MONDAY, February 6, 1865.
ATTORNEY GENERAL MACDONALD
moved, " That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She
may be graciously pleased to cause a measure to be submitted to the Imperial Parliament,
for the purpose of uniting the Colonies
of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick,
Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island,
in one Government, with provisions based on
certain Resolutions, which were adopted at
a Conference of Delegates from the said
Colonies, held at the city of Quebec, on the
10th October, 1864."
* He said:— Mr.
Speaker, in fulfilment of the promise made
by the Government to Parliament at its last
session, I have moved this resolution. I
have had the honor of being charged, on
behalf ot the Government, to submit a scheme
for the Confederation of all the British North
American Provinces—a scheme which has
been received, I am glad to say, with general,
if not universal, approbation in Canada.
The scheme, as propounded through the
press, has received almost no opposition.
While there may be occasionally, here and
there, expressions of dissent from some of
the details, yet the scheme as a whole has
met with almost universal approval, and the
Government has the greatest satisfaction in
presenting it to this House. This subject,
which now absorbs the attention of the
ple of Canada, and of the whole of British
North America, is not a new one. For years
it has more or less attracted the attention of
every statesman and politician in these provinces, and has been looked upon by many
far-seeing politicians as being eventually the
means of deciding and settling very many
of the vexed questions which have retarded
the prosperity of the colonies as a whole,
and particularly the prosperity of Canada.
The subject was pressed upon the public attention by a great many writers and politicians;
but I believe the attention of the
Legislature was first formally called to it by
my honorable friend the Minister of Finance.
Some years ago, in an elaborate speech, my
hon. friend, while an independent member
of Parliament, before bein connected with
any Government, pressed his views on the
Legislature at great length and with his
usual force. But the subject was not taken
up by any party as a branch of their policy,
until the formation of the CARTIER-MACDONALD Administration in 1858, when the
Confederation of the colonies was announced
as one of the measures which they pledged
themselves to attempt, if possible, to bring
to a satisfactory conclusion. In pursuance
of that promise, the letter or despatch, which
has been so much and so freely commented
upon in the press and in this House, was
addressed by three of the members of that
Administration to the Colonial Office. The
26
subject, however, though looked upon with favor by the country, and though
there were no distinct expressions of opposition to it from any party,
did not begin to assume its present proportions until last session. Then,
men of all parties and all shades of politics became alarmed at the
aspect of affairs. They found that such was the opposition between the
two sections of the province, such was the danger of impending anarchy,
in consequence of the irreconcilable differences of opinion,
with respect to representation by population, between Upper and
Lower Canada, that unless some solution of the dificulty was arrived
at, we would suffer under a succession of weak governments,weak in numerical support,
weak in force, and weak in power of doing good.
All were alarmed at this state of affairs. We had election after
election,—we had ministry after ministry,—with the same result. Parties were so
equally balanced, that the vote of one member might
decide the fate of the Administration, and the course of legislation
for a year or a series of years. This condition of things was well
calculated to arouse the earnest consideration of every lover of his
country, and I am happy to say it had that effect. None were more impressed
by this momentous state of affairs, and the grave apprehensions that
existed of a state of anarchy destroying our credit, destroying our
prosperity, destroying our progress, than were the members of this present
House; and the leading statesmen on both sides seemed to have come to
the common conclusion, that some step must be taken to relieve the country from the
dead-lock and inpending anarchy that
hung over us.With that view, my colleague, the President of the Council, made a motion
founded on the despatch addressed to
the Colonial Minister, to which I have referred, and a committee was
struck, composed of gentlemen of both sides of the House, of all shades of
political opinion, without any reference to whether they were
supporters of the Administration of the day or belonged to the
Opposition, for the purpose of taking into calm and full
deliberation the evils which threatened the future of Canada. That motion of
my honorable friend resulted most happily. The committee, by a wise
provision,—and in order that each member of the committee might have
an opportunity of expressing his opinions without being in any way compromised before
the public, or with his party, in regard
either to his political friends or to his political foes,—agreed that the
discussion should be freely entered upon without reference
to the political antecedents of any of them, and that they should sit with
closed doors, so that they might be able to approach the subject
frankly and in a spirit of compromise. The committee included most
of the leading members of the House,—I had the honor myself to be one
of the number,—and the result was that there was found an ardent
desire—a creditable desire, I must say,—displayed by all the
members of the committee to approach the subject honestly, and to attempt to work
out some solution which might relieve Canada from
the evils under which she labored. The report of that committee was
laid before the House, and then came the political action of the leading men
of the two parties in this House, which ended in the formation of the
present Government. The principle upon which that Government was
formed has been announced, and is known to all. It was formed for the very
purpose of carrying out the object which has now received to
a certain degree its completion, by the resolutions I have had the honor to
place in your hands. As has been stated, it was not without a great
deal of difficulty and reluctance that that Government was formed.
The gentlemen who compose this Government had for many years been
engaged in political hostilities to such an extent that it
affected even their social relations. But the crisis was great, the
danger was imminent, and the gentlemen who now form the present
Administration found it to be their duty to lay aside all
personal feelings, to sacrifice in some degree their position, and even to
run the risk of having their motives impugned, for the sake of
arriving at some conclusion that would be satisfactory to the country in
general. The present resolutions were the result. And, as I said
before, I am proud to believe that the country has sanctioned, as I trust
that the representatives of the people in this House will
sanction, the scheme which is now submitted for the future government of
British North America. (Cheers.) Everything seemed to favor the
project, and everything seemed to show that the present was the time, if
ever, when this great union between all Her Majesty's
subjects dwelling in British North America, should be carried out.
(Hear, hear.) When the Government, was formed, it was felt that the
difficulties in the way of effecting a union between all the British North
Amer27ican Colonies were great—so great as almost, in the opinion of many,
to make it hopeless. And with that view it was the policy of the
Government, if they could not succeed in procuring a union between
all the British North American Colonies, to attempt to free the
country from the dead-lock in which we were placed in Upper and Lower
Canada, in consequence of the difference of opinion between
the two sections, by having a severance to a certain extent of the present
union between the two provinces of Upper and Lower Canada,
and the substitution of a Federal Union between them. Â Most of us, however,
I may say, all of us, were agreed—and I believe every thinking man
will agree—as to the expediency of effecting a union between all
the provinces, and the superiority of such a design, if it
were only practicable, over the smaller scheme of having a Federal Union
between Upper and Lower Canada alone. Â By a happy concurrence of
events, the time came when that proposition could be made with a hope of
success. Â By a fortunate coincidence the desire for union
existed in the Lower Provinces, and a feeling of the necessity of
strengthening themselves by collecting together the scattered colonies on the sea-board,
had induced them to form a convention of
their own for the purpose of effecting a union of the Maritime Provinces of Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward
Island, the legislatures of those colonies having formally
authorized their respective governments to send a delegation
to Prince Edward Island for the purpose of attempting to form a union of
some kind. Â Whether the union should be federal or legislative was
not then indicated, but a union of some kind was sought for the purpose of making
of themselves one people instead of
three. Â We, ascertaining that they were about to take such a step, and
knowing that if we allowed the occasion to pass, if they did indeed
break up all their present political organizations and form a new one, it
could not be expected that they would again readily destroy the new
organization which they had formed,—the union of the three provinces on
the sea-board,—and form another with Canada.  Knowing this,
we availed ourselves of the opportunity, and asked if they would receive a deputation
from Canada, who would go to meet them at
Charlottetown, for the purpose of laying before them the advantages of
a larger and more extensive union, by the junction of all the provinces in
one great government under our common Sovereign. They
at once kindly consented to receive and hear us. They did receive us
cordially and generously, and asked us to lay our views before
them. We did so at some length, and so satisfactory to them
were the reasons we gave ; so clearly, in their opinion, did we shew the
advantages of the greater union over the lesser, that they
at once set aside their own project, and joined heart and hand with us in
entering into the larger scheme, and trying to form, as far as they
and we could, a great nation and a strong government. Â (Cheers.) Â Encouraged
by this arrangement, which, however, was altogether
unofficial and unauthorised, we returned to Quebec, and then the
Government of Canada invited the several governments of the sister
colonies to send a deputation here from each of them for the purpose of
considering the question, with something like authority from their respective governments.
The result was, that when we
met here on the 10th of October, on the first day on which we
assembled, after the full and free discussions which had taken place at
Charlottetown, the first resolution now before this House was passed
unanimously, being received with acclamation as, in the opinion of
every one who heard it, a proposition which ought to receive, and would
receive, the sanction of each government and each people. The
resolution is, " That the best interests and present and future prosperity of British
North America will be promoted by a Federal
Union under the Crown of Great Britain, provided such union can be
effected on principles just to the several provinces." Â It seemed to all
the statesmen assembled—and there are great statesmen in the Lower
Provinces, men who would do honor to any government and to any
legislature of any free country enjoying representative
institutions—it was clear to them all that the best interests and present
and future prosperity of British North America would be
promoted by a Federal Union under the Crown of Great Britain. Â And it seems
to me, as to them, and I think it will so appear to the people of this
country, that, if we wish to be a great people ; if we wish to form—using
the expression which was sneered at the other evening—a great
nationality, commanding the respect of the world, able to hold our own
against all opponents, and to defend those institutions we prize : if we
wish to have one system of government, and to establish a commercial union, Â with
unrestricted free trade, between people of the five
provinces, belonging, as they do, to the same nation, obeying
28 the same Sovereign, owning the same allegiance,
and being, for the most part, of the same blood and lineage : if we wish to
be able to afford to each other the means of mutual defence and
support against aggression and attack—this can only be obtained by a union
of some kind between the scattered and weak boundaries composing the
British North American Provinces. (Cheers). The very mention of the
scheme is fitted to bring with it its own approbation. Â Supposing that in
the spring of the year 1865, half a million of people were coming from
the United Kingdom to make Canada their home, although they brought
only their strong arms and willing hearts ; though they brought neither
skill nor experience nor wealth, would we not receive them with open
arms, and hail their presence in Canada as an important addition to our
strength ? Â Butwhen , by the proposed union, we not only get nearly a
million of people to join us—when they contribute not only their
numbers, their physical strength, and their desire to benefit their
position, but when we know that they consist of old-established communities, having
a large amount of realised wealth, — composed
of people possessed of skill, education and experience in the ways of
the New World — people who are as much Canadians, I may say, as we arepeople who
are imbued with the same feelings of loyalty to the
Queen, and the same desire for the continuance of the connection with
the Mother Country as we are, and at the same time, have a like feeling of
ardent attachment for this, our common country, for which
they and we would alike fight and shed our blood, if necessary. Â When all
this is considered, argument is needless to prove the advantage of
such a union. (Hear, hear.) There were only three modes,—if I may return for a moment
to the difficulties with which Canada was
surrounded,—only three modes that were at all suggested, by which the
dead lock in our affairs, the anarchy we dreaded, and the evils which
retarded our prosperity, could be met or averted. Â One was the
dissolution of the union between Upper and Lower Canada, leaving them
as they were before the union of 1841. I believe that that proposition, by
itself had no supporters. Â It was felt by every one that, although it
was a course that would do away with the sectional difficulties which
existed,—though it would remove the pressure on the part of the people of
Upper Canada for the representation based upon population,—and
the jealousy of the people of Lower Canada lest their institutions should
be attacked and prejudiced by that principle in our representation ;
yet it was felt by every thinking man in the province that it would be
a retrograde step, which would throw back the country to nearly the same
position as it
occupied before the union,- that it would lower the credit enjoyed by
United Canada,—that it would be the breaking up of the connection which had existed
for nearly a quarter of a century, and, under
which, although it had not been completely
successful, and had not allayed altogether the
local jealousies that had their root
in circumstances which arose before the union, our
province, as a
whole, had nevertheless prospered and increased. Â It was felt that a dissolution
of the union would have destroyed
all the credit that we had gained by being a
united province, and would have left us two
weak and ineffective governments, instead of
one powerful and united peeple. (Hear,
hear.) Â The next mode suggested, was the
granting of representation by population.
Now, we all know the manner in which that
question was
and is regarded by Lower
Canada ; that while in
Upper Canada the
desire and cry for it was daily augmenting,
the resistance to it in Lower Canada was proportionably increasing in strength. Â
Still, if
some such means of relieving us from the
sectional jealousies which existed between the
two Canadas, if some such solution of the
difficulties
as Confederation had not been
found, the representation by population must
eventually have been carried ; no matter
though it might have been felt in Lower
Canada, as being a breach of the Treaty of
Union, no matter how much it might have
been felt by the Lower Canadians that it
would sacrifice their local interests, it is certain that in the progross
of events representation by population would have been carried ; and, had it been
carried — I speak
here my own individual sentiments—I do
not think it would have been for the interest of Upper Canada. Â For though Upper
Canada would have felt that it had received
what it claimed as a right, and had succeed
in establishing its ight, yet it would have
left the Lower Province with a sullen feeling of injury and injustice. Â The Lower
Canadians would not have worked cheerfully under such a change of system, but
would have ceased to be what they are
now— a nationality, with representatives
29
in Parliament,
governed by general principles,
and dividing according to their political opinions—and would have been in great danger
of becoming a faction, forgetful of national
obligations, and only actuated by a desire to
defend their own sectional interests, their own
laws, and their own institutions. (Hear, hear.)
The third and only means of solution for our
difficulties was the junction of the provinces
either in a Federal or a Legislative Union.
Now, as regards the comparative advantages
of a Legislative and a Federal Union, I have
never hesitated to state my own opinions. I
have again and again stated in the House,
that, if practicable, I thought a Legislative
Union would be preferable. (Hear, hear.)
I have always contended that if we could
agree to have one government and one parliament, legislating for the whole of these
peoples, it would be the best, the cheapest,
the most vigorous, and the strongest
system
of government we could adopt. ( Hear, hear.)
But, on looking at the subject in the Conference, and discussing the matter as we
did,
most unreservedly, and with a desire to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, we found
that such a system was impracticable. In
the first place, it would not meet the assent
of the people
of Lower Canada, because they
felt that in their peculiar position—being
in a minority, with a different language,
nationality and religion from the majority,in case of a junction with the other provinces,
their institutions and their laws
might be assailed, and their ancestral
associations, on which they prided themselves,
attacked and prejudiced; it was found that
any proposition which involved the absorption of the individuality of Lower Canadaif
I may use the expression—would not be
received with favor by her people. Â We
found too, that though their people speak
the same language and enjoy the same system of law as the people of Upper Canada,
a system founded on the common law of England, there was as great a disinclination
on the
part of the various
Maritime Provinces to
lose their individuality, as separate political
organizations, as we observed in the case of
Lower Canada
herself. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, we were forced to the conclusion that
we must either abandon the idea of Union
altogether, or devise a system of union in
which the separate provincial organizations
would be in some degree preserved. So that
those who were, like myself, in favor of aÂ
Legislative Union,
were obliged to modify
their views and
accept the project of a
Federal Union as the only scheme practicable, even for the Maritime Provinces.
Because, although the law of those provinces is founded on the common law of
England, yet every one of them has a large
amount of law of its own—colonial law
framed by itself, and affecting every relation
of life, such as the laws of property, municipal and assessment laws; laws relating
to
the liberty of the subject, and to all the
great interests contemplated in legislation ;
we found, in short, that the statutory law
of the different provinces was so varied and
diversified that it was almost impossible to
weld them into a Legislative Union at once.
Why, sir, if you only consider the innumerable subjects of legislation peculiar to
new
countries, and that every one of those five
colonies had particular laws of its own, to
which its people have been accustomed and
are attached, you will see the difficulty
of
effecting and
working a Legislative Union,
and bringing about an assimilation of the
local as well as general laws of the whole of
the provinces. Â (Hear, hear.) Â We in
Upper Canada understand from the nature
and operation of our peculiar municipal
law, of which we know the value, the difficulty of framing a general system of legislation
on local matters which would meet the
wishes and fulfil the requirements of the several provinces. Even the laws considered
the
least important, respecting private rights in
timber, roads, fencing, and innumerable other
matters, small in themselves, but in the aggregate of great interest to the agricultural
class, who form the great body of the people,
are regarded as of great value by the portion
of the community affected
by them. And
when we consider that every one of the
colonies has a body of law of this kind, and
that it will take years before those laws can
be assimilated, it was felt that at first, at all
events, any united legislation would be almost
impossible. I am happy to state—and indeed
it appears on the face of the resolutions themselves—that as regards the Lower Provinces,
a great desire was evinced for the final
assimilation of our laws. Â One of the resolutions provides that an attempt shall
be made to assimilate the laws of the
Maritime Provinces and those of Upper
Canada, for the purpose of eventually establishing one body of statutory law, founded
on the common law of England, the parent of
the laws of all those provinces. One great ob30jection made to a
Federal Union was the expense of an
increased number of legislatures.
I will not enter at
any length into that subject, because my honorable friends, the Finance Minister and
the President of the
Council, who are infinitely more competent
than myself to deal with matters of this kindmatters of account—will, I think, be
able to
show that the expenses under a Federal Union
will not be greater than those under the existing system of separate governments and
legislatures. Here, where we have a joint legislature
for Upper and Lower Canada, which deals not
only with subjects of a general interest common to all Canada, but with all matters
of private right and of sectional interest, and with
that class of measures known as "private bills,"
we find that one of the greatest sources
of expense to the country is the cost
of legislation. We find, from the admixture of subjects of a general, with those
of a private character in legislation, that
they mutually interfere with each other ;
whereas, if the attention of the Legislature
was confined to measures of one kind or the
other alone, the session of Parliament would
not be so protracted and therefore not so
expensive as at present. Â In the proposed
Constitution all matters of general interest
are to be dealt with by the General Legislature ; while the local legislatures
will
deal with matters of local interest, which
do not affect the Confederation as a whole,
but are of the greatest importance to their
particular sections. By such a division
of labor the sittings of the General Legislature would not be so protracted as
even those of Canada alone. And so with the
local legislatures, their attention being confined to subjects pertaining to their
own
sections, their sessions would be shorter and
less expensive. Â Then, when we consider
the enormous saving that will be effected
in the administration of affairs by one General
Government — when we reflect that each
of the five colonies have a government
of its own with a complete
establishment
of public departments
and all the machinery
required for the transaction of the business of the
country—that each have a separate executive, judicial and militia systemthat each
province has a separate ministry, including a Minister of Militia, with
a complete Adjutant General's Departmentthat each have a Finance Minister with a
full Customs and Excise staff—that each
Colony has as large and complete an administrative organization,
with as many Executive
officers as the General Government will have
—we can well understand the enormous
saving that will result from a union of all
the colonies, from their having but one head
and one central system Â
We, in Canada,
already know something of the advantages
and disadvantages of a Federal Union.
Although we have nominally a Legislative
Union in Canada—although we sit in one
Parliament, supposed constitutionally to represent the people without regard to sections
or localities, yet we know, as a matter of fact,
that since the union in 1841, we have had a
Federal Union ; that in matters affecting
Upper Canada solely, members from that
section claimed and generally exercised the
right of exclusive legislation, while members from Lower Canada legislated in matters
affecting only their own section. We
have had a Federal Union in fact, though
a Legislative Union in name ; and in the
hot contests of late years, if on any
occasion a measure affecting any one section were interfered with by the members
from the other—if, for instance, a measure locally affecting Upper Canada were
carried or defeated against the wishes
of its majority, by one from
Lower
Canada,—my honorable friend the President of the Council, and his friends
denounced with all their energy and ability
such legislation as an infringement of the
rights of the Upper Province. Â (Hear,
hear, and cheers). Â Just in the same way, if
any act concerning Lower Canada were
pressed into law against the wishes of the
majority of her representatives, by those from
Upper Canada, the Lower Canadians would
rise as one man and protest against such a
violation of their peculiar rights. (Hear,
hear.) Â The relations between England and
Scotland are very similar to that which obtains between the Canadas. Â The union between
them, in matters of legislation, is of a
federal character, because the Act of Union
between the two countries provides that the
Scottish law cannot be altered, except for the
manifest advantage of the people of Scotland.
This stipulation has been held
to be so
obligatory on the Legislature of Great Britain, that no measure affecting the law
of
Scotland is
passed unless it receives the
sanction of a majority of the Scottish members in Parliament. No matter how important
it may be for the interests of the empire
as a whole to alter the laws of Scotland—no
31
matter how much it may
interfere with the
symmetry of the general law of the United
Kingdom, that law is not altered, except
with the consent of the Scottish people,
as expresssed
by their representatives in Parliament. Â (Hear, hear.) Â Thus, we have, in
Great Britain, to a limited extent, an example of the working and effects of a Federal
Union, as we might expect to witness
them in our own Confederation. Â The whole
scheme of Confederation, as propounded by
the Conference, as agreed to and sanctioned
by the Canadian Government, and as now
presented for the consideration of the people,
and the Legislature, bears upon its face the
marks of compromise. Â Of necessity there
must have been a great deal of mutual concession. Â When we think of the representatives
of five colonies, all supposed to have
different interests, meeting together, charged
with the duty of protecting those interests
and of pressing
the views of their own localities and sections, it must be admitted that
had we not met in a spirit of conciliation, and
with an anxious desire to promote this union ;
if we had not been impressed with the idea
contained in the words of the resolution—
" That the best interests and present and future prosperity of British North America
would be promoted by a Federal Union under
the Crown of Great Britain,"—all our efforts
might have proved to be of no avail. Â If
we had not felt that, after coming to this
conclusion, we were bound to set aside our
private opinions on matters of detail, if we
had not felt ourselves bound to look at what
was practicable, not obstinately rejecting the
opinions of others nor adhering to our own ;
if we had not
met, I say, in a spirit of conciliation, and with an anxious, overruling desire to
form one people under one government,
we never would have succeeded. With these
views, we press the question on this House
and the country. Â I say to this House, if you
do not believe that the union of the colonies
is for the advantage of the country, that the
joining of these five peoples into one nation,
under one sovereign, is for the benefit of all,
then reject the scheme. Â Reject it if you do
not believe it to be for the present advantage
and future prosperity of yourselves and your
children. Â But if, after a calm and full consideration of this scheme, it is believed,
as a
whole, to be for the advantage of this province—if the House and country believe this
union to be one which will ensure for us British laws,
British connection, and British
freedom—and
increase and develope the social, political and material prosperity of the
country, then I implore this House and the
country to lay aside all prejudices, and accept
the scheme which we offer.
I ask this House
to meet the question in the same spirit in which
the delegates met it. Â I ask each member of
this House to lay aside his own opinions as
to particular details, and to accept the scheme
as a whole if he think it beneficial as a whole.
As I stated in the preliminary discussion, we
must consider this scheme in the light of a
treaty. Â By a happy coincidence of circumstances, just when an Administration had
been
formed in Canada for the purpose of attempting a solution of the difficulties
under which
we laboured, at the same time the Lower Provinces, actuated by a similar feeling,
appoint-
ted a Conference with a view to a union
among themselves, without being cognisant
of the position the government was taking in
Canada. Â If it had not been for this fortunate
coincidence of events, never, perhaps, for a
long series of years would we have been able
to bring this scheme to a practical conclusion.
But we did succeed. Â We made the arrangement, agreed upon the scheme, and the deputations
from the several governments represented at the Conference went back pledged
to lay it before their governments, and to
ask the legislatures and people of their
respective provinces to assent to it. Â I trust
the scheme will be assented to as a whole.
I am sure this House will not seek to alter it
in its unimportant details ; and, if altered in
any important provisions,
the result must be
that the whole will be set aside, and we must
begin de novo.
If any important changes
are made, every one of the colonies will feel
itself absolved from the implied obligation to
deal with it as a Treaty, each province will
feel itself at liberty to amend it ad
libitum so
as to suit its own views and interests ; in fact,
the whole of our labours will have been
for nought, and we will have to renew our
negotiations with all the colonies for the
purpose of
establishing some new scheme.
I hope the
House will not adopt any such
a course as will postpone, perhaps for ever,
or at all events for a long period, all chances
of union. Â All the statesmen and public
men who have written or spoken on the
subject admit the advantages of a union,
if it were practicable : and now when it is
proved to be
practicable, if we do not embrace this
opportunity the present favorable time will pass away, and we may never
32
have it again.
Because, just so surely as
this scheme is defeated, will be revived the
original proposition for a union of the Maritime Provinces, irrespective of Canada
; they
will not remain as they are now, powerless,
scattered, helpless communities ; they will
form themselves into a power, which, though
not so strong as if united with Canada, will,
nevertheless, be a powerful and considerable
community, and it will be then too late for
us to attempt to strengthen ourselves by this
scheme, which, in the words of the resolution,
"is for the best interests, and present and
future prosperity of British North America.''
If we are not blind to our present position,
we must see the hazardous situation in
which all the great interests of Canada stand
in respect to the United States. Â I am no
alarmist. Â I do not believe in the prospect of
immediate war. Â I believe that the common
sense of the two nations will prevent a war ;
still we cannot trust to probabilities. Â The
Government and Legislature would be wanting in their duty to the people if they ran
any risk. Â We know that the United States
at this moment are engaged in a war of
enormous dimensions—that the occasion of a
war with Great Britain has again and again
arisen, and may at any time in the future
again arise. Â We cannot foresee what may
be the result
; we cannot say but that the
two nations may drift into a war as other
nations have done before. Â It would then
be too late when war had commenced to think
of measures for strengthening ourselves, or
to begin negociations for a union with the
sister provinces. Â At this moment, in consequence of the ill-feeling which has arisen
between England and the United Statesa feeling of which Canada was not the cause
—in consequence of the irritation which now
exists, owing to the unhappy state of affairs
on this continent, the Reciprocity Treaty,
it seems probable, is about to be brought
to an end—our trade is hampered by the
passport system, and at any moment we may
be deprived of
permission to carry our goods
through United States channels—the bonded
goods system may be done away with, and the
winter trade through the United States put
an end to. Â Our merchants may be obliged
to return to the old system of bringing in
during the summer months the supplies for
the whole year. Â Ourselves already threatened, our trade interrupted, our intercourse,
political and commercial, destroyed, if we do
not take warning now when we have the opportunity, and while
one avenue is threatened to be closed, open another by taking advantage of the present
arrangement and the
desire of the Lower Provinces to draw closer
the alliance between us, we may suffer
commercial and political disadvantgaes it may
take long for us to overcome. Â The Conference having come to the conclusion that
a
legislative union, pure and simple, was impracticable, our next attempt was to form
a
government upon federal principles, which
would give
to the General Government the
strength of a legislative and administrative
union, while at the same time it preserved
that liberty of action for the different sections which is allowed by a Federal Union.
And I am strong in the belief—that we
have hit upon the happy medium in those
resolutions, and that we have formed a scheme
of government which unites the advantages
of both, giving us the strength of a legislative union and the sectional freedom of
a
federal union, with protection to local interests. Â In doing so we had the advantage
of
the experience of the United States. Â It is
the fashion now to enlarge on the defects of
the Constitution of the United States, but I
am not one of those who look upon it as a
failure. (Hear,
hear.) Â I think and believe
that it is one of the most skillful works
which human intelligence ever created ; is
one of the most perfect organizations that
ever governed a free people. Â To say that it
has some defects is but to say that it is not
the work of Omniscience, but of human intellects. Â We are happily situated in having
had the opportunity of watching its operation, seeing its working from its infancy
till now. Â It was in the main formed on the
model of the Constitution of Great Britain,
adapted to the circumstances of a new country, and was perhaps the only practicable
system that could have been adopted under the
circumstances existing at the time of its
formation. Â We can now take advantage of
the experience of the last seventy-eight years,
during which that Constitution has existed,
and I am strongly of the belief that we have,
in a great measure, avoided in this system
which we propose for the adoption of the
people of Canada, the defects which time
and events have shown to exist in the American Constitution. Â In the first place,
by a
resolution which meets with the universal
approval of the peeple of this country, we
have provided that for all time to come, so
far as we can legislate for the future, we
33
shall have as the
head of the executive power, the Sovereign of Great Britain. Â (Hear,
hear.) Â No one can look into futurity and
say what will be the destiny of this country.
Changes come over nations and peoples in
the course of ages. Â But, so far as we can
legislate, we provide that, for all time to
come, the Sovereign of Great Britain shall
be the Sovereign of British North America.
By adhering to the monarchical principle,
we avoid one defect inherent in the Constitution of the United States. Â By the
election of the President by a majority and
for a short period, he never is the sovereign
and chief of
the nation. He is never looked
up to by the whole people as the head and
front of the nation. Â He is at best but the
successful leader of a party. Â This defect is
all the greater on account of the practice of
re-election.
 During his first term of office,
he is employed in taking steps to secure his
own re-election, and for his party a continuance of power. Â We avoid this by adhering
to the monarchical principle—the Sovereign
whom you respect and love. Â I believe that
it is of the utmost importance to have that
principle recognized, so that we shall have
a Sovereign who is placed above the region
of party—to whom all parties look up—who
is not elevated by the action of one
party nor depressed by the action of another, who is the common head and sovereign
of all. Â (Hear, hear and cheers.)
In the Constitution we propose to continue
the system of Responsible Government, which
has existed in this province since 1841; and
which has long obtained in the Mother
Country. Â This is a feature of our Constitution as we have it now, and as
we shall have
it in the Federation, in which, I think, we
avoid one of the great defects in the Constitution of the United States. Â There the
President, during his term of office, is in a great
measure a
despot, a one-man power, with the
command of the naval and military forceswith an immense amount of patronage as
head of the
Executive, and with the veto
power as a branch of the legislature, perfectly uncontrolled by responsible advisers,
his
cabinet being
departmental officers merely,
whom he is not obliged by the Constitution
to consult with, unless he chooses to do so.
With us the Sovereign, or in this country the
Representative
of the Sovereign, can act only
on the advice of his ministers, those ministers
being responsible
to the people through Parliament. Prior
to the formation of the American Union, as we all
know, the different
states which entered into it were separate colonies. They had no connection with each
other further than that of having a common
sovereign, just as with us at present. Â Their
constitutions and their laws were different.
They might and did legislate against each
other, and when they revolted against the
Mother Country they acted as separate sovereignties, and carried on the war by a kind
of treaty of alliance against the common enemy. Â Ever since the union was formed
the
difficulty of what is called "State
Rights"
has existed, and this had much to do in
bringing on the present unhappy war in the
United States. Â They
commenced, in fact, at
the wrong end. Â They declared by their Constitution that each state was a sovereignty
in
itself, and that all the powers incident to a
sovereignty belonged to each state, except
those powers which, by the Constitution,
were conferred upon the General Government and Congress. Â Here we have adopted
a different system. Â We have strengthened
the General Government. Â We have given
the General Legislature all the great subjects
of legislation. Â We have conferred on them,
not only specifically and in detail, all the
powers which are incident to sovereignty, but
we have expressly declared that all subjects of
general interest not distinctly and exclusively
conferred upon the local governments and
local legislatures, shall be conferred upon the
General Government and Legislature.—We
have thus avoided that great source of weakness which has been the cause of the disruption
of the United States. We have avoided
all conflict of jurisdiction and authority, and
if this Constitution is carried out, as it will
be in full
detail in the Imperial Act to be
passed if the colonies adopt the scheme, we
will have in fact, as I said before, all the advantages of a legislative union under
one administration, with, at the same time the guarantees for local institutions and
for local laws,
which are insisted upon by so many in the
provinces now, I hope, to be united. I think
it is well that, in framing our Constitution- although my honorable friend the member
for Hochelaga (Hon. Mr. DORION) sneered
at it the other day, in the discussion on the
Address in reply to the speech from the
Throne—our first act should have been to
recognize the sovereignty of Her Majesty.
(Hear, hear.) Â I believe that, while England
has no desire to lose her colonies, but wishes
to retain them, while I am satisfied that the
34
public mind of
England would deeply regret
the loss of these provinces—yet, if the people of British North
America after full deliberation had
stated that they considered it
was for their interest, for the advantage of
the future of British North America to sever
the tie, such is the generosity of the people
of England, that, whatever
their desire to
keep these colonies, they would not seek to
compel us to remain unwilling subjects of the
British Crown. Â If therefore, at the Conference, we had arrived at the conclusion,
that
it was for the interest of these provinces that a
severance should take place, I am sure that Her
Majesty and the Imperial Parliament would
have sanctioned that severance. We accordingly felt that there was a propriety in
giving
a distinct declaration of opinion on that point,
and that, in framing the Constitution,
its first
sentence should declare, that " The Executive authority or government shall be vested
in the Sovereign of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, and be administered according to the well understood principles
of the British Constitution, by the
Sovereign personally, or by the Representative of the Sovereign
duly authorised." That
resolution met with the unanimous assent of
the Conference. Â The desire to remain connected with Great Britain and to retain
our
allegiance to Her Majesty was unanimous.
Not a single suggestion was made, that it
could, by any possibility, be for the interest
of the colonies, or of any section or portion of
them, that there should be a severance
of our connection. Â Although we knew it to
be possible that Canada, from her position,
might be exposed to all the horrors of war,
by reason of causes of hostility arising
between Great Britain and the United States
—causes over which we had no control, and
which we had no hand in bringing aboutyet there was a unanimous feeling of
willingness to run all the hazards of war, if
war must come, rather than lose the connection between the Mother Country and
these colonies. Â (Cheers) Â We provide that
" the Executive authority shall be administered by the Sovereign personally, or
by the Representative of the Sovereign duly
authorized." Â It is too much to expect
that the Queen should vouchsafe us her
personal governance or presence, except to
pay us, as the heir apparent of the Throne,
our future Sovereign has already paid us,Â
the graceful compliment of a visit. Â The Executive authority must therefore be
administered by Her Majesty's Representative. Â We place no restriction on Her Majesty's
prerogative in the
selection of her representative. Â As it is now, so it will be if this
Constitution is adopted. The Sovereign has unrestricted freedom of choice. Â Whether
in making her selection she may send
us one of her own family, a Royal Prince, as a Viceroy to rule over us,
or one of the great statesmen of England to represent her, we know not.
We leave that to Her Majesty in all confidence. Â But we may
be permitted to hope, that when the union takes place, and we become
the great country which British North America is certain to be, it
will be an object worthy the ambition of the statesmen of England to be
charged with presiding over our destinies. Â (Hear, hear.) Â Let me
now invite the attention of the House to the provisions in
the Constitution respecting the legislative power. The sixth
resolution says, " There shall be a general legislature or parliament for the federated
provinces, composed of a Legislative
Council and a House of Commons." Â This resolution has been
cavilled at in the English press as if it excluded the Sovereign as a
portion of the legislature. In one sense, that stricture was just—because in strict
constitutional language, the legislature of
England consists of King, Lords and Commons. But, on the other hand,
in ordinary parlance we speak of " the King and his Parliament," or "the
King summoning his Parliament,"  the three estates—Lords spiritual,
temporal Lords, and the House of Commons, and I observe that such a
writer as Hallam occasionally uses the word Parliament in that
restricted sense. Â At best it is merely a verbal criticism. Â The
legislature of British North America will be composed of King, Lords,
and Commons. Â The Legislative Council will stand in the same
relation to the Lower House, as the House of Lords to the House of
Commons in England, having the same power of initiating all matters of
legislation, except the granting of money. Â As regards the Lower House, it
may not appear to matter much, whether it is called the House of Commons
or House of Assembly. Â It will hear whatever name the
Parliament of England may choose to give it, but "The House of Commons" is the name
we should prefer, as showing that it
represents the Commons of
35 Canada, in the same way that the English House of
Commons represents the Commons of England, with the same privileges, the
same parliamentary usage, and the same parliamentary authority. Â In
settling the constitution of the Lower House, that which peculiarly
represents the people, it was agreed that the principle of representation
based on population should be adopted, and
the mode of applying
that principle is fully
developed in these
resolutions. Â When I
speak of
representation by population, the
House will of course understand, that universal suffrage is not
in any way sanctioned, or
admitted by these resolutions, as the basis
on which the
constitution of the popular
branch should rest.
 In order to protect
local interests, and
to prevent sectional
jealousies, it was
found requisite that the
three great divisions into which British
North America is
separated, should be
represented in the
Upper House on the
principle of
equality. Â There are three great
sections, having
different interests, in this
proposed
Confederation. Â We have Western
Canada, an
agricultural country far away
from the sea, and
having the largest population who have
agricultural interests principally to guard.
 We have Lower Canada,
with other and
separate interests, and especially with
institutions and laws which she
jealously guards
against absorption by any
larger, more
numerous, or stronger power.
And we have the
Maritime Provinces, having also different
sectional interests of their
own, having , from
their position, classes and
interests which we do
not know in Western
Canada. Â Accordingly, in the Upper House,
—the controlling and regulating, but not the
initiating, branch (for we know that here as
in England, to the Lower House will practically belong the initiation of matters of
great
public interest), in the House which has the
sober second-thought in legislation—it is provided that each of
those great sections
shall be represented equally by 24 members.
The only exception to that condition of
equality is in the case of Newfoundland,
which has an
interest of its own, lying, as it
does, at the
mouth of the great river St. Lawrence, and more connected, perhaps, with
Canada than with the Lower Provinces. Â It
has, comparatively speaking, no common interest with the other Maritime Provinces,
but has sectional interests and sectional
claims of its own to be protected. Â It, therefore has been dealt with
separately, and
is to have a separate
representation in the
Upper House, thus varying from the equality
established between the other sections.- As may be well conceived, great difference
of opinion at first existed as to the constitution of the Legislative Council. Â In
Canada
the elective principle prevailed ; in the
Lower Provinces, with the exception of
Prince Edward Island, the nominative prin-
ciple was the rule.
 We found a general
disinclination on the part of the Lower
Provinces to adopt the elective principle ;
indeed, I do not think there was a dissenting voice in the Conference against the
adoption of the nominative principle,
except from
Prince Edward Island. The delegates from
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, as one man, were in favor of nomination
by the Crown. Â And nomination by
the Crown is of course the system which is
most in accordance with the British Constitution. Â We resolved then, that the constitution
of the Upper House should be in
accordance with the British system as nearly
as circumstances would allow. Â An hereditary
Upper House is impracticable in this young
country. Here we have
none of the elements
for the formation of a landlord aristocracy- no men of large territorial positions—no
class separated from the mass of the people.
An hereditary body is altogether unsuited to
our state of society, and would soon dwindle
into nothing. The only mode of adapting
the English system to the Upper House, is
by conferring the power of appointment on
the Crown (as the English peers are appointed), but that
the appointments should be
for
life. Â The arguments for an elective Council
are numerous and strong; and I ought to say
so, as one of the Administration responsible
for introducing the elective principle into
Canada. (Hear, hear.) I hold that this principle has not been a failure in Canada
; but
there were causes—which we did not take
into consideration at the time—why it did
not so fully succeed in Canada as we had
expected. One great cause was the enormous
extent of the constituencies and the immense
labor which consequently devolved on those
who sought the suffrages of the people for
election to the Council. For the same reason
the expense—(laughter)—the legitimate
expense was so enormous that men of standing in the country, eminently fitted for
such
a position, were prevented from coming
forward. Â At first, I admit, men of the
first standing did come forward, but we
36
have seen that in
every succeeding election
in both Canadas there has been an increasing disinclination, on the part of
men of standing and political experience
and weight in the country, to become candidates ; while, on the other hand, all the
young men, the active
politicians, those who
have resolved
to embrace the life of a
statesman, have sought entrance to the
House of Assembly. Â The nominative system
in this country, was to a great extent successful, before the introduction of responsible
government. Then the Canadas were to a
great extent Crown colonies, and the upper
branch of the legislature consisted of gentlemen chosen from among the chief judicial
and ecclesiastical dignitaries, the heads of
departments, and other men of the first
position in the country.  Those bodies commanded great respect from the character,
standing, and weight of the individuals composing them, but they had little sympathy
with the people or their representatives, and
coillisions with the Lower House frequently
occurred, especially in Lower Canada. When
responsible government was introduced, it
became necessary for the Governor of the
day to have a body of advisers who had the
confidence of the House of Assembly
which could make or unmake ministers
as it chose. Â The Lower House in effect
pointed out who should be nominated to the
Upper House ; for the ministry, being dependent altogether on the lower branch of
the legislature for support, selected members
for the Upper House from among their political friends at the dictation of the House
of
Assembly. Â The Council was becoming less
and less a substantial check on the legislation
of the Assembly ; but under the system now
proposed, such will not be the case. Â No
ministry can in future do what they have
done in Canada before,—they cannot, with
the view of carrying any measure, or of
strengthening the party, attempt to overrule
the independent opinion of the Upper House,
by filling it with a number of its partisans
and political supporters. The provision in
the Constitution, that the Legislative Council
shall consist of a limited number of members
—that each of the great sections shall appoint
twenty-four members and no more, will
prevent the Upper House from being
swamped from time to time by the ministry
of the day, for the purpose of carrying out
their own schemes or pleasing their partisans. The fact of the government being
prevented from
exceeding a limited number
will preserve the independence of the
Upper House, and make it, in reality,
a separate and distinct chamber, having a
legitimate and controlling influence in the
legislation of the country. The objection has
been taken that in consequence of the Crown
being deprived of the right of unlimited
appointment, there is a chance of a dead
lock arising between the two branches of
the legislature ; a chance that the Upper
House being altogether independent of the
Sovereign, of the Lower House, and of the
advisers of the Crown, may act independently, and so independently as to produce
a dead lock. Â I do not anticipate any such
result. Â In the first place we know that in
England it does not arise. Â There would
be no use of an Upper House, if it did
not exercise, when it thought proper, the
right of opposing or amending or postponing
the legislation of the Lower House. Â It
would be of no value whatever were it a mere
chamber for registering the decrees of the
Lower House. Â It must be an independent
House, having a free action of its own, for it
is only valuable as being a regulating body,
calmly considering the legislation initiated
by the popular branch, and preventing any
hasty or ill considered legislation which may
come from that body, but it will never set
itself in opposition against the deliberate
and understood
wishes of the people. Â Even
the House of Lords, which as an hereditary
body, is far more independent than one
appointed for life can be, whenever it
ascertains what is the calm, deliberate
will of the people of England, it
yields, and never in modern times has
there been, in fact or act, any attempt to
overrule the decisions of that House by the
appointment ot new peers, excepting, perhaps, once in the reign of Queen Anne. Â It
is true that in 1832 such an increase was
threatened in consequence of the reiterated
refusal of the House of Peers to pass the
Reform Bill. Â I have no donbt the threat
would have been carried into effect, if necessary ; but every one, even the Ministry
who
advised that step, admitted that it would be
a revolutionary act, a breach of the Constitution to do so, and it was because of
the
necessity of preventing the bloody revolution
which hung over the land, if the Reform Bill
had been longer refused to the people of England, that they consented to the bloodless
revolution of overriding the independent
37
opinion of the House
of Lords on that question. (Hear, hear.) Since that time it has
never been attempted, and I am satisfied it
will never be attempted again. Â Only a
year or two ago the House of Lords rejected
the Paper Duties Bill, and they acted quite
constitutionally,
according to the letter and
as many think, according to the spirit of the
Constitution in doing so. Yet when they
found they had interfered with a subject
which the people's house claimed as belonging of right to themselves, the very next
session they abandoned their position, not
because they were convinced they had done
wrong, but because they had ascertained
what was the deliberate voice of the representatives of the people on the subject.
 In
this country, we must remember, that the
gentlemen who
will be selected for the Legislative Council stand on a very different
footing from the peers of England. Â They
have not like them any ancestral associations
or position derived from history. They have
not that direct influence on the people themselves, or on the popular branch of the
legislature, which the peers of England exercise,
from their great wealth, their vast territorial possessions, their numerous tenantry,
and that prestige with which the exalted
position of their class for centuries has invested them. Â (Hear, hear.) Â The members
of our Upper House will be like those of
the Lower, men of the people,
and from
the people. The man put into the Upper
House is as much a man of the people the
day after, as the day before his elevation.
Springing from the people, and one of them,
he takes his seat in the Council with all the
sympathies and feelings of a man of the
people, and when he returns home, at the
end of the session, he mingles with them
on equal terms, and is influenced by the same
feelings and associations, and events, as
those which affect
the mass around him.
And is it,
then, to be supposed that the
members of the upper branch of the legislature will set themselves deliberately at
work
to oppose what they know to be
the settled
opinions and
wishes of the people of the
country? They will not do it. There is
no fear of a dead lock between the two houses.
There is an infinitely greater chance of a
dead lock between the two branches of the
legislature,
should the elective principle
be adopted, than with a nominated chamber
—chosen
by the Crown,
and having no mission from the people. Â The members of the
Upper Chamber would
then come from the
people as well as those of the Lower House,
and should any difference ever arise between
both branches, the former could say to the
members of the popular branch—" We as
much represent the feelings of the people as
you do, and even more so ; we are not elected from small localities and for a short
period ; you as a body were elected at a particular time, when the public mind was
running in a particular channel ; you were returned to Parliament, not so much representing
the general views of the country,
on general questions, as upon the particular
subjects which happened to engage the minds
of the people when they went to the polls.
We have as much right, or a better right,
than you to be considered as representing the
deliberate will of the people on general
questions, and therefore we will not give
way." Â (Hear, hear.) Â There is, I repeat,
a greater danger of an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the two branches
of the legislature, if the upper be elective,
than if it holds its commission from the
Crown. Besides, it must be remembered that
an Upper House, the members
of which are to
be appointed for life, would not have the same
quality of permanence as the House of Lords;
our members would die; strangers would succeed them, whereas son succeeded father
in
the House of Lords. Â Thus the changes in
the membership and state of opinion in our
Upper House would always be more rapid
than in the House of Lords. Â To show how
speedily changes have occurred in the Upper
House, as regards life members, I will call the attention of the House to the
following facts :—At the call of the House, in February,
1856, forty-two life members responded ; two years afterwards, in 1858, only
thirty- five answered to their names ; in 1862 there
were only twenty-five life members left, and in 1864, but twenty-one. Â
(Hear, hear.) This shows how speedily changes take place in the life
membership. Â But remarkable as this change has been, it is not so great as
that in regard to the elected members. Though the elective principle
only came into force in 1856, and although only twelve men were
elected that year, and twelve more every two years since, twenty-four
changes have already taken place by the decease of members, by the
acceptance of office, and by resignation. Â So it is quite clear that,
should there be on any question a difference of opinion between the Upper
and Lower
38 Houses, the government of the day being obliged to
have the confidence of the majority in the popular branch—would, for
the purpose of bringing the former into accord and sympathy with the latter,
fill up any vacancies that might occur, with men of the same political
feelings and sympathies with the Government, and consequently with
those of the majority in the popular branch ; and all the appointments of
the Administration would be made with the object of
maintaining the sympathy and harmony between the two houses. Â
(Hear, hear.) Â There is this additional advantage to be expected from
the limitation. To the Upper House is to be confided the protection of
sectional interests ; therefore is it that the three great divisions
are there equally represented, for the purpose of defending such interests
against the combinations of majorities in the Assembly. Â It will,
therefore, become the interest of each section to be represented by
its very best men, and the members of the Administration who belong to each
section will see that such men are chosen, in case of a
vacancy in their section. Â For the same reason each state of the American
Union sends its two best men to represent its interests in the Senate.
 (Hear, hear.) It is provided in the Constitution that in the first
selections for the Council, Â regard shall be had to those who now hold
similar positions in the different colonies. Â This, it appears to me,
is a wise provision. Â In all the provinces, except Prince Edward, Â there
are gentlemen who hold commissions for the Upper House for life. Â In
Canada, there are a number who hold under that commission ; but the
majority of them hold by a commission, not, perhaps, from a
monarchical point of view so honorable, because the Queen is the
fountain of honor,—but still, as holding their appointment from the
people, they may be considered as standing on a par with those who have Her
Majesty's commission. Â There can be no reason suggested why
those who have had experience in legislation, whether they hold their
positions by the election of the people or have received preferment
from the Crown—there is no valid reason why those men should be passed
over, and new men sought for to form the Legislative Council of the
Confederation. It is, therefore, provided that the selection shall be
made from those gentlemen who are now members of the upper branch of the
Legislature in each of the colonies, for seats
in the Legislative Council of the General Legislature. Â The
arrangement in this respect is somewhat similar to that by which
Representative Peers are chosen from the Peers of Scotland and
Ireland, to sit in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Â In like
manner, the members of the Legislative Council of the proposed Confederation
will be first selected from the existing Legislative Councils of the
various provinces. Â In the formation of the House of Commons, the
principle of representation by population has been provided for in a manner
equally ingenious and simple. Â The introduction of this principle
presented at first the apparent difficulty of a constantly increasing body
until, with the increasing population, it would become inconveniently
and expensively large.  But by adopting the representation of Lower Canada as a fixed
standard —as the pivot on
which the whole would turn—that province being the best suited for the
purpose, on account of the comparatively permanent character of
its population, and from its having neither the largest nor least
number of inhabitants—we have been enabled to overcome the difficulty I have
mentioned. Â We have introduced the system of representation by
population without the danger of an inconvenient increase in the
number of representatives on the recurrence of each decennial period. Â The
whole thing is worked by a simple rule of three. Â For instance, we
have in Upper Canada 1,400,000 of a population ; in Lower Canada 1,100,000.
Now, the proposition is simply this—if Lower Canada, with its
population of 1,100,000, has a right to 65 members, how many members
should Upper Canada have, with its larger population of 1,400,000? The same
rule applies to the other provinces—the proportion is always
observed and the principle of representation by population carried out,
while, at the same time, there will not be decennially an inconvenient
increase in the numbers of the Lower House. Â At the same time, there
is a constitutional provision that hereafter, if deemed advisable, the total
number of representatives may be increased from 194, the number fixed
in the first instance. Â In that case, if an increase is made, Lower
Canada is still to remain the pivot on which the whole calculation will
turn. Â If Lower Canada, instead of sixty- five, shall have
seventy members, then the calculation will be, if Lower Canada has
seventy members, with such a population,
39 how many shall Upper Canada have with a larger
population? Â I was in favor of a larger House than one hundred
and ninety-four, but was overruled. Â I was perhaps singular in the
opinion, but I thought it would be well to commence with a larger
representation in the lower branch. The arguments
against this were, that, in the first place, it would cause additional
expense ; in the next place, that in a new country like this, we could
not get a sufficient number of qualified men to be representatives. Â My
reply was that the number is rapidly increasing as we increase in
education and wealth ; that a larger field would be open to political ambition by
having a larger body of representatives ;
that by having numerous and smaller constituencies, more people
would be interested in the working of the union, and that
there would be a wider field for selection for leaders of governments and
leaders of parties. These are my individual sentiments,—which,
perhaps, I have no right to express here- but I was overruled, and we fixed
on the number of one hundred and ninety-four, which no one will say is
large or extensive, when it is considered that our present number in
Canada alone is one hundred and thirty. Â The difference between one
hundred and thirty and one hundred and ninety-four is not great, considering
the large increase that will be made to our population when
Confederation is carried into effect. While the principle of representation
by population is adopted with respect to the popular branch
of the legislature, not a single member of the Conference, as I
stated before, not a single one of the representatives of the
government or of the opposition of any one of the Lower Provinces was in
favor of universal suffrage. Â Every one felt that in this respect the
principle of the British Constitution should be carried out, and
that classes and property should be represented as well as
numbers. Â Insuperable difficulties would have presented themselves if we
had attempted to settle now the qualification for the elective franchise. We have
different laws in each of the
colonies fixing the qualification of electors for their own local
legislatures ; and we therefore adopted a similar clause to that which
is contained in the Canada Union Act of 1841, viz., that all the laws which
affected the qualification of members and of voters,
which affected the appointment and conduct of returning offcers and the
proceedings at elections, as well as the trial of controvertedÂ
elections in the separate provinces, should obtain in the first
election to the Confederate Parliament, so that every man who has now
a vote in his own province should continue to have a vote in choosing a
representative to the first Federal Parliament. Â And it was left to
the Parliament of the Confederation, as one of their first duties, to
consider and to settle by an act of their own the qualification for the elective
franchise, which would apply to the whole
Confederation. Â In considering the question of the duration of
Parliament, we came to the conclusion to recommend a period of five years. I was in
favor of a longer period. Â I
thought that the duration of the local legislatures should not be shortened so as
to be less than four years, as at present, and that the General Parliament should
have as long a duration as
that of the United Kingdom. Â I was willing to have gone to the extent
of seven years ; but a term of five years was preferred, and we had the
example of the New Zealand carefully considered, not only locally, but
by the Imperial Parliament, and which gave the provinces of those islands
a general parliament with a duration of five years. Â But it was a
matter of little importance whether five years or seven years was
the term, the power of dissolution by the Crown having been reserved.
 I find, on looking at the duration of parliaments since the
accession of George III. to the Throne, that excluding the present
parliament, there have been seventeen parliaments, the average period of whose existence
has been about three years and a
half. Â That average is less than the average duration of the parliaments
in Canada since the union, so that it was not a matter of much
importance whether we fixed upon five or seven years as the period of
duration of our General Parliament. Â A good deal of misapprehension has
arisen from the accidental omission of some words from the 24th
resolution. Â It was thought that by it the local legislatures were to have
the power of arranging hereafter, and from time to time of readjusting
the different constituencies and settling the size and boundaries
of the various electoral districts. The meaning of the
resolution is simply this, that for the first General Parliament, the
arrangement of constituencies shall be made by the
existing local legislatures ; that in Canada, for instance, the present
Canadian Parliament shall arrange what are to be the constituencies of Upper Canada,
and to make such changes as may be
necessary in arranging
40 for the seventeen additional members given to it by
the Constitution ; and that it may also, if it sees fit, alter the
boundaries of the existing constituencies of Lower Canada. In short,
this Parliament shall settle what shall be the different constituencies
electing members to the first Federal Parliament. And so the other
provinces, the legislatures of which will fix the limits of their several
constituencies in the session in which they adopt the new
Constitution. Â Afterwards the local legislatures may alter their own
electoral limits as they please, for their own local
elections. Â But it would evidently be unproper to leave to the
Local Legislature the power to alter the constituencies sending
members to the General Legislature after the General Legislature shall have
been called into existence. Â Were this the case, a member of the
General Legislature might at any time find himself ousted from his seat
by an alteration of his constituency by the Local Legislature in his
section. Â No, after the General Parliament meets, in order that it
may have full control of its own legislation, and be assured of its
position, it must have the full power of arranging and re-arranging
the electoral limits of its constituencies as it pleases, such being one of
the powers essentially necessary to such a Legislature. (Hear,
hear.) Â I shall not detain the House by entering into a consideration
at any length of the different powers conferred upon the General
Parliament as contradistinguished from those reserved to the
local legislatures; but any honorable member on examining the list
of different subjects which are to be assigned to the General and
Local Legislatures respectively, will see that all the great questions which
affect the general interests of the Confederacy as a whole, are
confided to the Federal Parliament, while the local interests and
local laws of each section are preserved intact, and entrusted to the
care of the local bodies. Â As a matter of course, the General
Parliament must have the power of dealing with the public debt and property
of the Confederation. Â Of course, too, it must have the regulation of
trade and commerce, of customs and excise. Â The Federal Parliament must have the
sovereign power of raising money
from such sources and by such means as the representatives of the people
will allow. Â It will be seen that the local legislatures have the
control of all local works ; and it is a matter of great importance,
and one of the chief advantages of the Federal Union and of local
legislatures, that each province will have the power and means of
developing its own resources and aiding its own progress after its own
fashion and in its own way. Â Therefore all the local improvements, all local enterprizes
or undertakings of any kind, have been left
to the care and management of the local legislatures of each
province. (Cheers.) It is provided that all "lines of steam or
other ships, railways, canals and other works, connecting any two or
more of the provinces together or extending beyond the
limits of any province," shall belong to the General Government, and be
under the control of the General Legislature. Â In like
manner "lines of steamships between the Federated Provinces and other
countries, telegraph communication and the incorporation of
telegraph companies, and all such works as shall, although lying within any
province, be specially declared by the Acts authorizing them, to be
for the general advantage," shall belong to the General Government. Â For instance,
the Welland Canal, though lying
wholly within one section, and the St. Lawrence Canals in two only, may
be properly considered national works, and for the general benefit of
the whole Federation. Â Again, the census, the ascertaining
of our numbers and the extent of our resources, must, as a matter
of general interest, belong to the General Government. Â So also with
the defences of the country. Â One of the great advantages of Confederation
is, that we shall have a united, a concerted, and uniform system of
defence. (Hear.) We are at this moment with a different militia system
in each colony—in some of the colonies with an utter want of any system
of defence. Â We have a number of separate staff establishments,
without any arrangement between the colonies as to the means,
either of defence or ofienee. Â But, under the union, we will have one
system of defence and one system of militia organization. Â In the
event of the Lower Provinces being threatened, we can send the large militia
forces of Upper Canada to their rescue. Should we have to fight on our
lakes against a foreign foe, we will have the hardy seamen of the
Lower Provinces coming to our assistance and manning our vessels.
 (Hear, hear.)  We will have one system of defence and be one
people, acting together alike in peace and in war. Â (Cheers.) Â The
criminal
41 law too—the determination of what is a crime and what
is not and how crime shall be punished—is left to the General Government.  This
is a matter almost of necessity. It is of great
importance that we should have the same criminal law throughout these provinces—that
what is a crime in one part of British America,
should be a crime in every part—that there should be the same protection of life
and property as in another. It is one of the
defects in the United States system, that each separate state has or may
have a criminal code of its own,—that what may be a capital offence in
one state, may be a venial offence, punishable slightly, in another. Â
But under our Constitution we shall have one body of criminal law, based on
the criminal law of England, and operating
equally throughout
British America, so that
a British American, belonging to what
province he may, or going to any other
part of the Confederation, knows what his
rights are in that respect, and what his
punishment will be if an offender
against the
criminal laws of the land. Â I think this is one
of the most marked instances in which
we take
advantage of the experience derived
from our observations of the defects in the
Constitution of the neighboring Republic.
(Hear, hear.) Â The 33rd provision is of very
great importance to the future well-being of
these colonies. Â It commits to the General
Parliament the " rendering uniform all or
any of the laws relative to property and civil
rights in Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, and rendering uniform the procedure
of all or any of the courts in these
provinces." Â The great principles which
govern the laws of all the provinces, with
the single exception of Lower Canada, are
the same, although there may be a divergence
in details; and it is gratifying to find, on the
part of the Lower Provinces, a general desire to join together with Upper Canada in
this matter, and to procure, as soon as possible, an assimilation of the statutory
laws and
the procedure in the courts, of all these provinces. Â At present there is a good
deal of
diversity. Â In one of the colonies, for instance, they have no municipal system at
all.
In another, the municipal system is merely
permissive, and has not been adopted to any
extent. Â Although, therefore, a legislative
union was found to be almost impracticable,
it was understood, so far as we could influence
the future, that the first act of the Confederate Government should
be to procure an assimilation of the statutory law of all those
provinces, which has, as its root and foundation, the common law of England.
 But to
prevent local interests from being over-ridden,
the same section makes provision, that, while
power is given to the General Legislature to
deal with this subject, no change in this
respect should have the force and authority
of law in any province until sanctioned by
the Legislature of that province. Â (Hear,
hear.) Â The General Legislature is to have
power to establish a general Court of Appeal
for the Federated Provinces. Â Although the
Canadian Legislature
has always had the
power to establish a Court of Appeal, to
which appeals may be made from the
courts
of Upper and Lower Canada, we have never
availed ourselves of the power. Â Upper Canada has its own Court of Appeal, so has
Lower Canada. Â And this system will continue until a General Court of Appeal shall
be established by the General Legislature.
The Constitution does not provide that such
a court shall be established.
There are many
arguments for and against the establishment
of such a court. Â But it was thought wise
and expedient to put into the Constitution a
power to the General Legislature, that, if
after full consideration they think it advisable to establish a General Court of Appeal
from all the Superior Courts of all the provinces, they may do so. (Hear, hear.) Â
I
shall not go over the other powers that are
conferred on the General Parliament. Â Most
of them refer to matters of financial and
commercial interest, and I leave those subjects in other and better hands. Â Besides
all the powers that are specifically given in
the 37th and last item of this portion of the
Constitution, confers on the General Legislature the general mass of sovereign legislation,
the power to legislate on " all matters
of a general character, not specially and exclusively reserved for the local governments
and legislatures." Â This is precisely the
provision which is wanting in the Constitution of the United States. It is here that
we
find the weakness of the American systemthe point where the American Constitution
breaks down. (Hear, hear.) Â It is in itself a
wise and necessary provision. Â We thereby
strengthen the Central Parliament, and make
the Confederation one people and one government, instead of five peoples and five
governments, with merely a point of authority connecting us to a limited and insufficient
extent.
42
With respect to the
local governments, it is
provided that each shall be governed by a
chief executive officer, who shall be nominated by the General Government. Â As this
is
to be one united province, with the local
governments and legislatures subordinate to
the General Government and Legislature, it is
obvious that the chief executive officer in
each of the provinces must be subordinate
as well. Â The General Government assumes
towards the
local governments
precisely the
same position as the Imperial Government
holds with respect to each of the colonies
now ; so that as the Lieutenant Governor of
each of the different
provinces is now appointed directly by the Queen, and is directly responsible, and
reports directly to Her,
so will the executives of the local governments hereafter be subordinate to the Representative
of the Queen, and be responsible
and report to him. Â Objection has been taken that there is an infringement of the
Royal prerogative in giving the pardoning
power to the local governors, who are not
appointed directly by the Crown, but only
indirectly by the Chief Executive of the
Confederation, who is appointed by the
Crown. Â This provision was inserted in the
Constitution on account of the practical difficulty which must arise if the power
is
confined to the Governor General. Â For example, if a question arose about the discharge
of a prisoner convicted of a minor
offence, say in Newfoundland, who might be
in imminent danger of losing his life if he
remained in confinement, the exercise of the
pardoning power might come too late if it
were necessary to wait for the action of the
Governor General. Â It must be remembered
that the pardoning power not only extends
to capital cases, but to every case of conviction and sentence, no matter how trifling-
even to the case of a fine in the nature of a
sentence on a criminal conviction. It extends
to innumerable cases, where, if the responsibility for its exercise were thrown on
the
General Executive, it could not be so satisfactorily discharged, Â Of course there
must
be, in each province, a legal adviser of the
Executive, occupying the position of our
Attorney General, as there is in every state of
the American Union. Â This officer will be
an
officer of the Local Government ; but, if
the pardoning power is reserved for the
Chief Executive, there must,
in every case
where the exercise of the pardoning power is
sought, be a
direct communication and report
from the local law officer to the Governor
General. The
practical inconvenience of
this was felt to be so great, that it was
thought well to propose the arrangement we
did, without any desire to infringe upon the
prerogatives of the Crown, for our whole action shews that the Conference, in every
step
they took, were
actuated by a desire to guard
jealously these
prerogatives. Â (Hear, hear.)
It is a subject, however, of Imperial interest,
and if the Imperial Government and Imperial
Parliament are not convinced by the arguments we will be able to press upon them for
the continuation of that clause, then, of
course, as the over-ruling power, they may
set it aside. Â (Hear, hear.) Â There are numerous subjects which belong, of right,
both
to the Local and the General Parliaments.
In all these cases it is provided, in order
to prevent a conflict of authority, that
where there is concurrent jurisdiction in the
General and Local Parliaments, the same rule
should apply as now applies in cases where
there is concurrent jurisdiction in the Imperial and in the Provincial Parliaments,
and
that when the legislation of the one is adverse
to or contradictory of the legislation of the.
other, in all such cases the action of the
General Parliament must overrule, ex-necessitate, the action of the Local Legislature.
(Hear, hear.) Â We have introduced also all
those provisions which are necessary in order
to the full working out of the British Constitution in these provinces. Â We provide
that
there shall be no money votes, unless those
votes are introduced in the popular branch
of the Legislature on the authority of the
responsible advisers of the Crown—those
with whom the responsibility rests of equalizing revenue and expenditure—thnt ere
can be no expenditure or authorization of
expenditure by Address or in any other way
unless initiated by the Crown on the advice
of its responsible advisers. Â (Hear, hear.)
As regards the financial features of the
scheme, the arrangements made as to the
present liabilities of the several provinces,
and the future liabilities of the Confederation, on these and kindred matters, I have
no doubt that my honorable friends, the
Finance Minister and the President of the
Council, will speak at full length, and that
they will be able to show you that this branch
of the subject has received the fullest consideration. Â I feel I would be intruding
myself unnecessarily on the House if, with
my inferior knowledge of those subjects I
were to detain you by venturing to speak of
them, when I
know that they will be
so ably
43
and fully gone into
by my two honorable
friends. Â The last resolution of any importance is one which, although not affecting
the
substance of the Constitution, is of interest to
us all. Â It is that " Her Majesty the Queen
be solicited to determine the rank and name
of the federated provinces." Â I do not know
whether there will be any expression of
opinion in this House on this subjectwhether we are to be a vice-royalty, or whether
we are still to retain our name and rank as a
province. Â But I have no doubt Her Majesty
will give the matter Her gracious consideration, that She will give us a name satisfactory
to us all, and that the rank She will confer
upon us will be a rank worthy of our position,
of our resources, and of our future. (Cheers.)
Let me again, before I sit down, impress
upon
this House the necessity of meeting this
question in a spirit of compromise, with
a
disposition to judge the matter as a whole,
to consider whether really it is for the benefit
and advantage of the country to form a Confederation of all the provinces ; and if
honorable gentlemen, whatever may have
been their preconceived ideas as to the
merits of the details of this measure, whatever
ma still be their opinions as to these details,
if they really believe that the scheme is one
by which the prosperity of the country will
be increased, and its future progress secured,
I ask them to yield their own views, and to
deal with the scheme according to its merits
as one great whole. Â (Hear, hear.) Â One
argument, but not a strong one, has been
used against
this Confederation, that it is an
advance towards independence. Â Some are
apprehensive that the very fact of our forming
this union will hasten the time when we shall
be severed from the mother country. I have
no apprehension of that kind. Â I believe it
will have the contrary effect. Â I believe that
as we grow stronger, that, as it is felt in
England we have become a people, able from
our union, our strength, our population, and
the development of our resources, to take
our position among the nations of the world,
she will be less willing to part with us than
she would be now, when we are broken up
into a number of insignificant colonies, subject to attack piece-meal without any
concerted action or common organization of
defence. Â I am strongly of opinion that
year by year, as we grow in population and
strength, England will more see the advantages of maintaining the alliance between
British North America and herself. Â
Does
any one imagine that,
when our population
instead of three and
a-half, will be seven
millions, as it will
be ere many years pass,
we would be one whit
more willing than now
to sever the
connection with England!
Would not those seven
millions be just as
anxious to maintain
their allegiance to the
Queen and their
connection with the
Mother Country, as we
are now? Â Will the
addition to our
numbers of the people of
the Lower Provinces, in any way lessen our
desire to continue our connection with the
Mother Country ? I
believe the people of
Canada East and West to be truly loyal.
But, if they can by possibility be exceeded
in loyalty, it is by
the inhabitants of the
Maritime Provinces.
 Loyalty with them is
an overruling passion. Â (Hear, hear.) Â In
all parts of the Lower Provinces there is a
rivalry between the opposing political parties
as to which shall most strongly express and
most effectively carry out the principle of
loyalty to Her Majesty, and to the British
Crown. Â (Hear, hear.) Â When this union
takes place, we will be at the outset no inconsiderable people. Â We find ourselves
with a
population approaching four millions of souls.
Such a population in Europe
would make a
second, or at least, a third rate power. Â And
with a rapidly increasing population—for I a
satisfied that under this union our population will increase in a still greater ratio
than
ever before—with increased credit—with a
higher position in the eyes
of Europe—with
the increased security we can offer to immigrants, who would naturally prefer to seek
a
new home in what is known to them as a
great country, than in any one little colony
or another—with all this I am satisfied that,
great as has been our increase in the last
twenty-five years since the union between
Upper and Lower
Canada, our future progress, during the next quarter of a century,
will be vastly greater. Â (Cheers.) Â And
when, by means of this rapid increase, we
become a nation of eight or nine millions of
inhabitants, our alliance will be worthy of
being sought by the great nations of the
earth. Â (Hear, hear.) Â I am proud to believe
that our desire for a permanent alliance will
be reciprocated in England. Â I know that
there is a party in England—but it is inconsiderable in numbers, though strong in
intellect and power—which speaks of the
desirability of getting rid of the colonies ; but
I believe such is not the feeling of the statesmen and the people
of England. Â I believe
44
it will never be the
deliberately expressed
determination of the Government of Great
Britain. Â (Hear, hear.) Â The colonies are
now in a transition state. Â Gradually a different colonial system is being developedand
it will become, year by year, less a case
of dependence on our part, and of overruling
protection on the part of the Mother Country, and more a case of a healthy and cordial
alliance. Â Instead of looking upon us as a
merely dependent colony, England will have
in us a friendly nation—a subordinate but
still a powerful people—to stand by her in
North America in peace or in war. (Cheers.)
The people of Australia will be such another
subordinate nation. Â And England will have
this advantage, if her colonies pragress
under the new colonial system, as I believe
they will, that, though at war with all the
rest of the world, she will be able to look to
the subordinate nations in alliance with her,
and owning allegiance to the same Sovreign,
who will assist in enabling her again to
meet the whole world in arms, as she has
done before. (Cheers.) And if, in the great
Napoleonic war, with every port in Eurcpe
closed against her commerce, she was yet
able to hold her own, how much more will
that be the case when she has a colonial empire rapidly increasing in power, in wealth,
in influence, and in position. (Hear, hear.)
It is true that we stand in danger, as we
have stood in danger again and again in
Canada, of being plunged into war and suffering all its dreadful consequences, as
the
result of causes over which we have no control, by reason of their connection. Â This,
however, did not intimidate us. Â At the
very mention of the prospect of a war some
time ago, how were the feelings of the people
aroused from one extremity of British America to the other, and preparations made
for
meeting its worst consequences. Â Although
the people of this country are fully aware
of the horrors of war—should a war arise,
unfortunately, between the United States
and England, and we all pray it never may
—they are still ready to encounter all perils
of that kind, for the sake of the connection
with England. Â There is not one adverse
voice, not one adverse opinion on that point.
We all feel the advantages we derive from
our connection with England. Â So long as
that alliance is maintained, we enjoy, under
her protection, the privileges of constitutional liberty according to the British
sys tem. Â We
will enjoy here that which is the
great test of
constitutional freedom—we will
have the rights of the minority respected
(Hear, hear.) Â In all countries the rights
of the majority take care of themselves, but
it is only in countries like England, enjoying constitutional liberty, and safe from
the
tyrany of a single despot or of an unbridled
democracy, that the rights of minorities are
regarded. Â So long, too, as we form a portion
of the British Empire, we shall have the example of her free institutions, of the
high
standard of the character of her statesmen
and public men, of the purity of her legislation, and the upright administration of
her laws. Â In this
younger country one
great advantage of our connection with
Great Britain will be, that, under her
auspices, inspired by her example, a portion
of her empire, our public men will be actuated by principles similar to those which
actuate the statesmen at home. Â These although not material, physical benefits, of
which you can make an arithmetical calculation, are of such overwhelming advantage
to our future interests and standing as a
nation, that to obtain them is well worthy
of any sacrifices we may be called upon to
make, and the people of this country are
ready to make them. (Cheers.) We should
feel, also, sincerely grateful to benificent
Providence that we have had the opportunity vouchsafed us of calmly considering this
great constitutional change, this peaceful
revolution—that we have not been hurried
into it, like the United States, by the exigencies of war—that we have not had a
violent revolutionary period forced on us, as
in other nations, by hostile action from without, or by domestic dissensions within.
Here
we are in peace and prosperity, under the
fostering government of Great Britain- a dependent people, with a government
having only a limited and delegated
authority, and yet allowed, without restriction, and without jealousy on the part
of
the Mother Country , to legislate
for ourselves, and peacefully and deliberately to
consider and determine the future of Canada and of British North America. Â It is
our happiness to know the expression of the
will of our Gracious Sovereign, through Her
Ministers, that we have her full sanction for
our deliberations, that Her only solicitude is
that we shall adopt a system which shall be
really for our advantage, and that She promises to sanction whatever conclusion after
full
deliberation we may arrive at as to the best
45
mode of securing the
well-being,—the present
and future prosperity of British America.(Cheers.) Â It is our privilege and happiness
to be in such a position, and we cannot be
too grateful for the blessings thus conferred
upon us. Â (Hear, hear.) Â I must apologize
for having detained you so long— for having
gone perhaps too much into tedious details
with reference to the questions bearing on
the Constitution now submitted to this
House. —(Cries of " no, no" and " go
on.")
—In conclusion, I would again implore the
House not to let this opportunity to pass.
It is an opportunity that may never recur.
At the risk of repeating myself, I would say,
it was only by a happy concurrence of circumstances, that we were enabled to bring
this great question to its present position.
If we do not take advantage of the time, if we
show ourselves unequal to the occasion, it
may never return, and we shall hereafter
bitterly and unavailingly regret having failed
to embrace the happy opportunity now
offered of founding a great nation under the
fostering care of Great Britain, and our
Sovereign Lady, Queen Victoria. Â (Loud
cheers, amidst which the honorable gentleman resumed
his seat).
The House, at eleven, P.M., adjourned.
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