482
MONDAY, February 27, 1865.
MR. DUNKIN said—Mr. SPEAKER, almost
every one who has yet spoken in this debate
has begun with some expression of his feeling
of embarrassment. For my own part, I should
be glad if I could begin in some other way,
but I confess that I cannot. For I certainly
never did rise to address this House, or any
other public body, under a feeling of such
oppressive embarrassment as I experience at
this moment. It is impossible for me, occupying the position in which I now stand,
not
to feel that I am opposed to powerful odds,
and that there is a sort of foregone conclusion, here, against the views I desire
to
impress upon the House. It is impossible
for me not to feel that the considerations to
which I have to ask the attention of the
House, are so many and so complex, that no
sort of justice can possibly be done them
within the limits of my capacity to speak, or
of yours to listen. The interests at stake,
too, are so large—so much larger than ever
were at stake in any question which has yet
been brought under the notice of this House,
and the difficulties arising out of the question
are so formidable, owing in no small measure to what I must call the many reticences
with which this scheme has been laid before
us, and the ambiguities of expression which
everywhere characterise it, as to tax
seriously the courage of those who may
attempt to discuss it. I feel, besides, that
I am entirely cut off from that description
of remark which most of all tends to make
one's speech pleasant to listen to ; for I cannot prophecy smooth things, or dilate
on
the marvels of progress to result from Confederation in the future. There is a character
of hurry, too, impressed on the whole
style of this debate ; everybody feels so
impatient, that one can scarcely hope to
express his views fully, as he would wish
and ought, on this vast scheme. I have even
the feeling that my capacity for exertion is
not up to its ordinary standard. I address
the House in a state of health that renders
me less capable than usual of physical
exertions. I must, therefore, beg honorable
members to make allowance for these circumstances surrounding my position ; believing
me that what I wish to do is to present as
briefly as I can, and as truthfully as I can,
my own deep seated convictions on the question now before the House. (Hear, hear.)
So strongly, Mr. SPEAKER, do I feel my
inability to discuss this scheme as I could
wish, that I almost must throw myself on
the forbearance of Hon. members—that I
hardly can help saying I should be in danger
of shrinking from the duty of addressing
you, but for the recollection that time and
again, I have known, in cases of contest
almost or quite as discouraging as this, that
" the race has not been to the swift nor the
battle to the strong"—that time and again I
have known those who went into such contests with the best hopes of success, disappointed
in their expectations. I do know,
and I know that others know—I believe it
to be the general conviction of those whom
I address to-night, as regards this question,
that whatever of popular feeling there may
seem to be in favor of the views I have
to combat, is anything but the deliberate
result of a well-considered examination of
the whole subject—is a feeling of most
sudden growth, and of most passing character. (Hear, hear.) Before I go further,
I may be permitted distinctly to accept the
challenge which has been more than once
thrown out on the other side as to the manner in which this question ought to be
discussed. I freely admit and sincerely
maintain that it ought not to be discussed
otherwise than as a great question, to be
considered entirely on a large view of its
483
merits. It is not a question of party, it is
not a question of persons, it is not a question of merely local, or class, or passing
interest, and it is not to be met by any of those
passing appeals which are too often resorted
to. It is not to be settled upon any ground
of mere theory, or by any criticism of mere
details. It requires indeed to be taken up
at once as a question of principle, and also
as a question of detail, involving a multitude of details ; and there must necessarily
be a careful criticism of such details. The
question really presented is this : on the
whole, viewing them collectively, are the
details involved in this great scheme such as
to commend the scheme itself to our approbation, or are they not ? (Hear, hear.) I
pledge myself that I will discuss the question from that point of view. I will do
my
utmost to avoid mere passing or personal
allusions. I will try to tread the dangerous
ground before me without arousing dangerous feelings. I do not know that I can succeed,
but at least I will make the effort. This,
however, I am bound to repeat at the outset,
that no one can do justice to a question like
this, and start with the idea of at all ignoring
details. Here is a measure proposed for our
acceptance, embodied in seventy-two resolutions, and which resolutions affirm a great
many more than seventy-two propositions,
connected with almost every principle known
to have reference to the theory and practice
of popular government. I say it is a scheme
which is as complex and as vast as one can
well imagine, and declamation about first
principles can be of no real use in its discussion—can avail only to mislead in reference
to it. We have to deal with no more
abstract question of a nationality, or of union
or disunion, or of a Federal as opposed to a
Legislative union. It is idle to talk
vaguely about the maintenance of British
connection, or to go into magnificent
speculations about the probable results of
independence, or blindly to urge this
scheme as a sure preventative of annexation to the United States. These cheap
and easy generalities are thoroughly unreliable. The only question is, how is this
plan,
in its entirety, going to work ? And this
question is one which is not easy to answer ;
it is one requiring much patience, and a close
examination of details. It is the question
which, if the House will lend me its attention,
I will endeavor to discuss to the extent of
my ability. (Hear, hear.) I may further
take leave to say at starting, that I do not
approach this question from any new point
of view whatever. Always I have been, and
now I am, a unionist in the strictest and
largest sense of the term. I desire to perpetuate the union between Upper and Lower
Canada. I desire to see developed, the largest
union that can possibly be developed (I care
not by what name you call it) between all
the colonies, provinces, and dependencies of
the British Crown. I desire to maintain that
intimate union which ought to subsist, but
which unfortunately does not subsist as it
ought, between the Imperial Government and
all those dependencies. I am a unionist, who
especially does not desire to see the provinces
of Upper and Lower Canada disunited. To
my mind, this scheme does not at all present
itself as one of union ; and if hon. gentlemen opposite will admit the truth, they
will
acknowledge that, practically, it amounts to a
disunion between Upper and Lower Canada.
(Hear, hear.) I confess that I am irreconcileably opposed to that portion of the
scheme. I repeat I do not care to see
Upper and Lower Canada more dissevered
than they are ; on the contrary, I wish to
see them brought into closer union ; and
far from regarding this scheme as cementing
more closely the connection of these provinces with the British Empire, I look upon
it as tending rather towards a not distant
disunion of these provinces from the
British Empire. (Hear, hear.) My position as regards this scheme is that of one
who desires to see this union perpetuated,
and not of one who would contemplate a
state of disunion between any of the
component parts of the British Empire.
I hold that proper means ought to
be taken to prevent our disunion from the
British Empire and absorption into the
United States, and that this scheme by no
means tends that way. I have no fancy for
democratic or republican forms or institutions, or indeed for revolutionary or political
novelties of any sort. The phrase of " political creation " is no phrase of mine.
I hold
that the power to create is as much a higher
attribute than belongs to man, in the political world, as in any other department
of the
universe. All we can do is to attend to and
develope the ordinary growth of our institutions ; and this growth, if it is to be
healthy
at all, must be slow. There must be the same
slow, steady change in political matters,
which answers to the growth visible in the
484
physical world. I do believe in this gradual
development of our institutions, but I do
not believe in any of those violent and sudden
changes which have for their object the
creation of something entirely new. I fear
this scheme is just of the character to prevent that slow, gradual, healthy development
which I would wish to see steadily carried
out. If I could be astonished at anything in politics, Mr. SPEAKER, I should
be astonished at the attempt which has been
made by some honorable gentlemen on the
Treasury benches to represent the state of
the public feeling on this subject as not having
that mere sudden, sensational, unreliable
character which I have ascribed to it. Long
forgotten expressions of individual opinion ;
clauses said to have formed part of bills not
to be found, and not known to have been
even drawn ; motions threatened but never
made, the small party fencings of past times,
from before the days of the Canada Trade
Act downwards, have been pressed into service to meet the exigencies of a hard case.
Well, I shall not follow out that line of
argument: it is not worth while. We all
know that, from the time of the union of
Canada, at all events, until very lately indeed, nothing like serious discussion of
the
propriety or impropriety of a Federal union,
or of any union at all, of the aggregate of
these British American Provinces, has ever
so little occupied the public mind. I will
here go back merely to 1858, when the
sixth Parliament was elected, and from that
time bring under review, as rapidly as I can,
such few points of our political history as
are relevant to shew that this is the fact;
although, indeed, argument to establish it is
scarcely necessary. At the election of 1857-
'58, what really were the issues before the
country? They can be easily stated. I
take the
résumé, in fact, from the announcements of the
Globe, the organ of
the great popular party of Upper Canada
at that time; mentioning not everything, but everything at all material. The
great demand of the then Upper Canada
Opposition, which gave the key-note to the
whole political controversies of the time,
was representation according to population,
irrespectively of the dividing line between
Upper and Lower Canada. That was urged
as involving everything. It was urged for
the sake of all the rest, and as sure to bring
about all the rest, that was demanded by the
party. It was to enable them to carry out
their opposition to what were called sectarian
grants, their opposition to the holding of
land in mortmain for sectarian uses, their
opposition to separate schools on a sectarian
basis. It was urged for the avowed purpose
of obtaining uniform legislation in the future
for the two sections of the province, and
also what was spoken of as the assimilation
of the existing institutions of the two
sections of the province, but which was
meant to be an assimilation of those of
Lower Canada to those of Upper Canada
much more than of those of Upper Canada
to those of Lower Canada. (Hear, hear.)
[t was urged with the view of obtaining
what was called free-trade, that is, an anti-
Lower Canadian commercial policy. It was
urged with the view of obtaining the settlement of the North-West; in other words,
the relative aggrandizement of Upper Canada. It was urged, also, no doubt, with the
view of obtaining what was called administrative reform—the driving from power of
a set of men who were alleged, for various
reasons, to be unworthy of holding it. But
the great questions of measures above alluded
to came first; those as to the mere men,
second. (Hear, hear.) The grand object
was declared to be to obtain an Upper
Canadian preponderance of representation
on the floor of this House, in order to put an
end to everything like sectarian grants, the
holding of lands in mortmain and separate
schools, to render uniform our legislation, to
assimilate our institutions, to carry out an anti-
Lower Canadian commercial policy, and to
secure the North-West for the aggrandizement of Upper Canada. In this way the
question of Upper Canada against Lower
Canada was unmistakably raised. What
must have been, what could not fail to be,
the result of an appeal of that kind? It
was easy to foresee that there would be
returned in Upper Canada a majority in
favor of these demands, and in Lower
Canada an overwhelming majority against
them. I do not go into this to raise the
ghost of past animosities; I am merely
showing what cannot be denied—that no
one at that time spoke of or cared for this
magnificent idea of the union of the
provinces, by Confederation or otherwise.
(Hear, hear.) The session commenced.
Those who had the advantage or disadvantage of sitting in that Parliament that session
will remember the tremendous contrast there
was between all those debates which had refer
485
ence to this class of subjects, and the one single
debate which-was attempted. but could not
be made to take place, on the question of the
Confederation of the Provinces. With all
his ability—and there are few abler men than
the hon. gentleman who undertook at that
time to bring that question before the House—
with all his ability, and the most earnest
effort on his part to press it on the attention
of the House, he could scarcely obtain a
hearing. No one cared for the matter; and
it was felt by every one that such was the
case. Soon after, a ministerial crisis took
place. A new government came in for a few
hours, and started a policy. But that policy,
again, was not this policy. It did not touch
this question. (Hear, hear.) It was proposed, indeed, to deal with that question of
representation by population by applying
some system of checks or guarantees, doing
or trying to do something that might lessen
the objection of Lower Canada to a change
urged forward as that had been. But that
was all. That government fell—fell instantly—and another was formed in its place.
And the present Finance Minister, the honorable member for Sherbrooke, who, with
all his ability, had not been able to obtain a
serious hearing for his proposal of Confederation of the provinces, going into the
new
government, induced his colleagues to come
before the House and the country, with that
as a professed portion of their policy. I
may be pardoned, perhaps, for a single word
here of personal reference, for saying,
en
passant, that when that idea was thus
broached (as it was by a Government of
which I was as firm a supporter as any man
in the House), I did not fail to make it
known, that if ever it should be presented
to the House as a practical measure by that
Government, I should cease to be (so far as
it was concerned) one of such supporters.
(Hear, hear.) That was not the first time I
had thought of it. It had long before been
a matter of study with me; and all the
anxious reflection l have ever been able to
give it, has only had the result of strengthening my convictions against it every
day.
But how was this idea then brought forward? Tentatively, and just to neutralize
the scheme which the BROWN—DORION Administration had hinted to the country.
The one fire was to burn out another's burning. (Hear, hear.) The plan of that
Government was to make propositions to
the Imperial Government, and to the gov
ernments of the Lower Provinces. But
how? If you want to gain an object, you
put that object before those to whom you
propose it in the way most likely to induce
them to say yes. This scheme was suggested to the Imperial Government, and to the
people and governments of the Lower Provinces, precisely in the way most calculated
to induce them to say no. We went and
told them, "We are in such a state of
embarrassment, we have political questions
which so trouble and bother us, that we
do not know if we can get along at all,
unless you will be so kind as to come into
this union with us." (Hear, hear.) It
was just as though I were in business, and
went round to half a dozen capitalists,
telling them, " I have got into debt; my
business is gone to the dogs; I have no
business capacity; help me by going into
partnership with me, or I am ruined."
(Hear, hear) If the object had been not
to carry it, it does appear to me that those
gentlemen could not have taken a better
method of accomplishing that object. And
we saw this—that just so soon as it was
found that the Lower Provinces did not, as
under the circumstances they could not, say
yes to a proposal of this kind, and that the
Imperial Government let the matter drop,
our Administration let it drop too. We
never heard another word about it The
despatches were laid on our table in
1859, but nobody asked a question about
them. The child was still-born, and no
one troubled himself about its want of
baptism. We went on with our old questions—representation by pepulation ; Upper
Canada against Lower Canada ; measures, to
a great extent; men also, to a great and
increasing extent. And we quarrelled and
fought about almost everything, but did not
waste a thought or word upon this gigantic
question of the Confederation of these provinces. (Hear, hear.) In a little while
we
drifted into another crisis—that of 1862.
And from the time of that crisis, and the
formation of the MACDONALD-SICOTTE
Administration, down to the time when the
present Administration was, last summer,
brought into its present shape, the one
prominent demand made upon political
parties and political men everywhere was,
to set aside the older questions of measures,
and occupy ourselves very much more—not
to say exclusively—with the question of
men. (Hear, hear.) I am not blaming
486
honorable gentlemen ; I am not raising the
question whether they were right or
wrong in taking that course. They may
have been the purest patriots, the most
farseeing statesmen the world has known,
for ought I care. What I say is merely
this, that whether for good or evil, whether
wisely or unwisely, the fact is, that the
public mind was not occupied in the least
with this Confederation question. After
having fought a long time, mainly about
measures, and secondarily about men, we
were all suddenly called upon, in 1862, to
consider nothing but the question of the men
who were to do everything right, and to
settle everything fairly and honestly, and so
forth. Representation by population was unmistakably, for a time at least, laid upon
the
shelf, declared to be secondary, almost unimportant. It had been half shelved some
time before ; then, it was wholly shelved.
It was hardly taken down from the shelf in
1863, when the MACDONALD-DORION Government merely put it back to the same
place, which it had long occupied to no
purpose of a practical character under
the CARTIER-MACDONALD Administration.
(Hear, hear.) Such, then, was the state of
affairs—nobody thinking or caring about
this great question, until last Session of
Parliament, when the hon. member for
South Oxford, the present President of the
Council, moved for and obtained a committee on the subject of constitutional changes
generally. Certainly that hon. gentleman
did a very clever thing, in embodying in his
motion extracts from the unfortunate defunct
dispatch of Messrs. CARTIER, GALT and
ROSS.
 HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—It was
a fortunate despatch—unfortunate for you,
but fortunate for us.
 MR. DUNKIN —lt is an old proverb that
says " He laughs well who laughs last."
  HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—I expect to laugh the last.
 MR. DUNKIN—No doubt. But I do
not care to joke in a matter which I think
of a very serious character ; and, seriously
speaking, I think the hon. gentleman is very
wrong. We have yet to see, in the first
place, whether the thing is done, and then,
if it is done, whether it succeeds.
 HON. MR. McGEE—" If 'twere done,
'twere well 'twere done quickly."
 MR. DUNKIN—The Minister of Agriculture is too good a Shakspearian to need to
be reminded that the thing to be done in that
case was a something very bad. The hon.
gentleman is welcome to all he can make of
his quotation,—" If 'twere done when 'tis
done, then 'twere well it were done quickly."
To return, however. It was clever, undoubtedly clever, in the hon. member for South
Oxford to quote from the despatch of these
hon. gentlemen—then, by the way, in opposition to the then Government and to himself
—an expression of opinion almost coinciding
with his own. He carried his committee.
No one made any great objection to it. I
have been told that I am guilty of some sort
of inconsistency, after having voted for that
committee, in now opposing this measure.
The sequitur is hard to see. I did certainly
speak and vote for it, but on the express
ground that I believed it would do no sort of
harm, and that, on the contrary, it might
have the good effect of leading other hon.
gentlemen to the sober conclusion at which
I had long before arrived myself. I therefore had no objection to the committee, and
I sat on it. I am not going to reveal what
have been called the secrets of the committee. As in many other like cases, there
was
mighty little in them. Owing to accidents,
wholly aside from this question of Confederation, the report of the committee was
presented on the very night that vote happened
to be given, indirectly adverse to the TACHE—
MACDONALD Administration. The report
itself was an accident. All the allusion there
was in it to Federation of any sort, found its
way there at the last moment and unexpectedly. It is no violation of confidence to
say
that it was even voted against by the leader
of this House, the Attorney General for
Upper Canada, the new leading advocate of
the present scheme. That fact is on the
printed record. It was voted against, also
by the members for Cornwall and West Elgin. There were five other members, of
whom I am sorry I was one, who were absent ;
had I been there, unquestionably my vote
would have been against it. (Hear, hear.)
And, Mr. SPEAKER, those who were in this
House at the time that report was made, will
remember pretty well the more than cool
indifference with which it was here received,
little or nothing, after all, as it amounted to.
Well, this vote in the House thus following,
the opportunity suddenly offered to honorable
gentlemen opposite of starting on a tack
which, up to that moment, I believe no two
men in the House had ever thought of as
487
possible. And from that day to this, a
series of accidents, each one more extraordinary than its predecessor, has led to
a state
of things about as extraordinary as the accidents emselvcs were. (Laughter.)
MR. DUNKIN—I dare say some people
think so ; and it may be so according to the
theology of my hon. friend, but not according
to mine. I repeat, what has happened since
has been tolerably unexpected, even by the
actors in those occurrences. I do not believe
they were expected by anybody ; and none,
I fancy, have been more surprised at them
than the very men who now take all the
advantage possible of them, and even the
credit of 0 having brought them about. And
how, Mr. SPEAKER, was this scheme presented to the public? Piecemeal, and with
reticences innumerable ; in a way that made
it hardly possible to criticise it in any of its
parts. When, after several members of the
Government of this province and several other
members of the Conference had gone into
long explanations of it publicly at Quebec,
Montreal and Toronto, the honorable member
for Hochelaga came out with a criticism
upon and a dissent from it. He was set
upon with a clamor, to the effect that he
ought not to have pronounced himself so
soon, as the whole scheme was not yet developed ! It was said he had misrepresented
the scheme, and ought to have waited until its
details were really known before attacking it.
Brought thus before the country, in piecemeal style, with some portions kept back,
and others ambiguously and even contradictorily stated, no one could seriously take
hold
of it. After some time, it is true, a printed
paper, purporting to set forth the resolutions
of the Conference, was sent round to members, but with the word " Private" written
on it, as much as to say that it was not officially communicated, and must be made
no
public use of. That that private communication was not even perfectly accurate, is
now perfectly well known ; but that was of
little consequence, as it could not be made
use of publicly. Such is the way in which
this matter was laid before the people. Every
possible advantage was given to the people
to praise it from every point of view, and
nobody got a fair opportunity of saying that
he did not like it. The praise was carefully
prepared and published, and everything that
could possibly be done to prepare the public
mind for the scheme before it final announce
ment was skilfully done. And now what
have we? Why, the cry that the whole
thing must be passed, " now or never." It
will never pass, we are told, if it does not
pass now! (Hear, hear.) Was there ever
l a measure of this magnitude before, on which
the heart of a country was set, the whole of
which was so wise and good as this scheme
is said to be—and yet, that had to be passed
(the whole of it) at once, or never? (Hear,
hear.) We are even told that it is a positive
treaty— made however, by the way, by
parties who were never authorized to make
any treaty at all. I must say, for one, that
I cannot but see in all this precipitancy
the unmistakeable admission
de facto, that
the Government themselves know and feel
that the feeling they have got up in favor of
this scheme is a passing feeling of momentary
duration, that they cannot themselves in the
least rely upon. (Hear, hear.) Mr. SPEAKER,
it is rather curious that hon. gentlemen, in
recommending this scheme of theirs, seem
never to be tired of speaking of its excellencies in general, and of modestly
eulogiziug the wisdom, and foresight,
and statesmanship of those who got it up.
I cannot wonder that their judgment in this
behalf should be a little led astray by their
surprise at the success which has so far
attended their project. Their " officious" visit
to Prince Edward Island took but a very
few days, and it resulted in the scheme of
a legislative union for the Lower Provinces
being (as I think, unfortunately) laid aside;
and then followed the Conference at Quebec,
where these twelve honorable gentlemen
representing Canada, and twenty-one other
gentlemen representing the Lower Provinces, sat together for the long period of
nineteen days—seventeen working days and
two Sundays—and as the result of these
seventeen days of but partial work by the
way, we have from these thirty-three gentlemen a scheme of a Constitution which they
vaunt of as being altogether better than that
of the model republic of the United States,
and even than that of the model kingdom of
Great Britain. Neither the model republic nor
yet the model kingdom of whose glorious traditions and associations we are all so
proud, is
for a moment to be compared with this work
of theirs. (Hear, hear.) So perfect do
they seem to regard their pet measure, that
they tell us we must not take time to discuss
it. Even though Her Majesty's Secretary
of State has told us that there are features
of it that require further consideration and
488
must be revised, yet they tell us that we
must not change a letter or line of it. (Hear,
hear.) And yet, we are at the same time
told that the details of this scheme, if
examined at all, must be examined and
viewed as those of a compromise. It is not,
they freely admit, as satisfactory in its details as any of us would desire to have
; but
it is all we can get, and must be accepted or
rejected as a whole. It must be examined
in the very spirit of compromise, meaning
that no serious fault shall be found with it,
however unsatisfactory it may be. I have
heard of Paddy's notion of a reciprocity
that was all on one side.
MR. DUNKIN—Oh! I mean it as a
national compliment. I would, however,
ask hon. gentlemen opposite not to throw
across the House these jokes; not that I
object to an occasional interruption by way
of question, but mere jokes thrown into the
discussion of a serious subject do not help
any man who desires to present his honest,
sincere and serious views on a grave question. I must ask the two hon. members of
the Government, who have several times, by
means of interruptions of that nature, tried
to throw me off the track, to desist from
such course in future.
HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—I am sure
the hon.gentleman did not intend to disconcert you, nor had I any such purpose in
view.
MR. DUNKIN—I will not say it is done
for that purpose; but I feel myself more
than usually annoyed with interruptions tonight, because the subject is of a nature
to
require the closest attention. This measure,
then, it is said, must be examined in this
spirit, of compromise, that is to sav, not
objecting to any of its provisions. One of
the expressions used by the hon. gentleman
was—that we should not require in the
scheme "an impossible perfection." Well,
sir, I do not think there is any danger of
our finding any impossible perfection in it,
or anything relating to it, unless, indeed, in
one particular direction ; and in that direction I do not know but that there has
been
attained all possible perfection at least, if
not an impossible perfection. I allude to
that particular kind of wisdom and foresight
which marks the astute official politician, as
contradistinguished from the far-seeing
statesman. (Hear, hear.) There has been
exhibited, in this one respect, an all but
impossible perfection. Every feeling, every
interest, every class, is bid for in the cleverest
way imaginable. The seat of the Federal
Government is to be at Ottawa, of course.
The Governor General or other head of this
magnificent future vice-royalty, or what not,
will hold his court and parliament at Ottawa;
but a handsome sop is thrown to Quebec and
Toronto, also. They, too, are each to have
a provincial court and legislature and governmental departments. Everything for
everybody! As to the state that is to be
created, its style and rank are left in most
delightful ambiguity. We may be honored
with the dignity of a kingdom, or of a viceroyalty, or of we know not what. All we
are assured of is, that it is to be a something
better, higher and more grand than we now
have. Perhaps the Sovereign herself will
occasionally come over and exercise her
authority in person; or, perhaps, a throne
will be created for some member of the royal
family; or, failing such dreams as these,
we are told, at the least, in reference to the
character of the representative who is to
be sent here in place of the Sovereign—that
is to say. the representative who is to administer the government during the ordinary
absence of the Sovereign from this
part of the British dominions—we are told,
I say, by the leader of this House, that, in
view of the functions to be entrusted to
him, the high position he is to hold, the
vice-regal state he will have to keep, it is
possible we shall, at least, have sent out here
in that capacity. hereafter, men of the class
emphatically called statesmen. I have no taste
for paying what may be termed courtier compliments to the living; but, looking back
only
to the dead, of whom one may speak freely,
without such fear, I must say that tho-e
who have been appointed to administer our
government in the past are hardly of the
class to be looked down upon—that the list
in which we find the names of DURHAM,
SYDENHAM, METCALFE and ELGIN, is not
precisely a list of men inferior to the higher
class of those whom we call statesmen; and
am not quite sure that even after this great
Confederacy shall have been established,
men of much higher mark than those we
have already had will be appointed to rule
over it. Be that as it may, however, the
bait is thrown out that we are to have men
much higher than we ever had before; that
in all manner of ways our state is to be
better, finer, grander, in fact, than our imagination can well conceive. (Laughter.)
We are, it seems, among other things, to
489
get a little more than we now have of what
is called a feature of the British Constitution, in the composition of the Legislative
Council. It has been spoken of as an impropriety, almost treasonable, to hint at it
as
a bait thrown out to gentlemen who have
been elected to the Legislative Council for
a fixed period, that by voting for this
scheme they may get themselves made legislative councillors for life. If in this
scheme provision had been made, in regard
to the members of this branch of the Legislature, that they should hold their seats,
not
for life, but say, for a mere period of five
years, I rather think there would be few
found here very mealy-mouthed on the subject; and when it is offered to men who,
like ourselves, will have to go before their
constituents within a few months, or years,
at most, that they are to be made legislative
councillors for life, the bait, I think, is not
a very small one. (Hear, hear.) We are told,
too, on the face of this scheme, that the
choice is to be made by the present governments of the several provinces; but of course
with perfect fairness to the Opposition in
each province! Most satisfactory! Each Opposition is to be treated with perfect fairness
—" it is so nominated in the bond." We hear
of a minister of the Crown in one place, addressing his neighbors, and telling them
they
may depend on it, that when Her Majesty
comes to make the selection, the utmost respect will be paid to the rights and privileges
of the elected members, so that their elected
member will have the fairest chance of becoming a life member of the Confederate
Legislative Council. In another place, on
the other hand, we hear from another minister of the Crown that those gentlemen who
hold patents of appointment for life may feel
quite as safe, for certainly their claim to be
retained in their present position is sure to
have full weight. Further, in Lower Canada,
each locality is told that it may rest satisfied
It will not be overlooked, for each is to be
represented in the Legislative Council by a
gentleman residing or holding property in
it; and both origins and both creeds alike
are thus to have representation and full protection. Another point upon which there
has been a like pleasant sort of ambiguity
kept up, is as to who are to make the future
nominations to this Legislative Council.
Viewing this part of the scheme as a matter of
principle, one would have thought that these
future nominations must be made on the
Federal principle. It was not expressly so
stated; it is not (as we are at last here
told) it is not so meant; but till we
were so told, everybody who thought one
way said that the resolutions meant it
to be that way, and all who thought the
other way conveniently found the resolutions
to justify their way of thinking. Well,
turning then to matters which affect this
House, the same sort of thing is still observable. Representation by population is
given to meet the grand demand of Upper
Canada; but the people of Lower Canada
are assured, in the same breath, that it will
not hurt them; that their institutions and
privileges are made perfectly safe ; that they
will even have as many members in the
Lower House as before, and that they will,
in a variety of ways, be really better off
than ever. A delightful ambiguity is found,
too, upon the point as to who will make the
future apportionments of the constituencies.
The leader of the Government, in explaining
the scheme the other night, admitted that
the decennial revisions of our representation
districts are really not to be left to the local
legislatures, but are to be dealt with altogether by the Federal Legislature. Till
then most people, I believe, had held the
contrary; but all had admitted the text of
the resolutions to be equivocal, and each
party had of course interpreted them as it
wished. The postponement of the local
constitutions is of the same character.
Everyone is given to understand that the
thing will be made to work to the satisfaction of all; each is promised that he
shall have it as he wants. Those who
hold to the principle of responsible government, as commonly understood, in the local
administrations are, of course, told to
expect a lieutenant-governor, with a cabinet,
and, presumably, two branches of a local
legislature. Those who Wmlld have two
legislative bodies, without a responsible
ministry, are told that very well it may be
so. Whoever prefers one legislative body,
hears that it is beyond a doubt there very
well may only be one; and those again who,
even with one House, do not wish to see
responsible government in the provinces, are
assured that the machinery is likely to be
very simple; that each province will probably have a lieutenant-governor, with a few
heads of needed departments, and one House,
and that so, no doubt, the affairs of each province can be managed most economically
and
490
to the entire satisfaction of all. The appointment of lieutenant-governors is again
a bait,
and perhaps not a small one for more than
a few of our public men. The power of
disallowance of local bills, and also that of
reserving them for the sanction of the General Government, are on the one hand
represented as realities—powers that will
really be exercised by the General Government to restrain improper local legislation—
to make everything safe for those who want
a Legislative rather than a Federal union ;
but on the other hand, to those who do not
want a legislative union, it is represented
that they mean nothing at all, and will never
be exercised. (Hear, hear.) Uniformity
of laws again is to be given to all the provinces, if they desire it, except Lower
Canada ; but by a peculiar provision of the
Constitution, although nothing can be done
by the General Parliament to render the
laws uniform, without the consent of the
provinces concerned, it is stipulated that it
shall be impossible for Lower Canada, even
though she should desire it, to have her laws
uniform with those of the other provinces.
So, too, with regard to education in Upper
and Lower Canada ; the provision is to be
made, no one knows how, for everybody, and
all are guaranteed some sort of satisfaction.
It is true we are not told what the promised
measures on this head are to be ; whether
they really will give increased facilities to
the minorities in the two sections for the
education of their youth in their own way
or not ; but we are to take the promise as
all right, and everybody is required to be
content. Turning to the financial features
of the scheme, we find it roundly stated that
all the debts and liabilities of each province
are to be assumed by the General Government ; but if we look again into details we
find that—no, they are not. There is a
something here, too, beyond what appears
on the face of things. Upper and Lower
Canada are each to stay burthened with some
unstated parts of the debt of Canada, and the
other provinces are to have
bonuses of unstated
and variant mounts, not easy to be come at.
The financial portion of the scheme, equally
with every other, is presented to everybody
in whatever light he would like to view it in.
It will surely bring about economy, because
the local governments will have so little to
expend unless they resort to direct taxation ;
but yet, on the other hand, it is as surely to
carry us through all sorts of wild expenditure—to give us new and exhaustless credit
in England—to make possible vast defensive
works throughout the country—to construct
the Intercolonial Railway—to enlarge our
canals westward—to create no one knows
how vast a scheme of communication with
the far North-West. Literally, it sounds at
every turn as a promise of everything for
everybody ; and yet, when each comes to ask
how much it promises, and how, and where,
and when, the whole is to be found ambiguous, unsubstantial and unreal. (Hear, hear.)
I repeat, there is everywhere throughout this
scheme a most amazing amount of that sort
of cleverness which may characterize the
astute politician, but which, I think, I shall
be able to show is yet far from being the wisdom and foresight characteristic of the
farseeing statesman. (Hear, hear.) The game
of all things to all men is a game that cannot
be played with success in the long run. lt
can, under any circumstances, be but temporary in its success. (Hear, hear.) Seriously,
then, Mr. SPEAKER, I pass on to examine
this work in a constitutional point of view,
clearing away, as best one may, these ambiguities that surround it, dealing with it
as it is,
and comparing it primarily with the Constitution of the United States, and secondarily
with
the Constitution of Great Britain. I wish
I could compare it primarily with that of
Great Britain ; but it is so much more like
that of the United States, that I cannot. In
parts only has it any resemblance to the
British Constitution ; and for this reason the
order of comparison cannot be reversed. I
must say, before I go further, that I am by
no means an admirer of a great deal that I
find in the Constitution of the United States.
I have always preferred, decidedly preferred,
and do now prefer, our own British Constitution. But this, at least, no one can deny,
that the framers of the American Constitution were great men, wise men, far-seeing
men ; that their work was a great work ; and
that to compare anybody else's work—
especially a work such as this, of the few
gentlemen, doubtless able gentlemen, who
framed this Constitution—with it, is to
submit that work to a very severe and trying
test. (Hear, hear.) The framers of the
Constitution of the United States were,
indeed, great men—living in, and the
product of a great age, who had passed
through a great ordeal and been brought
up to the level of their work by great
events in which they had been leading
actors ; and their work was a great
work, which cost much time and much
491
discussion, and underwent long and painstaking revision of all sorts, in all quarters,
before it was finally adopted. (Hear, hear.)
Yet we are called upon to admit now, and to
admit it without examination, that this work
of thirty-three gentlemen, done in seventeen
days, is a much better work than that; and
not only so, but that it is even better for
our people and situation, than the time-
honored Constitution of our Mother Land;
that it combines essentially the advantages
of both, with the disadvantages of neither.
I do not think so. The Constitution of the
United States, it must be borne in mind, at
least lasted seventy years without fracture.
It has stood a good deal of straining, from
events beyond the possible foresight or control of those who framed it; and it may
yet
stand many more years, notwithstanding
this late strain upon it. If, indeed, Louisiana
had not been purchased, if the cotton-gin
had not been invented—the two unforeseen
events which so encouraged the growth
of cotton and therefore of slavery—if it
had not been for these, what I may call
extraneous events, which could not be
expected to enter into the minds of the
framers of that Constitution, it probably
would not have received the shock that
it has received ; but we do not know yet
that that shock will have a fatal effect,
or that it will break up the wonderful fabric
which they created. Perhaps it may change
that fabric more or less in some of its parts;
and after it shall have passed away, the fabric
itself may not improbably endure for a very
long time to come. But as to this proposed
Constitution of ours, should it become the
organic law of the land, how long will it last ?
How will it work, if it does last? And to
or towards what, while working, will it tend?
To these questions, I have now to call the
earnest attention of this House. I begin,
Mr. SPEAKER, with the future House of
Commons—falsely so called. I shall not take
up the different resolutions one after another,
and criticise them in that manner; but I
will take up the difl'erent leading features of
the scheme consecutively, and endeavor not
to misrepresent them. If I should do so,
or at all misstate their character or probable
effects, I give honorable gentlemen opposite
full leave, if only they will do so without
throwing jokes across the floor of this House,
to correct me, and I will do my best'to set
myself right. The House of Commons,
then, incorrectly so called, to distinguish it
from the other House that corresponds
with, but is not named after the House
of Lords, the Legislative Council, forms
the leading feature of this project; and
I take it up first, comparing it with the
House of Representatives of the United
States, and speaking litre not so much of its
powers as of its composition. I cannot, in
this view, compare it with the Imperial
House of Commons, because the principle of
its construction is so entirely different. In
that respect, it is simply copied from what I
think the wrong model; and the copied
parts correspond most faithfully and exactly
with what I venture to call the least desirable
features of the Constitution of the United
States House of Representatives. (Hear,
hear.) The copy is not, I repeat, of a thing
absolutely good, but only of a thing as good
as the framers of the Constitution of the
United States, circumstanced as they were,
could make it ; but the peculiarity of their
system that I object to, was not at all necessary to ours. I think it was absolutely
unnecessary; I think it even very much of .
an excrcscence. It can hardly be denied,
Mr. SPEAKER, that there is a good deal of
practical objection to the plan of shifting
representation districts, which is what this
system adopts, and what the system of the
United States adopted. Every ten years the
representation from each province in the
House of Commons is to be changed or
readjusted by a rule which, for all practical
purposes, is essentially the same as that of
the United States. Of course we have not
the little addition of the allowance for the
three-fifths of the slave population which
they have ; but decennially we are to take
the population of the several provinces, and
by a rule in all essentials common to the
two systems, we are to declare how many
representation districts are to be allowed to
each province. Now, the result of that
system must be that we can have no lasting
constituencies for the future House of Commons. These representation districts cannot
be kept to correspond with our municipal,
business or registration districts, or with our
districts for representation in our provincial
legislatures. We are to have sect of special,
shifting districts for the mere purpose of
electing our Federal House of Commons. I
must say that this principle is not, from a British point of view, a sound one. (Hear,
hear.)
What we ought to «his, to try to establish
in this country of ours a set of representation
492
districts as permanent and as closely coinciding with our territorial divisions existing
for other purposes, as circumstances will allow
us to have them; subdividing or otherwise
altering them, or erecting new ones, only as
occasion may be found to require.
Mr. DUNKIN—"Perhaps so, and perhaps
not. That distinction, however, is just what
I complain of. We are to change our districts for purposes of representation in the
local parliaments, if we like, but not unless
we like. These subdivisions of our provinces
may thus, in the main, be permanent. But.
for representation in the Federal Parliament
we are, at each of these decennial periods, to
have a general readjustment of the whole
country, so as to divide each province anew
into its due number of aliquot parts. This
is an innovation on our usages, greatly for
the worse. It goes to destroy that character
of reality, convenience and stability which—
if our system, as a whole, is to have such
character—had need be maintained to the
utmost extent practicable, in respect of our
constituencies and of our minor territorial delimitations generally. This changing
every ten years brings together electors who
have not been in the habit of acting with
each other. In England they do nothing of
this sort; they do not change their limits
lightly. The several bodies of men who
send representatives to the Imperial House
of Commons have the habit of so coming
together, as bodies not likely to be broken
up. We ought to keep this as an element
of our Constitution, but it is carefully eliminated from it.
. HON. Mr. McDOUGALL—I am sure
the honorable gentleman does not wish to
build up an argument on a misconception of
the resolutions for the purpose of misrepresentation. I am sure that he must have
observed this fact, that it may, and probably
will often happen, that there will be no
change as to the number of members or
electoral districts, and there certainly will
be none if the increase of population in
Lower Canada keeps pace with that in Upper Canada, and therefore the evil he complains
of will not occur unless there be some
different rule of increase from that which
has prevailed heretofore. .
MR. DUNKIN—If any one imagines that
the population of the different provinces is
going to increase upon any thing like the
same rule, then I difler trom him. I believe
there will be a very much more rapid rate
of increase in some provinces than in others;
a divergence between them in this respect,
of the same kind, and perhaps, even to the
same degree as in the case of the United
States. There, in the old states, at every
decennial revision, the number of representatives lessens, and in the new states it
increases, and that rapidly. It is only in the
comparatively few states which may be said to
be neither old nor new that it remains about the
same. The rule is one of change, for the
country everywhere. Any escape from change
is the exception. And with us, those provinces
which shall be found to increase faster than
Lower Canada, as some certainly will be,
will re-divide their whole territory every ten
years, in order to increase their number of
districts; and those which increase slower
will do the same, in order to cut some off.
Even Lower Canada, to meet the varying
rates of increase of its several parts, will be
drawn into doing the same sort of thing. I
shall be told, no doubt, that this need not
be—that mere partial changes here and there
may be made to answer the end; but I know
that in the nature of things it will be, that
such partial changes will not be made the
rule. The sweeping rule is laid down, in the
abstract, of basing representation on mere
population; and that rule is sure to be followed out—not only as between the several
provinces, but also as within each ; and
here again, not only as for Federal, but also
as for provincial legislation. For all legislative purposes, we must look to have
all our
territorial divisions open to frequent, one
might say perpetual, reconstruction ; and
this subject perpetually to the disturbing
influences of the party warfare of the hour.
The exigencies of that warfare, we may be
sure, will tell ; and whatever the party in the
ascendant, whether in the country at large
or locally, will find means in this part of our
machinery for advancing its ends—means not
quite of the sort to commend themselves to
one's approval. (Hear, hear.) It is claimed,
I know, as a merit of this scheme, that it
allows a five years' term to our House of
Commons, in place of the two years' term
fixed for the House of Representatives.
Apart from these decennial revisions, I would
be glad of this. But five is the half of ten, I
think; and though our Houses of Commons may
often not last their full term, there will yet seldom or never, in all probability,
be more than
either two or three general elections held
between any two decennial revisions. A less
493
satisfactory arrangement, if one is to think
of our House of Commons at all treading in
the footsteps of its great namesake, I confess
I can hardly imagine. There everything
favors that combined steadiness and variety
of local influences upon the representative
machinery which is at once characteristic of,
and essential to, the British system, and
without which neither public parties nor
public men can act or last as it requires they
should. Here everything is to be allowed to
tend in precisely the opposite direction. Nor
is this all. At home, while the constituencies are wisely kept as lasting as they
can
be, the members they return are all held
members of the one House of Commons, as
little distinguished by the English, Scotch,
Irish or Welsh location of their constituencies as they well can be. Here, again,
this
United States system which we are asked to
copy, is the reverse, and the reverse of sound
judgment. The House of Representatives
is an aggregate of state delegations, and our
mock House of Commons is to be an aggregate of provincial delegations. Each man is
to come to it ticketed as an Upper or Lower
Canadian, a New Brunswicker, a Nova
Scotian, Newfoundlander, a Prince Edward
Islander, or what not. These distinctions,
which, if we are to be a united
people, we had better try to sink, we
are to keep up and exaggerate. The
system will do that, and but too well.
There is, however, one marked contrast as
to this, between the system of the United
States and that proposed here. In the
United States, for the House of Representatives, the system is at least sure to work,
whether for good or evil. Theirs is a true
Federation. Its founders took care, when,
with the foresight of statesmen, they arranged
the details of their constitution, to frame it
so as to work in all its important parts, and
with that end they left it mainly to the
several states to work out the arithmetical
rule laid down for these decennial revisions,
giving them such powers as to make sure
that the thing intended would be really
and punctually done. I thought when I
read these resolutions first, that it was, of
course, the intention of their framers to
adopt that system here; but we are now
authoritatively told that it is not so. The
General Parliament is alone to do the whole
work of these re-divisions of the constituencies throughout the provinces. But,
suppose that for any cause, such as readily
may suggest itself—under pretext of alleged
incorrectness of a census, or without pretext
—it should fail to discharge this duty
promptly, or should discharge it in a questionable way, or not at all—what then?
Is the Imperial Parliament to reserve a right
of interference in such case ; or is the
doctrine broached the other night by the
Attorney General for Lower Canada, as to
its power to revoke our constitutional charters,
to be acted on? I should fancy not. But
why, then, pretend to ask the Imperial
Parliament to do so weak a thing as to lay
down for us a bad rule for all time to come,
merely that we may follow it or not, as in
our wisdom or unwisdom we may please?
Well, then, Mr. SPEAKER, I turn next to
our Legislative Council — too little like
the House of Lords, to bear even a moment's comparison. in that direction. It
must be compared with the Senate of the
United States; but the differences here are
very wide. The framers of this Constitution
have here contrived a system quite different
from that; and when we are told (as it seems
we are) that the Legislative Council is to
represent especially the Federal element in
our Constitution, I do not hesitate to affirm
that there is not a particle of the Federal
principle about it ; that it is the merest sham
that can be imagined. (Hear, hear.) To
show the contrast. The Senate of the
United States consists of just two senators,
freely chosen by the Legislature of each
State of the Union.
MR. DUNKIN—That does not in the
least touch what I am saying. I say that
the Senate consists of just two senators from
each state, who are freely selected by the
legislature of each state. It is true that in
case of any casual vacancy power is given to
the Governor of the state to fill up such
vacancy until the next meeting of the legislature of the state. But it is the legislatures
of the several states who regularly elect these
senators from each, for a stated term of six
years, and subject to an arrangement for
their retiring in such rotation as never to leave
any state unre resented. Well, sir, the
Senate of the nited States, thus constituted of two picked men from each state, and
presided over by the Vice-President or by
one of themselves, freely chosen by themselves, have devolved upon them the important
judicial function of impeachment.
Even the President of the United States may
be impeach before them for treason or
494
malversation in office. They have a large
share of executive power also; sitting in
secret session upon all treaties and upon
most appointments to oifice, that is to say,
upon all appointments of the more important
kind. There are appointments which the
President may make without their concurrence; but as a rule, there are no important
appointments which he can so make. Every
treaty and every important appointment
must go before them, and may be disallowed
by them. They further exercise coordinate
legislative functions, as to expenditure and
taxation, with the House of Representatives.
From all these circumstances combined, the
Senate of the United States is, I believe,
on the whole, the ablest deliberative body
the world has ever known. As to men of
third and fourth rate importance finding
their way there, it is hardly possible. The
members of the Senate, almost without
exception, are first or second-rate men.
There are no small men among them. (Cries
of " Yes ! yes !") Well, Mr. SPEAKER,
there is certainly no proportion of small men;
comparatively speaking.
HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—It is a
question at this moment as to the relative averages of the House of Representatives
and of
the Senate. I heard it discussed when I was
in Washington.
MR. DUNKIN—What I say is, I believe,
fully borne out by constitutional writers of
the highest mark—by DE TOCQUEVILLE,
CHEVALIER, and others. They say that the
peculiar constitution and attributes of the Senate of the United States have made
it a deliberative body of the very highest mark. And even
were it doubtful whether or not in this respect
it is all I have called it, at least of this there
can be no doubt at all. As intended for the
Federal check in the system of the United
States, it is a machine simply perfect. It is
a very able, deliberative body, of moderate
numbers, carefully chosen on the strictest
principle of federation, changing constantly,
and having, on every matter of importance,
a voice and veto of the most efficient kind.
For stopping everything, for bringing about
a deadlock—all parts of their machinery viewed together—it affords no formidable facilities;
whilst for preventing anything from being
done which it may be to the public interest,
or to that of any number of the states, to
prevent, it is as perfect as can be. Look now
on the other hand, Mr. SPEAKER, at the Le
gislative Council under the Confederation; what is it? There is a sort of attempt
to prevent its numbers from resting on
a population basis; and this is about the only
principle I can find in it. (Hear, hear.) It
would seem to have been thought, that as the
branch of the legislature was to be shared between the provinces in the ratio of their
population, there must be some other rule followed
for the Upper Chamber. So we are to have
twenty-four for Upper Canada, twenty-four
for Lower Canada, twenty-four for the three
Lower Provinces, and four for Newfoundland;
simply, I suppose, because the populations of
these equalized sections are not equal, and
because four is not in proportion to the population of Newfoundland (Hear, hear.)
And
these legislative councillors, thus limited
in number, are to hold their seats for
life. They are not to be even freely
chosen, in the first instance, at least,
from the principal men in each section of
the country. They are to be selected,
as far as possible, from the small number of
gentlemen holding seats in the present Legislative Council, either by the accident
of their
having been nominated to them some time
ago, or by the chances of popular election
since; and until that panel is exhausted, no
other person in any province is to be taken ;
and hereafter, Mr. SPEAKER, as vacancies
occur, they are to be filled as we are now told
—and this is the strangest thing of all—not
by the provincial legislatures, nor by any
authority or under any avowed influence of
the local kind, but possibly by the General
Government. And forsooth, this is called
the Federal feature of our system ! (Hear,
hear.) The vacancies, to be sure, in Lower
Canada are to be filled by selection of individuals having or holding property in
Lower
Canada,—and more than that, in articular
territorial divisions of Lower Canada ! But
are these individuals to be ever so little chosen
by the people of such territorial divisions, or
even of Lower Canada, or with any necessary
reference to their wishes in that behalf ?
Bless you, no! not at all. That would go
towards making a Federal body of this House!
(Hear, hear.) It might then be something
of a Federal check upon the General Government, and that would never do. But suppose
this should happen—and honorable gentlemen
opposite must admit that it may,—that
in the Federal Executive Council some
one province or other—Upper Canada, Lower
Canada, or any other, no matter which—
either is not represented, or is represented
495
otherwise than as it would wish to be. While
thus out in the cold, a vacancy arises in the
Legislative Council, requiring to be filled as
for such province. Where is the guarantee
that it will be filled on any sort of Federal
principle ? (Hear, hear.) And yet, what
worse wrong or insult could be put upon a
province, than would be involved in the kind
of selection likely under such circumstances
to be made for it? Surely, Mr. SPEAKER,
this Legislative Council, constituted so differently from the Senate of the United
States,
presided over by a functionary to be nominated by the General Government; having no
such functions of a judicial or executive
character as attached to that body, and cut
off from that minute oversight of the finances
which attaches to the Senate of the United
States; although it may be a first-rate deadlock; although it may be able to interpose
an absolute veto, for no one can say how long,
on all legislation, would be no Federal check
at all. I believe it to be a very near approach
to the worst system which could be devised in
legislation. While the Senate of the United
States is nearly perfect in the one way, our
Legislative Council is to be as nearly perfect
in the other way. (Laughter.) The Hon. Attorney General for Upper Canada, the other
night, devised and stated just the cleverest defence he could, of this constitution
of the Legislative Council. But what did it amount to ?
Nothing. He undertook to tell us, that from
the ordinary course of events, the deaths to
be counted on in a body numbering its certain
proportion of elderly men, and so forth, the
personal composition of this Council would not
change so slowly as many feared. He also
urged that those who thus found their way
me it would be but men after all—perhaps
politicians a little or more than a little given
to complaisance—but at any rate men, who
would know they had no great personal hold
on public confidence; and so, that they might
sometimes even yield to pressure too easily, in
place of resisting it too much. Well, sir, I
have heard it said that every government in
the world is in a certain sense a constitutional
government—a government, that is to say,
tempered by check of some kind. The
despotism of the Grand Turk has been said
to have its constitutional check in a salutary
fear of the bow-string; and there may prove
to be something of the same sort here. But
I confess I do not like the quasi-despotism of
this Legislative Council, even though so
tempered. Representing no public opinion or
real power of any kind, it may hurt the less;
but it can never tend to good, and it can never
last. It is satisfactory for one to find that in this
view I do not stand alone. This plan is condemned, not simply by the Colonial Secretary,
but by the Imperial Government, as one which
cannot be carried out. The Imperial authorities cannot but see that a body appointed
for
life and limited in numbers, is just the worst
body that could be contrived—ridiculously
the worst.
MR DUNKIN—I say it is the worst.
They say it is bad. It is condemned by Her
Majesty's Government, in diplomatic terms it
may be, but in sufiiciently emphatic terms.
I believe Her Majesty's Government regard
it as I do—as pretty nonsensical. I know it
may be said that Her Majesty's Government,
perhaps, may apply a remedy by leaving out
the provision about a limited number of members.
MR. DUNKIN—Security it is none, but
the very contrary. But, Mr. SPEAKER, even
though this should be done, or though the
Imperial Act should even not state the restrictions by which it is proposed to limit
the
Crown in its first choice of Legislative Councillors, such remedy would be the merest
palliative imaginable. The restrictions on such
choice would be maintained in practice all the
same; and even the limitations as to number
would remain as an understood rule, to be
set aside for no cause, much less grave than
might suflice to sweep away even a clause of
an act of the Imperial Parliament. Before
leaving this subject, Mr. SPEAKER, let me ask
the attention of the House for a few moments
to the past history of Canada in respect of
our Legislative Council. (Hear, hear.) Did
it not happen, as matter of fact, that the first
Legislative Council of Canada, not being
limited in point of numbers, being like the
House of Lords in that respect—the Crown,
I say, having the full choice of its members,
and full control over their number—did it
not happen, I say, that its members were most
of them, for some time, named from one side
in politics ? The gentlemen named by Lord
SYDENHAM and his immediate successors,
were, undoubtedly, most respectable. There
was nothing out of common course that I see
about these appointments; they were party,
political appointments of the ordinary kind.
And under this proposed scheme the same
kind of thing would naturally happen again.
496
But in 1848, with a change of government,
it became necessary to carry through Parliament a measure or measures to which it
was
well known that a large majority of this Upper
House were decidedly opposed. There had to be
some talking about a swamping of the House
—a similar step to what was threatened once
in the constitutional history of Great Britain.
It was not really done. It did not need to be
done, or at least, it only needed to be done
in part; the peculiarity of the position
of honorable gentlemen, and the impossibility of their standing out beyond a
certain point, made it unnecessary to carry
out the threat to extremity. But it was
carried far enough to destroy their self-
respect, and the respect of the public for
them. It was felt that they had no sufficient
status in the country; they sank in public
opinion, and sank and sank until every one
quietly acquiesced in the change which was
afterwards made in the Constitution of the
Council. (Hear, hear.) I do not overstate
the truth when I say that the Legislative
Council so sank in public opinion, because
there was no machinery by which public opinion could act upon it, except that of a
further
creation of councillors by the Crown, and
there being no other way of averting a deadlock, they had to be made to feel that
in case
of extremity their power would not be found
equal to their will.
MR. DUNKIN —If the Crown had not
been able to increase the number, those honorable gentlemen might have stood out against
the popular deman , until a revolution had
swept them away, or they might have shrunk
before the fear of it; as it was, they gave way
under a milder pressure. (Hear, hear.)
HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—There is a
central power in all things. There is a centrifugal force and a centripetal force.
Too much
of either is dangerous, and what is true in the
physical world, is true also in the political
world.
MR. DUNKIN—Certainly. But I do not
see that that has much to do with the remarks I am just now offering. (Hear, hear.)
I say the elective Legislative Council was
rendered necessary, in the opinion of the country, by this unfortunate state of things,
even
though the system then in existence was not so
bad as the system now offered for our acceptance. There was then the power constitutionally
given to the Crown to augment the numbers of the Legislative Council, so that the
gentlemen constituting that body could recede
before the determined expression of the public will, as gracefully as did the House
of
Lords on the memorable occasion I have already alluded to. Had that House not yielded
in those days of the Reform Bill, even the
Crown of Great Britain might not have escaped the consequences of a bloody revolution.
That House might have been constitutionally
omnipotent, but its physical was not equal to
its constitutional capacity. What is it that
is proposed to be given to us here? A body
not at all weighty in the influence of its members, and which, it is said, will have
to shrink
from the exercise of its prerogatives. I do
not know whether it will or not. But I had
rather not give to a body of men limited in
number—though even so little weighty in the
community—an absolute veto on all legislation, for so long as the Almighty may
be pleased to continue them in life. I
think a much better system could be
devised—nay, I am sure of it. At all
events, here is this proposed body, which,
we are told, is to be Federal, but which is not
to be so. We are told it is to be a constitutional check, but it is not to be that
either.
It is rather, I take it, a cleverly devised piece
of dead-lock machinery, and the best excuse
made for it is, that it will not be strong enough
to do near all the harm it seems meant to
do. Her Majesty's Government condemns it.
It may not be necessary that we should say
with very marked emphasis how we join in
that condemnation. (Hear, hear.) I have
then shewn, Ithink, Mr. SPEAKER, as regards
our House of Commons, that we have not reached perfection; and that, as regards our
House
of Lords, we have not come near it. I pass
on to the Executive. Here, too, there is to
be a very wide difference between our proposed system and that of the United States.
To begin, they have an elective president,
chosen for a short term; with all the evils,
therefore, of frequent presidential elections,
aggravated by the president's allowed capacity
for reelection. No doubt, we avoid these ;
our Viceroy, or Governor General, is not to be
elective. Nobody proposes that—I do not
think anybody ever did propose it. And the
authors of this project have, therefore, no
great right to take credit for this, any more
than for their unasked offer to continue Her
Most Gracious Majesty upon the throne, or
in other words, create her Queen of British
North America, by the grace of the Quebec
Conference ! (Laughter.) This, however,
Mr. SPEAKER, by the way. What is more im
497
portant to notice in this connexion, is the
marked distinction on which I have already
touched, between the United States system,
which devolves in part upon the Senate—and
our system, which devolves not at all upon the
Legislative Council, but wholly on the Executive Council, the duty of advising and
aiding the head of the Government in the
discharge of his executive functions. As I
have said, in the United States the Senate
has large executive functions.
HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Without
responsibility for their advice. We have responsibility, and in that respect our system
is
better.
MR. DUNKIN—My honorable friend
says "without responsibility." I rather
think not. Take the case of a senator from
Massachusetts or New York. I rather think
he will feel himself very distinctly responsible
to the state he represents. He is not responsible
to the whole people of the United States, nor
is the Senate, as a whole, collectively responsible. But each senator is particularly
and
personally responsible to his own state, and
acts under a sense of that responsibility.
(Hear, hear.) Take the case which occurred
a number of years ago, when President JACKSON named, as Minister to the British Court,
MARTIN VAN BUREN, afterwards his successor in the presidential chair. A majority
of the Senate disallowed that nomination.
Did not the senators who voted for or
against that nomination, do so under a weighty,
practical responsibility? Every man of them
did. They voted in the view and under the
sanction of that responsibility; and some of
them had to pay for the exercise of it. And
so they do, all along. (Hear, hear.) This,
however, is a digression into which I
have been led by the remark of my
honorable friend. I return to the line of
argument I was pursuing. What I am just
now shewing is, that in respect of the constitution of the executive power, this scheme
urged upon our acceptance differs
toto caelo
from the system in operation in the United
States. I shall consider presently the question of its advantages or disadvantages.
In
the United States, as is admitted, the Senate
does a certain part of what we undertake here
to do by means of a Cabinet. The Federal
check so exercised by the Senate renders unnecessary, for any Federal purpose, the
existence of a Cabinet. Indeed they do not want
a Cabinet for any purpose at all. It is not of
their system. But here, with our chief magistrate not elected, we must have one. And
yet, how are we to make it work, engrafted
on a system which, in its essentials, is after
all more American than British? This is
what I have now come to. I have to ask
honorable gentlemen opposite how they are
going to organize their Cabinet, for these
provinces, according to this so-called Federal
scheme? (Hear, hear.) I think I may defy
them to shew that the Cabinet can be formed
on any other principle than that of a representation of the several provinces in that
Cabinet. It is admitted that the provinces are
not really represented to any Federal intent
in the Legislative Council. The Cabinet
here must discharge all that kind of function,
which in the United States is performed, in the
Federal sense, by the Senate. And precisely
as in the United States, wherever a Federal
check is needed, the Senate has to do Federal
duty as an integral part of the Executive
Government. So here, when that check cannot be so got, we must seek such substitute
for it as we may, in a Federal composition of
the Executive Council; that is to say, by
making it distinctly representative of the provinces. Well, I must say that this sort
of
thing is utterly variant from, and inconsistent
with British practice and British principle;
with the constitutional system which makes
the whole Cabinet responsible for every act
of government. The British Cabinet is no
Cabinet of sections, but a unit. In illustration of the view which I am anxious to
impress upon the judgment of the House, let me
revert for a moment to our Canadian history.
I can only look forward to the future by the
lights given me by the past. The union of
the Canadas, consummated in 1841, was a legislative union. There was nothing in it
savoring ever so faintly of Federalism, unless
it were the clause which declared, and quite
unnecessarily declared, that there should be an
equal representation, in the Legislative Assembly of Upper and Lower Canada respectively.
If the Union Act had merely distributed the
constituencies in such a way as to give equality of representation to Upper and Lower
Canada, it would have done for practical purposes all it did. But besides doing this,
it
quite uselessly added in terms that the numbers were to be equal—subject always, however,
by a strange anomaly, to our declared
power thereafter by legislation of our own
to disturb that equality, if we pleased. Well,
sir, when an Executive Government had to
be first organized for Canada, Lord SYDENHAM was obliged to call into his Cabinet
certain officials whom he found in Upper and
498
Lower Canada respectively, and he did so
without observing any rule of equality as to
their numbers. Indeed, until 1848, equality
in the representation of the two sections of the
province in the Cabinet was never seriously
aimed at. In 1848, from considerations of a
peculiar character—perhaps more personal than
political—the usage was commenced, and it has
since been persevered in, of having a Premier
and a sub-Premier, and a Cabinet organized
under them, respectively, in two sections—of
course equal in numbers, or as nearly so as
possible. And on this usage and in connection
with it have developed themselves all those
double majority and double ministry notions
and practices which again of late have so constantly been leading us into all manner
of
constitutional difficulties. (Hear, hear.) It
has been found again and again impossible to
constitute a satisfactory ministry of two sections; because one or other of the two
sections,
if they came together on any basis of real
political agreement, was so very likely not to
be able to command a majority of its sectional
representation in this House. It was, practically, a division of the House, as well
as of
the Government, into two sections—practically, all but a government by two ministries
and with two Houses. We did not quite
admit, to be sure, that there were two ministries; although, by the way, at one time—I
refer to the time of the first proposed vote of
want of confidence in the MACDONALD—DORION
ministry—a motion was on the point of being
made—notice of it was given—which positively did speak of a Lower Canadian ministry
as contradistinguished from an Upper
Canadian ministry. I go into this to shew
that already, in Canada, the force of circumstances has been one too many for us,
and has
inflicted upon us a system more complex—less
workable—than obtains in England. With
us, as at home, the Constitution makes the
whole Ministry, collectively, responsible for all
the acts it performs; but it is well known that
here, for all practical purposes, we have for
years had our Ministry acting by two sections
—each section with a chief of its own, to a
large extent a policy of its own, and the
responsibility of leading and governing a
section of this House of its own. (Hear,
hear.) We have been federalising our Constitution after a very new and anomalous
fashion ever since 1848, and by that, more
than by anything else, have been getting ourselves into that sort of difficulty in
which we
have latterly found ourselves. (Hear, hear.)
And now, Mr. SPEAKER, I just want to know
how this proposed scheme is going to work in
this respect? As we have seen, it starts with
a principle, as to the election of the House of
Commons, which must involve the arraying
on the floor of that House, not of a set of
members of Parliament coming there to judge
and to act each for the whole of British North
America, but of a certain fixed number of
Upper Canadians, a certain fixed number of
Lower Canadians, a certain fixed number of
Nova Scotians, of New Brunswickers, of
Prince Edward Islanders, of Newfoundlanders, of Red River men, of men from Vancouver's
Island, of British Columbia men, of Saskatchewan men—each to act there for his own
province. (Hear, hear.) If we ever get all these
territories laid out into provinces, we are to
have just so many sections, numerically most
unequal, upon the floor of this House, and
the only abiding distinctions between members will be those represented by the territorial
lines between their provinces. The Legislative Council, we have seen, will not be
the
check which these sections will require. The
Executive Council has got to be that check,
and in the Executive Council these sections
will have to reproduce themselves. Apart
from the provinces or vast territory to the
west of us, we shall thus have our six such
sections on the floor of the Commons House,
with their six corresponding sections in the
Executive Council, and six parliamentary
majorities to be worked together, if possible,
while hitherto we have found our two sections
and two majorities one too many. Our constitutional difliculties, I repeat, are referable
to that very practice, and so it is proposed
that we should try a system three times—and
more than three times—more complex still.
(Hear, hear.) That cleverest of politicians
who, for two or three years running, under
such a system, shall have managed to carry
on his Cabinet, leading six or more sections
in our Commons House, six or more sections
in the Legislative Council, and, forsooth, six
or more local parliaments and lieutenant-governors, and all the rest of it besides—that
gifted man who shall have done this for two
or three years running, had better be sent
home to teach Lords PALMERSTON and DERBY their political alphabet. The task will be
infinitely more dificult than the task these
English statesmen find it none too easy to undertake. (Hear, hear.)
MR. DUNKIN —The hon. gentleman never
sees a dificulty in anything he is going to do.
499
HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—And I
have been generally pretty correct in that.
I have been pretty successful. (Hear, hear.)
Mr. DUNKIN—Pretty successful in
some things—not so very successful in some
others. The hon. gentleman has been a
good deal favored by accident. But I am
not quite certain that I believe in the absolute omniscience of anybody. (Hear, hear.)
But now, if this Executive Council is to
have in it, as I am sure it must have, in
order to work at all, a representation of the
different provinces, all or nearly all of them,
let us look for a moment at what will have
to be its number. There are two ways of
calculating this—two sets of
data on which
to go. Either we must go upon what I may
call the wants of the component parts, or we
may start from the wants of the country as
a whole. Suppose, then, we start from the
wants of the different provinces. I take it
that no section of the Confederation can
well have less than one representative in the
Cabinet. Prince Edward Island will want
one; Newfoundland, one. A difficulty presents itself with regard to Lower Canada.
On just the same principle upon which
Lower Canada wants, for Federal ends, to
have a proper representation in the Executive Council, on that same principle the
minority populations in Lower Canada will
each want, and reasonably want, the same
thing. We have three populations in Lower
Canada—the French-Canadians, the Irish
Catholics, and the British Protestants. In
other words, there are the Catholics, and the
non-Catholics, and the English-speaking and
the non-English-speaking, and these two cross-
lines of division cut our people into the three
divisions I have just indicated. Well, if in
a government of this Federal kind the different populations of Lower Canada are to
feel
that justice is done them, none of them are
to be there ignored. The consequences of
ignoring them might not be very comfortable.
Heretofore, according to general usage, the
normal amount of representation for Lower
Canada in the Executive Council has been
six seats out of twelve. Of those, four may
be said legitimately to belong to the French-
Canadians, one to the Irish Catholics, and
one to the British Protestant class. Everyone is satisfied that that is about the
fairest
thing that can be done. There have been
times when these proportions have varied.
There have been exceptional times when the
British Protestant population has had to put
up with a Solicitor-General out of the Cabinet,
and has done so with no very loud complaint.
There has never been a time, I think, when
there was not an Irish Catholic in the Cabinet. There have been times when the number
of French-Canadians has been less than four,
and there was then much complaint. Six
members—four, one and one—are just about
what you must give to please each section
of Lower Canada. Well, sir, if there are to
be six for Lower Canada, there must be six
or seven for Upper Canada and you cannot
very well leave less than three each for Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick, and, as I have
said, one each for Newfoundland and Prince
Edward Island ; and thus you have an Executive Council of twenty or twenty-one members,
besides all we might have to add for other
provinces ; and this, I rather think, is a little
too many. The thing could not be done;
for so large a Cabinet could never work.
Suppose then, on the other hand, that we start
with the idea of limiting the number of our
Executive Council to meet what I may call the
exigencies of the country as a whole. Eleven,
twelve or thirteen—the latter, as an hon. member observes, is an unlucky number—will
be as
many as we can possibly allow. Of this
number one, as before, will he wanted for
Newfoundland and one for Prince Edward
Island. If one is wanted for each of the
little provinces, New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia will be sorely discontented
unless they get, at least, two apiece; and
neither Lower Canada nor Upper Canada
will be contented with the three left for each
of them. And for Lower Canada, in particular, how will anyone divide this intractable
figure between her French, Irish and
British? Shall we give them one apiece,
and ask the French-Canadian element to be
content with one voice in a cabinet of a
dozen ?—or, give that element two, without
satisfying it—so leaving out either the Irish
or the British, to its intense disgust ?—or, give
the preponderating element the whole, to
the intense disgust of both the others? It
will be none too easy a task, sir, I think, to
form an Executive Council with its three
members for Lower Canada, and satisfy the
somewhat pressing exigencies of her creeds
and races.
MR. DUNKIN — The Hon. Attorney
General East probably thinks he will be able
to do it.
500
MR. DUNKIN—Well, I will say this,
that if the hon. gentleman can please all
parties in Lower Canada with only three
members in the Executive Council, he will
prove himself the cleverest statesman in
Canada.
MR. DUNKIN—The hon. gentleman has
evidently not been listening to my line of
argument, and I do not think that, to
enlighten him, I am called upon to punish
the House by going over it all again. (Hear,
hear.) What I say is, that if the number
of the Executive Council is fixed according
to the wants of the country as a whole, and
not to what I may call the local wants of the
several provinces, there will be in all some
eleven, twelve or thirteen members; and
you will have a number so small in proportion to the various interests to be satisfied,
that it will be extremely difficult to avoid
serious trouble in the matter of its local
distribution. On the other hand, if you
give all the localities the number they had
need have, on local grounds, the Council
will be too large to work. It will be practically impossible to meet the needs of
all the
provinces ; and yet, none can be left out in
the cold, on pain of consequences. (Hear,
hear.)
HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—When
the matter is brought to a test, the hon.
gentleman will see that he has aggravated
the difficulty.
MR. DUNKIN—SIDNEY SMITH once
said of a leading Cabinet minister at home,
that he would be willing at the shortest
notice, either to undertake the duties of the
Archbishop of Canterbury or to assume
command of the Channel fleet. (Laughter.)
We have some public men in this country
who, in their own judgment, have ample
capacity for assuming the responsibility and
discharging the functions of those two high
posts, and perhaps of a field marshal or
commander-in-chief besides. (Renewed
laughter.)
HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—I would
say, that although I do not feel equal to the
task of commanding the Channel fleet or filling the office of Archbishop of Canterbury,
I
do feel equal to the work of forming an Executive Council that will be satisfactory
to
Upper and Lower Canada, as well as to the
Lower Provinces. (Hear, hear, and laughter.)
MR. DUNKIN—Well, it will require, in
my opinion, something more than bold assertion, and capacity for a hearty laugh, to
overcome the difficulty that will some day or
other be presented. (Hear, hear.) And
now, sir, I come to speak of the relations to
subsist between this Federal power and the
different provinces, as compared with those
between the United States and the different
states. Again, the comparison has to be
made much more with the United States
system than with that of Great Britain;
although, unfortunately, perhaps, there is
in this part of the scheme some confusion of
inconsistent features of the two systems.
Great Britain has not yet, in any true sense
of the term, federated herself with any of
her colonies. She just retains a nominal
supremacy over them.
MR. DUNKIN—No ; it is only nominal
as regards its exercise. It is not real in the
sense of amounting to a substantial, practical
exercise of power over the colonies. For
these nearly five and twenty years past.I
call to mind no legislative act of ours disallowed by the Home Government.
AN HON. MEMBER—Yes, there was
one—Mr. HINCKS' Currency Act.
MR. DUNKIN—Well, I believe that was.
But in that case we got our own way in
effect directly afterwards. I am referring
more particularly, of course, to what may be
called the conduct of our own domestic
affairs. There is no mistake but we have
had given to us by Great Britain a control
practically unlimited over our own affairs;
she lets us do what we like, while professing
to retain a perfect nominal supremacy over
us. She appoints our Governor General,
but when he comes here, he does what we
want, not what she may want. She can, if
she likes, disallow all our statutes; but for
all practical purposes she never does. She
may, if she chooses, alter or repeal the
Charter of our liberties which she granted to
us, but she never thinks of doing such a
thing, and we know she will not. Well,
here in this proposed Constitution—looking
to the relations which are to subsist between
the Federation and the provinces—in lieu
of a real Federation, such as subsists between
the United States and the different states,
we find an attempt to adopt to a considerable extent the British system of a stated
supremacy, not meant to be in fact the half
of what it passes for in theory. But, however
such a system may work as between Great
502
Britain and her colonies, it by no means
follows that it admits of extension to this
case. If the vaguely stated powers of our
so-called Federation are to be merely nominal, they will be insufficient; if not nominal,
they will be excessive. Either way, the
United States idea of an attempted precise
statement of the powers meant to be given
and used, is the true one. What, then, is
the system adopted in the United States, as
regards these relations between the Federal
power and the several states? There are
two leading principles, and very sound principles, that pervade it. In the first place
the
United States, by its Constitution, guarantees
to every state in the union a republican form
of government ; by which is meant a Constitution. in the main, analogous to that of
the
United States—an elective executive, an
elective second branch, an elective popular
branch—the whole without what we here
call responsible government. This is what
everybody understands as the republican system. Accordingly, just the same sort of
thing in principle and in all its great outlines
as the Constitution of the United States, is
the Constitution of each separate state of the
union. And in the second place, along with
this uniformity in principle and outlines
between the Constitution of the United States
and those of the different states, there is
established a very exact system of what I may
call limited state autonomy. The state,
within its certain range of subjects, does what
it likes, and is as free to act as the United
States; it has its own functions, and within
the limits of those functions nobody controls
it. The United States have their special
functions also, and within the range of those
functions can, in turn, control everything.
The respective judiciary systems of the state
and of the United States, are further so contrived as to be the most perfect check
that
can well be imagined to secure the smooth
and steady working of this Federal national
machinery. It is a complex piece of machinery, if you will ; there are many delicate
parts
in it, one depending nicely upon another;
but, upon the whole, it has worked pretty
well for many years, and may go on working
pretty well for many more.
MR. DUNKIN—Does the hon. gentleman
mean to tell this House that the principle of
elective judges forms a part of the constitutional system of the United States? Why,
sir, elective judiciary is a mere excres
cence of quite late growth, and has not
fastened itself on the system of the United
States at all. It is not even as yet adopted
by nearly all the individual states, but only
by some of them. It is an excrescence
which the founders of the United States
system never, I fancy, thought of, or in all
human probalility they would have expressly
provided against it. (Hear, hear.) But
now, sir, what is the system we are going to
adopt according to these resolutions ? What
are the relations to be established between
our general and local governments? We
are told to take for granted that no clashing
of interest or feeling need be feared; that
the Federal union offered us in name will
be a legislative union in reality. Yet, whoever dislikes the notion of a legislative
union
is assured it will be nothing of the sort. Now,
sir, I do not believe that you can have all
the advantages of these two systems combined in one. (Hear, hear.) A Legislative
union is one thing; a Federal union is another. The same system cannot be both at
once. You cannot devise a system that
shall have all the advantages of the one and
of the other; but it is quite possible that
you may devise one that will combine the
chief disadvantages of both, and that is, I
fear, pretty much what this system does.
(Hear, hear.) Let me first take one feature
of the scheme, or, I might say, one absence
of a feature from the scheme—the non-
provision of anything like provincial constitutions. We are not told about them; they
are kept back completely in the dark; it is
part of the scheme that we are not to know
what it means them to be. (Laughter.) It
is part of the scheme, too, from all appearance, that they may not be at all alike.
For anything I can see, Nova Scotia will
have a right under this scheme to devise a
system of responsible government, with a
cabinet and two branches of the legislature.
New Brunswick, if it pleases, may have only
one legislative body, with or without responsible government. So may the Prince
Edward Island people have anything they
like; and the people of Newfoundland may
do what they like, and so may we in Canada.
Lower Canada may even have a constitution
of one kind, and Upper Canada one of a
totally different kind. There may be no
two of our six or more local constitutions
framed on the same model. (Hear, hear.)
It seems to he meant that these constitutions
shall be as varied as the people of the
different provinces may see fit to make them;
502
nay, there are even left to the people of the
different provinces the same large powers for
amending them afterwards. To be sure
there is the grand power of disallowance by
the Federal Government, which we are told,
in one and the same breath, is to be possessed
by it, but never exercised.
MR. DUNKIN—The hon. gentleman's
presumption reminds me of one, perhaps as
conclusive, but which DICKENS tells us
failed to satisfy his Mr. BUMBLE. That henpecked beadle is said to have said, on hearing
of the legal presumption that a man's wife
acts under his control :—" If the law pre—
sumes anything of the sort, the law's a fool
—a natural fool !" (Laughter.) If this
permission of disallowance rests on a presumption that the legislation of our provinces
is going to be unjust or unwise, it may be
needed ; but under that idea, one might
have done better either not to allow, or else
to restrict within narrower limits, such
legislation. If the promised non-exercise of
the power to disallow rests on a presumption
that all will be done justly and wisely in the
provincal legislatures, the legislative power
is well given ; but then there is no need,
on the other hand, for the permission to
disallow. (Hear, hear.) I repeat, this
system, or no-system, aims at nothing like
uniformity between the general and local
constitutions, or between the local constitutions themselves ; and in this respect,
it is
essentially at variance with the much wiser
system adopted in the United States. It
further allows of no real autonomy; in fact,
the only trace of uniformity it can be said to
have about it, consists in its disallowance of
all autonomy to the provinces. (Hear,
hear.) Now, let me take up those few
features that undoubtedly are given to us,
as characterizing our provincial system. Wide
as we have seen the latitude is which the provinces may take in framing their constitutions,
there are a few matters as to which the
system lays down an iron rule. There is
the appointment of a lieutenant-governor
which is to be vested the General Government. It is not said in so many words that
he is to be a colonist, but I think it may be
taken for granted that he will be. It is not
ve likely that we shall get any right honorable gentleman or eminent statesman, from
home, to come out here for an appointment
of that kind ; and I take for granted, there
fore, that the General Government will
always nominate Mr. Somebody or other, of
local distinction, to this office of lieutenant.
governor. An hon. gentleman opposite, (I
beg his pardon for noticing his gesture,)
seems never to have had the thought cross
his mind, that perhaps if he were named to
it, there might be a doubt in some quarters
as to his entire fitness for it. (Hear, hear.)
But seriously these lieutenant-governors
thus selected, are all to hold office by a very
peculiar tenure. They are not to be removable except by the Federal power; nor by
it
within the term of five years, except for
cause, which cause must be stated in
writing, and laid before both branches of
the Federal Parliament. For five years,
therefore, they may be said to hold office
during good behaviour. They are to be
paid, too, by the Federal power. They are
to exercise the reprieving and pardoning
power, subject to such instructions as they
may receive from the General Government
from time to time. And they are to have
the initiation, by message, of all money
bills, and the power to reserve bills for ap—
proval of the Federal Government. They
are to have these leading functions of the
nominated lieutenant governors under our
system, but with one most marked differ—
ence— the attribute of non-removability.
Beyond these few points, the resolutions
leave us all at sea. Save as to these, they
leave room, as we have seen, for the widest
divergencies of constitution. To be sure, I
gather one hint more, not from the resolutions themselves, but from the dispatched
sent
along with them to the Colonial Secretary,
by the Governor General, and this is, that
according to the view of our Canadian Government, the provincial legislatures had
better be framed on the one chamber principle.
I presume this will hardly be gainsayed by
the honorable gentlemen who have laid the
dispatch before us, and which supplies this
feature that we cannot find in the resolutions
themselves. Says the dispatch :—
For the purpose of local administration, it is
proposed to have in each province an executive
officer, to be appointed by the Governor, and
removable by him for cause to be assigned,
assisted by a legislative body, the constitution of
which it is proposed to leave to the decision of
the present local legislatures, subject to the approbation of the Imperial Government
and Parliament.
But, sir, whether our local legislatures are
to be of one house or two, or however other
503
wise any of our provinces may experiment,
in the way of variation, in framing their
constitutions, at least there must everywhere
be some attempted approach, in principle,
to one or other of the two great divergent
systems—the British on the one hand, with
its responsible Cabinet—the American, on
the other, without. That you cannot work
the problem on the former of these two
plans, I will show presently. For the latter,
Mr. SPEAKER, in the States, it is always
carried on with two elective houses, never
with one, and with an elective governor;
and all are chosen for terms that are not
long. It could not be made to work otherwise. An appointed governor, holding independently,
for a term not short, and above
all, with only one House, is an experiment
as new and unpromising as need be. For a
moment, before going further, I revert to
the principle on which the Federal Executive is to be constituted. We are promised
there a cabinet, responsible after the British
model, and strangely and anomalously as we
have seen that it will have to be organized,
in sections to represent our provinces, we
must understand that the British principle
of its joint responsibility is to be and will
be carried out. But it is of the essence of
responsible government, that with its responsibility such government should have
power. No ministry can be answerable for
the entire government of a country, unless
it has the power to control in some way or
other, and to the requisite extent, the course
of affairs. If we are going to build up or
suffer in the country any power too strong for
it to deal with, it will cease to be responsible. It must be able to overcome opposition,
and that in a constitutional manner.
Yet, according to this scheme, independently of and besides all the difficulties our
sectionally-organized Federal Cabinet will
find in dealing with its sectionally-organized
Federal Legislature, it is to have these provincial governments also, to embarrass
it.
Let these last be what you will, responsible
or republican, or some of them the one and
some the other, so soon as they begin to act
for themselves, so soon you have got powers
in action that cannot long move together
without clashing, and yet neither of which
can overcome the other, unless by practically
destroying it, or in other words, by revolution. ( Hear, hear.) Whether we adopt
one system or another, we must create the
proper machinery for carrying out whatever
system we adopt. And the plain truth is,
that the Federal system is simply inconsistent with the first principles that must
prevail in a properly organized British responsible central government. (Hear, hear.)
Indeed, aside even from Federalism, the
British system and the republican are
antagonist in principle ; neither of them will
work mixed up with the other. You
must be content with one or other, and
must not commit the folly of attempting
any new, untried, mongrel system, or compound of the two—such as nobody can shew
to be capable of being worked at all.
And now, Mr. SPEAKER, let us just follow out the course of our distinguished fellow-colonist
who is trying to govern some
one of our provinces under this proposed
amalgamation of the two systems. We will
suppose him a most admirably fitted person
for the post, the functions of which he is called
upon to exercise; but he must necessarily
have one or two causes of incapacitation, so
to speak, for it. When Her Majesty appoints
a governor to come out to Canada, or any
other colony, she is presumed by every one
here to have named somebody holding a
good position at home, and somebody against
whom no one in the colony can have any
ground of dislike. He comes with a social
rank and status presumedly higher than that
of the people whom he is here to meet with
and govern. Every one is disposed to recognise in him the representative of Her
Majesty ; and he has every chance of maintaining himself in that pleasant attitude—
that of administering his government to the
satisfaction, so far as such a thing is possible, of all parties. In adopting the
views
of his constitutional advisers, he is not called
upon to give up any views which he may
himself be thought to entertain. He can
express to the people's representatives the
views of his Cabinet, whether they be conservative or reform, or even though they
be
conservative this session and reform the
next, without any sacrifice of position, no
matter what his own political views may
have been in the Mother Country. But
suppose any of our politicians, whether of
this province or of any other in the Confederacy, say Canada, Newfoundland or Nova
Scotia, to be assuming this rĂ´leM of lieutenant-governor in any of our provinces. He
has this disadvantage to begin with; he has
to that moment been passing through that
ordeal of abuse under which every prominent
public man in this country must have suffered before attaining any distinction what
504
ever. (Hear, hear.) When a politician,
Mr. SPEAKER, in the United States, who is
obnoxious to the ill-will of any large body of
the people, is there elected to be Governor
of his state, the halo of his election surrounds him with a something of political
glory that throws into shade any stains on
his political reputation. But if the governors
of the several states of the American Union
were appointed from Washington, do you
think the people would put up with the
results of such appointment, as they now do
with those of their own choice; when they
might feel that the man was even a despised,
dishonest man, and his appointment as well
an insult as a wrong? Who does not know
that our chief public men of all parties have
been so assailed, as to be held at this moment
at a painfully low value by the large section
of our people who have differed from their
views? I do not say that they have deserved
this fate, but the fact is undeniable that
they have met it. Let any one of our dozen
or twenty most prominent Canadian politicians be named Lieutenant-Governor of Upper
or of Lower Canada, would net a large
and powerful class of the community in
either case to be governed, be very likely to
resent the nomination as an insult? Do not
tell me that we are entering upon a new era,
that all such things are passed away, that
we are to have a political millennium, by
virtue of this Confederation? Come what
may, we are going to have pretty sharp contests for place and power in the future
as in
the past. No matter over what colony appointed, or from what colony coming, a lieutenant-governor
will have hard cards to play,
and will have very much to put up with from
the people over whom he is set, on this
mere score of his past political exploits.
And he will not find it easy, either, to get
along without exciting a good deal of ill-
feeling, as he goes. He has been known as
a politician, and will be held to be favorable
or unfavorable to this or that party in the
province he governs. He will have stepped
into position as a statesman of the Confederation. No man so placed will be able to
blot
the record of his past, or deny his participation in this, that and the other proceeding,
which his opponent may choose to brand as
perhaps next to criminal; how then will he
be able to hold that position of equilibrium
between political parties, which, if he is not
to fail utterly in his rĂ´le of governor, he must
maintain? He will be suspected, watched
attacked, vilified; must stick by friends and
punish enemies; cannot win respect, esteem
and sympathy, as a stranger might. Nor will
he be free from another source of embarrassment. I incline to think there will be
a
sort of distinction between the two clues
of politicians to grow up under our proposed
Confederation. There will be those who
will aim at and get seats in the Federal
Legislature, and who may be denominated
the senior or higher class of our politicians.
It will be from this class that men will get
into the Federal Executive Council, into
high-caste judgeships, lieutenant-governorships, and other high places of the new
system—" the chief seats in the synagogue."
The lower seats, with their less tem ting
prizes, will be left to the junior or ower
class of our politicians. But if anything
ever so little like responsible government
is to be carried out in the provinces, while
the lieutenant-governors must be taken from
the former of these two classes, the members
of any cabinets or quasi-cabinets that they
may have (not to say their provincial Premiers even, very likely), must be taken from
the latter class. Do you mean to tell me that
a governor chosen from among our politicians, of what I may call high caste, will
put
up with much of control from a lot of politicians of low caste, sitting at his sham
council board or forming his sham legislature? I fancy he will want to have—and
will be held by his pe0ple to be wanting to
have—a vast deal more of power than they
will like, or than any system ever so little
free can allow of. And meantime, what of
the power behind, and nominally above him
—the Federal Executive—with its Premier,
sections, and what not? Once named, he is
likely to feel every inch a governor ; might
perhaps run round to the Premier and Ministry that had named him, and tell them in
effect, though probably not in so many
words: " I am here and you are there. I
shall be careful not to give you suficient
cause for so bold a step as my dismissal, but
there is a good deal I can do. I am here for
five years; and your tenure of office is less
certain." He may be drawn into this attitude by differences growing up between
himself and them. Or, the Federal Cabinet
may so change its composition or policy as
to force such attitude upon him. Why, Mr.
SPEAKER, you may have a Lieutenant-
Governor—say of Lower Canada— in open
quarrel with the Premier who named him, or
with a successor of such Premier; the two,
may be, not speaking in the streets ! He has
505
his seat for five years, and the unfotunate Federal Premier, his supposed master,
whose views do not agree with his, may-
 A MEMBER - Whistle! (Laughter.)Â
 Mr. DUNKIN - Yes, may whistle—may
find his Lieutenant-Governor counter-working
him in Parliament, in the Provincial Legislature, everywhere ; and perhaps, in the
encounter, may catch a very ugly fall. (Laughter.) Mr. SPEAKER, let me once again
make reference to Canadian history. Just
before the union of the Canadas, and after
it, the late Lord SYDENHAM, who was certainly not a fool, thought he would try a
political experiment. I believe he made no
secret of its being, to his own mind, an experiment, nor yet of the fact that he did
not
suppose it would so far succeed as to last
long. He was very anxious to introduce
into Canada a municipal system. Well, he
tried first to get such a system embodied in
the Union Act ; but he failed in that. He
afterwards got his enactment passed as he
wished, for Lower Canada, by the Special
Council, and for Upper Canada by the Canadian Parliament at its first session. That
system had in it certain features of this
scheme now proposed for our Confederation.
Each municipal district was to have its
warden appointed by the Governor General,
and to have its elected district council, or
little legislature of one chamber. The powers
of that little legislature, or large municipal
body, were well stated. There was no mistake as to just how far it could go. The
power of disallowing by-laws passed by it,
and also that of nominating the warden,
were carefully reserved to Government. And,
mind you, my Lord SYDENHAM did not
make the blunder of letting his wardens
hold otherwise than during pleasure. He
kept in his own hands all needed control
over them; and, by the way, he kept, too,
what was most material, the power of dissolving any refractory council, in the hands
of Government. The whole thing was nicely
arranged, and was meant to work, and Lord
SYDENHAM probably thought it would work
for some few years, and that then the districts would outgrow the system, and elect
their own wardens and pass their by-laws
freely. But, Mr. SPEAKER, the plan never
did work at all, neither in Lower nor
in Upper Canada; and the first thing
done by the next Parliament was to
sweep it all away—nominated wardens and
power of disallowing by-laws together.
Everybody saw and felt that it was a
real power and not a sham, that was so reserved to Government. And so it will be
in this case. Your Lieutenant-Governor will
be felt to have a real power, not a sham
one. What your petty districts would not
put up with five and twenty years ago, your
provinces will not put up with now. Is a larger
illustration wanted ? One comes readily to
hand. The Imperial Government used once to
try the experiment of sending out governors
to colonies having representative institutions,
without instructing them to pay due deference
to those institutions, and it led to a most lamentable failure. (Hear, hear.) Are
we
going to try to work, in all these provinces, a
worse system than that which, when worked
from the Colonial Ofice at home, resulted in
what Lord DURHAM well called "constituted
anarchy ?" If we are, how long may we
count on putting off the conflict of authority
that shall end in a complete crash of the entire fabric ? (Hear, hear.) But, Mr. SPEAKER,
I have not come to the crowning difficulties of
this case, even yet. Not at all. Between
the states of the United States, as I have already stated, while there is an essential
identity of constitution, there is at the same time
a carefully distinct separation of powers and
functions. I do not say that the dividing
line is drawn exactly where it should be, but
that there is a distinct dividing line, no one
can gainsay. But how do we stand here, Mr.
SPEAKER, as to the attributes of our own
provincial legislatures and governments, on
the one hand, and those of the Federal power
on the other? Do we follow American example, and give so much to the union and the
rest to the provinces; or so much to them,
and the rest to it? Either rule would be
plain; but this plan follows neither. It simply gives us a sort of special list for
each;
making much common to both, and as to
much more, not shewing what belongs to
either. I cannot go now—it is impossible for
me at this hour of the night to go—into detail on this head. I can give no more than
some few specimens; and I take first the three
subjects of the fisheries, agriculture, and immigration. These three subjects are
equally
assigned to the General Legislature on the one
hand, and the Provincial Legislature on the
other. It is provided by the 45th resolution,
that in all such cases, wherever any statutes
of the general and local parliaments clash,
those of the General Parliament shall override those of the local. So that in these
matters of the fisheries, agriculture and
immigration, either the local legislatures
must not legislate at all, or if they do
506
the General Legislature may at any time
undo any thing they may have done. One
can easily foresee any amount of clashing
of authority in such cases. Fishery regulations of all sorts — bounties perhaps; the
thousand questions affecting agriculture. Or
to take just one that suggests itself as to immigration ; one province wishes, perhaps,
to encourage immigration of a certain kind,
say, for instance, from the continent of Europe. It is a legitimate wish; but the
Federal Legislature may, perhaps, in the varying
shifts of public opinion, adopt a different
policy, and reverse all that the province may
have done. To what end give powers to
the local parliaments which may thus be
taken away at any moment by the Federal
Legislature ? (Hear, hear.) But, Mr. SPEAKER, there are a hundred other cases as to
which I could satisfy the House, had I time
for doing so, that more or less of this confusion arises. Take the subject of marriage
and divorce for one—a subject on which there
is a great deal of local prejudice and feeling,
and into which even religious convictions
largely enter. That matter is given to the
General Legislature. But on the other hand
the larger matter, civil rights—of which
this of marriage and divorce, from one point
of view, forms a mere part—is given to the local legislatures. I turn to another matter,
haphazard—the subjects of railway legislation, of
railway incorporation, and of railway amalgamation. What Legislature has power in
these
matters under this scheme? I am not sure that
there are not here as nice a lot of pretty little
questions as one would desire to see in a summer's day. And I am not alone in the
matter of
this criticism. Her Majesty's Colonial Secretary expresses an opinion, rather diplomatically,
it is true, but still an opinion on this
point ; and what does the Colonial Secretary
say? —
 The point of principal importance to the practical well-working of the scheme, is
the accurate
determination of the limits between the authority
of the central and that of the local legislatures
in their relation to each other. It has not been
possible to exclude from the resolutions some
provisions which appear to be less consistent than
might, perhaps, have been desired with the simplicity of the system. But, upon the
whole, it
appears to Her Majesty's Government that precautions have been taken which are obviously
intended - [" intended ;" he does not say " calculated"] - which are obviously intended
to secure to
the Central Government the means of effective
action throughout the several provinces, and to
guard against those evils which must inevitably
arise if any doubt were permitted to exist as to
the respective limits of central and local
authority.
 It is perfectly plain from this that Her Majesty's Government could see that whatever
may have been the intention, there has been
a good deal of short-coming between it and
the execution. (Hear, hear.) A thing is not
done by being merely intended. I will take
now a criticism on the same point from the
London Times. In an article most eulogistic
of these resolutions on the whole, the writer
in the London Times says—" But the most
important clause in the whole resolutions, and
unfortunately by no means the easiest to
understand, is the one which defines the
powers of the Central Federal Legislature."
He then quotes the words of the resolutions,
and goes on to say :—
 It is exceedingly difficult to construe these provisions. First, general powers
of legislation are
given in the widest terms to the General Parliament; then a power is given especially
to make
laws on thirty-seven subjects, one of those being
all matters of a general character not exclusively
reserved to the local legislatures. Nothing is
exclusively reserved to the local legislatures, and
it would seem, therefore, that the effect of this
clause is to cut the power of central legislation
down to matters of a general character—a most
vague and unsatisfactory definition, and one sure,
if it be retained, to produce conflict and confusion. In the same way, what are matters
of a
private and local nature not assigned to the General Parliament ? We have failed
to discover
any matters of a private and local nature which
are so assigned, and therefore the power will be
limited by the words " private " and " local, " so
that the effect of these clauses will be that, beyond the subjects attributed to
each, the Central
Legislature will have jurisdiction over general
matters, whatever they are, and the Local Legislature over local matters, whatever
they are ; while
it is in the highest degree doubtful what the courts
would consider general and what local, and whether
the Central Legislature has any concurrent jurisdiction over private and local matters
or no.
The writer in the Times goes on to say—and
I have great respect for the opinions of these
writers when they criticise what they understand though I have none whatever for them
when they take it upon themselves to tell us
what we know a good deal better than they :—
 These inaccuracies are probably the result of a
succession of compromises, and we can do no
better service to the federative movement than
by thus early pointing them out. The resolutions ask for the co-operation of the Local
and
Imperial Parliaments for the purpose of giving
them effect, and we have no doubt that before
they assume the form of law they will have under
507
gone consideration and scrutiny fully commensurate to their importance.
 I rather think this writer had little idea of
what we were to be asked to do! He little
thought that there was not a word of alteration to be allowed ; that these resolutions
were to be laid before Parliament, and that
Parliament would be required to swallow
them at once, defects and all. (Hear, hear.)
Well, Mr. SPEAKER, I have stated what, in
diplomatic phrase, are the views of Her Majesty's Government, and I have also read
those of the leading journal ; and now I desire
to quote a few expressions from the last number of the Edinburgh Review. The Edinburgh
Review is about as good an authority as can
be cited on a question of this kind, for its articles are never lightly written.
 HON. J. S. MACDONALD - It is the organ
of the Liberal-Whig party in Great Britain.
 Mr. DUNKIN—Certainly, it is a most
important and influential publication ; and
there are a few words that I desire to quote
from an article it contains on this subject.
The article is in the last or January number
of the Review, and purports to be in commendation of this scheme. After giving the words
of the resolutions themselves on the subject,
and especially their residuary legacy, if I may
to call it, to the General Legislature, of all matters of a general character not
specially and
exclusively reserved for the local parliaments,
this probably not undistinguished writer
remarks—"Obviously very loosely expressed ;
for what are matters of a general character,
and who is to decide whether a matter is of a
general character or not? * * We should
prefer to the foregoing enumeration of the
powers of the Federal Parliament, a simple
declaration that all powers are given to it
except those expressly reserved to the several
members of the Confederation." And in
another part of the same article, reverting to
the same subject, we have these words—" And
although the distinction attempted to be drawn
between general and local matters is in some
respects scarcely traceable in the draft
minutes of the Conference "—Yes, sir, so this
writer calls them, their looseness of expression
evidently leading him to take them for something far short of the solemnly drawn treaty
they are now set up for,—though this distinction, says he, is hardly traceable in
these
draft minutes, "the object they had in view is
sufficiently clear and intelligible." Perhaps
so ; or perhaps that object was little more
than to give people to understand that somehow or other the General Government and
Parliament were to have great power, and the
provincial governments and parliaments none
too much. Any way, the idea is very like
that of the Colonial Secretary's despatch, and
the two run rather to the tune of the left-
handed compliment paid SLENDER, " I think
my cousin meant well."
 HON. J. S. MACDONALD—Quote the
concluding part of the article.
 MR. DUNKIN—I shall do so before I
sit down, if my strength allows me to complete my argument. I pass now to another
matter, as to which further capacities for conflict are very well laid out for us.
In the
framing of the United States Constitution
they did not forget to provide for a district
of Columbia, for a territory within which the
power of Congress and the General Government was to be perfectly and unmistakably
supreme for all purposes. And they did not
forget to declare that the powers, legislative
and otherwise, of the Federal authority, were
to be complete over all the vast territories
belonging to the nation, and over all its
smaller properties, such as forts, arsenals,
dockyards and the like. We have nothing
of the kind here; and, at least as regards
the seat of Government, this is not a mere
forget. We find it stated that " The seat
of Government of the Federated Provinces shall be Ottawa, subject to the royal
prerogative." It is distinctly laid down as a
part of our system that the royal prerogative,
the right to change the seat of the Federal
Government at will, is to be maintained. But
I venture to say that the maintaining of that
right is simply inconsistent with the practical
working out of a Federal system. And this
is a matter involving a good deal of anomaly,
as honorable gentlemen will see when they begin to think of it. The Governor General
or Viceroy, the all but king of this Confederacy, with his all but Imperial Govenment,
and all but Imperial Legislature, constituted no matter how, resident within the territorial
jurisdiction of a subordinate province! The police of the Federal capital, not Federal
but provincial! That thing won't do. The framers of the Constitution of the United
States knew it would not do, and therefore they were particular to give power to their
General Government to acquire and hold and control and legislate for, in all respects,
as they liked, a territory within which they could reign and rule and have no subordinate
authority over them. We have not got to Ottawa yet, but suppose the seat of Government
were in Ottawa - perhaps we may yet get it there - it might so
508
happen that some Honorable Premier of the
Federal may not be on speaking
terms with the Lieutenant-Governor of Uppcr
Canada ; or at least, there may be between
them the most decided, thorough, unmistakably proclaimed antagonism of
views and
feeling. It is easy to imagine that a Premier
in that position, and a Lieutenant Governor in
that position, could between them make a
Viceroy very uncomfortable ; and
that the result might be the bringing up of a great many
ticklish questions for adjudication by the
various authorities. It is clear there is a defect here, which might lead to plenty
of
trouble. But it is said—" Oh! there won't
be any trouble; men are in the main sensible,
and won't try to make trouble."
Well, sir,
if this is so, if there is this general disposition
to be sensible, and make things work well, I
just want to know how we come to have had
four crises in two years? (Hear,
hear.)
There is another matter, intimately connected with this, to which also I must
pass on. I said a little while ago, that
the United States system was one of exceeding skill as regards the constitution of
the
judiciary. DE TOCQUEVILLE, and every other
writer who has treated of the United States,
has awarded it this praise ; and
they are
right. Each state has its own judiciary ; and
the United States have theirs ; and the functions of the two are most carefully laid
down,
so that no serious trouble has ever arisen
from their clashing. The judiciary of the
United States is undoubtedly the most conservative and strongest bulwark of their
whole
system. (Hear, hear.) What then
are we
going to do on this head ? Just as we have
forgotten all about difficulties
where the seat
of government is concerned, so here. We
are not quite sure whether we are going to
have any distinctively federal judiciary or
not. There is a power given to have one—there
may be one ; but we are expressly told that
perhaps there will not be. But what are
we told on the other hand? Oh, there
is no doubt whatever, according to the resolutions laid before us — no doubt whatever—that
whether we have a Federal judiciary or not, the provincial judiciaries are to
be a sort of joint institutions. And a very
curious kind of co-partnership the Federal
Government and the provincial governments
—thc Federal Legislature and the
provincial
legislatures—are thus to have in the judicial
institutions of the country, generally. All
the courts, judges, and other judicial officers
of the provinces are to be, for all manner of
federal purposes, servants of the Federal
Government. There is an old saying, "No
man can serve two masters." But all these
unfortunate courts, and all their officers, and
specially all their judges, must serve two masters, whether they can or not. All the
Superior Court judges—and, in Upper Canada,
the judges of the County Courts—are to be
named and paid by the Federal authority, and
are only to be removable by the Federal authority, on a joint address of the two Houses
of the Federal Parliament. But, on the other
hand, the provinces are to constitute the
courts—(hear, hear)—are to say what their
functions shall be—what the number of the
judges—how they are to perform their functions—are to give them more work or less—
to make their work pleasant or disagreeable,
high work or dirty work, as they like. (Hear,
hear.) In this way they can wrong a judge
just as much as they please ;
the only check
on them being the power of the Federal Government to disallow their legislation. The
Federal Government, forsooth, names the
judges, and pays them, and alone can remove
them. Does that take away the power from
the local parliaments and governments, the
power to change the constitution of the court,
to change it in the way most distasteful to
those judges, to legislate away the court altogether, to legislate down its
functions in such a
manner as may drive the judge to resign?
And we are told there will be no clashing!
(Hear.) I have no doubt the Hon.
Attorney
General East thinks he could manage courts
on this system ; could have one
authority
constituting the courts and another naming
and removing thejudges, and have the system
work harmoniously. He may think so. I do
not. I am satisfied if ever the scheme is
tried, it will be found that it will not work.
Human nature is human nature ; and here is
a first rate lot of matters to
quarrel over, and
to quarrel over seriously. Why, there is even
a special refinement of confusion as to criminal matters. Criminal procedure is to
be
federal; civil procedure, provincial; criminal legislation, proper, is to be federal;
but
with a most uncertain quantity of what one
may call legislation about penalties, provincial; civil rights, in the main, provincial;
but with no one can tell how much of federal
interference and over-ruling, and all with
courts provincial in constitution, but whose
judges hold by federal tenure
and under
federal pay. I pity the poor man who is at
once a criminal judge and a civil judge. Between the clashing ofhis masters and the
clash
509
ing of his book authorities, he had
better mind
what he is about, with the
painful doubt rising
at every turn whether provincial legislation
may not be overridden by federal legislation.
His province may well have legislated on what
it holds a local matter, while the Federal Parliament may have legislated on it, thinking
it
a federal matter. Anywhere there
may well
be some bit of federal legislation
contradicting something in a local statute. And do our
resolutions say that the federal statute shall
always override the local statute ? No, only
in cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction. And yet our judge who is
to decide these
nice questions is paid by one power and re-
moveable by that power, and may have his functions taken away and be persecuted
to the death
by the other. He will have it bad time of it.
Well, Mr. Speaker, I have so far been dealing with matters, nearly all of which may
be
said to be general to every part of this great
Confederacy ; but now I must ask the attention of the House for a few moments, to
some
sources of misunderstanding
which may more
particularly make trouble, unless human nature ceases to be human nature
within this
Canada of ours. There are in Canada, and
especially in Lower Canada, the two differences
of language and faith ; and there is no doubt
that the real remains which have
rendered,
or are supposed to have rendered necessary
this plan of a sort of Federal Government,
are referable to this fact. This machinery is
devised, on purpose to meet a possible or probable clashing of races and creeds in
Canada,
and particularly in Lower Canada. Now, in
the United States, when their constitutional
system was adopted, the framers of it must
have foreseen, of course, that controversy
would arise on the subjects of state rights
and slavery. There was a jealousy between the small states and the large, and
the commencement of a dissent
between the
Northern and the Southern States of the republic. There was undoubtedly a foreshadowing
of trouble on the subject of slavery,
though, by the way, slavery was to all appearance dying out rapidly in the Northern
States, not so rapidly in the Southern. How,
then, did the framers of that Constitution undertake to deal with these foreseen troubles,
these questions of state rights
and slavery ?
Sir, they did all they possibly could to keep
both out of sight—to bury them—that they
might not rise up in the future to give trouble. It is true that in so doing they
but buried
the dragon's teeth, and that these, all buried
as they were, have yet since sprung up, armed
men ; but so far as they could, they kept
them
down, kept them from growing, prevented
recognition of them at that time and for long
after. Well, how are we going to carry out
this scheme of ours? Are we burying, or are
we of set choice sowing, our dragon's teeth ?
Are we trying to keep our difficulties out of
the way, to bury them out of sight, that we
may smooth our way for, the future lessening
of them? I think not. On the contrary,
we are setting ourselves as deliberately as we
well can to keep up the distinctions and the differences which exist among us, to
hold them
constantly in everybody's sight—in the hope,
I suppose, that while everybody is looking at
them intently, somehow or other no one may
see them at all. (Laughter.) In
the United
States, be it remembered, they started with
their states sovereign and independent.
From
that they went into their system of confederation, which was a great improvement;
and
from that they went on into their present
federal-national constitution. At each step
they were moving to limit state rights, and
also, indirectly, the extent and influence of
slavery. It is true they did
not altogether
succeed in this policy, but their want of success has been mainly owing to circumstances
over which they could exercise no control.
We in Canada, for the last twenty-five years,
have been legislatively united,
and we have
worked that union in a federal spirit. We
complain that, as a result of this,
the distinctions which exist among us have become
so prominent—the truth being, that it is
rather this proposed change which is suddenly
bringing them into startling
prominence—
we have worked that union, however, I say,
in a federal spirit, and it is said to have
produced or aggravated a certain state of
feud amongst us ; and now, for the purpose
of perpetuating this state of fund, we are
going to effect a professcdly
Federal union
which is even expressly
recommended to us,
or to many of us, as meant and calculated to
be so worked as to amount, for all practical
purposes, to disunion. Under it
Lower
Canada has all sorts of special exceptions
made, as the phrase runs, in her
favor. The
Legislative Council is to he named
in a
peculiar manner, so far as its members
from
Lower Canada are concerned. The other
provinces may have their laws
made uniform,
but an exception in this respect is made for
Lower Canada, and as if to make it apparent
that Lower Canadais never to be like the rest
of the Confederation, it is carelully provided
that the General Parliament may make
510
uniform the laws of the other provinces
only—that is to say, provided those provinces consent to it, but by inference it cannot
extend this uniformity to Lower Canada,
not even if she should wish it. Supposing,
even, that the other provinces were to desire
to adopt our Lower Canadian system, according to the letter of this Constitution,
one
would say they cannot do it. They may
become uniform among themselves, but
Lower Canada, even though her people were
to wish it, must not be uniform with them.
Again, as to education, exceptions of some
sort are to be made in Lower Canada, and
indeed in Upper Canada too, though no one
can tell to what extent these exceptions are
or are not to be carried. Thus, in one way
and another, Lower Canada is to be placed
on a separate and distinct footing from the
other provinces, so that her interests
and institutions may not be meddled
with. I say this system, as a whole,
and these peculiarities and exceptions in
regard to Lower Canada, are adopted with a
special view to remedy our Canadian difficulties of race and creed. But, sir, this
is no way
at all of avoiding or lessening trouble from
this cause. It is idle to pretend that by this
system collision is going to be prevented.
Under the legislative union of the Canadas,
even worked as it has been, the tendency of
the minorities in Upper and Lower Canada,
respectively, has been towards the maintenance of the union—towards the avoidance
of all intemperate language and prejudiced
feelings—towards the pulling down of the
feuds that before divided them and the
respective majorities. And the result has
been, that while just before the union
the feud between the races in Lower Canada
was at its highest and bitterest point, it has
since then all but disappeared. The complaint of Upper Canadian politicians has been
that they could not set the British and
French races in Lower Canada by the ears,
that they could not get the former, either as
British or as Protestants, to join with them
in a crusade against the Lower Canadian
majority.
MR. DUNKIN—I do not say that it has
been said in words, but it has been in spirit.
MR. DUNKIN—Yes ; the complaint has
been made, perhaps not in that particular
form, but certainly in that spirit. The
British of Lower Canada have been again
and again told they were worse than their
French neighbors, for not casting in their lot
with the people of Upper Canada. (Hear,
hear.) Well, Mr. SPEAKER, undoubtedly,
before the union, Lower Canada, as I have
said, was the place where the war of races
was at its height ; and that war of races did
not nearly cease for a number of years after.
But the strife did very gradually lessen, and
a better and more friendly feeling has for
some time prevailed, in both camps. Indeed,
there has been a more tolerant state of feeling in both camps, than in any other
community so divided as to race and creed,
that I know of. But the moment you tell
Lower Canada that the large-sounding
powers of your General Government are
going to be handed over to a British-
American majority, decidedly not of the
race and faith of her majority, that moment
you wake up the old jealousies and hostility
in their strongest form. By the very
provisions you talk of for the protection of
the non-French and non-Catholic interests,
you unfortunately countenance the idea that
the French are going to be more unfair than
I believe they wish to be. For that matter,
what else can they well be ? They will find
themselves a minority in the General Legislature, and their power in the General
Government will depend upon their power
within their own province and over their
provincial delegations in the Federal Parliament. They will thus be compelled to be
practically aggressive, to secure and retain
that power. They may not, perhaps, wish
to be ; they may not, perhaps, be aggressive
in the worst sense of the term.—I do not say
that they certainly will be ; but whether
they are or not, there will certainly be in
this system the very strongest tendencies to
make them practically aggressive upon the
rights of the minority in language and faith,
and at the same time to make the minority
most suspicious and resentful of aggression.
The same sort of alienation, as between the
two faiths, will be going on in Upper Canada.
Note of warning is already given by this
scheme, to both parties, that they prepare
for fight ; and the indications, I regret to
say, are that such note of warning is not to
be given in vain. (Hear, hear.) The
prejudices of the two camps are once more
stirred to their depths ; and if this scheme
goes into operation, they will separate more
511
and more widely, and finally break out
into open war, unless, indeed, it shall work
very differently from what any one can now
imagine. If provincial independence is to
be crushed down by a General Government
careless of local majorities, then you will
have this war. Or, if on the other hand,
the policy of the Federal Executive should
be to give effect to the aggregate will of the
several local majorities, at whatever sacrifice
of principle, still then you will have this
war. The local minorities—threatened with
elimination, in their alarm and jealousy,
will be simply desperate, ready for any outbreak of discontent at any moment. Take
a
practical case. Suppose the rule adopted,
of not having an Executive Council inconveniently large, Lower Canada, as we have
seen, can then only have three members of
it ; and if all these three are French-Canadians—as they almost must be, because the
French cannot put up with less than three
out of twelve—how will not the Irish Catholics and the British Protestants feel themselves
aggrieved ? You cannot help it.
They must in that case feel deeply aggrieved,
and so feeling, they will cause troubles. The
Irish Catholics will be told, I suppose, " Oh,
you will have an Irish Catholic member of
the Government to look to from Newfoundland;" and if so, they will have to guide
themselves by some sort of Irish-Catholic
Newfoundland rule of policy, and not by any
rule ever so little savoring of a regard for
larger or higher principle. The British
Protestants, in their turn, will be told : "You
have a majority of your own tongue and
faith from Upper Canada and the Lower
Provinces ; you must be content with that,
and look to their members of the Government
for such care as you may need in the matter
of your affairs." " Oh, we must, must
we ?" will be the answer ; "then we will
square our conduct, not by any rule for
British America or even Lower Canada,
but by the shifting exigencies of prejudice or passion, whatever they may be, in
Upper Canada and your Lower Provinces."
(Hear, hear.) These discontented elements
in Lower Canada, depend upon it, will
create no small confusion ; and among
those thus driven into making trouble, there
will be not a few whose preferences will even
be American, and who will appeal to outside
influences for protection. Such will be the
legitimate effect of this system ; and if any
one tells me that it will be conducive to the
peace and good government of this country,
I say he prophecies in a way that I cannot
understand. Thank God, Mr. SPEAKER, I
do not need, as I stand here, to defend myself from any charge of bigotry as against
any sect or party. There was a time in Canada when it was most difficult for any
person who spoke my tongue to stand up
and say that the French-Canadians ought
not to be politically exterminated from the
face of the earth. I stood out steadfastly
against that doctrine then. I remember
well the painful events of that sad time.
I foresee but too distinctly the fearful
probability there is of that time coming
again, through the adoption of these resolutions. And I do not shrink from the
danger of being misunderstood or misrepresented, when I now stand up here and warn
the country of this danger. If trouble of
this sort ever arises, it is one that will extend very rapidly over the whole Confederacy.
In all parts of it, in every province, there
are minorities that will be acted upon by
that kind of thing. In the Lower Provinces,
and in Newfoundland, things are but too
ripe for the outburst of hostilities of this
description. Talk, indeed, in such estate of
things, of your founding here by this means
" a new nationality "—of your creating such
a thing—of your whole people here rallying
round its new Government at Ottawa. Mr.
SPEAKER, is such a thing possible ? We
have a large class whose national feelings
turn towards London, whose very heart is
there ; another large class whose sympathies
centre here at Quebec, or in a sentimental
way may have some reference to Paris ; another large class whose memories are of the
Emerald Isle ; and yet another whose comparisons are rather with Washington ;
but have we any class of people who are
attached, or whose feelings are going to be
directed with any earnestness, to the city
of Ottawa, the centre of the new nationality
that is to be created ? In the times to
come, when men shall begin to feel strongly
on those questions that appeal to national
preferences, prejudices and passions, all
talk of your new nationality will sound but
strangely. Some other older nationality will
then be found to hold the first place in
most people's hearts. (Hear, hear.) Mr.
SPEAKER, it is only right that I should
state to the House that I have not reached
within a long distance of the point which I
had hoped to reach before sitting down ; but
512
I feel compelled to ask the indulgence of
the House, from my strength being insufficient to hear me through. (Cheers.)
The debate was then adjourned, Mr.
DUNKIN having the floor again for tomorrow.
This individual participated in:
