Mr. Cashin Mr. Chairman, I am glad Mr. Small-
wood brought that matter up. With regard to
closure, it is immaterial to me; but I want to point
out that before the Ottawa delegation left last
year, this Convention was practically assured it
would reconvene again around the middle of
July, but the Ottawa delegation ignored that; they
did not have the decency to communicate with
the Secretary telling him to advise the members
of the Convention that they were sorry about the
delay; we had to take it upon ourselves to communicate with them, and we were told
we were
committing an act of national treachery. Mr.
Smallwood can reply all he likes to my remarks.
This confederation issue has been before this
house for 16 months. That is all we have heard.
Every report has been torn abroad and told what
confederation would do. The thing should never
have happened. Even the
Evening Telegram
practically said it was a farce.
A few items have been drawn to my attention
to bring up, and there are many points I omitted,
particularly from the point of financial interest.
A party asked me today to inquire what is going
to happen to the Newfoundland Savings Bank in
which there are $20 million belonging to our
people at 2.5%. When the Ottawa delegation was
discussing these matters, did they ask the Ottawa
government what would become of the bank? It
is a very important matter.... I am one of those
who believes in that bank. If those savings are
going to be reduced in annual interest charges,
that money should be withdrawn; and for those
in the country who have their savings in that
bank, I am going to direct a question to the
Minister of Finance. 1 will draft a question.
This so-called budget of Mr. Smallwood's
[1]
indicates to me that, in addition to paying an
annual federal tax of around $230 per annum,
every Newfoundlander, will have to find an additional $30 per year in provincial taxation.
In all,
therefore, the people of the country would have
to find over $80 million each year to pay both
federal and provincial taxation. In short, the
whole thing means that the people of Newfoundland would be taxed to death — that the
dole days would be considered luxurious living
and opulence in comparison to the manner in
which the people of our country would be forced
to live in union with Canada.
Mr. Chairman, there is a saying that there is
none so blind as those who will not see, and it is
certain that many of us refuse to see things as they
are in this country today. They cannot plead
ignorance, they cannot say they have not been
told that the threats to our country have not been
pointed out to them. Time and time again, the call
has come to them to assume the duty which as
Newfoundlanders is rightly theirs. And whatever
befalls us in the future, whatever disasters happen
to us, the people generally cannot say that have
not been asked to stave off such disasters.
I am not speaking to hear the sound of my own
voice. Nor am I trying to warp the judgement of
the delegates to this Convention or the people of
the country, or influence their minds with any
more airy rhetoric or political spellbinding. My
purpose has been, at this time particularly, to give
hard, cold facts which cannot be denied or talked
away. What I have said emanates from my sincere political belief which is based on
the solid
and eternal doctrine: first, a country belongs to its
people; second, it is the solemn duty of the people
of that country to shoulder the responsibility of
governing it. Any divergence or avoidance of that
doctrine, any excuse for acting contrary to that
fundamental truth is cowardly, unediical and immoral. The challenge which faces the
people of
this country today is the patriotic and moral challenge to do their duty and to face
their responsibilities like real men and women. It is a
clear-cut issue — as clear and unambiguous as
the challenge of right and wrong. But again I say,
there are those amongst us who have shown that
they are unwilling, or have not the capabilities of
facing their responsibilities and accepting obligations of democratic decency. They
are prepared
instead to assume the garb of mendicants and go
begging at the back door of some outside country,
asking to be taken in out of the rough world which
they fear to face. Like Shakespeare's character,
they are prepared to crawl under the huge legs of
some foreign colossus and find themselves dishonourable graves. But I know that there
are
1090 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
many thousands amongst us who are not prepared
to form their opinions on mere moral or ethical
grounds. They prefer to deal with matters from a
more practical standpoint. They ask for facts.
Well, I think I have given them the facts.
In my opinion, Canada is today in a position
where she finds she has overreached herself. She
reminds me of the frog in the fable who wanted
to be as big as a bull and who puffed himself up
until he burst. Canada is an ambitious country
and in the thirties she got the idea that she wanted
to become a big nation. She put on long pants
before she became of age. She wanted an army,
she wanted a navy and all the trimmings. How
she might have gotten on if World War II had not
come along we do not know. But like other
countries, the blast of war hit her, and today she
is left in an exhausted position, struggling for her
life, and her financial bloodstream is fast running
dry. As I said, she is begging Uncle Sam for
dollars and her people are on the rocky road of
austerity....
I want to apologise for being so long discussing this matter. I felt that it is of
such great
national importance that it required extensive
study, and during Christmas recess I spent practically all my time going into the
Black Books
and particularly the Grey Book. I felt, as a former
Minister of Finance for Newfoundland, that I
owed it to you people who sent me here, particularly the District of St. John's West
because
when they elected me I told them that I would not
let them down, and I am not going to let them
down now. I felt I had to make a complete study
with no one bothering me in order to work out
these figures which I have given, and I have come
to the conclusions which I have already given to
the house and the country, which I elaborated on
yesterday.... I have lived in Canada and worked
there from coast to coast. I like Canada, it is a
great country, but after living and working there,
I want to give it as an honest opinion, that if
confederation were good for Newfoundland
there would not be a stronger supporter of it in
Newfoundland today, but I am honest in my
opinion when I say that confederation will be the
worst thing that ever struck Newfoundland....
Canada is in a worse position financially than
Newfoundland.... We are not begging for dollars,
all we are trying to do is keep people from
plundering our treasury. We can sympathise with
Canada in her present plight, just as any other
allies made prosperous by the war, but nevertheless we must remember that charity
begins at
home, and our first duty and our first obligation
we owe to ourselves, our families, our children
and our children's children.... Canada is well
aware, as we are, that if she can take over Newfoundland she can richly benefit by
our assets.
For instance, if she controlled our rich Labrador
possession, it would in a few years place her in a
position where she could get all these American
dollars which she urgently needs....
Is it not quite obvious from all the evidence
available to us that Canada is definitely using her
power and efforts to wrest from Newfoundland
this particular part of Labrador, together with its
great undeveloped waterpower? Don't let us
blind ourselves with the stupid and rather naive
idea that the Privy Council's judgement protects
us in the possession of our Labrador territory.
Don't let us get that idea in our heads, because if
the agreement made by our government in 1933
with the British government can be converted
into a scrap of paper, if the Atlantic Charter
signed in our own Placentia Bay can become
equally worthless, what dependence do you think
we can place in a mere decision of the Privy
Council? Let us remember that there are more
ways than one of skinning a cat. Why, I myself
can think of three different ways at least right
now, whereby Canada can usher us out of our
Labrador territory, regardless of any Privy Council, if we were to unite with Canada
and become
the tenth province. It is contained in this Grey
Book, and it is in there for that purpose. I quoted
that yesterday, that within a period of eight years
a royal commission, a royal force, like they had
here in 1933, would come and find that the
country is bankrupt and say, "We are going to
take this", and I am convinced that, in the minds
of some of our pro-confederates today is the
thought that Canada will rent Labrador from us
in order to bolster up that so-called budget that
Mr. Smallwood brought in here.
Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to take up much
further time, but in closing, I would wish to
summarise briefly the meaning of all that I have
said. As I see it, the situation is simply this:
Canada wants this country and our Labrador possession, and the government of Great
Britain has
given her consent to this arrangement. There
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1091
have been in this country since 1941, and are
today, active agents whose business and object is
to usher Newfoundland into confederation with
Canada, and to induce our people to walk into the
trap which has been baited. The outward
evidence of the activities of these pro-confederate agents is shown in the foisting
of this
Convention upon us, so that the agreement made
with the Newfoundland government in 1933
could be evaded. It is shown in the act of exporting from this country a great portion
of the
people's treasury; in the reckless and deliberate
squandering of our revenues to the tune of $40
million a year; in the giving away of reckless
concessions, and under disgraceful conditions, of
our Labrador territory. It is evidenced by the false
pictures of the fictitious prosperity which would
be ours if we have confederation. It is shown by
the actions of members of the Ottawa delegation,
who in collaboration with the Canadian government, cooked up and brought back to us
false
estimates and misleading statements; by the existence of secret documents given to
that delegation and the failure to produce them before this
Convention; by the circumstances under which
the Canadian delegation was elected. All these
things indicate to me at least beyond all doubt,
that Newfoundland today is being conspired
against from all sides. And if there was any doubt
on this score, it must be dismissed when we see
that the business of negotiating us into confederation has been entrusted to a body
such as this,
which has no power to negotiate, no power to
speak for the people, which in the last analysis
has neither the knowledge, the experience, nor
the qualifications to pass on this matter, a matter
which any sensible person knows is one for a
properly constituted and elected government.
This whole business is not alone illegal, it is
worse, it is immoral.
I would ask you to believe me when I say that
I have not said these things merely to make a case
for responsible government, or because I am
against confederation with Canada. I have made
my criticisms against these terms as a Newfoundlander rather than a politician — as
a Newfoundlander who sees in them a threat to his
people and his country, who sees hidden in their
beguiling phrases nothing less than an invitation
to national disaster. For I say that I was never as
certain of anything in my life, as I am of the
worthlessness of these so-called Canadian terms.
Now I realise that some people may not agree
with me. They may see, or think they see, bright
prospects for us under confederation with
Canada. I cannot find it in my mind to judge them
too harshly. For out of the political muddle which
has been purposely created in this country, how
can we expect the average man or woman to
know what it is all about, when we, who have
been close to the picture for over 16 months, are
still looking for information? It is because I am
aware of this bewilderment on the part of our
people, that I feel it my duty to take upon myself
the obligation of advising them to the best of my
ability as to the road I think we should pursue.
To those who, like myself, recognise the fact
that the only proper and decent course open to us
is to become masters in our own house, no further
words of mine are necessary. But to those who
may be beguiled to any degree by this confederation mirage, I say do nothing further
— make no
new steps. Do not consider any negotiations until,
as a first step, you have a duly audiorised government of your own to consider the
whole matter.
Any other course is sheer political madness. That
is my solemn advice to you. Whether you take it
or not rests with yourselves. And if we delegates
have failed to carry that one message to the
people who sent us here, then I say we have failed
dismally in our duty.
In closing I would ask your permission to
express a purely personal opinion. I am convinced that although our country and our
people
are at present enshrouded in a pall of political
darkness, they will eventually find their way into
the light. This whole matter of bribes and
promises will in the end be shown up for what it
really is. And I say this not because our people
would shrink from the new burden of taxation
which confederation with Canada will place on
their shoulders, not because of the vision of the
thousands of homesteads which may have to be
sold to satisfy the Canadian tax gatherers. No. It
will not be for these things alone, that our people
will spum this offer for them to sell out the land
of their birth. I say our people will win through
because of other, greater things. They will triumph, emerge from this ordeal, because
there are
still in this country such things as pride, courage
and faith. Pride in the great traditions which have
come down to us through the centuries of inde
1092 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
pendent living. Courage to face up to life and hew
out our individual fortunes. And finally faith in
our country, and in the great destiny which I am
convinced lies ahead of us.
That concludes my address, Mr. Chairman, in
this respect. Now, before I sit down, I just want
to read for the information of the committee a
reply which I received in answer to a question.
The question was placed on the order paper on
January 6, and I got the reply last night.
I give notice that I will on tomorrow ask His
Excellency the Governor in Commission to
ascertain from the United Kingdom government the latest date on which the recommendations
of this Convention must be submitted
to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations in order to ensure the holding of a
referendum in the Spring of 1948.
(2) In the event of the majority of the
voters in the forthcoming referendum
favouring a form of government other than
Commission of Government, at what time
and by what method will the change to the
new form of government become effective.
Now here's the letter written by Mr. Carew.
St. John's, Nfld.
January 8, 1948.
Dear Sir:
I have to refer to the question asked by a
member of the National Convention as to the
latest date on which the recommendations of
the Convention must be submitted to the Rt.
Hon. the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations in order to ensure the holding of a
referendum in the spring of 1948.
The Rt. Hon. the Secretary of State has
already informed the Commission of
Government that a period of at least one
month will be required for the consideration
of the recommendations of the Convention.
The Commission of Government have
given consideration to the question of setting
a date for the holding of a national referendum and I have been directed to communicate
their views to the National Convention.
It is hoped that it will be possible to hold
the referendum about the end of the month of
May this year. It is impracticable to hold a
poll during the period from early June to late
September as so many people are away from
their homes and may be disfranchised. Final
arrangements cannot be made for holding the
referendum until the necessary legislation
has been passed and steps in this direction
cannot be taken until a decision has been
made as to the questions to be submitted to
the people.
The members of the Convention, familiar
with the difficulties of travel during the
spring months in sections of Newfoundland
and in Labrador will realise that ample time
must be allowed for the distribution of ballot
papers and other materials for all polling
booths. The matters preliminary to the voting
will take place in the following order —
delivery of recommendations by the National
Convention; consideration by HM Government in the United Kingdom; communication of
decision as to forms of government to
the submitted to the people; final draft for
publication of legislation for continent; passing of legislation; printing of ballots
and
other forms; setting up of polling stations and
distribution of election material.
In order to permit sufficient time to complete the necessary arrangements and to ensure
to all qualified electors of
Newfoundland and Labrador the opportunity
of voting, it will be necessary, if the referendum is to be held during the month
of May,
to have the recommendations of the Convention submitted at an early date. The Commission
are unable to give any assurance that the
referendum will be possible this spring if the
recommendations of the Convention are not
received by the end of the present month.
Yours faithfully,
W.J. Carew, Secretary.
I will put this on the order paper, and it is tabled.
There is another answer there also Mr. Chairman.
It is immaterial, that's the most important.
Mr. Higgins Mr. Chairman, in addressing you
and the members of the Convention this afternoon, I would like to point out that I
do not intend
to go over the ground which is very well covered
by Mr. Hollett, Mr. Fogwill and Major Cashin in
these admirable addresses which we have heard
in the past few days, but I do intend to touch on
the subject which I hope is noncontroversial, but
at the same time is of real moment, and important
to the people of Newfoundland, and to us of the
Convention in particular.
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1093
Now as you probably have gathered, I am not
altogether sold on the idea of confederation.
However, the profession of which my learned
friend the Chairman, and Mr. Bradley and myself
are members, demands of necessity that whether
we like a case or not, whether we like the client
who brings in the case or not, nevertheless, if we
are retained to do a job we do that job to the best
of our ability. We work hard to prepare it, and do
all that needs to be done.
Now in this particular instance, and I refer to
the work of the delegation that went to Ottawa, I
and my co-delegates were retained by this Convention to discuss with the Canadian
government
the matter of the basis of union between Newfoundland and Canada. I can say quite
truthfully
that no matter what has been said in or what has
been said out of the House, and no matter what
jokes may have been made with respect to that
Ottawa delegation and the time spent in Ottawa,
and I myself probably added more to such type
of jokes than any other single member, I can say
quite truthfully that we did as good a job as any
delegation from Newfoundland under the circumstances could have done. I can say to
you
quite truthfully that we had no officials of any
kind to help us, no officials from the government,
or the civil service to help us. We were six men
appointed by this Convention. I don't even say
the six best men that you have. A great number
of you did not even choose to be part of that
delegation, probably some of you better than the
men who did go up. But, even with the lack of
assistance that we had, we did do as good a job
as we possibly could and I trust that you will
understand me when now I take a different stand.
Being a lawyer, as I explained to you, and doing
cases for people that we don't like, and preparing
cases that we don't like to do, nevertheless when
we agree to do a job we do it to the best of our
ability. I am stressing that point because I hope
you will judge that I am competent and fair-
minded enough to give honest advice to you with
respect to union between the two countries on the
basis of the facts as brought back from Ottawa.
To begin my argument to you today, let me
quote from the reply we received from the
Canadian government to our request for these
discussions. It is contained in your Black Book:
The Canadian government is of the opinion
that the questions to be discussed with the
delegation are of such complexity and of
such significance for both countries that it is
essential to have a complete and comprehensive exchange of information and a full
and
careful exploration by both parties of all the
issues involved, so that an accurate appreciation of the position may be gained on
each
side.
Now you have read and heard it on many occasions, but I draw your attention to these
words,
and that is, that the questions to be discussed are
of such complexity and of such significance for
both countries that it is essential to have a complete and careful exploration by
both parties; and
again, at the end of that message: "so that an
accurate appreciation of the position may be
gained on each side". You see how important it
was to the Canadian government to make their
position very clear. They recognized the complexity and the seriousness of this approach.
As
you are aware, and as I said before to you, we had
no expert assistance of any kind to help us. We
applied to the Commission of Government to
assist us in this matter, but the request was
refused, so we went off with what we had to do
the best we could....
On the Canadian side, the cabinet members
designated to take part in the discussions were
flanked by some of the top men of the civil
service of Canada. Moreover, the problem of
confederation had been under active study by this
particular group since October of 1946, and actually Canada has been studying the
proposition
for some years past. As you are aware, our
delegation had no such opportunity of preparation and certainly no such assistance
during the
discussions. In my opinion our delegation was
not competent to fully discuss such an important
matter without proper assistance, and without an
adequate study of the problem.
I say quite sincerely that for any person, member of this Convention or not, to advise
the people
of this country to join in federal union with
Canada without the necessary study of all the
implications of such union, is nothing less than
criminal. What, you ask, is the proper approach?
In my opinion, before union should be recommended, a complete study of the Canadian
system should be made by the various departmental
heads of our civil service, to see and advise the
effect such union would have. The heads of these
1094 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
departments would then confer with a delegation
having full powers to negotiate. In other words,
the case for Newfoundland would be carefully
prepared and fully understood by those who are
to present it, and moreover, the delegation representing Newfoundland should have
with them
these same departmental heads to advise and
assist throughout the negotiations.
I trust my fellow members of the delegation
will not take it that I am making any reflection on
them when I say that the delegation was not
competent to discuss the matters we were discussing. This is not intended to be a
reflection on
the ability of any one of them, but simply —
except possibly in the case of Mr. Smallwood —
that none of us had studied the matter before the
appointment of the delegation, and we were at a
tremendous disadvantage with no technical advice, and lastly, but most important of
all, we had
no power to negotiate.
I frankly confess that the offer we have
received appears to be fair, but I am fully confident that a delegation properly informed,
assisted
by competent advisers, and with the power to
negotiate, would receive a better offer from
Canada than we received. I say that with full
knowledge of what I am saying. From information I gathered from various sources during
our
visit to Ottawa, I am certain that the Canadian
government would have given us a better offer
had the case been properly presented. Again I
repeat, with full knowledge of what I am saying,
that we can still get a better offer or, if you will,
more favourable terms of confederation, if the
approach is made by a government elected by and
representative of Newfoundland.
I do not want you to understand that our
delegation did not do a good job or that we were
not given every assistance by the Canadian
government. On the contrary, I can assure you
that the delegation did a good job and further, that
we had every co-operation from the Canadian
government. Every possible courtesy was extended to us, from the time of our arrival
in
Canada until our departure. I have nothing but the
greatest of praise and the kindliest feelings for all
those with whom we came in contact, from the
Prime Minister down. The representatives of the
Canadian cabinet with whom we held these discussions, were extremely generous of their
time
and more than considerate in the manner in which
they treated us. These gentlemen are extremely
busy, but at all times they endeavoured to meet
our ideas with respect to meetings, no matter how
inconvenient it was to them. Their advisers,
among whom were included the top men of the
civil service, were not only very kind, but at all
times showed that they were anxious to assist us
in every way possible. I gathered from what was
said here on their return, that those who visited
England did not get such a reception. However,
I repeat to those of you who are inclined towards
confederation, that the only proper way in fairness to Newfoundland, is that negotiations
should be conducted by a Newfoundland government if we are to make the best possible
deal for
the country.
The facts we have brought back are a very
good basis for future negotiations, and there need
be no worry in your minds that if the present offer
from Canada is not accepted, it will lapse. This
was made clear at our last meeting when we were
informed that, unless world economic conditions
changed, the offer would remain the same if it
was not accepted at this time, and negotiations
later renewed. Therefore I say, in view of this
fact, should we not first elect a government to
finalise any such deal? If nothing else but from
sentiment, if we are going to confederate, let us
do it in the proper way. Let us go in the front door
and not the back door! Let us, as befitting the
dignity if this country of ours which is 450 years
old, consummate union in a manner that befits
such an important decision.
[Short recess]
Mr. Higgins Just before that recess, I was commenting on the fact that the report brought back
by the delegation and embodied in the Black
Books and the Grey Book, was in my opinion a
good basis for future negotiation. That is as far as
this country can go at the present time — it is a
good basis for future negotiations between
countries.
However, to return to the argument. It is easy
to understand the reason for Canada wishing to
acquire Newfoundland. To begin with, Canada
is, I believe, the third largest country in area in
the world, but she only has a population of some
12 millions. She needs immigrants to develop her
own country and is at present engaged in bringing
them in by the thousands. She has tremendous
areas of territory, good rich land at present lying
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1095
idle. Why acquire more land that, in a large
measure, does not compare with what they have
at present? Why acquire additional territory that
Canada appears to consider is merely going to be
an additional drain on the pockets of her people?
Various explanations have been advanced, from
personal pride of the Prime Minister to complete
a job his predecessors could not do, all the way
down to the fact that Canada likes us and wants
to help us. Tucked into the middle of all these
reasons are the mineral resources of the island,
but in my opinion the only real reason is our
strategic geographical position. It is in this connection that I propose to address
you at length
today.... The United States, as well, recognises
this fact. North American pressure and economic
interest tend to take Newfoundland towards the
United States, and it is the fear of Newfoundland's becoming a possession of the United
States more than any other single factor that is
motivating the evident interest that Canada has in
Newfoundland.
Newfoundland, because of its position, possesses a meaning that its economic weight
alone
could not give it. It is on the edge of two worlds
— the North American continent and the North
Atlantic basin. To the continent it is an outpost
but in the North Atlantic it forces itself on the
attention; it is in the forefront of the sailor's
thoughts. When soundings are picked up on the
Banks, America is coming near, and when the
first landfall is made it is Newfoundland. The
island is of the continent but not in it. As long as
faces on the continent were turned westward,
Newfoundland was forgotten; but for some years
past, events forced them to turn eastward again
and so their glance had to rest on it. The island is
a focus of the lines of force crossing the North
Atlantic basin...
[Mr. Higgins then gave a lengthy summary of
Newfoundland's history, concentrating on its
strategic position in the North Atlantic]
Four centuries of history reveal rather clearly
the influences that play about the island of Newfoundland. They are oceanic and continental;
they radiate out from Europe and from the continent of North America. They are not
constant,
but vary with the variations in the forms of political organisation in surrounding
lands and with
the combinations or severances between those
political organisations. The island is revealed by
its history to be a focus of lines of force, a place
where international policies intersect. As such it
will always be conspicuous in the history of the
North Atlantic basin and usually so in that of the
North American continent.
Human history has alternated between terrestrial and maritime periods. In the middle
ages,
the chief centres of movement, the chief routes,
were within the continents. As a result of the
discoveries beginning in the 15th century,
mankind became maritime and the centres moved
out to what had formerly been distant frontier
countries. With exploration completed humanity
tended to become terrestrial once more, the interior continental masses, such as Germany
and the
United States, rising in importance as the
maritime areas declined. Today ease of communication makes lakes of the oceans and
hence
the sharpness of the distinction is softened. The
past war, indeed, has caused the maritime areas
to take on a new importance.
The English thrust into the Americas three
centuries ago afforded a striking example of the
rise in significance of the maritime world. Yet no
sooner had settlements been made then the
oceanic thrust began to be transformed into an
indigenous continentalism, solidly based on the
soil. This continentalism has steadily grown and
upon it is now erected the world's greatest power,
the United States. The resolution of extra-continental rivalries by the English victory
of 1763
left one race supreme and its later unfortunate
division as a result of the American revolution
has not prevented harmonious co-operation between its two parts in the threat of a
common
peril. Among other things, it has allowed the
continent of North America to be thought of and
dealt with as a unit in a way which Europe never
could. This has made for a simplicity and largeness of conception with all secondary
details
tending to fall into a general scheme. For example, plans for the defence of Europe
have not
entered into European thinking, but we in this
continent are busy putting into execution plans
for the defence of North America.
The American "fence" through the middle of
the Pacific ocean and the American thrust
eastward from the Atlantic ocean, together
amount to a recognition that North America is an
island and that its problems must be studied as
those of an island; sea communications and out
1096 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
lying positions. In terms of defence this means
that the continent as a whole must think in naval
terms and must advance its defence far off from
shore to prevent threat of invasion or of serious
damage to the island citadel.
We are concerned here with one aspect of the
entire Atlantic effort— the thrust northeastward,
particularly as it impinges on Newfoundland.
This thrust is readily divisible into two arms, that
along the coast and that coming out of the St.
Lawrence valley. The Maritime Provinces of
Canada and Newfoundland are the area in which
the two thrusts meet. The area of meeting has not
been stationary but constantly moving. In the
17th century, French (or St. Lawrence) influence
extended well into the present State of Maine. In
the 18th the Gut of Canso was its extreme southwestern limit. In the first half of
the 19th, St.
Lawrence influence was still further curtailed
and was hardly visible beyond Gaspé. Then with
modern communications came its rapid recovery.
Confederation extended it throughout the three
Maritime Provinces, and note the absorption of
all local banking institutions by the large
Canadian banks, and the Bank of Nova Scotia's
conversion of itself into a Montreal organisation
— and the economic forces of which Confederation was a counterpart worked over the
political
boundary into Maine, once more tying a good
part of that state into the structure.
A similar extension went on to the northeastward; with the railway built to Port-aux-
Basques, the way was open for an assault on the
last stronghold of maritimism, Newfoundland.
This assault was delayed, but when it came, the
main manoeuvre in it was the establishment of
the steamer route from Sydney to Port-aux-
Basques, and the building of the Newfoundland
railway across the island to St. John's. This of
course was not the only means by which St.
Lawrence influences came in, but it immensely
facilitated their ingress. The Canadianisation of
island finance was a subsidiary movement based
on this St. Lawrence system of communication,
as was the Canadianisation of two of our major
denominations within recent years. Other evidences of the St. Lawrence impact will
suggest themselves. In a mechanical age, the St. Lawrence
holds the trump cards of transportation — steamship, rail and air. Its most serious
disability is its
winter closing, which forces it back to its second
line through Sydney or Halifax.
Since the summer of 1940 political events
have given renewed vitality to the other arm of
the thrust. American influence has been vastly
strengthened by the grant of the bases which has
been characterised as "moving the American
boundary 700 miles eastward". The American
flag now flies in Newfoundland, American
sailors and soldiers are to be seen on the streets
and American ships in the harbour. American
civilians are following, most of them as tourists
and out of curiosity, some on the outlook for
business. Behind this renewed Atlantic push lies
the gigantic wealth and power of the United
States...
If the Maritime Provinces are the continental
termination of the Appalachian Barrier, Newfoundland is in its extreme end, severed
from the
rest of the formation by the sea. It thus affords the
clearest illustration of the marginal nature of the
maritime region, set as it is squarely at the intersection of the two lines of force.
To put the point
another way, it is within the overlapping fields of
those two great metropolitan magnets which
have been battling each other for three centuries
past, Montreal and New York. Like other Atlantic lands, it is of course also within
the magnetic
field of another metropolitan area, Great Britain.
The pulls of the three, as its history indicates,
have never been constant or equal upon it. Newfoundland may be likened to a buoy fast
to a long
mooring chain in water where strong currents
run; the buoy streams out from its mooring first
this way and then that, dependent upon the direction of the current.
Newfoundland lies across the sea entrance to
the Dominion of Canada, and may well be
described as Canada's front door. If the door were
closed by the island's coming into unfriendly
possession, it would menace Canada's main
highway with the outside world. The ports of the
Maritime Provinces would remain, but their use
involves an additional rail-haul of 500 to 1,000
miles. If the door were locked, as by hostile
occupation, it would be difficult to keep communication going even through the ports
of the
Maritimes. This becomes obvious when the narrowness and difficulty of the passages
north and
south of Newfoundland are realised...
The situation works just as well in reverse.
Given effective defence of Newfoundland by
January 1948 NATIONAL CONVENTION 1097
Canada, it is difficult to see how an enemy surface vessel could get into the Gulf,
or if it did, get
out again, especially now that aircraft play so
large a part in observation and attack. Submarines
are a different story: both straits have ample
water to allow submarines proceeding through
submerged. The Straits of Bell Isle, with modem
means of detection, could be made very
dangerous to them, but no doubt they could still
pass and repass Cabot Strait, but certainly not
without considerable risk. If the island by some
unlucky chance were to fall into hostile hands, it
would be another story: shipping within the Gulf
would be in constant peril. Everything considered, Newfoundland may be held to be
a very
effective stopper in the Canadian bottle, or in the
picturesque language of Mr. Churchill, "an
orange in the mouth of a sucking pig".
Strategically our possession of Labrador is
also very important. Apart altogether from the
airport at Goose, seaplanes may very well be
secreted in the deep fiords of Labrador and by
building up caches of gasoline between Quebec
and Ontario, and using the innumerable lakes of
that part of the world, they could work across to
within easy bombing distances of the main
centres of the continent, strike sudden blows and
be off again. Anyone who knows that country
will grasp at once the difficulties involved in
stalking a raider to his lair. If he had numerous
caches of gasoline on various lakes, he could
keep playing hide and seek indefinitely... The
coast of Labrador, the natural base from which
bush-raiding would be conducted, is definitely of
great strategic importance.
The great airport at Gander has changed the
strategic picture of Newfoundland for it is so
large and has such an enormous capacity in plane
traffic that it becomes like a great fortress or
battleship. It would be fatal to allow an enemy to
damage it or capture it, hence the defences by
which it is surrounded make the island still more
like a fortress — a fortress from which the garrison can sally out at will and over
oceanic distances. From Newfoundland, modern bombing
planes can reach the British Isles to the east and
Martinique, Puerto Rico and New Orleans to the
south, Kansas City and Regina to the west... If
the Newfoundland airports were in hostile hands,
many important centres might thus expect to be
bombed.
The vital position of Newfoundland in the
approaches to North America thus clearly comes
out. It covers the whole of the eastern seaboard
at least as far down as New York. If it were in the
hands of an unfriendly power, all exits from the
Gulf of St. Lawrence would be closed and every
Atlantic coast port down as far as Boston would
be subject to attack from the air. Even if the
power which had seized it did not have complete
command of the sea, it could slip out surface
raiders as the Germans did in the last war....
The constant element in all strategic studies is
geography in its aspects of distance, topography,
means of communication and climate. The varying element is national policy. Before
specific
strategic plans can be worked out, the policy of
the state must be decided upon. If the state wishes
to survive, the constant elements impose upon its
policy a certain quality of predestination....
Let us look at what the attitudes of the chief
powers interested must necessarily therefore be
towards Newfoundland. The countries considered are Great Britain, the United States
and
Canada in the order named. The direct interest of
Great Britain in Newfoundland is small. There is
the historic connection, composed of sentiment,
allegiance and finance, but for Great Britain
Newfoundland is necessarily a minor matter, one
of the infinite embarrassing problems of empire,
no more. The day has long gone by when British
policy towards North America had any element
of the dynamic about it — that day passed with
the annexation of Canada in 1763 — and today
North America represents for England not a
sphere of interest but a supply base. Providing the
supplies keep coming, the internal matters of the
continent are a matter of indifference to Great
Britain. Her anxiety about supplies would lead
her to try to see that there are good bases from
which they may be despatched, but efforts of this
sort take the form of advice and request, not of
direct action. In World War I, Great Britain was
still acting indirectly in British North America
and there was much British naval activity in the
Atlantic ports, especially St. John's and Halifax.
In the last war Canada replaced Great Britain,
except in the matter of conveying ships.
For the United States, on the other hand, Newfoundland is vital. The United States
could not
possibly tolerate a hostile power in Newfoundland. American naval thinking since
1098 NATIONAL CONVENTION January 1948
Mahan's day is said to have desired a base in
Newfoundland but there could have been no possibility of obtaining the concession
except under
the pressure of a great emergency, such as occurred on the fall of France. The unconditional
British grant of the Newfoundland bases therefore represents something far larger
than the mere
panic of the moment; these bases seem to be part
of a coherent, consistent pattern of American
defence now of many years standing. This pattern
works itself out bit by bit, either by conscious
action based on long-range policy or by empiric
processes enjoined by the circumstances of the
moment and as opportunity offers, opportunity
being political events of sufficient magnitude to
scare the American public out of its ordinary
indifference to matters of defence.
American expansion, of which schemes for
defence form an aspect, has been continuous
from the days of the first settlements and the
doctrine of isolation has had little to do with it....
Since World War I at least, the motive in most of
this expansion has been plain — to add to the
security of the continental United States... The
east coast, far the most important, for some
curious reason, has been the most neglected —
perhaps because of a half-conscious perception
of Great Britain as a barrier against predatory
Europe. Yet it must have been evident to keen
students that the United States sooner or later
would have to have Atlantic offshore defences
comparable with those it possesses in the Pacific.
That process was begun in the summer of 1940
with the acquisition of bases in Bermuda and
Newfoundland and extended in 1941 with the
moves into Greenland and Iceland. The United
States has thus very consistently throughout its
history followed a policy of securing control of
all outposts from which threats to its security
might be made. Its conception of outposts has
grown with the increase in the range and effectiveness of the instruments of war.
Where the
conception will eventually lead American arms,
is anyone's speculation...
Whatever the temporary problems of adjustment yet unsettled, it is impossible to go
about
Newfoundland today without feeling that something big has occurred; something as big
as the
previous American advances eastward along the
coast in 1745 and 1758. This advance has cut that
much more of the continent out of the dominion
of a non-American power. Actually, perhaps, out
of the dominion of another power into whose
possession the island came many generations
ago.
The nation whose fortunes are most intimately
bound up with Newfoundland is Canada. It is
abundantly clear that it must be a major aspect of
Canadian policy to ensure the retention of Newfoundland in friendly hands and to see
that even
the friendliest of hands do not arrange things to
her disadvantage. So long as Newfoundland was
a simple British possession and there was no
doubt of Great Britain's sea supremacy in the
Atlantic, issues of sovereignty did not arise.
Canadians were slow to grasp the changing position of Great Britain in sea power and
the way in
which that change might affect them. The whole
issue was focused sharply in June, 1940. The fall
of France and the possible fall of Great Britain
was quickly reflected in Canada's assumption of
responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland
and in her increase of her forces there. This was
the first direct Canadian intervention in Newfoundland.
Canada is as yet politically an immature
country that is only slowly realising its own individuality; it is therefore not to
be expected that
it would have as clear-cut a policy as has the
United States. Until June 1940, it was impossible
to secure much attention to arguments urging that
Canada should assume responsibilities in Newfoundland.
I move now that the committee rise and report
progress.
Mr. Chairman The committee report that they
have considered the matter to them referred,
made some progress and ask leave to sit again
tomorrow. The motion is that the report of the
committee be received and adopted. Motion carried.
Mr. Hollett Notice of closure: I beg to move that
immediately before the orders of the day are
called on Wednesday, 14 January, 1948.
[The Convention adjourned]
