Mr. Smallwood Mr. Chairman, I would like to
congratulate this National Convention on its wis
dom in sending a delegation to London. I want to
congratulate, very sincerely, the delegation itself,
536 NATIONAL CONVENTION May 1947
on getting the clear-cut reply it has brought us
from the British government. The reply is clear,
crisp and unmistakable. Except as to one point,
the reply tells us exactly where we stand so far as
Britain's connection with our future government
is concerned. Now, where
do we stand? ....With
regard to the public debt, whatever form of
government we may choose, Britain will call in
$63 million of our sterling debt, and issue new
bonds at a saving of one-half of one percent. That
will save us roughly half a million dollars a year
in interest on our debt. That Britain will do
whatever form of government we choose.
Interest-free loans — the British government
has $9 million of our money that our government
loaned them during the war, free of interest.
Britain says now she isn't anxious to pay interest
on it, but whatever form of government we
choose we can have the $9 million back whenever we ask. They say they hope we won't
ask
them for it yet, because their own financial condition is pretty black — but whatever
form of
government we have, we can have that $9 million
when we demand it. Development loans —
whatever form of government we decide to have,
Britain will not be able to lend us money for
development purposes.
Gander — so long as we are under Commission government, Britain will pay two-thirds
of
the operating losses on Gander, and Newfoundland one-third, with Newfoundland paying
all the loss up to quarter of a million a year. Under
any other form of government, the British
government will not pay any of the losses on
Gander. American bases — Britain will not try to
get anything from the US for us in return for the
American bases. She tells us that she sees no
reason to think that the States would give us
anything. It's Britain's opinion that no matter
what form of government we may have, we will
not get anything from the States. However,
should we ever have our own government,
Britain would be willing to help us try to get
something from the States, even though she herself does not think that the States
would listen to
it. Fish and ore — no matter what form of government we may have in future, Britain
sees very
little hope of any long-term contracts to sell Newfoundland fish or iron ore in Great
Britain. And
that's the story, Mr. Chairman — these are the
things the British government will do, or will not
do, under this or that form of government.
But it's not the whole story. For example, the
delegation asked the British government whether
the national referendum could contain only two
forms of government for the people to vote on —
Commission government and responsible
government, they asked them that question. No.
said the British government, that is not so, the
Convention can recommend other suitable forms
of government. The National Convention Act,
they tell us, clearly authorises the Convention to
make recommendations as to possible future
forms of government in addition to Commission
government and responsible government. And
the British government told the delegation something else. They said that if the Newfoundland
people should vote for responsible government,
then from that minute that government would be
completely responsible for Newfoundland's
finances. The British government would no
longer take the responsibility they took for Newfoundland when we went under Commission
government in 1934. If we vote for responsible
government, then we are cut off without even the
proverbial shilling; we'll be completely on our
own, we'll have to paddle our own canoe.
There's nothing surprising in that statement,
nothing new in it. It's exactly what we expected,
for in that statement the British government has
only repeated one of the oldest, one of the most
widely recognised principles of the British
constitutional system. Back in 1894 the banks
went broke. There are people in this country who
remember that now. It was a desparate situation
that confronted the Government of Newfoundland, as desparate a situation as ever confronted
the Newfoundland government. The
cabinet met, I believe it was Sir William
Whiteway who was prime minister, they met day
after day to see what they could do to deal with
that desperate situation, and finally, on February
11, 1895, the cabinet asked the Governor to send
a cable to the Secretary of State, and this is the
cable he sent:
St. John's, Feb. ll, 1895.
To the Secretary of State:
I am requested to forward the following:
My Ministers are of opinion that an Imperial
Guarantee of Interest to the amount of
£20,000 sterling per annum of Newfoundland's bonds would enable them to pay off
May 1947 NATIONAL CONVENTION 537
all floating liabilities of the Colony and to
carry the Government over the present crisis
until revenue will again suffice for the wants
of the Island. Would the Imperial Government consider this matter at as early a date
as
possible and reply on what conditions they
would give such guarantee to preserve the
integrity of the Colony through a temporary
though most serious crisis.
Signed: Governor.
Eight days later the Secretary of State cabled
back his reply, which is as follows:
London, Feb. 19, 1895.
To the Governor of Newfoundland:
The application of your Ministers made in
your telegram of the 11th February has been
carefully considered by Her Majesty's
Government. It is a necessary consequence
of the self-government enjoyed by Colonies
having Responsible Government that such
Colonies should not look to the Imperial
Government to aid them in their financial
arrangements. Such aid would require constant supervision, inconsistent with self-
government. To guarantee Newfoundland's
bonds would be to create a precedent of wide
application which would involve Her
Majesty's Government in responsibilities
which they could not with justice to the tax
payers of the United Kingdom undertake.
They are therefore unable to accept the
proposal contained in your telegram.
Signed: Secretary of State.
The general principle of responsible government is plain and simple. If a British
colony is
self-supporting, then it's entitled to responsible
government if it wants it. But the very fact that a
British colony has responsible government is
taken as meaning that it is not entitled to financial
help from the British government. If the colony
gets financial help from the British government
it has to give up responsible government, because
no colony is supposed to have responsible
government unless and until it is fully self-supporting: and if it is fully self-supporting
then it
does not need financial help from the British
government. Financial help and responsible
government are like oil and water — they just
don't mix, and so it is not surprising that the
British government tells us that you can have
responsible government if the people vote for it,
but if you have it don't count on financial help
from us.
And now there is one final piece of information that the British government gave our
London
delegation: if the Newfoundland people decide to
stay under Commission government, then the
British government will go on being responsible
for our Country's finances. They'll be responsible
for us if we stay under Commission government.
That, Mr. Chairman, is a gallant offer by the
mother country — a very gallant offer indeed. It
is an offer that stirs our emotion. The very gallantry of it brings the tears to our
eyes. The old
mother country is on the broad of her back. Men
around the world are wondering privately if
Britain is headed for a financial smash. She has
just come through the worst calamity in history.
She has been blitzed and smashed almost to
pieces — millions of her homes and buildings
levelled to the ground by bombs. Her industries
have been drained of their vitality, her factories
and mills have fallen into decay, her shipping has
been sent to the bottom in millions of tons. She
opened her very veins and poured out her blood
in her own defence and the defence of the
civilised world. Britain gave her all, to the last
farthing. Her people are bowed down now with a
public debt of $100,000 million — over $10,000
for every family. The British people have the
highest public debt in the whole world. Britain is
in debt to her very eyes — you could almost say
she's mortgaged up to the hilt, to the very limit,
yes, and beyond. the limit.... Altogether in the
world today the mother country owes more than
$20 billion....
The whole world is aware of Britain's plight.
She's being kept alive today by blood plasma in
the form of American and Canadian dollars
loaned to her. And we are given to understand
that shortly she is coming to Canada to ask for
another loan of $500 million on top of the $2,000
million that the Canadian government loaned her
last year. Australia the other day gave Britain a
gift of $80 million. New Zealand on the same day
gave her a gift of $40 million. Those were not
cash gifts, those two British countries simply
reduced by those amounts the debts that Britain
owed them. It was a gesture of goodwill to the old
mother country in her calamity, something like
the bowl of hot broth that a neighbour in Newfoundland carried to a sick patient next
door. For
538 NATIONAL CONVENTION May 1947
that is what Britain is today — she is the sick
patient of this world. It will take her many years
to pull through, and she is going to need all kinds
of help to do it even then.
And that is why, Mr. Chairman, Britain's
offer to Newfoundland is such a gallant one —
one of the most pathetically gallant offers this
world has ever seen. It is an offer to share her
poverty with us, with Newfoundland. As long as
the old mother country has a crust of bread she
offers to share it with us. Let us reverence her for
it. In 1934 she took over financial responsibilty
for Newfoundland. She said if we gave up
responsible government, and came under Commission government, she'd come to our rescue.
Britain was better off then than we were. It was
a little better than a crust of bread that she offered
to share with us then in 1934. That was six years
before the war broke out. Today she is letting
rich India, Burma, rich Palestine go, she is giving
up her vital control of Greece to the United States.
She is cutting some of her terrible losses, but out
of her poverty offers to continue to be responsible
for Newfoundland if we should decide to hold on
to Commission government.
Mr. Chairman, I wonder what Britain's
private thoughts are about this matter. Is she
privately hoping that Newfoundland will not take
her up on that offer? Does Britain make us this
offer out of a sense of honour?.... Does she make
it in the hope that we here in Newfoundland know
enough about Britain's own terrible plight not to
take her up on it?
Now, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take a look, a
close look, at what, this magnaminous, this gallant offer of Britain really boils
down to. Suppose
we Newfoundlanders in the referendum vote to
go on under Commission government. Just what
will that mean? Just what help would it mean to
us from the mother country? We've got two
things to judge by. We have the period from 1934
to 1940, when we desperately needed help from
Britain, when she was much better off than she is
today. What did Britain give us then?.... Out of
her taxes Britain paid over to us certain modest
amounts, just barely enough to keep our people
alive, hardly that. The Commission of Government between 1934 and 1940 was always
hard-
up, always short of money. They couldn't do this
and they couldn't do that. Our public services
were starved. It was only after 1940 that they
really began to spend money and then they were
getting it from us Newfoundlanders. In fairness
to their own taxpayers, the British government
could only hand money over to us in dribs and
drabs, in very small amounts between 1934 and
1940. That is the first thing we have to judge by.
The other thing is Britain's own condition now
and for years to come.
Now, judging by these facts, what help would
Britain give us in future, if we did vote for Commission government? Suppose hard
times fell
upon us, another depression, just what financial
help could we expect from the mother country?
Here is how it works. In the fall of the year the
Commissioner for Finance sends around to all
the departments; he says we are going to make up
a budget, you let me know what your department
will need, and let me have it as soon as you can.
The departments send back estimates, and from
those estimates the Commissioner makes up his
budget. He says for the year beginning April 1, I
am going to spend say $15 million; the only
revenue I can collect is $13 million. I am going
to have a deficit of $2 million. What does he do
next? He sends his budget to the Dominions
Office, hands it over to the accountants of the
Treasury.... If they approve that budget they are
going to have to pony up $2 million. What do they
do? They cut down the expenditure. They say to
the Commission, "We will allow you a deficit of
$1 million or $500,000, that is what we are
prepared to pay." When the Commissioner for
Finance was before the committee some time
ago, we asked him how the British government
exercised control over the Commission of
Government and he said, "They control our
budget." If we go on under Commission of
Government, what can we expect in 1948 or
1958?
I am driven to the conclusion that this offer
that the United Kingdom government has made
us, this offer to go on being responsible for our
country if we really do decide to hold on to
Commission government — I am driven to
believe that any help we would get would be on
the smallest possible scale, just bare token payments each year. Dole would be the
lowest possible scale, our public services would be starved.
The Commission government would always be
short of money. The only money they would have
would be what taxes we might be able to pay
May 1947 NATIONAL CONVENTION 539
them, and a small trickle of money from the old
country. The mother country would share her
poverty with us. That is what Commission of
government would mean in future, if we Newfoundlanders decide to take up the old country's
gallant offer to us.
Now, our people must have a free hand in this
matter. If they want to vote to go on under Commission govemment, they must have the
right to
do it — after all, it is their country, it is not ours.
But if they vote for Commission government,
they deserve to know what they will be voting
for. I believe that in voting to go on under Commission government, our people would
be voting
for financial help from Britain that just would not
be forthcoming. They would be voting for a
shadow.
Finally, I want to say a word of congratulation
to Major Cashin on his speech yesterday. I have
no doubt that he fought in London, along with the
other delegates, to get all he could for Newfoundland; but I also know that in his
heart it must
have been very little he expected from a country
that is up against what Britain is up against today.
I do not expect that he or the delegates can be
disappointed. If I wanted to be nasty, I could take
up his speech and criticise it, but I want Major
Cashin to back me up. I want to make him my
minister of finance. He has been fighting for
responsible government, and I believe he is as
sincere in that as I may be in fighting for confederation if we get good terms. If
I wanted to
make him angry, I would say what Sir Edward
Morris said (standing about where I am standing
now) to Sir William Coaker. He said (pointing his
finger at Sir William), "I will get you when I want
you." I will not say that, because I am sure of one
thing; if the day ever comes when Major Cashin
makes up his mind that there is a better chance to
get rid of Commission of Government by going
into confederation, I believe he will be a confederate from that day.
Yesterday Major Cashin gave us some news.
He told us that he brought back from London the
firm opinion that the British government would
be pleased if Newfoundland did throw in her lot
with the Dominion of Canada. I do not know if
Lord Addison or the prime minister told him that,
but he told us, and I hope he is right. Major
Cashin, like myself, is an old-timer; he has been
gauging public opinion for a long time. If the
people of Newfoundland thought that the British
government would like us to link up with Canada,
that will make more confederates in Newfoundland than Joe Smallwood could make if
I
am talking for a year. There is another hit of news.
He said that up in Ottawa they are pleased that
this delegation is going up there; they are
delighted; they are not writing back and demanding to know this, that, and the other
thing; they
said, "Come on up", with their heart in their hand.
He said the joy bells will ring. I hope they are
glad, because if the joy bells ring out in Ottawa,
it means they really want Newfoundland; and that
means they will give us better terms than I am
hoping for now, and I will get out fighting for
confederation and a better Newfoundland.
Mr. Crosbie I agree with Mr. Smallwood when
he said that some members of the delegation were
not disappointed. I know I was not disappointed
with the information we got. I was very pleased
we got the information from the Dominions Office that the people themselves would
have the
right to decide what form of government we
would have in this country.
We ought to remember the plight of the British
people is a very serious one. No one could go to
England, meet the people and see what they have
to put up with in the way of shortages, without
realising how high a price they paid for victory,
and are still paying. On top of that, they have had
a good deal of bad luck. Everything seemed to
come together and it is astonishing to see how
cheerful they are in the face of all their trouble,
and how sure they are of coming back to
prosperity.
I have heard it said we went to England to ask
for help. That was never in my mind, and I am
sure it was never in the mind of any of my
colleagues on the delegation. We did not want
help, and sought for nothing except what we felt
Newfoundland was entitled to, and what was fair.
We did want information, and we thought we
were entitled to discuss and ask for trade agreements with England.... On the financial
side, all
we wanted was the right to suggest that the money
on interest-free loan in England should be used
to reduce our debt. That would have saved us
about $400,000 a year in interest and sinking fund
at no cost to Britain. In fact, since she guarantees
the debt, it would be helpful to her to have a good
slice of it paid off by our cancellation of a dollar
540 NATIONAL CONVENTION May 1947
loan. We were told that the Commission of
Government did not think it prudent, having
regard for the development requirements of the
country, to use the balance of the loans for debt
reduction. The Commission of Government did
not think it prudent to save this country $400,000
a year in interest. The Commission is spending
more money than any government ever dreamed
of spending on what it calls development. Unfortunately, none of it is productive
development.
And this extravagant government does not think
it prudent to reduce our debt and save us
$400,000 a year. That, sir, was as far as we could
get on that issue. The Commission did not think
it prudent. The Dominions Office agreed, and
that was that.
What inference can we draw from all this? If
we used that $10 million to reduce the debt we
would still have $20 million left on which to draw
if need should arise. Does this mean that the
Commission expects to have so much of the
surplus spent by 1950 that it will have to draw on
that money in England? If that is the case, then I
say the quicker we get them out the better, for no
Newfoundland government would ever think of
spending money on that scale to so little purpose,
and have any hope of saving its political neck.
There is no special cause to be grateful for the
conversion of the sterling debt coming up next
January. Money can be borrowed in the open
market at 2.5% and we should be getting the
benefit of it. We should also have the debt
reduced by the amount of the sinking fund. I am
not particularly grateful for this intention to convert, because it should be done,
it costs nobody
anything and it saves us something worthwhile.
It was suggested to Commissioner Wild by the
Finance Committee sometime before he left for
England. No doubt the prudent Commission of
Government will be able to use the saving on debt
interest to good advantage.
There are many things about our visit to London to which I would like to refer. I
did not like
the attitude of the Dominions Secretary about
Gander airport. I did not like his attitude about
the US bases, I did not like a lot of things he said,
and I liked least of all the way in which he was
able to turn aside any questions of importance
when it did not suit him to answer them. We were
only a group of Newfoundlanders, the elected
representatives of the people, trying our best to
get some accounting of stewardship, and some
improvements in our financial relations with
Britain, and all we got was frustration at every
step. I have no personal axe to grind, but I felt that
we were unwelcome visitors who were going to
get as little information as possible. In fact, it was
clear that the quicker we relieved England of our
presence, the happier the Dominions Office
crowd would be
But there is one thing that made me more
angry than anything else, and that was the question of our trade with Britain. I do
not have to tell
the Convention or the country that our problem
is markets. During the war years we built up our
frozen fish industry from about 3 million to 30
million pounds a year. During these years we
could have sold most of our output to the United
States, but Britain's urgent needs naturally
caused the producers to give priority to United
Kingdom markets at prices below those obtainable elsewhere. That was the right thing
to do,
nobody can have two opinions on this point.
When the war was over the demand for Newfoundland fish was greatly reduced, not because
Britain could not use our fish, but because the
Ministry of Food had to buy it elsewhere. I intend
now to give a brief history of the negotiations that
went on this year for the sale of 20 million pounds
of frozen fillets to the British market. A price was
agreed which was lower than fish could be
bought from other suppliers. Our products met
difficult conditions relating to shipment. Everything seemed to be in the bag, and
then the
Ministry of Food reneged, and the news came to
us from other sources that the order was going to
Norway. The trouble, it was said, was the scarcity
of dollars. It was then proposed that Britain
should take payment for the new Railway
steamers in fish, but this proposition was
rejected, presumably because the dollars had already been transferred, even though
the first ship
would not be ready before July, and the others
much later. So the last word local suppliers had,
was that the Dominions Office had reported
having carried the matter to the highest quarters,
and had been advised to tell the Newfoundlanders that there was nothing doing. It
reminds me of the famous remark of a French
queen who, when told the French peasants had no
bread, asked, "Why don't they eat cake?"
This fish matter was very much on my mind
May 1947 NATIONAL CONVENTION 541
when I went to England. I am not in the frozen
fillet business, but I know what diversification
can mean to the fish industry. People had put
large sums of money into cold storage and
processing equipment. New draggers had been
built. The fresh frozen fishery was changing the
lot of many thousands of fishermen by giving
them cash returns and relieving them of the toil
and uncertainty of curing salt cod. However, to
keep up production until the American and other
markets expand, we have to find an outlet for our
full production for a period of two or three years
of readjustment. Britain had taken most of our
fillets. Now she is cutting us off completely, and
giving orders to Norway and Iceland. When this
matter was raised, Lord Addison did admit that
Newfoundland fish was preferred by the Ministry
of Food. When he was then asked why negotiations were going on for the purchase of
12,000
tons of Icelandic fish at higher prices, while Newfoundland had fish to offer, he
said that Iceland
was a soft money country. I told him that the
Icelanders had to get goods, if, with this money
they were unable to buy things in other markets,
because, you know, you can't eat five pound
notes, and then Lord Addison tried to change the
subject. I referred to our suggestion that Newfoundland lend dollars out of her surplus
to help
Britain pay for our fish, and all the Dominions
Secretary did was to tell us we had no right to be
discussing trade matters. These were outside our
terms of reference. It was pointed out that we had
to report on the economic prospects of the
country, and had to know something about these
trade matters, and all we met was a brick wall.
The only possible conclusion was that it was a
political matter and that, for reasons best known
to herself and not for shortage of dollars, Britain
was willing to buy Icelandic fish that she did not
like as well as ours, and was willing to pay more
for it than our producers wanted. If that is a square
deal, I don't know what the term means....
On other matters we were left in a state of
uncertainty. We can get no assurance that they
will keep on buying Bell Island ore, even though
very soon the British government itself will own
and operate the steel mills through nationalisation, and thus will not have to intercede
with
private owners. We can get no assurance they will
continue to buy other local products they can use.
They turned us down cold on our proposition to
lend them dollars, and then they expect us to
come home happy and tell you what grand people
they are because they got us a car to see the sights
of London, and tickets for a football match, and
tickets to an A.P. Herbert show. Mr. Chairman,
the very existence of the people of this country is
bound up in these trade matters, but it seems to
me that the position of our people is less of
importance than the special British interests in
Iceland and elsewhere. In the end, on all matters
that they didn't want to talk about, we were told
that we were outside our terms of reference. We
were reminded we were not a government, although I cannot help thinking that, as the
only
elected representatives of the people, we have
more right to be considered their spokesmen than
this prudent Commission whose voice may be its
own, but whose acts are those of the Dominions
Office. Time and again we were told the Commission was the government, and it was
up to
them to propose this or suggest that. We said the
Dominions Office was the real government,
which they half-denied and half-admitted. I can
assure you the Dominions Office is the government, and Commission government only
its
agents, in fact one Commissioner asked us to
remember that they were only agents.... It is all
very well for them to tell us that if we choose
Commission government they will guarantee our
debt and our solvency. They hedge these guarantees about with such qualifications
as "to the
extent of our ability" and so on. In any case, Lord
Addison can safely promise for the time being
because our prudent Commission of Government
still has $30 million to spend and seem to be
getting through it with anything but the prudence
that Lord Addison gives them credit for.
Just a word about Gander. What I didn't like
was their ramming down our throats the fact that
the British taxpayer will have to foot this
$500,000 a year as their share of Gander's deficit.
I am as sorry for the British taxpayer as anyone
can be, but don't let this get out of line. The
people of Britain are poor in goods. They are not
short of money, but even if they had lots of money
and all that money was dollars, it would be the
same thing as far as I am concerned. Gander is
directed by the British government. The special
position of the United Kingdom in Newfoundland has enabled the British government
to
get special concessions from other countries for
542 NATIONAL CONVENTION May 1947
its nationalised airline. Those privileges are
worth more than money. We are not allowed to
operate Gander as a private enterprise, to see if
we can make it pay. We are not allowed to lease
it to PICAO
[1] or anyone else so that we can escape
the deficit. We have no rights there, and then
when we say that we should not have to be
saddled with the deficit of $750,000 on Gander
because it is not being run on business lines, they
tell us this $500,000 a year to pay two-thirds of
the deficit is at the expense of the British taxpayer. It is not cricket to give us
that kind of
answer and they know it. Why should they throw
us this stuff about the British taxpayer as if we
were trying to rob the poor, when we object to
paying the deficit on an airport we are supposed
to own and don't control? And with all due sympathy to that British taxpayer, Mr.
Chairman, I
would point out that the Chancellor of the Exchequer expects to have a large surplus
in the present
fiscal year. We, in this country, with the highest
revenue we have ever had, are expected to have
a deficit.
I got a great surprise in the discussion of the
US base deal. I always thought that it was not part
of the destroyer deal. That was officially stated
at the time. To my astonishment, Lord Addison
said the Americans would not have given the
destroyers without the bases in Newfoundland.
We were deceived even there. I know the
Americans drove a hard bargain. I still don't think
that the agreements should have been made
beyond the duration without some reciprocal arrangement. The Americans got from us,
through
their hard bargain with a desperate Britain,
privileges which they would have given millions
to get by purchase, They got all these things out
of Britain's need in order to serve their own
defence interest. I don't know what would have
happened if we had a Newfoundland government
that said Britain could give America everything
we had for the duration, and we would reserve
the right to enter into reciprocal negotiations
afterwards. I don't mind venturing the guess that
Britain would still have got the destroyers.
I have come back a disappointed man. I expected nothing that was not fair and reasonable.
I am as loyal and patriotic as any man in this
country. I want no part in imposing new burdens
on Britain in her present need. But we asked for
nothing that was not fair, that was not right, and
that would have put any new hardships on the
British government or the British people. We did
not get the kind reception we expected. I did not
expect to see flags waving and the Lord Mayor
standing in his robes at the entrance to the City
of London to greet us. But I did think that the
people who have been trustees for this country,
and who have disposed of so many of our assets
in these past 14 years, might at least have been a
bit more cordial in their discussions. It looks to
me, sir, that Newfoundland is still the Cinderella
of the Empire.
We suggested they reduce our debt by applying the $10 million interest-free loan to
its reduction. They said no, although it cost them nothing,
and it would have saved $400,000 a year in
interest and $100,000 a year in sinking fund
charges. We suggested lending them dollars to
buy fish they wanted and were going to take at
higher prices from other countries, and they said
no, and told us we had no right even to talk about
it. They would make no definite promises about
a few million dollars worth of ore from Bell
Island, although they want ore and have to buy it
from Spain or Sweden if not from Newfoundland, and pay for it in something the
Swedes or Spaniards can use. The only pledge of
any kind was that, if we got into financial difficulties after all our surplus was
gone, they would try
within the limits of their financial position to help
keep us solvent. Well, I know what that means.
When they had plenty of dollars the best that was
done for us by the Commission of Government
was to pay out dole at the rate of 6 cents a day.
Mr. Chairman, I am not afraid to stand alone
as a Newfoundlander. We are a fine people. We
should be an independent people. I want no
presents or gifts from anyone, and I think what
we have heard as a result of our visit ought to
suggest to us that we should decide to stand on
our own feet and work out our future by our own
efforts. As I see it, what we were told in London
leaves us no choice. I am a Britisher and I intend
to stay one. I have, as I said before, the greatest
sympathy for the ordinary people of Britain, and
I want nothing from them. But I am not satisfied
that this country has the kind of sympathy that
ought to exist between blood relations, and for
that I blame the Dominions Office and not the
May 1947 NATIONAL CONVENTION 543
British people, who would be as amazed as l was
if they knew the truth. Mr. Chairman, we know
where we stand. I hope we have the guts to do
what our fathers would have done, and show the
world that Newfoundlanders are able to stand on
their own feet and run their country as well as any
other people.
Lastly, gentlemen, I am going to surprise you
by telling you of two statements Lord Addison
made with which I agree one hundred per cent.
At the finish of our last interview, one statement
was, "God bless Newfoundland"; and when one
delegate replied, "God help Newfoundland", he
replied, "God helps them that help themselves."
Whether or not Lord Addison realised it, he hit
the nail on the head, because if we are not
prepared to help ourselves and fight for a better
Newfoundland, irrespective of class and creed,
through co-operation together, we have no right
to expect help from others, and if we do, we
certainly have no right to expect manna. So I say
to us all as Newfoundlanders, let's forget petty
jealousies, and pull altogether for Newfoundland
and Newfoundland only. I am confident that if we
do, our standard of living will be much higher,
and many of our problems will disappear like
chaff before the wind.
Mr. Butt ....The report of the delegation is clear
and unmistakable, printed so that everybody can
read it for themselves, but there are certain impressions arising out of the visit
to England which
I would like to pass on. Before doing so, however,
and I do this rather tentatively, I must say that it
sounds to me that some of the remarks of
Mr. Smallwood came perilously near to nonsense. He said, "The British government have
really done something which ought to stir our
emotions and bring tears to our eyes when they
said they would be responsible for our finances
if we stay under Commission of Government." I
read that statement of Lord Addison's, and to my
mind it has absolutely no meaning unless we are
going to wait until Britain can say, "We have the
dollars to help you", or until all the surplus dollars
we have are gone, because the position is that the
United Kingdom has told us that she has not got
the dollars to help us, but she said, "You are a
prosperous country — you have the dollars". I
cannot understand how anyone can think in terms
of the form of government we are going to have
in ten or 15 years from now in the changing world
of the present. I contend that that statement of
Lord Addison has no meaning unless you think
in terms of five or ten years time.
Another thing, I am not a financier, but something else which sounds like nonsense
to me is
this, "The principle of a guarantee of a
govemment's loan cannot hold true when we
have responsible government." In 1933 or 1934
when we gave up (shall I say?) our responsible
government, the United Kingdom government
guaranteed our loan. What was done in effect was
this: an act was passed which said that the
Government of Newfoundland should issue sterling bonds, on the back of which the United
Kingdom put her guarantee. It appears to me that
no matter what form of government we have in
the future that guarantee stands. I can't see how
they can get out of it if we hold them to it.... I said
before, other documents speak for themselves,
but there are one or two observations which I
would like to make on the treatment accorded to
the Newfoundland delegation by the United
Kingdom government.
As an example, I am going to take the method
of procedure which I consider to be pretty poor.
First we had a meeting which was nothing more
than "How do you do". At the second meeting it
was clear that it was only going to be a general
discussion of the problems, and we got a
transcript of this document which we could study
afterwards until the next meeting. What actually
happened was that we were presented with this
document on behalf of the British government
and Lord Addison said, "You may consider this
as my mature consideration, and not much
change will be made in it anyway." As a result of
that the Newfoundland delegation were determined they were going to have something
to say,
and so we put in this memorandum.... We were
told then in no uncertain terms, "You have no
business to be talking about these things"....
Now let us turn to the document. First of all
there was the sterling debt. I had in my mind the
position of the British government and people
when we approached them on the sterling debt,
but I also had in mind Newfoundlanders who, for
the last 200 years, have suffered plenty and more
than that because of debt, which we contracted I
grant you. At one stage of the game we were
paying half our revenues and a little more in
interest. I had in my mind at the same time the
544 NATIONAL CONVENTION May 1947
fact that Newfoundland was suffering because of
her debt, and England was now suffering because
of certain debts contracted because of the war,
and so were we, but at the same time we were
asking for something to be done; and on that same
date the daily newspapers carried the heading
"Lord Dalton declares war on war debts". Lord
Addison had never heard of Alberta or Australian
war finance. He had never heard of these things
except insofar as Newfoundland was concerned,
and Newfoundland was asked to pay.... The point
is this: that the British government, and make no
doubt about it, have already started to scale down
these war debts, and in one way and another they
will do it, and it is up to Newfoundland to see that
our debts, no matter how contracted, which are
having a disastrous effect, ought to have been put
in the background. We were faced with an uncompromising, "This is a Newfoundland obligation,
incurred by previous Newfoundland
governments, and His Majesty's Government
will naturally expect etc."
Now we turn to the interest-free loans. All we
wanted to say was that by using these dollars over
there Newfoundland would be helped and they
would do the right thing by Newfoundland.
"United Kingdom cannot undertake to pay interest on these loans". That's a plain "no"
I skip over the development loans — they are
not really important at the moment — and come
to the various base deals, and here I have no
words to express my indignation at the way in
which a government acting as trustees for the
people violated our sovereign rights. Coldly they
come back to us with this statement, "There is no
reason to think that the United States government
will be prepared to agree to any substantial varia
tion." In other words, "Run along home. We did
this and we are not going to find out if there is
any reason." It was not like that in 1857.
[1] The
French fishermen were given a guarantee of an
unlimited amount of bait. What happened then?
The Newfoundland government protested
strongly, and it resulted in a statement of an
important principle. It reads like this:
The proposals contained in the Convention
having now been unequivocally refused by
the Colony they will, of course, fall to the
ground, and you [the Governor] are
authorised to give such assurance as you may
think proper that the consent of the community of Newfoundland is regarded by Her
Majesty's Government as an essential
preliminary to any modification of their territorial or maritime rights.
That's 90 years ago, and when we go to London
on this occasion we are told that the Newfoundland government gave these rights fairly
and without consideration.
Now the financing and control of the Newfoundland Airport. I have said before that
there
is no justification for asking Newfoundlanders to
pay half the cost of services for foreign companies doing business in Newfoundland.
It is
wrong in principle. Then we get this statement
which brought up all that I have heard for many,
many years in my lifetime: "Oh but you get the
labour". That's all Newfoundland has ever got. It
is true that we got the labour, but if your deficit
is $250,000, you pay the full deficit,
I don't know that there is anything more I
would like to add except this, that I have come
back from London satisfied that there is only one
basic principle for Newfoundland, and that is that
if you want anything done, and done properly,
you do it yourself — that you fight on behalf of
yourself, your family, your country, and your
nation until you get your rights....
Mr. Higgins Mr. Chairman, I don't know if the
gentleman steering this report through could
answerthis question, I presume you could answer
it yourself. With respect to the memorandum
dealing with the United States bases.... It appears
that your delegation must have discussed with the
officials of the home office the question as to any
changes that might be made in that base deal
under a return to responsible government. I
presume that's the meaning of the question and
the answer?
Mr. Higgins The answer given you by Lord Addison, wherein it states, "Article 28 of the Agreement
provides that the Government of the
USA and the Government of the United
Kingdom agreed to give sympathetic consideration to any representations which either
may
make after this agreement has been in force a
reasonable time, proposing a review of any of the
May 1947 NATIONAL CONVENTION 545
provisions of this agreement to determine
whether modifications in the light of experience
are necesary or desirable. Any such modifications shall be by mutual consent". That
is copied
from the Bases Act, I presume?
Mr. Chairman There are certain portions
which are quotations.
Mr. Higgins Is the suggestion that the general
principle of the bases agreement might be
changed completely, or is it merely small items
that would be, after mutual discussion, changed
somewhat? There is no suggestion that if any
government, responsible or otherwise, went to
the United States, that it would have them agree
to relinquish the bases?
Mr. Chairman I would say that depends upon
the correct interpretation of the clause itself . I can
put my interpretation on it and you can put yours,
and Major Cashin can put his.
Mr. Higgins My interpretation was that these
were not major considerations.
Mr. Chairman They would not go to the root of
the whole deal, I don't think. That's as I would
interpret it.
Mr. Higgins This particular article being
quoted was a mild brush-off, is that it?
Mr. Higgins I did not quite get the meaning of
what Mr. Crosbie said in the Icelandic deal
regarding soft money. I presume you put up to
them the question of why they were buying
Iceland fish and not ours. They could very well
take our fish. Could you enlarge on it?
Mr. Cashin As I gathered from the conversation
... they had finished negotiations for 12,000 tons
of Iceland fish. They were asked what the meaning of "soft money" was, and the answer
did not
materially change the situation. It was merely a
name. They were buying fish from Iceland and
not from us. They put the dollar business right
over to us again, and when we brought up that we
had advanced $2.5 million for three ships they
were building over there, they could not see why
we could not send the cash over and not the fish.
They were indignant that we should question the
matter of us sending the cash and their not buying
the fish. Furthermore they were buying a lot of
fish from Norway and not from here. They gave
them fish for that. There was some kind of a deal
in that respect. It was just another brush-off.
Mr. Higgins There was no real explanation? Is
there any explanation, other than appears in the
record, with respect to iron ore, as to what they
will or will not guarantee?
Mr. Cashin It is the same old story. As a matter
of fact the Mining Committee brought up that
contract of 750,000 tons for this year. We were
pushing them to get a continuous contract for a
number of years. It came out in our talks that the
actual money for this year's iron ore has not been
approved by the Treasury at the present time.
Whilst they are negotiating, and are prepared to
take the ore, it is still in the hands of the Treasury.
We were told that the Commission of Government had been pushing that matter — the
Commission has been pushing everything. They
pointed out the freight rates were somewhat high
in connection with the transportation of ore. The
British Ministry of Shipping controls freight
rates. They make or break them. I feel we are
going to have that contract for 750,000 tons of
ore, but for next yearl would not bank on it. Even
though the steel industry is going to be
nationalised, even when we pointed that out, they
would not say whether or not they would buy the
ore. You will notice from the last memorandum,
the matter came up and we were told we were not
the government. In other words we were given a
smack on the hand, and told to go home and be
good boys.
Mr. Higgins It has been intimated that planes
flying the Atlantic and scheduled to land at Shannon, still had to pay landing fees
whether they
landed or not.
Mr. Cashin It did not come up in our talks. I
have heard that even though they fly over Ireland,
they have to pay whether they land or not. I have
no official information to confirm that. I believe
they should pay for flying over Ireland.
Mr. Higgins Having read the report, I think that
we here are indebted to the delegates that went
across.... I was told the delegation really did put
up a very worthwhile case for the country in their
discussions, and that at times it was not altogether
as peaceful as even it is in this House sometimes.
I understand people were called to order at times,
and that in the staid atmosphere of the House of
Lords people were shocked at the expressions
used. I wish to congratulate them on the work
they have done. I feel confident that the work they
have done and the answers obtained will be of the
greatest importance to us of the Convention. We
546 NATIONAL CONVENTION May 1947
did not want any help from England, but we did
want to find out the position. Now we know
where we stand and can act accordingly. I do not
know if there is going to be any more debate on
the report, but for me, the position is extremely
clear. I am not trying to stifle debate but in view
of the fact that we have to try and finish the other
reports, I suggest we cut the debate as short as
possible.
Mr. Fudge Before I proceed with my few
remarks I would like to refer to what Mr.
Smallwood said, that the British government is
not prepared to discuss base deals with us. The
British government is prepared to leave that matter in the hands of Newfoundlanders
— provided,
however, they get their own government; then
they will discuss the matter with us. As far as this
self-supporting business is concerned, it is a nigger in the woodpile. Who is self-supporting?
Is
Great Britain self-supporting? Is Canada self-
supporting? Not at all! Why put the burden on top
of us, gentlemen?.... We are the only people who
pay cash for democracy; the rest can have it
charged.
As a member of the delegation I feel that I am
called upon to add my cements to those which
you have already heard. I fully endorse the
opinions expressed by Major Cashin and
Mr. Crosbie. I, like them, have come back from
our visit keenly disappointed with the results
obtained, and the general tenor of our reception.
I feel as if I had been on some kind of a wild goose
chase. On the plane which brought us back to this
country, we might have marked the words:
"Returned Empty."
During my years as a representative of labour
unions, I have had the experience of being a
member of many delegations and sitting in at
meetings with many official bodies, both
governmental and otherwise. But in all such
cases I came away from such meetings knowing
that matters had been discussed openly and frankly, and in a common sense manner.
But that was
not my experience on this delegation, for I found
little of common sense and less of frankness. I
had the new experience of seeing certain persons
present whispering into the Chairman's ear. I saw
people pulling other people's coat-tails, and further whispering take place. It made
me wonder
sometimes where I was. Was this a meeting with
representatives of the British government? Or
was it some underground conspiracy, planning
some illegal movement?
Like Major Cashin, I was witness to the manner in which the Chairman, Lord Addison,
acted.
I saw the great exhibition which he gave us as
how not to answer a question, and how to avoid
an issue. The noble lord had three stock answers,
and when one failed he used the others. He said
either that our question was one which we could
not discuss as it was only in the power of the
government to do so; or he said that the matter
was already under consideration by the Commission; and when all else failed, and he
was apparently stuck for an answer, he said he would
make a note of what we said. I am prepared to
believe that if the Chairman had been asked if we
could have Bell Island towed to the mainland, he
would reply that the Commission of Government
had it under consideration.
Some people in this country were somewhat
astonished by the reports of the meetings of the
delegation which appeared in the English papers,
condemning the treatment we received. But
having been on the inside I can say that the
reports were what the old politicians used to call
"critically correct." We brought home nothing
from this trip, and the simple reason is that we
were given nothing we could bring home. But it
is often said that good sometimes comes out of
evil. And from this angle I can say that we did
bring something home, and that was the lesson
that we can expect nothing from any outside
sources that will be of any assistance to us in our
future. It taught me that if Newfoundland is to get
anywhere, if she is to make any progress, she
must go ahead under her own steam and with her
own native sons at the wheel.
As a representative of the common man, as
one whose adult life has been spent in the ranks
of the workers, I have always had the interests of
my fellow workers in mind. My politics are the
politics of the common man. I know that if labour
goes down to defeat, I must go with it. I know that
if labour prospers, I prosper. And so it is that
when I regard the position of Newfoundland
today, I look at it from the attitude of the working
man. In the present instance I tell the worker of
this country that it is no use looking to Canada or
the United Kingdom or anywhere else for his
future. He must, and I must, and we all must, look
to ourselves. There is an old saying that "every
May 1947 NATIONAL CONVENTION 547
man's fortune lies in himself", and this applies
also to countries. It applies to Newfoundland. She
must look to herself for her fortune and her
prosperity. Today she is in a happy position. She
is one of the most solvent countries in the world.
She has money, she has brains, she has the assets,
and she has the men who can govern her and
protect her sovereign rights. What then is holding
us back? Why do we hesitate? What are we afraid
of? What is all this talk about tying ourselves onto
someone else's apron strings? We are not
children, we are men! We are the sons of liberty-
loving people. The job awaits us, and we are able
to do the job. Then let us get on with it! For
myself, I have faith in my country and her people.
Every time the challenge came to our fathers,
they stood up to that challenge. They fought and
they won. As I see it, such a call has come to us
today. And in the historic words of Nelson,
"Newfoundland expects every man to do his
duty." With us, our first duty is to take over the
control of our country — to get back what we lost.
When this is done, then time enough to talk about
making deals with other countries. After all, what
do we want from other countries? All we want is
a chance to do business with them. We only want
their trade, not their traditions, not their politics,
not their ideas. All these things we have ourselves
in full measure, and we don't want to change
them for a foreigner's. As I see it, it is a waste of
time, a mistake, for us to think of sending delegations to Canada or anywhere else.
If there are a
certain number of people who are curious to
know what terms would be offered us by these
countries, then they could have their desires satisfied by simply having the government
of this
country send a letter asking for such terms.
I agree with Major Cashin that we should not
waste time with any lengthy discussion of the
report before the Chair. We all know now what it
means without going further into the matter. We
should now get on with the job. That job is to give
the people of the country a chance to express
themselves by the ballot. If we do not soon do
this, then there will be no country to hand back
to the people, and the treasury itself will be
emptied. In closing, then, I ask that every man,
woman and child in the country unite their voices,
their strength, and energies, in the great common
task of giving Newfoundland back to Newfoundlanders, and bring victory to this old
and
loved land in 1947.
Mr. Hollett What with the shades of Sir Edward
Morris and Sir William Coaker, I feel rather
dubious about getting to my feet, especially after
hearing the eloquent addresses of the various
speakers.... First, I am not disappointed in the
replies which we received from the Dominions
Office. I did not expect to bring home something
in a basket. As you knew from the first. an attempt
has been made to work out our destiny by powers
other than the popular vote of the people of the
country. I felt it before I went to London, and I
am confirmed that that attempt has been, and will
continue to be made. We must take note of these
things, and endeavour to exercise the prerogative
of every man and woman in the British Empire.
The mother of democracy is doing something no
mother in a democratic world should ever try and
map out for her child....
We were asked to consult with the Dominions
Office on matters relative to public debt, interest-
free loans, development loans, the position arising out of the various base deals,
financing and
control of airports, and trade and tariffs — the one
concerning trade and tariffs is the most important
and the one to which we got the most disappointing reply from Lord Addison — and any
other
matter which the delegation may raise and which
the British government may feel disposed to discuss!
The Dominions Office was well aware of
these subjects which we wanted to discuss, and
they had expressed their willingness to receive
your delegation and to answer and to discuss the
matters. What happened? We were handed these
replies which, in my opinion, could easily have
been sent at a cost of 20 cents. Why therefore was
it necessary to have 12 people travel all the way
from St. John's to London to be handed this
document? Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, you
may answer this question how you wish. This is
my answer, and I have given it much thought. But
before I give you that answer, let us look at what
they will do about the debt. First, the two 3.5%
sterling loans amounting together to about
£870,000 which mature in 1950 and 1952; that
has been taken care of — "In making available to
the UK Government interest-free loans...." How
delightfully smart of them; how sweetly naive to
say this action was taken at the instance of the
Commission of Government. They tell us that the
548 NATIONAL CONVENTION May 1947
£400,000 temporary loan we may consider cancelled. Remember that that £400,000 was
the
price of keeping your brothers in Flanders Fields
in 1916, 1917 and 1918. It was never intended at
the time it was raised that our people would be
called upon to pay it. Is there any concession
there? They say that the question of convening
the debt to a lower rate of interest had been raised
by the Commission of Government with the
United Kingdom government, and that a conversion operation can be carried out in January
1948,
provided the Commission gives them three
months' notice — and we hope the Commission
does not forget to give them notice. You will
agree that all these things were ours of right. The
sinking fund should naturally have been applied
to the debt long ago, ever since 1937 and 1938.
The £400,000 — it was never intended we should
pay it, otherwise we should not have gotten off
so easily. This supposedly generous action of
converting from 3% to 2.5%, that is in line with
the United Kingdom cheap money policy, and
also the Canadian cheap money policy.
Why then, I repeat, why was it necessary to
send a delegation to London? The answer, in my
opinion, is simply this: the Dominions Office
wanted the Convention to send a delegation to
Canada! Why? Because Canada wanted the
Dominions Office to send a delegation there!
They know very well that only by receiving the
English delegation was it possible to achieve
their principal aim. You will all remember the
resolution of the member from Bonavista Centre
— that the delegation to Canada should not be
sent until after the return of the English delegation. That is the only reason why
the answers of
Lord Addison were not sent by airmail. Receive
a delegation to England? Of course! What shall
we do when we get them here? Oh, we shall brush
them off somehow. We shall make a gesture
about the debt. Oh yes, we must be careful to tell
them that if they vote for responsible government
we shall no longer guarantee their financial
stability. That is exactly what they did. You have
heard Lord Addison's statement given the press
— "Vote for responsible government and your
financial stability will no longer be guaranteed."
Just what did they mean by financial stability?
That is what they assured us in 1933 when they
took away our constitution — "We will look after
you", "We will look after your financial
stability." What did it amount to from 1933 to
1940?
Any of you who have lived on our coast where
our fishermen go out from day to day in the shore
fishery, where our bankers go out on the Grand
Banks and risk their lives and toil from long
before daylight to dark, if any of you lived on
these portions of the coast between 1933 and
1940, you must ask yourselves, "What does Lord
Addison mean by financial stability?" If any of
you acted as relieving officers during that period,
as I did, and saw our people go from a robust,
hardy people, down to a very gaunt, starved
population, is that financial stability? Is that the
financial stability which is to be taken away from
us if we vote for responsible government? I ask
you to consider it well. Ask yourselves what the
Dominions Office means by financial stability.
Does it mean a starved beri-beri race? Does it
mean a TB race? Gentlemen, if that's the financial stability which Lord Addison promises
you,
I ask you to reject it without any hesitation
whatever. I won't go into the question as to
whether, if they guarantee it, they can carry it out.
I have no patience with those people who are
putting up this austerity business about Great
Britain. 1 ask you to remember that the British
Empire has granted credits to the extent of
£750,000 to European countries. £300 million
worth of credits have been given out to Greece,
Turkey, Holland, Belguim, Italy and God knows
how many other countries, and most of those, it
has been stated, need never be paid back. We,
300,000 Britishers here, who gave our young
men in two wars and suffered starvation over a
period of years, shall not have financial stability
if we endeavour to exercise that right which our
forefathers won. You will not get financial
stability.
Let us take another look at Lord Addison's
answers to our questions, and I do not forget that
the Chairman of the Commission government
and the Commissioner for Justice had a hand in
forming these answers. for did not the Secretary
of State state that these two gentlemen had been
invited to London by him to assist him? It is my
opinion that these answers were formulated
before our visit began, and that these gentlemen,
as Professor Wheare said, "simply concurred".
Now as to interest-free loans and development
loans and base deals, these things have been very
May 1947 NATIONAL CONVENTION 549
well explained to you by other members who
have spoken. With regard to the base deals we did
have a very extended conversation and it was
admitted by the Chairman, "Yes, we made the
base deals, we had to save our lives and keep our
ships from sinking. We never would have done it
but for that." In other words Lord Addison admits
that these base deals would not have been made
had it not been that they wanted to save their
lives. We have no kick about the base deals as far
as granting them to the United States at that time
is concerned, but we do have a kick when Great
Britain gives away our land for 99 years without
any saving clause whatever. Go back to the
Treaty of Versailles when most of our northern
coast was given to France.
[1] Go back to the time
when concessions regarding our lobster fishery
were given to USA,
[2] and come down to this war
and you get another piece given away. Why, for
70 years responsible government fought for that
which Great Britain gave away freely and
without concession.
Regarding Gander, that was explained and
you are let in for a deficit of at least $250,000,
and that may be multiplied. Regarding debt and
tariffs, that end of it was taken care of as far as
we could. We pointed out that if they did not have
the dollars over there, apart from the fact that we
have $9 million there, we pointed out that rather
than let our fish industry go to the wall, the
Commission government might be able to find it
convenient to advance a credit to Great Britain to
take care of the sale of fresh fish from this
country. Well, that was not entirely turned down,
we were simply told it was none of our business,
which we know We replied to that by a
memorandum on 7 May which has been read. I
ask you to study it carefully, and then take a look
at Lord Addison's reply. He replied, "I have
studied your memorandum". After prolonged
and careful study he arrives at his conclusions.
Don't you think they are momentous conclusions? Listen: "In my view, it goes beyond
the
terms of reference of your delegation, and indeed
of the National Convention itself." Just imagine
that! Forty-five men elected by a free people in
this country have not the right to discuss trade and
tariffs with the government. Why? Because it
goes beyond the terms of reference of the Convention Act. If that's not an answer
that would
make anyone weep, I don't know what is. Let me
quote you section 3 of the Convention Act: "To
examine the position of the country". And yet we
could not possibly talk about fish and iron ore.
Now let me go on to his momentous answer to
our memorandum: "Most of the items to which
you refer have already been raised with the
United Kingdom Government...." That is excellent news. I am proud of our Commission
government to think that they raised all these points,
probably before this Convention was ever
thought of, according to that we have been berating the Commission of Government just
a little
too much. All matters you gentlemen have raised
here, they have been taking over to Lord Addison
and the Dorninions Office, and they have been
pressing them very hard for concessions for this
country. I ask you gentlemen to reconsider your
views on Commission of Government. I am sure
Mr. Smallwood will agree with me on that. He
says: "I have throughout been as helpful as I can
be. I do not however regard it as the function of
this delegation to debate with me questions of the
policy of the Newfoundland government in current administrative and other issues,
or seek to
negotiate trade arrangements between the United
Kingdom government and the Government of
Newfoundland." Now I want you to study and
read that again, and if you can show me any
criticisms of the Commission of Government or
the government of Great Britain, then there is
something wrong with my eyesight. We did say
we could not understand the attitude of the Commission on the matter of interest-free
loans, but
if that's a criticism, I don't know what criticism
means. We could not understand their attitude. Is
that criticism? No. We wanted an explanation of
why a thing that would save the people $400,000
could not be put into effect.
I feel that your delegation did all it was
550 NATIONAL CONVENTION May 1947
humanly possible to do over there. I got the
impression that when we were handed the first
memorandum that they considered that the whole
matter was closed. The answers were put before
us when we sat down at the first meeting and we
were supposed to discuss them intelligently....
But it seemed as if they said, "There's your
answer. We will take you here and there, and we
will meet again before you go back, and say
goodbye", but we were not having that and immediately studied the memorandum and shot
back another memorandum in answer to theirs.
Their answer was a flat, "No, we have said what
we have said, and can do nothing more in the
matter." Your action in sending a delegation to
London and raising all these points will redound
to the good of this country, which you love and
which you serve.
Mr. Keough Mr. Chairman, now that all the
other members of the London delegation have
said what they had to say, that leaves only the
Walrus to have further things to say about this
delegation of tribunes of the people which recently went up to London to beard the
Dominions
Secretary in his den.
I wish to dissociate myself completely from
all the petty furore about the delegation's not
being treated with due deference in London. As
far as I am concerned we were. We were received
in right good spirit and were extended many
courtesies. Anyone with an opinion to the contrary must have been expecting a salute
of guns
and red plush carpets. It is utterly ridiculous that
I should have to go into this matter. The treatment
we received was quite considerate, and I am
appreciative of the courtesies extended. However, there seems to have been such a
furore here
at home that I feel I should have somewhat more
to say. I remember what happened in London this
way. On arrival at Heathrow we were met by
Rear Admiral Sir Arthur Bromley, who welcomed us on behalf of the Secretary of State,
and
then conducted through Immigration and Customs with diplomatic immunity. In that there
was
no discounesy. Next we were driven in special
cars to our hotel. There, some delay was occasioned on the doorstep because, through
some
misunderstanding, the hotel management had us
booked for two days subsequently. However, the
difficulty was ironed out and those of us who
wished to moved into the hotel forthwith. In any
case, the delay at the hotel did not involve, as far
as I was concerned, any discourtesy, merely a
misunderstanding....
I am quite satisfied, too, that every effort was
made to secure for the delegation the best possible accomodations. We arrived in London
at a
time of a great influx of visitors. Besides ourselves, there were some 15 other delegations
in
London for consultations with the United
Kingdom government. There were buyers there
to attend the British Industrial Fair. And there
were fans from all over the United Kingdom to
attend the soccer and rugby cup tie finals. Lodgings were not at a premium, they were
just simply
unobtainable. We were advised by responsible
officials that every effort had been made to secure
the best accomodations available. I believe them.
I was quite comfortable, and the food was adequate. Incidentally, a New Zealand delegation
was housed in the same hotel shortly before our
arrival, and as far as I know found no reason to
work themselves up into an international incident
about their accomodations.
The officials of the Dominions Office went
out of their way to make our visit a pleasant one.
Cars were put at our disposal. A tour of London
was arranged. Tickets were procured for those of
us who wished to attend the mgby finals and a
showing of A.P. Herbert's new play. Arrangements were made for us to sit in the Dominions'
Gallery during a session of the House of Commons. We were entertained at luncheon
at the
Savoy Hotel. The prime minister took time out to
meet the delegation informally in the cabinet
chamber at 10 Downing Street. In all of these
goings-on I saw no evidence of discounesy no
reason to be insulted. And that I hope will dispose
of the discounesy myth forever. There is this
much more that needs to be said of the furore that
was raised here at home about our reception. I
have often heard of a mountain being made of a
molehill. This was the first time I have seen an
international incident made of a molehill.
Shakespeare was a piker. From us he could have
learned things he never knew about how to make
much ado about nothing.
Turning now to the results that came of the
London mission. I think I should review the
powers that were conferred on the London
delegation by motion of this Convention for it
was on interpretation of function that dissension
May 1947 NATIONAL CONVENTION 551
arose in London within the delegation. The motion that provided for the London delegation
empowered it to ask questions only to seek
information. That was a right and proper projection of the Convention's own powers,
which are
purely fact-finding. The delegation had no mandate to advise as to policy. It had
no power to
bargain or negotiate agreements. It had no justification to advise as to the disposition
of the
national assets of Newfoundland. Even if it had
so wished, the Convention could not have endowed the delegation with such powers, for it
has no such powers itself. When a position was
taken to the contrary, the Chairman and I had no
choice but to dissent.
The dissension within the delegation arose in
this way. At the final meeting but one with the
United Kingdom representatives, there was
handed to us a paper setting forth the considered
replies of the United Kingdom government to the
questions we had put. Subsequently there began
the preparation of a memorandum that would set
forth the case as advanced by the delegation. The
delegation considered the first draft of the
proposed memorandum at a meeting held on the
morning of Monday, May 5. We did not make
much progress, as disagreement occurred almost
immediately on the specific point of recommending the application of the balance of
interest-free
loans to the reduction of the public debt. The
specific sentences with which issue was taken
were: "In addition to the above the Newfoundland Delegation are of opinion that the
balance standing to the credit of Newfoundland
in the way of interest-free loans to Great Britain,
and which is now lying idle, should be devoted
to the further reduction of Newfoundland's sterling debt." Also: "We cannot understand
the attitude of Commission of Government when they
advise you that, in their opinion, it would not be
prudent to adopt this last-named procedure in
reference to interest-free loans, which procedure
as we have just pointed out will mean a saving to
the Newfoundland Treasury of some $400,000
annually." And, "... there lies to the credit of the
Newfoundland Treasury in the Bank of Montreal
in Newfoundland, well over $20 million which in
our opinion, is ample for any immediate or
foreseeable construction or development
programme." And again, "We strongly urge such
a policy and we seek some assurance from the
United Kingdom Government before our departure to report back to the National Convention
and through it to the people of Newfoundland."
Finally, "Furthermore we consider this proposal
a sound business proposition."
Mr. Bradley and I disagreed. We dissented on
the grounds that to advise policy was not the
concern of the delegation, that we had no mandate to urge the disposition of the national
assets
of Newfoundland, especially since no reduction
in the principal of the public debt could be effected until January, l948. The disposition
of the
balance of the interest-free loans was a matter
properly to be left for the decision of such Newfoundland government as might by that
time
materialise. Further, we had no guarantee that a
mere $20 million would be ample for immediate
or foreseeable development programmes. After
all what is $20 million when it comes to financing
an industrial revolution which is just exactly
what we need in our fishing industry? A mere
drop in the bucket! Why, already we have $5
million invested in fresh fish plants in this
country, and the surface has hardly been
scratched. There were far too many imponderables and unpredictables involved to
agree that $20 million was ample, and in the event
that it should prove to be not nearly enough, it
would then appear as decidedly unsound business
to have eliminated a $9 million loan at 2.5% only
to have to borrow a like, or perhaps a greater sum
at a higher rate of interest.
Now suppose we turn for a moment to the
results that came of the London talks. Suppose
we try to look at them objectively without
benefit of emotionalism.
1. The Public Debt. The truth of the matter is
that we have no case in absolute justice for the
cancellation of that debt. it was an honourable
debt, honourably incurred by honourable men —
and in honour and injustice should be met. I
imagine that those men of honour who made
Newfoundland — those men of the past who
were giants in their day and generation — would
disown this day and generation if it sought to
avoid such an obligation. We have a conditional
case for the cancellation of the public debt. That
case is set out in the memorandum submitted to
the British government by the delegation. The
condition upon which the case rests is Britain's
being in a position to cancel, and being willing
552 NATIONAL CONVENTION May 1947
to. As a matter of fact Britain is in no position to
cancel anything for anybody. She simply has
nothing left. Under these circumstances the conversion of debt offer must be interpreted
as a
generous gesture.
2. Interest-Free Loans. The disposition of the
balance of interest-free loans is to remain at the
discretion of the Newfoundland government —
a right and proper thing
3. Development Loans. The answer given is
most reasonable.
4. The position arising out of the various base
deals. It is my unqualified opinion that Newfoundland should have received, and still should
receive, a suitable quid pro quo for the territories
that were alienated. We have been told that if we
want something done about all that, that we
should get ourselves a government and do it
ourselves. Sound advice, mind you, and maybe
we should be doing something about it instead of
sitting here Fiddling while we burn.
5. Financing of Gander Airport. Admittedly
the arrangement for the financing of Gander is far
from satisfactory. Again, it is a matter of getting
ourselves a government and of doing something
about it.
6. Trade and Tariffs. It was unfortunate that
Britain could not give us an understanding to do
more with regard to our fish and iron ore. I say
"understanding" not "undertaking", for the
delegation was not such a body as an undertaking
could be given to. We were not empowered to
negotiate any trade agreements. The hard fact is
that just now, out of utter necessity, Britain must
consider herself and what will best suit her purpose first — and all other things
second. And no
arguments to the contrary are likely to move her
in that at this time.
7. Forms of Government. Anyone who was
not expecting exactly the answer received was
not a realist. He was building castles in Spain
with visions of United Kingdom guarantees and
grants-in-aid. The answer does emphasise a point
I have always tried to make — that any people to
be sovereign unto themselves, must first be sufficient unto themselves. Responsible
government to be really responsible must be able to
finance its own way, and be its own adequate
guarantee in the credit markets of the world. For
it to be anything else would be not to be really
responsible, since its sovereignty would be open
to dictation from the source that would foot the
balance of the bill. Even in governments, he who
pays the piper calls the tune.
I am going to repeat something I have aleady
said to the press of St. John's. I am convinced that
Lord Addison and the United Kingdom government have dealt with us in good faith. They
have
given direct answers to the questions asked. The
answers are clear, concise, unmistakable. We
may not like those answers. We may find some
of them to be hard answers. But they are answers
that call a spade a spade. And they are straight
from the horse's mouth. And we know now
where we stand. Yesterday Major Cashin made
another one of those speeches. He said some
things with which I agreed. Those were the things
that had reference to the actual facts in the case
of the London mission. He said some other things
with which I did not agree. Those had to do with
his constructions, interpretations and opinions.
Indeed, he said so many things with which I
disagree as would take a considerable period of
time for me to go into in detail — something
which I have no intention of doing. I am going to
content myself with a blanket disavowal. As far
as I am concerned all the opinions, interpretations, conclusions and so forth voiced
by Major
Cashin yesterday, were entirely his own.
Finally, I have a word to say to the people of
this island. All my life I have been close to the
common man of this land All my life I have lived
on the wrong side of the tracks. All my life my
associations have been with the labour and cooperative movements. I have done what
I could
in my time to help the little fellow the better to
make both ends meet. And all over this land today
there are some ordinary people who will at this
time of decision hear my voice and believe it. To
them — to the woodsman filing his bucksaw for
a day in the woods tomorrow, to the man mending
his herring nets or lathing his lobster traps, to the
miner resting after a hard day in the mines — to
all the little people all over this land, struggling
away for their three square meals a day, and a
decent suit of clothes on the back, and a tight roof
over the head — to all you, and not forgetting my
last forgotten fisherman on the bill of Cape
St. George — to all of you, I say that this time
you are going to get a square deal. The British
government is not going to try to sell you up the
St. Lawrence. It is not going to try to railroad you
May 1947 NATIONAL CONVENTION 553
back to responsible government. The British
government will facilitate in every way an expression of your opinion as to the form
of government you really do desire. And if you should be
sold out or railroaded into anything, the thing will
be done by people here in this island. In the days
that lie ahead you will be bombarded with
propaganda designed to convince you of the
merits of this form of government or that. All that
you hear will not be true. Much of it will be
confusing. But all of you have had a sufficient
experience of the stark realities of life in this
island to enable you to decide in the end what will
be best for you. If then, when comes the referendum, you will each seek to disregard
the
emotionalism that will be poured at you, and
judge according to the facts and the dictates of
your own conscience, I have every confidence
that in the making of this greatest decision that
you, the people of this island, have ever had to
make — I have every confidence that in the
making of that decision you shall not err.
Mr. Reddy[1] Mr. Cashin, why is it we can't have
a verbatim report of the whole proceedings in
London?
Mr. Chairman I will answer that question, Mr.
Reddy. When the discussions began, it was
drawn to our attention by Lord Addison that there
were two courses open. One, to have a free discussion at which every member of both
delegations, if I may use that term, could, as it were, let
his hair down, to use a more or less feminine
expression, and talk freely. There would be no
necessity to pick and choose one's words. That
was one course. If that course were adopted,
obviously it would be necessary that the actual
proceedings should be regarded as confidential
and only the formal documents be for public use.
The other was to stick strictly to formal debate,
which naturally would make free discussion
very, very difficult. It was decided that we should
adopt the former course; that we should talk
freely, and that whatever was said, and which was
reported of course in full, should be regarded as
confidential, and the transcript of the reporter's
notes should be for use only by the delegates
themselves. Consequently, the actual speeches or
statements made by the different delegates cannot be disclosed to the public.
Mr. Reddy Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
explanation.
Mr. Harrington Mr. Chairman, is there any
reason why the transcripts of these notes cannot
be seen by the Convention in a private session?
Mr. Chairman The transcript of these notes can
be seen by nobody except those who were present
at the various meetings.
Mr. Miller Mr. Chairman, clause 7 of the
resolution — that's Mr. Hollett's resolution of
March 10 — other matters relative to Newfoundland affairs, that the delegation may
raise
in the United Kingdom if they're willing to discuss them. I'd like to ask if any other
matters were
raised.... If my memory serves me right, when the
delegation went to Government House in
February, I think it was, that particular section
which brought in the name of the United States,
we were quietly calmed down by being reassured
that when the delegation went to England, they
could take up these matters. Now that was more
or less a promise. Was there any reference made
to the annexation of the United States to Newfoundland? Not that I would be one to
propose it,
Sir, but I do want to know for the benefit of this
house and for the benefit of the country, since
people here this afternoon are talking to the
country. I came here to talk to this Convention,
not to talk to the country, not to make a political
set-up out of it. I want just the facts for myself
and for my fellow candidates. I'd like to have a
little more information on that, sir.
Mr. Chairman I cannot recollectjust now, Mr.
Miller, that the question of annexation with the
United States was discussed at all. Do you
remember that, Mr. Cashin?
Mr. Cashin No, not right directly. It was intimated there at one time, I think, by one of the
delegates.
Mr. Cashin We were told, as far as my memory
serves me, that on matters of trade or anything
with the United States, that we would have to
have our own government to do any business of
that nature. We were told that any future business
that might be contemplated by the Government
of Newfoundland in connection with the bases,
we would have power to go and talk to them about
it....
Mr. Chairman I think that's when it arose,
554 NATIONAL CONVENTION May 1947
when we were discussing the question of these
bases.
Mr. Cashin And this base question was at our
first meeting, and there was no stenographic
report as far as I'm concerned. It came up later in
the second meeting, when one of our delegates
took the matter up. I think he's going to say
something right now, by the look of him over
there.
Mr. Chairman There was a stenographic report
at the first meeting. They have it.
Mr. Fudge I drew to Lord Addison's attention
that in this house two members had asked regarding discussions with the United States,
and the
late Chairman of that time gave the answer, "Yes,
it was a matter that could be discussed." And
Professor Wheare concurred. I think I brought
out that in my opinion there were more people in
this country interested in talks with United States
than in confederation with Canada. That is what
I said, and I'm prepared to defend it. I am somewhat surprised at my friend across
the row there,
Mr. Keough.... I'm not looking for a hand-out. I
never had always a silver spoon and I don't know
if I ever had either one, but I have had good and
I've had bad. People call us poor, and plenty over
there, but that's more than the British people got
over there. They haven't got food in plenty — far
from it. Now I'm of the opinion that when the
matter was referred to in connection with bases,
because of the fact that Great Britain was depending largely upon loans from the United
States,
Lord Addison did say that...
Mr. Chairman Mr. Fudge, I have to draw your
attention to the fact that you have no right to
repeat anything that Lord Addison said.
Mr. Fudge What right did he have to repeat
what we said before we got here to the Convention?
Mr. Chairman I am not aware that he has
repeated anything that you said. If he has done
so, then he is guilty of a breach of Confidence.
Mr. Fudge ....That's the information that was
given in the House of Commons before the
delegation arrived here.
Mr. Chairman That was a pronouncement as to
the results of the conferences by Lord Addison
which he had a perfect right to make.
Mr. Fudge I am of the opinion, Mr. Chairman,
that the information or the discussions that took
place over in that House is the property of the
people of Newfoundland, they should have it. it
shouldn't be hidden from them.
Mr. Hollett I can't go as far as Mr. Fudge has
gone as to whether or not the conversations which
took place between the delegates and the
Dominions Office officials should be made
public or not. I am of the opinion that this Convention elected a delegation to go
to England, and
they expected that delegation to bring back to
them the fullest report possible. I have no recollection whatsoever of any agreement
on keeping
things which happened in the Convention room
or delegates' rooms from them. No agreement
whatsoever. I do think that we were the servants
of this Convention. There are things brought out
in the conversation which this Convention should
know. I agree entirely if Mr. Fudge will confine
his statement to the fact that this Convention
should know exactly the results — the
stenographic report which was made by our
reporter during these conversations — because I
maintain there are things in these statements
made by officials over there which you must have
if you are to get a real true perspective of the
report which is now being submitted and laid on
the table.
Mr. Chairman The two alternatives, either a
free discussion or a formal discussion, were
presented to all present. And Lord Addison made
the statement that he assumed if we agreed to
conduct our negotiations or our conversations,
whichever you like to call them, freely, it would
be essential that all statements made by individual members should be regarded as
completely confidential. I agreed. No one so far as I
know dissented. Consequently, Lord Addison
was justified in assuming thateverything that was
said would be kept confidential. Now, if there's
any particular statement that was made by
anyone present, that any member of that delegation thinks should be laid before this
Convention,
there is a way for him to get it. And that is obtain
the permission of Lord Addison to disclose it. But
until that is done, no member of that delegation
has any right to disclose a single statement made
by Lord Addison or by anyone else during those
conferences.
Mr. Bailey Mr. Chairman, I think it's up to this
National Convention to know what should be
done or shouldn't be done. I cannot see why the
six or the seven men that went across to Britain
May 1947 NATIONAL CONVENTION 555
and got this information have got the right to keep
it from the 44 of us. We're getting the same pay.
We represent the same people. I believe firmly
that we as a body of men should receive it in
secret and put out what we believe the people
should know as near as we can, on account of it
was to be kept in. I know there are things as you
said when your hair is let down, but I firmly
believe that whatever's been said should be let
known to the representatives of the people. Can't
the 44 of us keep it as quiet as six of us? I, as a
member of this Convention, demand that we now
have the report.
Mr. Cashin Mr. Chairman, I happened to be a
member of that delegation. I have a clear
memory.... I attended the first meeting of that
conference over there, and to my recollection I
don't remember Lord Addison saying that we
were to keep these things confidential. That is my
recollection. I do remember him saying, the last
day we were there, five or six minutes before we
disbanded, that we've had very fine talks between ourselves, and these are confidential
talks.
These were his exact words. That was five
minutes before we disbanded. That is the position. There were matters in connection
with
American bases and so forth which wouldn't
probably be made public. But as far as before we
started saying, "Well now gentlemen, all our
talks here have got to be confidential", there was
no such statement made. That's all there is to it.
Mr. Chairman Just a moment please, just a
moment. I have made a statement here which I
stand by.
Mr. Chairman That Lord Addison did definitely indicate to us that we had these two alternatives
and he assumed that if we were to talk freely, then
all these talks would be confidential He definitely made that statement in the House
of Lords at
our first meeting, and I assented.
Mr. Hollett That is right, what you say. I
remember Lord Addison making the statement.
He said words to the effect, if I remember, that
things would be said off the record that would not
be said if he knew the record was going to be for
publication. As it is three minutes to six, I propose
the committee rise and beg leave to report
progress and sit again tomorrow.
[The committee rose and reported progress, and the Convention adjourned]
