the taxpayer the least taxes. So in
looking through the assessment I find that in
many provinces their social service is on a much
higher scale than ours, and the provinces are
paying twice the amount of money which Mr.
Smallwood is budgeting for, and it does not make
sense to me, for we must face this question in the
Grey Book which says that within eight years a
royal commission will be set up, and the question
will be gone into.
I think before we consider the question of
confederation at all we should have gone into this
and thrashed it out thoroughly. That would have
been the first step, to get the laws of Canada, their
assessment, their taxation, and it should have
been gone into so that we would know what is
before us in the future. One thing we should have
had was this information, and before our people
vote they too should have it, but it is the last thing
that the powers that be intend that we should
have, so we are faltering along without it. Mr.
Smallwood made great capital out of belittling
the assistance of the municipal councils in those
provinces, but to look at it from a common sense
point of view, and see what part they play in the
everyday life of our Canadian neighbours, I want
the people to know that in the provinces they play
a leading part. They are well governed, and
without this form we cannot have good government, I only wish our economic system
could
stand it, and if I were a praying man I would pray
that day would soon come when we could go into
it in a big way and benefit from it.
First they would educate our people how to
govern wisely, give them a sense of responsibility, for it is the greatest curse of
our government in Newfoundland which would be removed
— the curse of one body collecting the taxes and
another body spending it. People would learn that
the taxes were coming out of their own pocket,
and would realise that they were not to be frittered
away. And last but not least, we would demand
that the taxes be spent for the good of the community, and consequently everything
would be
better off for it.
These are my convictions. So you see that
although I believe in all there is, yet it is those
terms, taxes and trade that makes me the anticonfederate I am. Now if we had an income
to pay
these taxes without undue hardship, and if we had
a domestic market in Canada for our products
whereby we could fill our stomachs with
Canadian flour and grain feed for our animals,
then you can pin the maple leaf on my arm right
away.
Mr. Harrington Sir, I begin by referring to a
reply made by Mr. Bradley, member for Bonavista East, at one time Chairman of this
Convention,
and also of the Ottawa delegation, to a speech
made by the Prime Minister of Canada at the first
meeting of the Newfoundland and Canada
delegations at Ottawa, on June 25, 1947. I want
to quote:
It was a great dream that the founders of
this Canadian union had 80 years ago, when
they foresaw on the northern half of this
continent a vast British nation stretching
from St. John's to Victoria. Two of our own
Newfoundlanders shared that dream and did
what they could to give it birth — Sir Frederic
Carter and Sir Ambrose Shea, who will go
down in history as two of the Fathers of
Confederation. Newfoundland did not elect
to enter the new union at that time, but when
we remember that the union itself was very
new, and was not all understood by our
people, and the more important fact that
Newfoundland did not then enjoy a
democratic franchise or the secret ballot, it is
easy to understand why that first invitation to
Newfoundland to enter the partnership was
rejected. The other rejection was not made by
the Newfoundland people, for it was not submitted to them. That was the occasion,
in
1895, when your Dominion was administered by the government headed by Sir
Mackenzie Bowell. The failure of that attempt at federal union of the two countries
was due largely to the hurried nature of the
1106 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
explorations and conversations between the
parties, for the conference of 1895 occupied
a mere 12 days. I believe I can say that if the
present discussions come to nothing in the
end by way of effecting federal union between us, it will not arise from any repetition
of the inadequate explorations of '95 or from
the undemocratic franchise of '69. We of this
delegation believe it to be our plain duty to
Newfoundland to make as thorough an investigation of this whole question as your cooperation
and forbearance will permit.
I am sorry Mr. Bradley is not here today; I
thought he would be by now, but I think it is quite
in order that, as we draw near to the end of this
discussion on this great issue which has shaken
this country and its people to their depths on two
occasions in our history, as referred to by Mr.
Bradley, that we should do well to have our minds
refreshed just a little on the two crises in question
— the election of '69, and the negotiations of
1895.
Before the Christmas recess, Mr. Hollett, in a
masterly way I thought, summed up the history
of the Canadian confederation from its beginning
with the Quebec resolutions of 1864 down to the
failure of the Dominion-provincial conference a
few years ago, which was held as an outcome of
a famous royal commission. When the British
North America Act providing for the confederation of the British North American colonies
was
drawn up, there was a clause in it, and it is still in
it, that allowed for Newfoundland's entry into the
union. Newfoundland representatives attended
the Quebec conference of 1864, when the
framework of the union was set up. Mr., afterwards Sir Frederic Carter and Sir Ambrose
Shea,
were members of a government which was
favourably inclined to the entry of Newfoundland into confederation. Out of this Quebec
conference terms were drawn up as a fair and
equitable basis under which Newfoundland and
the other colonies might confederate. Quebec,
Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia did
confederate in 1867. Newfoundland was next to
consider the scheme, which was submitted to the
electorate in November of 1869, and turned
down. Manitoba, with a population of a thousand
whites and many thousands of half-breeds,
British Indians, was admitted in 1870, British
Columbia in 1871. Prince Edward Island held
aloof till 1873, though a provision for her entry
was written into the British North America Act.
Alberta and Saskatchewan were made provinces
in 1905, and it is to be noted that at the time of
the Quebec resolutions these provinces were only
vast unpopulated wildernesses.
Now let's consider first the position of Newfoundland in relation to the other British
colonies
of North America in those far-off days. In 1864
all those colonies were much of a muchness, but
Newfoundland was in a unique position, as she
has been all through her history. Nova Scotia and
the others were flourishing colonies under the
system of responsible government, which they
had had for several years. Previous to this event,
Mr. Chairman, Newfoundland was still feeling
her oats as far as her problems were concerned.
She had only won responsible government in
1855, nine years before; she had only been
granted a representative form of government
some 32 years before, while colonies like Nova
Scotia and the rest of them had been enjoying
such institutions for several generations, far back
into the previous century.
The history of Newfoundland up to that time
had been one of repression by the mother
country. The story of retarded colonisation is so
well known now to all of us, or should be, that
there is no need to labour it, but while Newfoundlanders were loyal to the mother
country
they still could not forget the wrong that was done
them, and just ten years before, when the French
had been given concessions on their coast, a great
outcry had been raised, and there was some talk
of joining the United States. Imperial influence
was a touchy point with Newfoundlanders, especially when it impinged on their independence
so
hard bought and so recently gained, and they
were jealous of it, and they chose their individualism, and on that rock confederation
foundered in 1869. There was too much suggestion of doing what Britain wanted about
the
whole matter in Newfoundlanders' eyes, half of
whom at that time were Irish, and full of the
wrongs of Ireland. To show you what I mean:
from the time of the Quebec resolutions, beginning with the British North America
Act, it was
no secret that the British government wanted a
confederation of the North American colonies.
Major Cashin referred briefly to that the other
day. That was the whole idea of the Quebec
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1107
resolutions. It was to bear out the old adage that
"in unity there is strength", which is not always
so, especially when the union is made up of
groups and forces fundamentally diverse and opposite. The Government of Newfoundland
in
1867, at the time of confederation was, strange to
say, a merchant government. It was led by Mr.
Carter, who was strongly pro-confederate. It was
enthusiastic about the proposals submitted, and
which, considering the gap in time, are amazingly
similar to those of the 1895 negotiations and the
proposed arrangements before us today. That
government was ready to consummate the arrangements as had been done in the other
colonies,
and which in the case of Nova Scotia almost
provoked a rebellion. But a strong opposition in
the Newfoundland government of this time
fought this move, and amongst other objections
were:
1. Under union with Canada the people of Newfoundland would surrender to a large extent
the
power of self-government conferred on them by
the constitutions of 1832 and 1855.
2. Amongst other rights that would be surrendered was the all-important one of taxation.
Under the BNA Act the Dominion government
claimed the right which they had by law to raise
money within the limits of the Dominion by any
method or system of taxation.
Those objections, amongst others, were made
in an amendment to the confederation resolution
moved in this very chamber on the 5 March,
1869. The opposition members strongly urged
that the government should not make any final
irrevocable commitments on the question till it
had been submitted to the electorate in a general
election. Well, that course was adopted, and in
November, 1869, the election was held. It was a
bitter campaign, but not more so than many that
have been fought in Canada on the same question,
and even less so than those that have been fought
in other countries on less fundamental issues.
Charges and counter-charges were the order of
the day, as they have been in every election
campaign, and will be, but the money and influence of the many powerful merchants
of the
time, who were supporters of confederation,
could not cope with the dynamism and energy of
Charles Fox Bennett, who was leader of the opposition. It was a typical election of
the time, and
no holds were barred on either side. Of the four
newspapers of the period, three were confederate
and one was neutral, so it cannot be said that the
people were misled in this regard. Neither is it
fair to state, as Mr. Bradley stated, that Newfoundland did not enjoy a democratic
franchise,
or a secret ballot. Newfoundland enjoyed a
franchise as democratic, and to the same degree
as the other colonies.
As for the secret ballot, Mr. Bradley surely
must have known that in 1869 the secret ballot
was unheard of in this part of the world, and not
only in North America but in Great Britain as
well. The secret ballot, as you know, was an
Australian invention, first used in that country in
1856, and the secret ballot is still referred to as
the Australian ballot. Around the process of polling great parliamentary fights were
waged in the
19th century, and the issue at stake was always to
seek the freedom of the voter from outside influences, and honesty in the counting
of the votes.
Every election was a time of underground pressure and interest. One authority says,
"Social and
economic interest in more or less organised form,
disturbing constitutional symmetry and advocating its equity, threats, intimidation,
terrorisation
and victimisation of the most diverse kinds became operative, and in their obvious
indiscrete
forms are forbidden by law everywhere." The
19th century stage relied exclusively upon political parties for their choice of candidates,
and even
in many countries for other electoral services and
the distribution of ballot papers. The result of
these tendencies in the United States was the
party boss, the plugging of nominating conventions with party heelers, the padding
of electoral
lists with the names of people who were dead or
non-existent, and the stuffin g of ballot boxes with
illegal votes.
Now these, Mr. Chairman, as you know, were
exercises of the parliamentary system which have
been largely eradicated today in democratic
countries, but they were practiced in the last
century, when the parliamentary system was in
use in Newfoundland. The election of 1869, in
which the confederate party was annihilated, was
conducted in conformity with similar elections
everywhere in the Anglo-Saxon world, including
Canada. The assertion made in the speech at the
opening of the Ottawa conference last summer,
that the main reason for Newfoundland's failure
to enter confederation in 1869 was due to the
1108 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
undemocratic franchise and the absence of the
secret ballot, is hardly fair. It displays an ignorance not only of Newfoundland,
but of world
history. South Australia's introduction of the
secret ballot in 1856 did not mean its immediate
application to the rest of the world. England
herself, with her parliamentary government, was
without it until three years after the 1869 election,
and it was introduced into Britain in all parliamentary and municipal elections by
the Ballot
Act of 1872, when it spread to America, while up
to 1884 the general practice in the United States
was open voting. After the presidential elections
of that year the Australian ballot system was
extensively adopted. Now I think these things are
relevant to the discussion, otherwise I would not
have gone to the trouble I did during the
Christmas recess, to study and read on this matter. If Mr. Smallwood is interested
in my sources,
the Encyclopedia Britannica is one of them.
In that election of 1869, nine confederates
were returned and 21 anti.
Mr. Harrington Ten, was it? All right, one
more, in the House of Assembly of 30.
[1] The
confederate papers of the day screamed about
unfair methods used by their opponents to gain
their seats, but it is a significant fact that Newfoundland history was made not by
confederates
against anticonfederates, but by anticonfederates
against confederates, for in the district of Burin,
Carter and Evans, confederates, were elected by
a matter of a few votes over LeMessurier and
Woods, antis, and a celebrated case arose in 1870
when the Assembly opened, with a question of
who had actually been elected. When the hue and
cry died down, Carter and Evans were sustained.
You can be sure, Mr. Chairman, that if the confederates had any reasonable ground
for
suspicion that they had been manoeuvered out of
election by unfair practices, they would be the
first to raise a howl in every district, but as I said,
the only side which did have good grounds for
suspicion of unfair practices was the anticonfederate side.
Now if there is any doubt in our minds that
Britain was pushing confederation in 1869 and
that that fact helped to wreck confederation
plans, here is a little more evidence. On August
25, 1869, nearly three months before that elec
tion, the following despatch was received by the
Governor in connection with the terms of the
proposed union, which had been communicated
to the House of Assembly with, as far as I can
learn, none of the ostentatious and rather silly
theatricals which accompanied the reception of
the proposals now under discussion. The
despatches were from Lord Granville, Secretary
of State for the Colonies, and said: "I have expressed the hope that nothing will
occur in Newfoundland to delay the measures from which I
confidently anticipate advantages to the
Dominion Government and to the Colony." A
second despatch, sent to the Governor-General of
Canada, said in part: "I believe it is in the interest
of the whole of the British North American
Colonies that they should be united under one
government, and Her Majesty's Government
watches with much interest the successive steps
that are being taken towards the accomplishment
of this great end." That was before the election
was held. And after it was held, when the anticonfederate House of Assembly was opened
on
February 3, 1870, Governor Hill, in his opening
speech said, amongst other things, with reference
to the question of confederation, "The views of
an enlightened British statesman, and one of the
highest authorities on colonial affairs need no
endorsement from me, for it is quite clear that the
current of opinion and events has strongly set in
towards union, and I firmly trust that nothing will
occur to check, turn or defraud Newfoundland
from gliding onward, and that the advance already made may be continued until the
Colony
joins the Dominion, thus completing the great
end so anxiously desired by the Imperial Government." The address in reply, amongst
other
things, said, with reference to that paragraph in
the Governor's speech just quoted, "The subject
of the union of this colony with the Dominion of
Canada has been largely discussed both within
and without this House for several years past, and
the result has been a settled conviction in the
minds of the people that such union would not be
conducive to their essential interests, a conclusion which has manifested itself at
the general
election by the return of an overwhelming
majority of representatives in opposition to that
measure. Firm in their adherence to the fortunes
of the mother country the people of New
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION
1109
foundland shrink from the idea of linking their
destinies with a Dominion, in the future of which
they can at present see nothing to inspire hope,
but much to create apprehension". Now that last
sentence is important, very important.
Those who try to claim that the people of
Newfoundland in 1869 held aloof from confederation only because they fell for a tissue
of
lies must be shown, like everybody else, that
there was far more to the reputation of the Carter
government than the fears of sending their sons
away to bleach their bones on the desert sands of
Canada. Undoubtedly there was exaggeration on
both sides. There always is and always has been
in election campaigns, as I have pointed out, but
let us consider the nature of the times. The North
American continent was still shaken by the effects of the civil war in the United
States, and all
sorts of subversive movement was afoot in that
country and in Canada. "The Province of Nova
Scotia, one of the four which had been inveigled
into adopting the resolution, was regretting it
already ..." says one author, "so much so that on
the 22nd of February, 1868, the House of Assembly of Nova Scotia sent an address to
the
British Crown, declaring that the Province was
adverse to the measure of Union, and, on an
unsatisfactory reply being received on the 4th of
June the Executive Council sent a further
despatch in which they threatened the possibility
of the Province not only leaving Confederation,
but seceding from the British Empire as well,
observing that there was no change in their political relations which they would not
prefer to their
present place in the Confederation". That was
Nova Scotia's attitude on confederation in 1868.
Prince Edward Island's attitude was plain —
she would stay out. As for British Columbia, as
late as March, 1870, a few months after the '69
election, a speech delivered in the Legislative
Council said, "The people of this colony have,
generally speaking, no love for Canada. They
care, as a rule, little or nothing about the creation
of another empire, kingdom or republic. They
care little about the distinctions between the
forms of government of Canada and the United
States". And in that connection, Professor Walter
Sage declared in 1945 that, "In the colonial war,
and even for a time before confederation,
Canadians were unpopular. They were known as
North American Chinamen — a tribute to their
thrift. They send their money home and do not
spend it so freely as do the open-handed
Americans."
I mentioned too the subversive movements in
the United States and Canada, among which was
the famous Fenian organisation made up of Irishmen driven from their homeland, and
who were
determined to take a blow at England whenever
and wherever they could. In 1866 they made an
unsuccessful invasion of Canada, a raid it was,
and fought in 1870 from the United States, being
joined by their compatriots in Canada, and in
addition to this movement there was a famous
uprising of the MĂ©tis, the French-Indian half-
breeds in Manitoba, under Louis Riel in 1869,
known in Canadian history as "Riel's rebellion";
add to that dissension and open warfare the
supreme fact that the French Canadians in
Quebec, the real Canadians, believed that confederation was an attempt to submerge
their identity, and although they accepted the arrangement
in principle, were to leave few stones unturned in
after years to my to wreck the union. That was the
union that Newfoundland repudiated, and the
reasons I have given were principally at the bottom of the mother country's desire
why it should
be effected. Confederation was for protection in
the middle of the last century if nothing else. It
was to get the colonies of British North America
under a central government which could be
delegated with the responsibility of defending its
interest against the many internal advances from
races and wolves, and against the external
dangers, principal among which was the growing
republic to the south. Furthermore, at that time
there was little or no communication between the
provinces apart from the few commercial contacts between the provinces of Ontario
and
Quebec and the Maritimes, but the total value of
trade between them was very small, and between
either Canada or the Maritimes and the farther
west there was practically no commercial
enterprise of any kind, and it was such a haphazard, loose conglomeration of colonies
covering a vast and potentially valuable territory, that
made the British government anxious to see them
brought together under a central government. No
wonder, sir, that the anticonfederate party of
1869 was able to convince the electorate that
union would not be conducive to their essential
interest — union with a Dominion in the future
1110 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
of which they could see nothing to inspire hope,
but much to create apprehension. Sir, it is not by
the conditions of 1948 that we must pass judgement on the decision of '69. We must
try to see
it as it was, and as they saw it almost 80 years
ago, and be not too sweeping in our judgement,
and endeavour to see the present situation from
every angle, including the question of dollars and
cents, which may seem the most important question to some, but there is more at stake
than that.
I have pointed out the anxiety with which the
British government pressed for the confederation
of the North American colonies, and it is obvious
that this desire was prompted far more by imperial than colonial interests. The opposition
in
the House of Assembly here after the 1869 elections expressed it as their main opinion
that confederation had been prevented by first the studied
determination of some persons of influence to
oppose the desires of Her Majesty's Government,
and secondly by the active dissemination of
Britain, which entirely ignored the true merits of
the question. And if you want final proof that this
1869 election was principally brought about by
imperial planning, listen to what Governor Hill
said at the closing session of the House of Assembly in May, 1870: "Her Majesty's
Government," he said, "ever awaits the welfare and
prosperity of her people, and not only approves
Confederation of Newfoundland with the
Dominion, but is anxious for its speedy completion"; and I, in the light of all the
circumstances
of our history in the 19th century, say that was
the main rock on which confederation foundered
— the feeling of coercion that was behind the
whole movement, the definite pressure that was
exerted by the Queen's representative in many
pronouncements, and while the matter of entering confederation was in theory a matter
of
choice, it was in fact something of a pressure
movement, with the realisation that while it was
being arranged for the colony's protection, it was
still an end that must be achieved willy nilly....
That, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, was the
real position as I see it at the close of the 1869
election, And confederation slept until 1888,
when due to the efforts of Alfred Morine, a Nova
Scotian who had adopted Newfoundland as his
country and gained a reputation here as a lawyer
as well as a politician, an attempt was made to
reopen the negotiations, but it fell through, and
in 1890 the Whiteway government began to
negotiate with the United States for a reciprocity
treaty, and the result was the Bond-Blaine convention, which never came to anything
due to
Canadian interference with the home government; for had not Sir Charles Tupper, the
Canadian High Commissioner in London, been
assured by the British government that Newfoundland would not be allowed to do anything
with the United States until it had been submitted
to his government? There, sir, was the rock on
which confederation foundered again in 1895.
Sir, is it the intention to rise the committee?
Mr. Chairman Subject to the approval of the
House, it is my intention to sit tonight.
Mr. Chairman Yes, you can continue until six,
unless you want a recess. Do you want a recess
for five minutes?
Mr. Smallwood We have not got very much
time, and if Mr. Harrington is prepared to go
ahead until six, it is only what? 20 minutes or so.
[The Convention adjourned to 8 pm]
Mr. Harrington When the House rose this
afternoon I had been speaking on the country's
history from 1869 to 1895, and I had come to a
consideration of the present day situation.
Newfoundland's position has greatly changed
since 1869, and since 1895. In 1927, Newfoundland gained a possession, the Labrador,
three times as large as itself. Hitherto, she had
been a small island colony whose strategic position, as Mr. Higgins has pointed out,
was ignored
until the second World War. Up to that time too,
the United States had not come into its own as a
number one world power. Now the US has assumed Britain's traditional role in world
affairs,
and the US has bases in Newfoundland. Hence it
is now more imperative than ever to get Newfoundland into confederation. Hence the
statement that if Newfoundland enters confederation,
Canada will replace Britain as the other party in
the base agreement.
It might well seem that the pressure is on
Britain this time — pressure from Canada. When
Britain made the surrender of self-government in
1933 the condition for financial aid, she knew
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1111
that she was getting control of not only the island
of Newfoundland, but the vast area of Labrador,
which only six years before her Privy Council
had awarded to Newfoundland. What her ultimate plans for this island and Labrador
were in
the minds of her long-headed statesmen, who can
tell? But the war of 1939-1945 turned the world
upside down. The balance of power shifted to the
New World. England, in desperate straits in 1940,
got 50 over-age destroyers for bases in Newfoundland and elsewhere, something which
might have been foreseen in 1933, the year that
Hitler came to power in Germany. Canada, too,
must have struck a bargain with the mother
country, not as well-publicised as the base deal.
England's need was Canada's opportunity. The
process of rounding out the Dominion was begun.
It seems to be a fairly well-known fact that
while the government of Mr. Churchill was still
in power, a plan was drawn up for a ten-year
programme of reconstruction in Newfoundland.
Some sources claim that the return of responsible
government was also contemplated in conjunction with this offer. It is reliably understood
that
Canada interfered, as she did in 1892 at the time
of the Bond-Blaine treaty. The late Sir John Puddester, in a meeting of the Public
Health and
Welfare Committee (of which I was a member,
and Mr. Smallwood and others), stated:
Mr. Smallwood: Bearing on that, what is the
irreducible minimum?
Sir J.C. Puddester: I made up a list, two years
ago of what our outlay would probably be.
When the Goodwill Mission was here they
talked about a 10-year plan. When they went
home, they talked a lot about it and Lord
Cranborne sent for representatives of the
Commission of Government to go over.
Emerson, Dunn and myself went over, and
there were visions of everything. I was asked
to put down then what I thought we would
require in our department and the whole thing
comes to $10 million capital expenditure
over 10 years. There was also to be a gift of
$100,000 for 10 years to do construction
work.
Mr. Higgins: Did they fall down on that?
Sir J.C. Puddester: Nobody seems to know
the real facts; but I think with the American
plan of lend-lease and the Canadian raising
money, they said, "If you have money to give
Newfoundland, better pay your debts first".
Is it too fantastic, too far-fetched to even suggest
that the Canadian government went a step further
and made aid to Britain contingent on the entry
of Newfoundland into confederation? And that as
far back as 1941 or 1942, if I might paraphrase
the title of this Grey Book, arrangements were
proposed for the entry of Newfoundland into
confederation?
It is very significant to my mind, arising out
of the remarks of Major Cashin last week, that
around the period that he says the plan was instituted, this country became the target
for a
barrage of newspaper and other propaganda of
the most one-sided, unfair, and in some cases,
scurrilous type that our people have had to contend with in many years, the greater
part of it
originating in Canada. The general effect of this
propaganda was to convey to the rest of the world
that Newfoundland was — to quote Mr.
Smallwood more than a year ago in this chamber
— "50 years behind the times"; that our people
were a benighted race, and that in the interests of
international decency we should be saved from
ourselves. The obvious inference was that
Canada should be the saviour. Mr. Chairman, I
cannot help but draw a comparison between such
tactics and those used in Europe just prior to the
second World War by Adolf Hitler. He sang
much the same song. He looked over his borders
at Czechoslovakia, Austria and other lands, and
with variations on the theme, said that these
people should be saved from themselves, and
proceeded to march in and "save them". But then
he was not hampered by the necessity of even
paying lip-service to democracy, like the nations
of the western world must do. So the "capture"
of Newfoundland had to be achieved by more or
less "peaceful penetration"; by power politics in
the guise of democracy; in the guise of a National
Convention.
Now, Mr. Chairman, before I proceed to a
consideration of the "Proposed Arrangements for
the Entry of Newfoundland into Confederation"
of 1947, I wish to make one point very clear. I am
not anti-Canadian. Far from it. The suggestion
has been made in some quarters that opposition
to Newfoundland's entry into union at this stage
is anti-Canadian. That is not so; certainly not in
my case. Anticonfederate, yes. But anti-
Canadian, no! I have as much regard for Canada
1112 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
and her achievements as I have for the United
States. Some of the finest people I have known
have been Canadians, or the sons and daughters
of Canadians living in this country. I would like
that to go into the records of this House. Anticonfederate, yes; but anti-Canadian,
no!
With that general introduction I would like to
pass on to the present proposed arrangements,
and make a few observations on the debate of
those so-called terms which went on from 20
November to 12 December, 1947. I did not participate to any great extent in that debate,
for I
realised the magnitude of its implications, and I
confess I felt rather at a loss as it muddled through
the weeks before Christmas. I, for the most part,
sat and listened to the by-play between certain
speakers; and day after day I made notes on
certain aspects of the debate as the House struggled slowly through the documents.
I do not intend to deal with each of the 23
clauses; many of them I shall only briefly refer
to, for if some members here do not realise their
limitations, I do. Hence, I do not intend to indulge
in academic appraisals of high finance. I shall
leave that involved problem to those better
equipped to deal with it, and go on to considerations to my mind just as important
in a proper
understanding of the confederation issue.
Clause 2. "The Province of Newfoundland
will include the territory of Labrador defined by
the award of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in 1927 as Newfoundland territory."
This clause has raised quite a storm, and that it
will continue to do so is inevitable. We must be
realistic on this question; we must face up to it.
These arrangements, the Canadian government
calls them, are supposed to be a "fair and equitable basis" for our entry into the
Canadian confederation. We have heard it described as a
federation of nine self-governing provinces with
a central government set above them all. We have
not heard it referred to here as a hybrid nation,
which it is; for Canada is not one nation, but two.
Canada is English and Canada is French; and if
we don't recognise the difference, others do.... It
is now almost a proverb that unless the present
trend is not altered considerably, "Ontario or
Quebec will destroy Canada".
The vexed question of Quebec and our
Labrador cannot be pooh-poohed off, as it has
been here on every occasion it arose, by the
oversimplification of saying that the Privy Council made a decision in 1927, and though
the
heavens fall, it stands. I put this to you, suppose
the Privy Council in some not too distant day
ceases to be the highest tribunal of the British
Commonwealth. We know that the British
dominions are each year becoming more and
more autonomous, more and more self-sufficient. The King's title which effects his
"dominions beyond the seas" is altered; citizens
of the dominions are now Canadian or Australian
citizens, etc., not "British subjects". In time the
supreme courts of the dominions will no doubt
become the highest courts of law, the highest
tribunals of these dominions.... What then?
Should the Supreme Court of Canada become the
highest tribunal of the Dominion of Canada, superseding the Privy Council, what is
there to
prevent Quebec appealing to that new tribunal,
and in the light of present events, receiving a
reversion of the 1927 decision, in whole or in
part? That is one aspect that has not been touched
upon at all, and I draw it to members' attention,
and to the attention of the country as well. This,
separate and apart from the other excellent arguments on the possibility of our losing
Labrador,
such as the fact that our provincial finances after
the first eight years of union would be in such a
state as to force us to part with some or all of
Labrador as contingent for the receipt of further
federal aid.
Clause 3. The public services provided from
time to time by Canada for the people of Canada
generally will be extended to the people of Newfoundland, etc.... There is little
need to comment
on this. Canada is only doing what she would do
for any other part of North America that went into
confederation. She would extend the same
facilities to Alaska, if it was a British territory and
wanted to become a province. There is only one
observation necessary to make. If we get those
services, we will pay for them.
Clause 4. Welfare services presently provided
by Canada, and therefore applicable to Newfoundland after union pursuant to clause
3, include the following... This is the heavy metal of
the confederates. This is why confederation can
be an issue in 1947 when it could not possibly
have been one four years ago when the family
allowance scheme was not in existence. I am not
attacking the family allowance scheme. It is only
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1113
in the experimental stage in Canada. It is costing
a fabulous sum. It has yet to prove itself. But at
the moment it is the chief selling point of the
confederates, and its basis is that the people will
get something for nothing. That argument has
been tried in other places besides Newfoundland.
Here is what a semi-official Canadian publication
supplied to the members of this Convention says
in this regard:
The family allowance is a broad raise in
wages for many people. To those of fixed
income, especially those who derive little or
no benefit directly from the bonus, it is quite
injurious. As an example, it has been found
that part-time and other jobs which for
various reasons do not pay fancy sums, are
being turned down by those who regard the
allowance as a convenient dole system.
Thus it not only encourages unemployment, but forces wages up in certain industries
which in turn raises costs on
manufactured articles. The general public,
therefore, not only pays for the family allowance, but pays again in increased prices.
The government's estimated $250 million
cost, means that over $20 in extra taxes now
has to be raised for every man, woman and
child in Canada. It has been said that the plan
is economical when it is considered that the
annual expense is only equivalent to two
weeks' average expenditure for war. On the
other hand, the war has put us tremendously
into debt, and it seems reasonable to believe
that family allowances will send us further
into debt. Particularly is this probably in view
of our commitments to heavy post-war expenditures which have hitherto not entered
into the picture.
Mr. Harrington The idea was to give something for nothing. That is the gist of this article.
They give the idea that it is a bonus to those in
need by a direct cash grant, and that creates a
further illusion. The theme is, "soak the rich and
get family allowances" But just how far can the
rich be soaked? And just how many rich are there
in Newfoundland to soak? You can soak them to
the limit of the law, and you still won't get a
fraction of the money needed to run the tenth
province. And you can only soak them by income
tax, and that goes to the federal government.
Old age pensions. Everyone agrees with old
age pensions. As I said in the debate on the
Economic Report, what we pay in in old age
pensions is not, should not, be a matter of dollars
and cents, but a matter of conscience and justice.
We cannot wait until we have a surplus to increase old age pensions, and there should
be no
restrictions as to a means test, involving the signing away of rights to property
or anything else.
When Bill 339 on old age pensions was brought
into the Canadian House of Commons on June 18
last, a few days before our delegation arrived in
Ottawa, here is what the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Bracken, said: "This government
promised two years ago, in this public document
I have read, a pension plan which would provide
for the elimination of the test... This government
then proposed to eliminate the means test. Now
they are bringing forward a measure which
retains the means test. They promised old age
pensions at 70, all to be paid by the Dominion.
They now bring forward a measure in which they
leave 25% of the cost to be paid by the provinces.
And the proposed old age pensions for people
between the ages of 65 and 69, half to be paid by
the Dominion and half by the provinces. Yet there
is nothing of that in this bill..." And further on in
the debate, M. J. Coldwell, leader of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, spoke
in
the same strain: "I want to make a plea again this
afternoon, for the complete abolition of the
means test. I see no reason whatever for continuing this humiliating test, which is
entirely unnecessary. In another act the government has
recognised the validity of not applying the means
test. They have recognised this in connection
with childrens' allowances."
Mr. Smallwood spoke of Canadian social
measures as though no other country in the world
had ever heard of them until Canada made the
first move. He referred to Canadian thinking in
these matters, and I might just for the record,
inject here, that whereas old age pensions were
introduced in Canada in 1927, Sir Michael
Cashin in his budget of 1911-12 earmarked a vote
1114 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
of $12,000 in connection with an old age pension
scheme which his government was about to inaugurate. I say this just to show that
our former
governments and public men were not as
benighted as some people would have us believe.
In the debate on old age pensions the first big
flaw in the Black Books came to light. The figure
set down by the Ottawa delegation for old age
pensions to be paid in the province was $510,000.
In the debate, Mr. Smallwood said the figure
would be increased to $750,000, and actually it
was finally concluded it would be $900,000. This
the province would have to find — almost a
million dollars, almost twice the amount the
delegation first supposed. The $64 question is,
will the province be able to pay it? Newfoundland
as a province could pay her old age pensioners
what she liked; $100 a month if she could afford
it, if she could raise the money. There are a lot of
ifs in this business, Mr. Chairman — too many
ifs, ands, and buts. It is too theoretical, too vague.
We have to take too much on spec for my liking,
and with all due respect for Mr. Smallwood's
integrity, too much on his word.
Clause 5 — Here is our big-hearted gift to the
great Dominion. The Railway, the Newfoundland Hotel, postal-telegraphs, civil aviation
including Gander airport, Customs and Excise,
defence, pensions of war veterans, fisheries, etc.
etc., Canada takes over these. We give them to
her for free. I ask you, is that a bargain for
Canada? Oh, I can hear the sneers about our
"narrow-gauge Newfie express", but it is worth
$72 million, so the Railway officials say. And
even if it is only worth $50 million, it is still a lot
of valuable property. It has been roughly computed that the public utilities value
that Canada
takes over is roughly $150 million, and that"ain't
hay" for a small country like this to have to build
up; and it is a mighty big item of generosity to
hand this over lock, stock and barrel to the
Dominion of Canada for nothing. If the seven
man delegation to Ottawa had been seven members of the cabinet of an elected government
of
Newfoundland, they could very well have
demanded some lump sum payment for the handing-over of these assets. But they could
not do
that; that would be negotiating. And here is
another $64 question — who did the negotiating?
Was there negotiating? How come margarine?
But more of this anon, Mr. Chairman.
Now, about the Railway under confederation.
Under the Canadian National Railway, Mr.
Smallwood read something from the Black Book
that says nothing about the Railway employees.
Mr. Higgins came in the next day with the
minutes of a meeting, which word for word was
the same as that found in the Black Book, volume
2, with a significant exception. When this occurred — members were apparently letting
it pass
— I raised a question which was to the effect that
it seemed the delegation was in possession of
information that the Convention was denied. I
had no inkling it would start a 70 minute debate,
but I soon saw I had touched on a sore point. From
the trend the debate has taken all through it seems
there are many sore points. Taxation is certainly
one. Notwithstanding Mr. Smallwood's declared
eagerness to come to grips with this fascinating
subject before Christmas, the truth of it is that it
was scarcely touched on until last week. It has
been continuously shelved since the debate
began on November 20 or earlier. Sometimes the
Black Books are official, sometimes unofficial.
On the matter of the employees of the Railway
under Canadian National, Mr. Smallwood's
claim is that this inferred reduction of staff is not
in the Black Books, ergo it is unimportant. I
cannot accept this view. These statements are
there in black and white in the files at Ottawa, and
if it is produced and acted on when the tenth
province is sworn in, then what kind of an argument is it to say, "It is not in the
Black Books"?
The officials will say it is not in the terms either,
that these people should be kept on. And what can
we say? And that goes for more than the Railway.
Then Newfoundlanders are supposed to continue
to run the Railway. Why? Because the Canadian
Civil Service Act says, "Employees must be
citizens of the province". But it is stated in the
Black Book that administration goes to regional
headquarters at Moncton. Who employs who,
then? Do Newfoundlanders go up to Moncton to
run the Railway, or do the New Brunswick
people run it? Or does Ottawa send down men to
keep New Brunswick and Newfoundland from
each other's throats? Note well in this regard,
what of the Housing Association with its regional
office somewhere in the Maritimes — does the
same hold? I ask you in all seriousness, what are
we expected to suppose?
Clause 6. Canada will pay the salary of the
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1115
Lieutenant-Governor and the salaries, allowances and pensions of superior court
judges and of judges of district and county
courts, if and when established.
Need we add that the Province of Newfoundland will have to pay the salaries or sessional
pay of 15, 20 or 30 members, however
many representatives there are in the provincial
House of Assembly, plus the Speaker's emoluments, plus the various officials? I know
that Mr.
Smallwood's provincial budget has set down a
sum of $200,000 to cover these expenses, but has
it been made abundantly clear to many of our
people what that sum represents? I am under the
impression that a considerable number of our
people believe that under confederation they will
be governed from Ottawa only, just as they are
governed now from London. They have not the
faintest idea that there will be a legislature in
between, here in St. John's, almost the same as in
the days of responsible government. Some folk
may not credit this, but it is true. Many of our
people think that by voting for confederation they
are going to eliminate the necessity of having a
local House of Assembly in St. John's. That
explains, for the most part, why we hear so many
people say. "Where are we going to get the men
under responsible government?" Let them
ponder where, then, they are going to get them
under confederation! If we are not ready for
responsible, we are not ready for confederation.
Clause 7. Debt. Canada will assume and
provide for the servicing and retirement of
the 3 percent stock issue maturing 1943-63
guaranteed by the United Kingdom... etc.
etc.
Here we have the same stumbling block over
which the confederate plan of 1895 tripped and
came a Cropper. In 1895 Canada could not assume the entire debt of Newfoundland. When
Britain was asked to bridge the gap, she would
not do so. The negotiations fell through. That is
why confederation was never put to the people of
a bankrupt country in 1895 — the terms were not
generous enough. Yet 50 years after, Canada
expects the National Convention to consider putting substantially the same arrangements
before
the people of a solvent country, to vote themselves into a union and start it with
a provincial debt
to service — in other words, to hang a millstone
about our necks for life, and our children's necks
after us. And yet at every turn we are confronted
with headlines about the generous terms that
Canada has offered Newfoundland. The confederates said they will be so generous that
we
won't be able to turn them down. Now I ask,
where are the special concessions for Newfoundland? They are certainly not in the
financial
arrangements, and as far as I can see, they are not
in any of the others. All the Grey Book represents
is a mere application of the main features of the
Canadian confederation to Newfoundland. No
more, no less. Of course there's margarine, but
more of that later.
Let me put it this way, Mr. Chairman. Suppose
Alaska was a British colony, a British dominion
like Newfoundland. And suppose Alaska wanted
to enter the Canadian confederation. Like Newfoundland, there would be provision in
the RNA
Act. Canada would have all the same services
extended to Alaska as are offered to Newfoundland. She would get all the promises
we are
getting. Canada would also take over all her
assets, her railways, steamships, etc., just as in
clause 8. But Alaska's government, presuming
she had self-govemment as a British dominion,
would say to Canada, "We are a big country;
we're rich; you will have to do better than that.
We want some special concessions." And if
Canada wanted Alaska as badly as she seems to
want Newfoundland, then Alaska would get special concessions. But our delegation could
not act
in that way because they had no authority to act
as a government, no authority to bargain, to
negotiate, They just had to take whatever Canada
was prepared to offer. Even if they went beyond
their powers and secured margarine, that was not
a concession for it is in the cards that all Canada
may soon have that particular freedom to
manufacture and sell margarine. That is why the
terms — the so-called terms - do not say we will
get a standard gauge railway, which would be a
special concession. It is left to Mr. Smallwood to
read between the lines and suggest we will get it
some day. That is why Canada will maintain only
a steamship service no better or worse than the
present one on the Gulf. And when the motor
highway is completed, if it is completed and if the
province can afford to complete it, it will include
suitable provision for motor vehicles. Whereas a
special concession would have said, Canada will
complete that road and build a transinsular high
1116 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
way and provide a super ferry service, a boat-
train on the Gulf like the one I spoke of on the
debate on the Transportation Report in 1947.
These are just two examples of real bait to get us
into confederation, something to make it really
worthwhile. But what are we going to get? Margarine. They are going to let us make
and eat
margarine; what generosity!
I said, Mr. Chairman, concessions like these
might make it worthwhile, on a financial basis,
to enter confederation. And why not concessions? We are not bankrupt as in 1895; we
are not
a shaky, insecure colony as in 1867. We are
today, in 1947, comparatively well-off with
many of the characteristics of a nation. We
deserve special inducements to get us to forsake
our traditional independence and our economic
sovereignty. But we are not getting them; we are
not even offered them. We are handed something
and told to take it or leave it: "the Government of
Canada believes that the arrangements go as far
as the government can go under the circumstances". The confederates have been preaching
that
if we do not take it, then we are doomed and
damned. That is their propaganda. Newfoundland has no future. her future is built
on
sand, she must clutch this Canadian straw or go
down in the financial whirlpool. They are not
arguing for confederation on its merits; they are
trying to press their case by aiming to prove that
Newfoundland is headed for ruin otherwise.
They are apparently blind — conveniently so —
to the fact that as yet Newfoundland has not been
able to ask the United States for any concessions
— concessions, it is needless to point out, that
could only be sought and secured by a sovereign
government of the Newfoundland people.
I say again, Mr. Chairman, there should be
special concessions before we should, in our
present position, even consider confederation.
Yet there are none, and they call them generous
terms. I don't know that we have a right to even
call them "terms" — nowhere in any of the documents which I have, does the Canadian
government call them "terms". The Grey Book is titled
Proposed Arrangements for the Entry of Newfoundland into Confederation. Arrangements —
that doesn't mean very much. I can arrange for
you to become a member of my club, but I do not
guarantee that if you accept, you will become its
president. That would have to be a deal of some
kind, we would have to agree on terms for that.
We should not be using that word "terms" so
glibly; neither should we be using the word
"generous" in connection with them. They are
not generous, neither should they be. "Fair", yes;
"equitable", yes, if they are (which I doubt); but
"generous" — no! We do not want generosity.
Some of our people may be looking for a handout,
but most of them are not, I believe. As Major
Cashin said, Newfoundland's entry into confederation is a going into partnership.
Partners
are equals, at least that's how I always understood
it. Partners do not expect generosity from each
other. They expect co-operation. They expect
each other to accept equal responsibilities,
receive equal gains, share equal losses. A partnership is not one-sided. One partner
does not get all
the benefits and the other take all the risks. It is
like marriage, or like marriage is supposed to be.
Of course, there's divorce from marriage in
Canada, but not in Newfoundland. We have not
heard much about that yet. But there is no divorce
from confederation — it is final, it is forever. You
cannot try it for ten or 15 years, like Commission
or responsible government, and then change. No,
sir, you are stuck with it.
But getting back to partnership and confederation between Canada and Newfoundland
as an
arrangement between equals, these so-called
terms are, as far as I can see, a one-sided affair.
If anyone is going to benefit from confederation,
it is going to be Canada. We will get a few paltry
millions in family allowances, old age pensions,
and other subsidies which will cease after the first
eight years of union; and Canada will get control
of Newfoundland and Labrador. There will pass
into her hands the control of one of the most
strategic areas of the earth with all that implies in
these days. What she pays into Newfoundland
will return in time to her a hundredfold from the
exploitation of that strategic position, and the
tremendous bargaining power that will accrue to
her in dealing with the United States in particular,
by virtue of air bases like Gander and Goose; the
United States bases; the immense iron and
mineral deposits of Labrador. In regard to the
Labrador, the Privy Council heard the case on the
boundary in 1926; their judgement was handed
down in 1927, giving Newfoundland 110,000
square miles. Early in 1928, Senator C.E. Tanner
moved the following resolution: "That in the
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1117
opinion of this House, Canada should favourably
consider any proposals that may be made by
Newfoundland for union with the Dominion of
Canada." Speaking on this resolution, Senator
Rufus Pope said in part, "That territory which has
been awarded to Newfoundland by the decision
given in England on the boundary line, has become very valuable, and if Canada desires
to
possess it, we have no time to lose..." That was
the theme of the whole debate, the value of
Labrador, the need for Canada to repossess it.
That was only 20 years ago. The wheel has come
full circle again. Let's not kid ourselves with that
fatuous statement that Canada does not want
Newfoundland, that we will be a drag on Canada.
The only ones we will be a drag on are ourselves,
when we try to make our little province pay and
make both ends meet, out of the pitifully small
and inadequate revenues left us after the
Dominion has taken over the most lucrative fields
of taxation.
Mr. Smallwood has made a valiant attempt to
produce a provincial budget for eight years, and
it is as fine a piece of financial juggling as anyone
could wish to marvel at. He rakes the Finance
Committee from stem to stem for giving a
budget, admittedly based on conjecture, for three
years, and then blithely produces one for eight
years. All through the previous debates Mr.
Smallwood was the champion of no limit on
future expenditures; there had to be more money
for this and that, for everything, every service of
government. But now he has to cut the provincial
coat to fit the cloth at his disposal, if we enter
confederation; and we find him with a limit on
everything, not for one year, but for eight! And
the trump card for the provincial budget seems to
be Clause 14 —
Reassessment of Newfoundland's Financial Position.
In view of the difficulty of predicting with
sufficient accuracy the financial consequences to Newfoundland of adjustment to
provincial status, the Government of Canada
will appoint a royal commission within eight
years of union to review the financial position of Newfoundland and to recommend the
form and scale of additional financial assistance, if any, which may be required by
the
Government of Newfoundland to enable it to
continue public services at then prevailing
levels without resorting to taxation more bur
densome, having regard to capacity to pay,
than that of the Maritime Provinces.
If we can only manage to struggle through the
first eight years, then everything will be fine. We
will get a royal commission to figure out how
much additional financial help we will need. It
will be plenty, and we will have no collateral, no
security, nothing to exchange for the do-ray-me
except Labrador. So the pressure is put on the
provincial parliament, and they amend the legislation and alter the boundaries of
the Province of
Newfoundland, that part of it called Labrador.
That is the consent of the province, and someone
takes over Labrador or part of it, and that someone will be Quebec. I'll stake my
life on it. On
the other hand, we may never get that royal
commission. We have heard a lot about what the
Duncan-White Commission did, but how many
commissions did not function? As recently as
1911 a commission of inquiry was set up for
British Columbia to look into the matter of granting that province better terms. The
commission
was set up, but it never functioned. The letter of
the law may have been followed, but its spirit was
hardly interpreted. Could not this happen in our
case? Remember, Newfoundland would be the
tenth and last province. Once in, anything would
be good enough for her because there would not
be any more prospective customers for the confederation wares.
I just mentioned the provincial budget, Mr.
Chairman, and now I want to make a few references to a table on page 2, "Probable
Revenue
and Expenditure of the Province". Expenditure is
$15,138,775, an annual average for the first four
years. Then the revenue. Note two things - the
word taxation at the very beginning, and the
amount of almost $3.5 million, and the sentence
"New taxation is to be imposed", another million
and a quarter. Total provincial taxation, $4.5
million. It goes up another million in the next four
years. Now I ask the people to note this: the
Dominion has taken the income tax, the customs
revenues, has put excise on liquor and tobacco.
What is left? What remains to permit the
Province of Newfoundland to raise $4.5 million
each year in taxation? Very little that I can see.
There is $750,000 raised on gasoline. That is not
regular revenue as of now, it would be new taxation to add to the $1.25 million earmarked
in the
budget as new taxation. Almost $5 per person,
1118 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
almost $25 per family in new taxation, just in the
province. What kind of taxation? Mr. Hollett read
a list of what kind of taxes it can be raised from.
It is all in the Black Books, pages 149 to 153, five
pages of the kinds of taxes that can be levied,
either by the federal or the provincial governments. The province, if it signs the
tax agreement,
loses income and corporation taxes and succession duties. These are the big ones.
The province
is then left with real and personal property, the
gasoline tax and fuel oil tax. Besides the federal
excise on tobacco, the province can levy a tobacco tax also. Then there can be a retail
sales tax in
the province, plus the federal sales tax of 8%.
Then the amusement taxes on movies, shows of
any kind, plays, concerts, dances, athletic competitions and so on. That brings us
to (i) on the
list; then there is (j) and that has almost as many
"Other Taxes", as it is called, as the foregoing put
together. Amongst these can be placed the luxury
taxes, or excise taxes, but I won't read them all.
Clause 8 is very much the same as clause 5.
Canada takes over the assets of Newfoundland
freely and without consideration of any kind in
way of reimbursement.
The next clause I want to comment on briefly
is clause 9 dealing with our accumulated financial surplus. Section 3 of this clause
reads:
No part of the surplus shall be used to
subsidise production or sale of Newfoundland products in unfair competition
with similar products of other provinces, it
being understood that this proviso does not
preclude assistance to industry by such
means as developmental loans on reasonable
conditions or by ordinary provincial administrative services.
Now, in the debate before Christmas, when
Mr. Hickman drew our attention to this restriction, Mr. Smallwood observed in all
seriousness
that it was a pure piece of politics and not to be
taken seriously. Now that struck me so forcibly
that I made a note of it. If the Canadian government, in a matter as serious as this
for Newfoundland, can be said to be playing politics in
even one section of one clause of this Grey Book,
then is it not open to wider implication that the
whole Grey Book is a pure piece of politics, or
impure, depending on your point of view?
The next clause to which I want to draw to
your attention is clause 15:
Representation of the Province of Newfoundland in the Senate and House of Commons
of Canada will be in accordance with
the British North America Acts, 1867 to
1946, as amended from time to time. Under
the existing provisions, while the number of
senators to which each province is entitled is
fixed, the number of members of the House
of Commons is determined from time to time
on the basis of population, but in any case is
not to be less than the number of senators to
which the province is entitled. Under these
provisions, the Province of Newfoundland
will be represented by six members in the
Senate and, on the basis of its present population, by seven members in the House
of Commons.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I well remember the night
session at which this particular clause was read
and explained. The House was in a good humour
for a change, and there was a lot of joking and
fun generally about this representation, and who
were going to be or could be senators and so on.
Now, sir, I did not find that discussion in the least
bit funny, when I considered that Newfoundland
as the tenth and last province would be represented in the Dominion parliament by
seven
members out of 265, and in the Senate by six
members out of 96. I confess it did seem like a
joke, but the kind where the other fellow has the
laugh. Why, we could not be much worse off if
we had no representation. How far would we get?
How often would our voice be heard? To bolster
the position, pro-confederates cite a possible
union of Maritime Provinces. It will never come
in our lifetime, probably never come, as long as
Quebec and Ontario look upon such a union as a
possible threat to their sway.
And now, Mr. Chairman, the last clause that I
wish to refer to before a general summing up,
clause 19:
Education: The legislature of the Province
of Newfoundland will have exclusive
authority to make laws in relation to education within the province, provided that:
The legislature will not have authority to
make laws prejudicially affecting any right
or privilege with respect to denominational
or separate schools which any class of persons has by law in Newfoundland at the date
of union, but the legislature may authorize
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1119
any two or more such classes of persons to
amalgamate or unite their schools and to
receive, notwithstanding such amalgamation
or union, their proportionate share of the
public funds of Newfoundland devoted to
education.
If anyone thinks that Canada is not bending over
backwards to make easy the entry of Newfoundland into confederation, let him read
that
education clause —- not only read it, but take note
of the most peculiar position that arose out of the
debate before Christmas I cannot recall the exact
day that Mr. Smallwood made, what I consider,
a revelation. On this matter Mr. Smallwood was
rather humble, I thought; not only on behalf of
himself, but of the rest of us as well. I do not recall
the exact words, but I think the gist of his remarks
went something like this: now here is this education question — a matter of conscience
as the
Canadian Prime Minister pointed out in his letter
— something on which Newfoundlanders feel
very strongly. Now, we in this Convention are
just a bunch of ordinary fellows, floundering
through, so to speak —- we're not the heads of the
denominations, so we cannot be expected to appreciate the implications of this clause.
Therefore, if any or all of the heads of the various
denominations or other high ecclesiastical sources see any complications in this clause,
they are
perfectly at liberty to address a letter or some
other communication to — now I'm not sure if
Mr. Smallwood said the Convention or the
Canadian government, but I believe it was the
latter, expressing their opinions and suggesting
changes or alterations.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I ask you, isn't that the
most peculiar position that has arisen in this
Convention in your time? It certainly is in my
time. We are not competent to pass on the merits
of this clause 19, on a matter with which we are
all familiar, education, since we were born. Yet
we are considered to be competent to pass on the
fairness of all the other clauses, including the
most complicated financial arrangements, the
most far-reaching international questions like the
American bases and an international airport, in
fact, on confederation itself — the most crucial
and controversial issue that has faced this country
in nearly two generations. And the very suggestion itself, that contacts be made inside
or outside
this house with the Canadian government to alter
that clause in any sense, shape or form would
most assuredly, as far as I am concerned, take on
the aspects of negotiation and nothing else.
Now, on the clause as it stands. It appears to
have covered every angle and stopped all the
loopholes, but before leaving it I would like to
point out that other and similar clauses were
written into the BNA Act on the same matter
when other provinces were being taken into confederation — "taken in" is probably
the right term
for it, too. For instance, Manitoba — BNA Act,
section 22 (2)... That was in 1870 when
Manitoba became a province. But what happened
in 1890, 20 years after? The Liberal government
of the day unified the schools in a non-sectarian
system. There was a great stir over it, an appeal
was made to the clause in Manitoba's terms,
especially the section which, in effect, meant that
the federal government could override the
provincial govemment's decision on this matter.
But when the appeal was made, Sir Wilfred
Laurier pointed out that while the federal government might by legislation direct
the correction of
the grievance, it had no power to intervene in the
administration of education in Manitoba; for
education, after all, was a responsibility of the
province. So that clause to safeguard the separate
denominational schools in Manitoba was not
worth the paper it was written on, anymore than
clause 19 in these so-called terms.
Now, sir, I have finished my references to
specific clauses and I wish to make a few
general remarks on the Grey Book. In the first
place, they are not terms of union, as their
proponents are striving so hard to assert. The
delegation to Ottawa had no power to negotiate
terms. Its job was to ascertain if a fair and equitable basis existed for the entry
of Newfoundland
into the Dominion of Canada. Out of their three
month stay came the two Black Books, incomplete as we have discovered, and regardless
of
how or when it came, this Grey Book, titled
Proposed Arrangements for the Entry of Newfoundland into Confederation. The dictionary
defines "arrangement" as the "act of arranging or
putting in an orderly condition, the state of being
so arranged; disposition in suitable form". A very
general definition, and one which fits this Grey
Book very well. It is a nice arrangement of a basis
of union set down in 23 clauses and several
annexes. The dictionary defines "terms", on the
1120 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
other hand, as "propositions, limitations or
provisions, stated or offered, as in contracts, for
the acceptance of others and determining the
nature and scope of the agreement". There is a
tremendous difference in the word "terms" and
the word "arrangements". And this Grey Book is
called "arrangements". Nowhere in the whole
business does the Canadian government call it
"terms", nowhere. The Prime Minister's letter
takes great care on this point.
Besides the Grey Book, which is not "terms",
and the Black Books which are incomplete and
official or semi-official as the situation arises,
what else do we have to go on? In the debate,
especially before Christmas, explaining these arrangements, much stress was laid by
the pilot of
the report on what so-and—so had said, suggested,
hinted or alluded to at various meetings and apparently on other occasions. For instance,
in connection with the Housing Corporation and the
National Housing Act, it was said that the head
of that Canadian organisation had said that something might be worked out, but he
did not know
what could be worked out until we were a
province. Again, on the matter of the service on
the Cabot Strait and the matter of a super-feny,
it was stated that on this matter Mr. St. Laurent
had read something from a memo about details
of such a ship, and in this connection Mr.
Smallwood had asked Mr. Ballam to tell the
house what he knew or had heard about the car
ferry on the Straits. And Mr. Ballam had risen in
his place to say that he had nothing to say on this
matter, that it was purely an off the record conversation between himself and the
high Canadian
official while walking along the street, and that
he did not think it right to make any pronouncement under the circumstances. And he
was quite
right; for if the decision of our people in this
matter of confederation is to be swayed by conjectures made or heard in a conversation
on the
streets of Ottawa, then the whole affair has indeed
deed come to a sorry pass. It would seem to me,
from the personal allusions made by Mr.
Smallwood about what will happen when we are
a province, that the Canadian officials were
prepared to promise anything and everything, but
to put nothing very much in writing. There were
many other occasions when similar statements
were made that could be quoted, but I have already taken up far more of the time of
this house
than I ever intended at the outset; but the whole
matter is so complicated that the further one
proceeds, the further one is involved.
Only one other aspect of the debate remains to
be cemented on. It is in reference to the multitude of taxes that the Canadian people
pay in all
the provinces — to their municipal government,
to their provincial government, and to their
federal government. Mr. Smallwood had
reiterated over and over again that it does not
follow because Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island or any other province has certain
taxes that
we have not now, that under confederation we
will still not have them. In other words, we will
be the tenth and last province and we will be a
law unto ourselves. There is an old saying,
whether you do what the Romans do, when
you're in Rome, is a matter of choice. But when
in confederation, you will do as the Canadians do
and it won't be a matter of choice, I can assure
you. Not that the federal government will compel
us to do certain things, raise certain taxes, but we
ourselves will be compelled, we will have to
compel ourselves to raise additional taxation to
try and provide the services that the province
under confederation is required to provide. Yes,
Mr. Chairman, the CNR may take over the Railway, but the Province of Newfoundland
will not
be permitted to run on a separate track. It will
have to shunt onto the main line on which the
other nine provinces run; and where there is no
precedent in our set-up we will have to take
leaves from their books. To advance the argument that Newfoundland and her people
will
remain tax-free to the same extent as they are now
under confederation, is the height of false reasoning. It is absurd. Even if we were
to take the
figures of Mr. Smallwood' s provincial budget we
would still have to raise more than $1.25 million
in additional provincial taxation, besides that
provided for, in addition to the great amounts that
would find their way from our pockets to the
federal treasury at Ottawa. But other speakers
have proved to my satisfaction at any rate, that
Mr. Smallwood's budget is set at too low a figure
to run the province successfully and make both
ends meet.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to refer
to certain other aspects of this whole question
which as yet I have not touched upon in any great
detail, if at all. As I said at the beginning, I realise
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1121
my limitations and I have not gone very
thoroughly into the high finance of the question
which has been, in any case, dealt with very
effectively by other speakers. It is argued that we
are too small to stand alone; yet other countries
as small, and smaller, notably Iceland, have done
so; and Iceland is not in half as important a part
of the world as we are, and her position is not as
quarter as strategic as ours; nor does she have
even a fraction of the bargaining power that we
possess. Even though there are 60 to 70 miles of
deep Atlantic water between us and the mainland
at the end that counts most, it is argued that we
are a part of the Canadian mainland, when it
would be equally correct or incorrect to argue that
we are a part of the American mainland. The truth
of the matter is, we are no more an intrinsic part
of the mainland than is England of the continent
of Europe, and I would recall to your attention
how barely 25 miles of water made all the difference for England in 1940. The attempt
to foist
confederation on us is to ignore the facts of
geography and international politics, which
makes us as much a part of the United States as
of Canada. The men who voted for a delegation
to Ottawa on the grounds that they were concerned with the people's welfare, will
not be able
to reconcile their concern for that welfare with
their refusal to vote to send a similar delegation
to the United States.
I say then, Mr. Chairman, that it is wrong,
ethically, morally and economically to suggest,
much less to ask our people to vote themselves
into union with Canada on such one-sided arrangements; arrangements which even rambunctious
debates by a crowd of amateurs, for the
most part, have shown up as shot through with
future trouble —— trouble which will involve
ethics and morals and economics and finances.
They, these arrangements, are a one—sided bargain — which is no bargain at all — and
as has
been pointed out by one member of the delegation, all these arrangements actually
provide is a
fair and equitable basis on which a sovereign
government of the Newfoundland people, assisted by the expert knowledge and staff
that this
delegation did not have, could negotiate "terms"
acceptable to the Newfoundland people.
Here is Newfoundland, a people voteless for
14 years, coddled for 14 years, not thinking, not
doing the normal political things that all Anglo
Saxon peoples have won the right to do -
governing their own people, governing themselves. At the present stage they are divided
as to
whether or not they should take once again that
control of their own affairs and bid farewell to
outside control. Yet while they are in that dilemma, it is proposed, on the basis
of these one-sided
arrangements, to ask them to not only assume
control of their own affairs, yet at the same time
give the complete control, finally and irrevocably
to outside sources, by entering a political union
which may not be the best political or economic
union this country could get. I say to them, make
haste slowly, take one step at a time. The
Canadian offer can wait; they've been waiting
since 1864 and another year or two won't hurt.
Decide first whether you wish to reject or retain
Commission of Government. If you reject it, then
with a sovereign elected government of your own
choosing you will be able to approach Canada
and the United States, so that if your wish is then
no longer to stand alone, you can be assured that
whichever union you enter, political or economic
or both, it will be the best that can be secured for
yourselves and those who come after you.
Mr. Vincent Mr. Chairman, if my introductory
comments are just so much water under the
bridge now, I yet cannot refrain from making
reference to them. Some of us, after more than a
year of bickerings, divisions and not too dignified
debates, had fondly hoped that with the passing
of 1947 would come an eclipse of such shortcomings that would be as permanent as it
was total.
Unfortunately such has not been the case, and
1948 brought no angel of light presenting this
assembly with a certificate of freedom from
having such millstones around its neck, and so
the debates meander on.
I have, sir, watched with growing admiration
your intelligent attempt to keep this Convention
from bogging down in dawdlings and delays.
Some were inescapable, however, and members
have from time to time as self-appointed
proponents of this, and crusading prophets of that
form of government, lost complete sight of the
forest in the minute and precise examination of
their own particular trees.
In the discussion statements, speeches, apparent implications made by members, though
not intended perhaps to do so, have incited bitter
antagonisms that rankle deeply, created ill—will
122 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
and helped defeat the purpose for which this body
was created. Perhaps it is not too much to say that
to the casual listeners-in, it appears to be just so
much shoddy and lingering childishness. This is
regrettable indeed, for to many of us, who have
had and will have no part or parcel of such
sometimes very undignified discussions, is also
attached the lack of decorum which should at
least be ours. I trust I am not being guilty of
tedious repetition, sir, when I make reference to
what you have so many times pointed out, that
the specific mandate of this Convention was
simply to examine into something, and on the
basis of its findings, to make intelligent recommendations. That something was the
financial
and economic condition of Newfoundland. Has
it done that? It has, in my opinion, deteriorated
from the status of a fact-finding body into two
hostile political camps, each apparently led by a
crusading giant in the realms of oratory, and as
the leaders fence and draw, the minor Chieftains
cheer or jeer as the tide of battle ebbs and flows.
The Canadian proposals now on the desks
submitted by the head of a sovereign government
to this Convention, have been bandied about
and given many strange names. This, if I may say
so, is hardly good ethics. Either they are good or
they are not good; but perhaps the fiery enthusiasm of the gentleman from Bonavista
Centre has unwittingly helped to strengthen
much of the criticism which these proposals have
received. He may have meant well, but as far as
I am concerned, confederation is not the brainchild of Mr. J. R. Smallwood, neither
is responsible government the privileged dowry of my
good friend, Major Cashin. It does seem to me,
sir, that the debates and discussions have
developed into a marathon, a rush to ring the
voters' doorbells, a scramble to see who gets
there first with the most. Ironically enough, it
may well be that in the finals, we will have
brought too little much too late. I apologise for
having perhaps generalised too much, but in view
of the fact that my associate, the very able member for Bonavista Centre, has dwelt
at great
length with all salient points in both the Black
Books and the Grey Book, I shall content myself
with a brief summing up of some particular
aspects of these Canadian proposals.
The chief line of attack of opponents of confederation seems to be the taxation problem.
That
is proper I suppose, since two of the greatest fears
of our race are death and taxes. Making a fine
speech in his usual very able way, Mr. Hollett
told of taxes on the house, on the boat, on fishing
equipment. Now, it may well be that Mr. Hollett
assumed such taxes would be necessary under the
provincial set-up to pay for cost of government.
Certain it is, that Mr. Hollett had no intention to
tell Newfoundlanders that they were paying taxes
now; for presently at the end of the fiscal year,
the cost of government will have extracted from
our people something in the vicinity of $40 millions. Mr. Hollett very properly pointed
out that
fishermen may have to pay a tax or license to
operate fishing equipment under confederation.
May I be personal, Mr. Chairman, and get district-minded and be guilty of that Bonavista
Bay
provincialism? In 1946 a schooner in which I had
an interest fished in the Province of Quebec.
There was no tax other than a license fee of $10
per codtrap. Thus the maximum taxes collected
from the schooner amounted to exactly $30....
Against that, if I could have purchased supplies
in that Canadian Labrador port, the cost of
production of that schooner would have been
reduced by not less than 25%. Furthermore, that
same province pays a bonus to fishermen for all
small boats. That doesn't exist here, Mr. Chairman, except in cases of boats 12 tons
and up; and
my guess is that 90% of Newfoundland fishing
boats are less than ten tons. The ordinary Newfoundlander does not need to be told
that taxes
are necessary, with that he is not greatly concerned. What does concern him is this:
who will
pay the taxes? Will it be, as it ever was in this
country, placed on the backs of the toiling fishermen. the industrious farmer, least
able to bear it?
Mr. Chairman, we must not ask our people to
accept conclusions that are disturbing or fantastic, or other than those that cool
logic would
allow. Mr. Fogwill talked a few days ago of
excise taxes, excise duties, sales taxes, luxury
taxes, presenting an imposing array of figures
which, in my estimation at least, has singled him
out as a topnotcher in mathematics. He pointed
out how an extra $10 million from such sources
would be extracted from Newfoundlanders, and
thus go to enrich to coffers of the government of
Mackenzie King. What Mr. Fogwill apparently
forgot in his breakdown of figures and his obvious concern at their huge dimensions
was just
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1123
this: that with all the taxes he mentions, the
greater part of the commodities he listed will be
purchased under confederation very considerably cheaper than they are at present.
Let me
illustrate.
During the Christmas recess I was approached
by a very intelligent fisherman. Walking into my
store, he greeted me with, "Merry Christmas,
profiteer". I had long ago joined "the customer is
always right club", so I couldn't say a thing about
it. In his hand he carried copies of a Montreal
daily and the Maritime Merchant. "What have
you there?", I asked. "Something for you to carry
back to the Convention", he rejoined, and then he
let loose with a barrage. "Is this correct," he
asked, "Maritime Merchant — flour, 98 pound
bag, $4.75 at St. John, New Brunswick?" I tried
to explain the subsidy. He then quoted "Hay, $30
per ton". This was November 8, 1947. "What are
your prices?", he asked. Flour $10; hay $60. He
pointed to a footnote which said a subsidy of $2
had recently been removed from flour; the earlier
price was exactly $2.78. He then quoted retail
prices from page 6 of a Montreal daily —
emperor grapes, 8 cents per pound. "What's your
price?" he asked. "Only 30 cents," I said. I tried
to explain disparity in prices. My only reward
was "swindler", and I might as well have tried to
swim the Atlantic as to convince that fellow. I
trust you will pardon me, sir, for talking about
such mundane things as grocery prices, but since
we all must eat, grocery stores are very important
places, and it is in the grocery stores and fishing
boats that the government of tomorrow will be
decided. Mr. Smallwood may not be a mile and
a year ahead of his noisiest critic, as someone has
written, but if he can intelligently show that confederation means a lowering of the
cost of living,
then those big bad wolves with no teeth, called
excise taxes, luxury taxes, etc., just won't scare
anybody, for the ordinary fishing Joe and farming
Jack are not so much concerned with what goes
up the river as they are with how much more
cheaply things will come down the river.
"The 15% tax on transportation will cost this
country $200,000," says Mr. Fogwill. Mr.
Smallwood explains, and no one has satisfactorily proven him wrong, that add on that
15% and
transportation will still be very considerably
lower than at present. And since I feel that every
member is concerned chiefly with the most good
to the masses, he will at least admit that if this is
so, then confederation will mean a big advantage;
for a railway ticket reduced by 2 cents a mile will
mean much to the lumberrnan making five trips
a year to the Millenown hinterland. All this has
been said before in this house, so it is a needless
waste of time to go on expounding this and that,
but I cannot refrain from saying again that charges that the proposals should be thrown
out the
door and other derogatory statements, are altogether unfair to our people, and unjust
to this
Convention. I may or may not vote for confederation, but in justice to the good people
I have the
honour to represent, and conscious of my duties
as an elected representative of this assembly, I am
going to weigh the issue dispassionately, basing
my conclusions as to its merits or otherwise on
the findings of this Convention, and not at all
upon the pet opinions of some would-be aspirants
to political greatness shouting hysterical hallelujahs to the skies. I submit, Mr.
Chairman, that
the Canadian proposals should be intelligently
studied by every Newfoundlander.
Major Cashin and Mr. Higgins recently made
two fine speeches, both of great length and signal
distinction. The Major said, in so many words,
that the Canadians want the Labrador. In this
connection will someone tell me just how many
Newfoundlanders have gotten work in our big
northern dependency? Actually, Mr. Chairman,
as far as I am aware, Bonavista North sent its first
deputation of labourers this past summer, when
through the kind office of my good friend, Mr.
Claude Howse, a number of our fishermen
secured work at Knob Lake with a Canadian
company doing preparatory prospecting in that
area. Major Cashin has already stressed that this
was a Canadian company interested in the
development of Labrador. That, to my mind,
sounds like a very good argument for the affirmative of the motion. The Major further
stressed,
with a rather alarming use of superlatives, the
very awkward position which, in his opinion,
Canada finds herself at the moment. So far as I
am concerned, that was simply the Major's
opinion. I was particularly struck, however, by
his application of the term "immoral" to the
Canadian system of family allowance. I am quite
sure that the Major was not at all serious when he
used this, for surely a subsidy of $60 or $70 per
year that will ensure some worried mother the
1124 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
wherewithal to purchase clothing and thus help
in that child's education, cannot be termed immoral...
Mr. Cashin You cut the educational vote in
your provincial budget.
Mr. Vincent Is it immoral because it must be
paid for out of some other form of taxation? Then,
by the same yardstick of measurement, the
Gander airport must be termed a very immoral
business, since tens of thousands of our
countrymen who have never gotten five hours
work, contribute every year their pennyworth of
taxes to help defray the operational deficit. The
same can be said of the Railway. All Newfoundlanders contribute to the liquidation
of its
big deficits, but not all Newfoundlanders travel
by, or directly benefit from its services.
Like Mr. Fogwill, the Major stressed the many
taxes on ordinary commodities. He talked of 26
taxes on a pair of shoes. He didn't quote the prices
in Canada and St. John's, Newfoundland...
Mr. Cashin I could have bought shoes here $3
cheaper.
Mr. Vincent Somebody told of 52 taxes on a 20
ounce loaf of bread, but failed to add that with the
52 taxes included, that same loaf of bread could
be bought 6 cents cheaper in Canada than it can
be here at the moment. I am not going to stress
any of the points so lucidly explained by Mr.
Higgins. Like a learned professor of history, he
took us through a very interesting homily, and he
used very few political catchphrases as did his
well-versed associate, the worthy Major. It was
not difficult, however, to disentangle the perception of the lawyer from the prejudices
of the
politician, for both ultimately arrived at the same
conclusions.
Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I repeat with
Mr. Higgins that the Canadian terms are fair, and
I earnestly recommend them to the intelligence
of every fellow Newfoundlander.
Mr. Butt Last year I voted against sending a
delegation on to Ottawa. I did that, sir, because
after a number of months in this Convention, I
became convinced we were not properly constituted to do a job of that kind. I say
now — not
prompted by any person in or out of this house —
that in my opinion, the debate during the last three
or four weeks has shown to my own satisfaction
that I am correct and I was justified in reaching
that conclusion. All through this debate, in spite
of the fact that I felt myself thoroughly incompetent to deal with a number of matters,
I kept
notes of things as they were said both for and
against the proposed arrangements for the entry
of Newfoundland into confederation. I looked at
those notes a few days ago, and if I were to make
a comment of one minute on every one, I should
certainly be talking from now until the closure
motion. I do not propose to do that because a great
deal of what has been said has already been
referred to by other speakers for and against.
There are one or two things to which I would
like specifically to refer, and it will be in the main
connected with my feelings that Newfoundland
should not entrust negotiations of this kind to a
body such as the National Convention. Before I
do that, however, and so that I will not be irrelevant and immaterial, I would like
to read the
first clause in the proposed arrangements: "1.
Newfoundland will have, as from the date of
union, the status of a province of Canada with all
the rights, powers, privileges and responsibilities
of a province." It is a plain statement of fact.
Since this debate on confederation and for a time
before it, I have heard that clause turned inside
out and given to me in reverse by a whole series
of derogatory statements destined to loosen the
morale of this country, so that we will be able to
contemplate easily, quietly and very deceitfully
the loss of dominion status, the loss of a political
entity of our own, and easily slide into that of the
baby province of the Dominion of Canada.
I find it very difficult and a bit embarrassing
to refer to these things, but I must give expression
to the faith that is in me, regardless of its unpopularity in many quarters. It seems
very
fashionable today in these quarters to play down
national pride, and I ask members here and
anyone listening in, to remember the last 16
months both in and out of this house. Newfoundlanders, as Major Cashin said the other
day,
have always been prone to be overcritical of
themselves. This, I think, is a result of a long
series of incidents in the history of Newfoundland which has given us the attitude
that we
must, in some way, be an inferior people. If you
were to meet the ordinary American, he will
approach you in such a way that you will feel that
he is bragging. Nothing is further from the truth.
The real truth of the matter is that he has known
what it is to be free... We have never allowed
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1125
ourselves to look upon ourselves as true Newfoundlanders; we are ashamed to tell the
cockeyed world we are Newfoundlanders; that we are
equal to any people inside or outside the house.
We are as good as any other people, no better, no
worse. The world today is struggling to get a
government which will be effective in stopping
the excesses of nationalism which led to blood
and tears, but that is no reason why the drive and
morale caused by love of country should be lost
sight of, and treated by many people as a thing to
be scorned and looked upon almost with contempt. This error is, to my mind, one (and
this is
a hard thing for me to say) for which we have to
thank, in large measure, the intellectuals of this
country — this talk about the intellectual and
historic processes driving this country into political union with another country!
We are told by
many people that we have no right to expect to
stand on our own feet because we are only a small
group of 300,000 people, as if character and
brains and resources were developed only by
bigness in the world. The whole negative attitude
that I have heard on many occasions, I now
repudiate and deny. There should be a pride in the
things done well in this country, and we have
done them well. If we were not so prone to tell
our young politicians that they have been used,
when they stand to a question of principle; if we
had not been so prone to tell our teachers that they
cannot teach as well as people in other countries,
that our education is not as good and as firmly
rooted as the education system of other countries;
if we had not been so prone to go outside and get
experts, you would have a better country and
more morale than you have today. The negative
approach I repudiate and deny, as it is one of sure
inertia, and also one of eventual death. There
were some scornful remarks made when I happened to raise the question of faith in
speaking of
the Economic Report. Faith should be an ingredient. People may sneer, but faith is
the most
important thing you can have, whether in an
organisation, a family, a country or any unit. You
call it faith in one instance and morale in
another....
I want to give you another example. When we
were discussing the problems of Newfoundland
in England, I did a lot of study and had hoped I
would have been able to show, in my own personal way, the aspirations of Newfoundlanders,
if at all possible. I know many of my colleagues
felt the same way. The dead hand of officialdom
did not allow it. Once we got outside officialdom
in England, I found they could not understand
why we in this country had such little faith in
ourselves; why we were not taking a bolder hand
in our own affairs than we are taking. I found it
in the printing presses we went to see. I talked to
the printers. I found it outside, in places we went
looking for information. I found it from ex-officials of the British government. I
found it with
the people with whom I lived. I came back to
Newfoundland and the first thing I had to face as
a Newfoundlander was the dead hand of so many
in this country: "Newfoundlanders cannot do
this. We have no faith in ourselves. We are too
small. We must tie up with some other country.
We must become the tail-end of a kite before we
can go anywhere on our own." I feel deeply about
this. I have felt for many years that the problem
of this country is more morale than it is material,
and I am not neglecting the importance of
material things in this world. I am not thinking in
terms merely of baby bonuses or unemployment
insurance. I am thinking in terms of that drive
which can make us work together as a unit to
bring about a decent standard of living for every
man, woman and child in this country. Call it
vague talk; sneer, call it unreal, if you like —I
have heard it said, "It is sheer idealism to talk that
way." As far as I am concerned, let him who
wants to sneer, sneer. But I cannot leave either
this subject or this Convention without giving
expression to that one thing which I feel, and feel
very deeply, is important to us when we face this
issue either of confederation or return to responsible government, or any other form
of government. If you were to turn up the World Report of
December, 1947, you will find there an expression of what Canadians are saying on
union with
another country. It is one man's opinion, I will
willingly admit; but in their present difficulties it
is being suggested in many quarters that political
union with the United States would be the easiest
way out of the trade difficulties of Canada in her
present situation. If you would care to look up the
World Report you will know what I mean. You
will know also that opposition to this kind of
union has been and is widespread in Canada. The
answer to it is the Canadian citizenship law. A
quotation from that report shows they are afraid
1126 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
Canada will become the tail-end of the United
States kite. On that point I think perhaps I have
said enough — a little too loudly, perhaps, and
with a little heat. I was determined I should say
it at some time or other because, for anybody who
wishes to listen to me, I want him to think seriously about this question of morale
as we approach
the problem of the future form of government in
Newfoundland.
Mr. Chairman, in 1933 we made an error. It
has not taken me from 1933 to 1947 to realise
that. I said so at the time to an ex-Commissioner
— an English Commissioner — and I do not
think I will be breaking confidence if I say that
he agreed that we had made a mistake on the
grounds that we had gotten ourselves in a mess
and we did not ourselves face up to it. What I am
afraid of, in the approach to this problem, is that
we will do exactly the same thing. There has been
a lot of talk here about the Labrador....
[Short recess]
Mr. Butt Just before recess I was about to say a
few words about clause 2. That is the one which
deals with Labrador. I was saying we have heard
a lot of talk about Labrador. "It cannot happen to
us", some will say, "it was all settled legally." So
was the case which led to the French fishing
rights of 1857 all settled legally, but as a result of
the willingness of the people of Newfoundland
— and I think none was for the party and all were
for the state — Newfoundlanders got together
and fought for the rights of Newfoundland
citizens, and we got what is termed today, or what
used to be termed, the "Magna Carta of Newfoundland". It has been referred to on two
or three
occasions in this chamber. It reads like this: "The
proposals contained in the Convention having
now been unequivocally refused by the Colony,
they will of course fall to the ground and you [the
Governor] are authorised to give such assurance
as you may think proper that the consent of the
Colony of Newfoundland is regarded by His
Majesty's Government as an essential preliminary to any modification of their territorial
or
maritime rights."
[1] All very legal! What about the
territorial rights given in 1940 at the expense of
Newfoundland? Were we asked to give our consent to the modification of our territory?
The
answer, of course, is "no". Here is a point I do not
like. If we ever as much consider that we, as
young Newfoundlanders, should ask, should
think about asking, for concessions of some kind
or another on behalf of our people (this has happened to me), we are treated as naive,
simple
schoolboys (age, Mr. Bradley!). But not the
Secretary of State! When we discussed the matter
with him, what he said to us in effect was this:
"There are political considerations why the
Government of the United Kingdom should not
approach the United States on this matter; but
now, if you had your own government, you could
make a try." What is the relevancy of what I have
just said to clause 2? In my opinion, just this: on
paper, that clause is fine. I have no doubt about
it. It is perfectly legal. But in the world of power
politics of the higher level, in the world of big
financial interests, there is only one force that can
put teeth in a clause which looks all right on
paper, and that is the willingness of the people of
Newfoundland, however small we may be in
number, to fight to keep our rights. Now, sir,
when I use the word "fight", I do not necessarily
mean fight physically.... If you look in the world
of nations and power politics today, you will find
there is (to use the new term) a cold war being
fought today between the nations of the world. A
cold war can be fought with material possessions,
and it can also be fought with staying power on
the part of the people. In this connection, I come
back to my first point, which is in my personal
opinion the only thing that could put real teeth in
a clause of this kind. Newfoundland and Newfoundlanders, at some time in our long
history,
should be able to stand together and say, "We
have certain rights in this country; we are going
to have those rights; insofar as we have the power
we are going to fight to see we keep them; if we
do lose them we will know we have kept the only
thing which matters, and that is the drive to go
forward in the material and spiritual progress of
Newfoundland."
Now I would like to turn to the public services
referred to in clause 3. When the list of federal
services which would apply directly to Newfoundland was read in this Convention, I
confess
that I became a bit angered, not because of the
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1127
mere reading of that list of federal services, but
because of the exaggeration, the overtone, the
emphasis which was laid upon the reading of that
list. So much so, I felt sure that there were people,
thousands of people in this country who had no
experience in these matters at all, who would feel
that if all these services were applied to Newfoundland, nothing short of the millennium
would have come. At that time, I injected a note
of doubt and later I made an attempt to find out
just how we would benefit, apart from the purely
financial services which were allotted to these
lists of services before us. I came to this conclusion: we could not possibly benefit
very much
materially by the direct application of these
federal services. for the following reasons. Most
of these services are research and consulting services. Secondly, the result of the
findings of these
services are open to Newfoundland today and are
being availed of by Newfoundlanders. Take for
example, geology, labour, agriculture. Let us
look at page 19 of the Black Book (volume 2),
the long list of services. The delegation put a
question directly to the Ottawa group:
Question: Would the agricultural services
described in the Canadian memorandum
automatically extend to Newfoundland in the
event of union?
Answer: One of the services which the
Department of Agriculture would expect to
make available to Newfoundland in such
event, would be the experimental farms service. While the Department is not familiar
with the present development in this field in
Newfoundland, they understand that it does
include a central experimental station. They
would hope to use such a station in much the
same way as they use their presently established experimental stations in the various
provinces of Canada and through this they
would plan to develop supplementary services, which in Canada take the form of illustration
stations and, where required,
sub-stations for dealing with special investigations.
Consistent with the general policy of the
Department and the resources available, the
Department of Agriculture would also contemplate making available other services of
the Department for which there would appear
to be need and opportunity.
Out of a list of five or six, that was the answer
to that particular question. A little further on, a
question was put on the Canadian Farm Board
loans. The answer was that the loans would be
made available to Newfoundland. On the
mortgage loans, I would not like to see that introduced into Newfoundland because
I am aware of
the fact, through my reading, that those loans and
mortgages on farms in both the United States and
Canada have led, in my opinion, to a great deal
of hardship. I believe we should develop agricultural services in Newfoundland, and
I believe that
Newfoundland should find the money to develop
these resources without taking mortgages on
people's property. The real point I want to make
is this: in agriculture, all you have is their promise
that one service would apply to Newfoundland,
and that one service we already have, presumably
up to the standard which Newfoundland would
require at the present time. Then on page 21:
Question: Would the services outlined in
paragraph 36 — also paragraph37 — (mapping, survey work of all sorts, investigation
of mineral deposits, metallurgy, economic
problems, etc.) apply to Newfoundland, and
how rapidly would it be likely they would be
introduced?
Answer: The services described have been
carried on for many years and would undoubtedly be extended to Newfoundland under
present federal policy, although not all of
them are, strictly speaking, federal responsibilities. For example, the federal government
is obligated by statute to carry out
geological surveys in Prince Edward Island,
Manitoba and British Columbia. No such
obligation exists in respect of other provinces, although in practice Mines and Resources
has carried on such surveys in the other
provinces as well. It is hoped that in due
course further Dominion-provincial discussions will result in clarification of these
matters when public investment policy generally
is under discussion.
Mr. Smallwood Would Mr. Butt permit me to
refer to the Grey Book, section 22? Does not that
supersede the thing you just read? "As soon as
may be practicable after union, the Government
of Canada will make a special effort to collect and
make available statistical and scientific data
about the natural resources and economy of New
1128 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
foundland, in order to bring such information up
to the standard attained for existing provinces."
Mr. Butt If that is important, as I think it is, I
was perfectly right the very first day in asking
where the appendix was (which you said was
forthcoming) giving a plain statement of fact.
Mr. Butt To do what? To me, it has no real
meaning when I am thinking of the responsibility
I have to recommend; I have to cast a vote, that
is the point I am quarrelling with. Take the
geological surveys; on that point alone, and bearing this one in mind as well, we
are promised two
geological survey parties. In Newfoundland last
year we had 11 survey parties in the field. In the
budget you drew up, you left in the salaries for
the geological department; but you took out
every cent in the provincial budget for the survey
parties. We are promised two. We are given this
vague paragraph and asked to take it on trust...
The same holds true if you follow all the way
down. For instance the question of air surveys —
"Air photography required for the surveys and
mapping outlined above would be supplied by
the Dominion."
[1] It may be callous, but I think as
long as we are finding the facilities for foreign
countries to do business, and we have no air fleet
of our own, I think they should pay for the surveys and pass them on to us. To me
it is not a
concession at all.
Under Defence, in the Black Book, pp. 26-28,
Prime Minister King gives an explanation of
military arrangements with the United States;
and when he was just about finished, he was
asked:
Mr. Pearkes: May I ask the Prime Minister
whether the Government of Newfoundland
was represented in the discussion leading up
to this agreement or had it been a party in any
way to the agreement?
Mr. Mackenzie King: The Permanent Joint
Defence Board is composed of representatives of Canada and of the United
States. There are no representatives of the
Government of Newfoundland on the Board.
Mr. Graydon: Will this necessitate any extension in either the personnel or the functions
of the Permanent Joint Defence Board?
Mr. Mackenzie King: I cannot think of any
extension at the moment. It may be that as
time goes on, as in the past, the Board may
have to be enlarged for certain purposes.
Now, Mr. Chairman, that is pretty plain as to
their intention. Mr. Higgins said here yesterday
afternoon that every man and every woman in
Newfoundland feels in his or her heart that if any
international trouble starts, we will be, this time,
in the thick of the fight. If anyone will look at the
publications by the Office of War Information
published in 1940, he will see there that prior to
1940 the American government was well aware
of the fact that Newfoundland was in the possible
path of the approach to the American continent.
He will see it in print and in diagram in the form
of an arrow coming right down straight through
the St. Lawrence. Surely the people to whom
concessions have been given without our consent, a friendly country who will dominate
us to
the extent that they are not in any way to be
charged with anything, even to be given the use
of the roads without having to pay the cost, not
only the license for the number plates that are on
them; surely Newfoundland should in a matter of
this kind have some say and some representation.
I happen to be aware of the fact that a civilian in
an important position in Newfoundland, on more
than one occasion during the last war, had the
courage to protect civilian rights when they were
trying to be usurped by the military, unnecessarily. I say that a thing like this
going into the Black
Books should have been thoroughly aired, and
we in Newfoundland should have been given
something more than has been given.
Right on that point, I come to another made by
Mr. Harrington and Major Cashin when they
referred to the number of material things which
Canada would control. These are purely material
things and to me they do not count very much.
Whether Canada controls the Railway, the post
office or other things does not, to me, amount to
very much. I agree with both gentlemen on that
point. But I have to ask myself, and I think we
ought to ask ourselves, in the control of these
things, what are we really giving up? Here is what
we are giving up — any possible advantage or
bargaining power we might get out of our
strategic position. We may not get a thing, but I
for one at least, want to make an effort, or the
people of this country should make an effort in
that behalf. We are giving up communications,
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1129
controlled entirely away from this country —
railway, telegraph, control of roads in an emergency, our government marine fleet,
our broadcasting corporation. In short, we are giving up the
control of all our essential communications, and
all that might mean to the people of Newfoundland if (and God forbid) we should get
into
difficulties. We are giving up the control of our
fisheries. We are giving up the right to decide on
the question of conscription for ourselves, in spite
of the fact that we have down through our history
prided ourselves that we have always turned out
on a voluntary basis enough people to do as
much, and probably more than our share in the
defence of freedom. We are giving up this too,
the right to fix our own rates of taxation, and on
that I would like to have one word on sales tax
alone. I am not going into the question of taxation
fully. I am going to say one thing on what was
not brought out particularly, the general sales tax;
that is an indirect tax.
As the hour is late, I now move that the committee rise and report progress.
[The committee rose and reported progress, and
the Convention adjourned]
