Chapter 10: Internment in the United States and Canada

There are some parallels to the Australian experience among Japanese interned in the United States and Canada. In all three countries precedents were set during World War I when Germans were interned as enemy aliens.1 Also, at the outbreak of World War II, suspected German and Italian subversives were interned in the United States and Canada.2 Unlike Australia, there were large concentrations of Japanese in the United States and Canada, particularly on the west coast. On the entry of Japan into the war, these Japanese were relocated to inland areas. Following relocation, the US and Canadian governments interned them in special camps. Yet in many ways the experience of Japanese internees in each country differed. The policies and procedures of each government were shaped by different social, historical and political forces.

The Japanese community in the United States was many times larger than in Australia. In 1941 there were about 127,000 persons of Japanese origin on the mainland of the United States. Approximately 90 per cent of them resided in four western states California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona, most in California. Some 47,000 had been born in Japan (Issei) and 98 per cent of them had come to America prior to the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924. With few exceptions, they were not entitled to US citizenship.3 The remaining 80,000 were born in America, the children (Nisei) or grandchildren (Sansei) of immigrant Japanese. As they were born on American soil they held American citizenship.4

Initially well-accepted in the United States, the efficiency and willingness of Japanese migrant labour came to be resented by others and there was increasing opposition from organised labour.5 Many Japanese began to purchase their own farms and small businesses, thereby competing with the same people who had earlier praised them as ideal employees.6 The resultant hostility triggered anti-Japanese legislation to restrict their successes. Most significant was the Californian Alien Land Law of 1913, which prevented aliens who could not apply for citizenship owning land.7 This included all Asian aliens, but was particularly aimed at the Japanese, even though they only owned about 12,000 acres of the 27 million acres of farm land in California.8 Although the number of Japanese immigrants to the US was small, less than 3 per cent of total immigration to the US in 1907, their concentration in particular areas of the west coast gave a false impression of numbers. Although numbers in Hawaii were much greater, there was less concern about their arrival. Nevertheless, this did not prevent pay discrimination against the Japanese there.9

As families grew, the Japanese were able to purchase land in the names of their Nisei children. By 1930 half of all Japanese Americans were native-born. Many of those not able to purchase land were very successful as tenant farmers. In 1920 a new Alien Land Law was passed in California to prevent these devices from being used. In 1923 the Supreme Court upheld this law, and similar laws were passed in Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming.10 Despite continuing attempts to restrict their success, by 1940 a majority of Japanese males in California were farmers.11

As well as their notable successes as farmers, Japanese very quickly established themselves as entrepreneurs in a number of fields. For example, by 1919 half the hotels and one-quarter of the grocery stores in Seattle were owned by Japanese.12 They also were successful at gardening, produce distribution and running laundries and lunch counters.13 By 1941 the Japanese American community had existed for half a century and had a well-established social structure. By this time the Nisei had entered the mainstream of the community.14

On the outbreak of war with Japan on 7 December 1941, the US government declared enemy aliens of Japanese origin subject to internment and restriction. Initial arrests were based on previously compiled lists of those suspected of subversive activities. Within a few hours of the Pearl Harbor attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began to round up all suspects.15 By 16 February, 2,192 Japanese aliens had been arrested on the mainland.16 They were first detained in local gaols and detention centres for migrants, and later transferred to internment camps in various states such as Wisconsin, Tennessee, Louisiana, Montana, Texas and New Mexico.17 In Hawaii, 164 arrests were made on the outbreak of the war. Later, about 1,000 were interned in the detention centre on Sand Island in Honolulu Bay. About 700 of these were later transferred to internment camps on the mainland.18

Various other precautionary measures were taken. Travel was restricted, possession of certain items such as short-wave radios was prohibited, and plans were made for possible exclusion from military zones. The Treasury Department froze assets and credits, and some businesses operated by enemy aliens were closed.19 Although these measures were supposed to be imposed only on Japanese classified as enemy aliens, neither official nor unofficial classification differentiated aliens from citizens. Extensive economic and social boycotts developed against the entire Japanese community.20

There was a lot of debate within the government about what to do with the “Japanese”. Some proposed removing all of them from the west coast, while others wanted to remove only the disloyal, interning them if necessary. There was considerable public support for evacuation of all Japanese from the west coast.21 During January and February 1942, the Attorney General announced the establishment of zones where enemy aliens were prohibited. These included airports, harbours and other strategic installations along the west coast. Travel for aliens was further restricted within coastal areas.22 On 19 February 1942 President Roosvelt issued Executive Order 9066.23 It stated:

the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate … to prescribe military areas … from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any persons to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restriction the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.24

On 20 February the Secretary of War delegated General De Witt to carry out the order. He did so immediately and announced that all enemy aliens of Japanese, German and Italian descent would be excluded from restricted areas. In fact, only Japanese, including those who held American citizenship, were compelled to leave.25 The initial evacuation, in Thomas and Nishimoto’s words, “had not been intended to limit the free movement of evacuees in any way”.26 However, public reaction to the arrival of Japanese Americans in areas outside the military zones was such that on 27 March De Witt announced the end of voluntary evacuation and the establishment of detention centres designed to last for the duration of the war.27 By 8 August 1942, 109,650 Japanese had been evacuated from restricted areas.28 Some were able to leave homes and property in the care of trusted friends. However, because of limited time and the lack of provision for securing assets, many were forced to sell businesses, homes and property at great loss.29

Ironically no such mass evacuation was imposed upon the 158,000 Japanese Americans who made up 37 per cent of Hawaii’s population.30 They too had suffered from the Pearl Harbor attack. The 327 civilian casualties included 30 Japanese.31 The US government first intended to intern all the Japanese in Hawaii. However, military officers there did not consider mass evacuation appropriate as they realised the forces could not function properly without the Japanese, who made up a large part of the naval and military labour force. Japanese in Hawaii remained at liberty and at work during the war.32

In the US the authorities referred to the relocated Japanese as “evacuees” and the camps which held them as “relocation centres” or “relocation projects”.33 However, these centres were internment camps, fenced with barbed wire and guarded by watch towers and armed soldiers.34 The evacuees were first moved to assembly centres and then to relocation centres. Ten centres were established in desolate areas – Manzanar and Tule Lake in California, Poston and Gila River in Arizona, Rohwer and Jerome in Arkansas, Minidoka in Idaho, Heart Mountain in Wyoming, Granada in Colorado, and Topaz in Utah – with capacities ranging from 8,000 to 20,000.35 The internees were housed in barracks, with cooking and plumbing facilities in separate buildings.36

The War Relocation Authority (WRA) was responsible for the establishment and administration of the centres. According to a WRA policy statement, plans were made to assure evacuees “an equitable substitute for the life, work, and homes given up, and to facilitate participation in the productive life of America both during and after the war”.37 Centres were to be made self-supporting and governed by evacuees themselves. Among the evacuees were 30,000 primary school children and 7,000 high school students.38 They were given schooling by evacuee teachers. Content and methods of instructions had to be in line with recognised standards and were developed in close consultation with state educational authorities.39 The language of instruction had to be English, and Japanese language schools were not permitted to operate in any camp.40 Over 4,000 students were allowed to leave the centres to study at some 534 institutions of higher learning.41 These students were among the first evacuees the WRA gave special permission to leave the centres under a resettlement program.42

While evacuees were still arriving at the centres, the WRA was faced with the fact that “American citizens were being detained in the relocation centres without due process of law and that this situation could not be defended”.43 It also admitted the relocation centres created by the government were undesirable, describing them as a “fundamental negation of American democracy and incapable of ever becoming anything else”.44 Consequently, the WRA embarked on a program to resettle all willing evacuees outside the west coast exclusion area, with a view towards the “liquidation of the relocation projects.”45 In May 1942 the WRA also made it possible for evacuees to do seasonal work on sugar beet farms when labour shortages became acute in the agricultural areas of the west.46 According to Myer, by October almost 10,000 evacuees had been recruited for work on western farms.47 After October 1942 the WRA officially allowed some Nisei educated in the US to leave the centres to take jobs in ordinary American communities.48

The processes of clearing Japanese for such exceptions involved extensive bureaucracy and FBI checks. To decide who would be allowed access to areas outside centres, the WRA needed to establish criteria for determining loyalty or disloyalty. By this time there was increasing pressure from evacuees themselves for the authorities to allow enlistment of Japanese Americans in the armed services. Questionnaires were devised to determine the loyalty of those who wished to serve. Nisei were exempted from the draft, and on 17 June 1942 the War Department declared them unacceptable for service in the armed forces “except as may be authorized in special cases”. On 14 September a special classification was provided indicating that Japanese Americans were not acceptable in the army. Many of the approximately 6,000 already serving were dismissed.49 However, from early 1942 the Army Intelligence Service had begun recruiting Nisei for training in the Japanese language with the intention of assigning them to military units in the Pacific area to serve as scouts and interpreters.50 During September and October 1942, recruiting officers went to all WRA centres to enlist volunteers from among the male citizens who already had a good working knowledge of the Japanese language. By the end of 1942 army intelligence authorities had recruited 167 American citizens for language training.51

As pressure from among evacuees and their supporters increased, it was decided that it would be advisable to allow Nisei to volunteer for combat service. On 28 January 1943 the Secretary of War announced plans to recruit volunteers from both the mainland and Hawaii.52 Two battalions, the 100th and the 442nd, were formed and later sent to Italy where they served at the front.53 Many of these Nisei were killed or wounded.54 By the end of the war more than 21,000 Nisei were taken into the US armed forces, although they were barred from enlisting in the Navy and Marines. Six thousand served as Army military intelligence specialists in the Pacific.55 The 100th Battalion received a Presidential Citation for “outstanding performance of duty in action … in Italy”.56 This recognition possibly influenced the government to relax treatment of Japanese Americans towards the end of the war. After the war, in an address to the 442 Regimental Combat Team, President Truman said:

You fought for the free nations of the world along with the rest of us … You fought not only the enemy, but you fought prejudice and you have won. Keep up that fight, and we will continue to win – to make this great republic stand for just what the Constitution says it stands for: the welfare of all people all of the time.57

Versions of the questionnaires used for military service were eventually applied to determine the loyalty of those not eligible for military service. In early February 1943 the government required all evacuees over 17 to fill out the questionnaires – one for male citizens of Japanese origin and another for female citizens and Issei males and females.58 The questionnaires closely examined such factors as foreign travel, relatives in Japan and membership of clubs. Most importantly, male citizens were required to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and to forswear any allegiance to the Japanese emperor. Those determined as having continuing ties with the Japanese Empire were classified as “disloyal”.59 Twenty-eight per cent of American citizen males and 18 per cent of females refused to swear or forswear as required.60 According to Thomas and Nishimoto, refusal to affirm loyalty did not necessarily mean that internees were disloyal. Often they were motivated by other factors, such as fear of being once more “relocated” to areas outside camps which might be hostile to Japanese.61 By early October 1943, 15,000 classified as “disloyal”, including families, were segregated from the “loyal” and concentrated at the Tule Lake Centre for the duration of the war.62 When Nisei were allowed to renounce their US citizenship in July 1944, approximately 5,700 took the opportunity. Ninety-five per cent of these were from Tule Lake.63

The progress of the war and the public relations value of the service record of Japanese Americans eventually allowed authorities to consider revocation of the exclusion orders. The Director of the WRA, Dillon Myer, wrote to the Secretary of War on 8 June 1943: “it is difficult to see why a wholesale evacuation for all persons of Japanese descent was ever necessary. If the dangerous and potentially dangerous individuals may be so readily determined as your letter implies, it should have been possible to evacuate only the dangerous from the Pacific Coast area.”64 After appeals from the WRA, in December 1944 the Department of the Army decided that Japanese Americans could return to their homes on the Pacific Coast from 2 January 1945.65 At that time approximately 75,000 evacuees were left in the centres.66 The WRA announced that all the relocation centres except Tule Lake were to be closed by the end of 1945. On 30 April 1945 the WRA estimated that by June the centres would be left with 44,000 relocatable evacuees. By 4 September the 1945 relocation order and restrictions were removed. On 1 December the relocation centres were closed, and on 20 March 1946 Tule Lake was closed.67

In some areas there was still considerable local opposition to the return of evacuees, including some violent attacks on property and personal threats. Despite these and other problems, such as housing and transport, by the time the relocation centres were closed, 109,300 people had returned to life outside the camps.68 According to Myer, the WRA carried out its responsibilities under Executive Order 9102 assuming that “all evacuees of Japanese ancestry, except for those who request repatriation and those who may be deported for illegal activities, will continue to live in the United States after the close of the war”.69 Immediately after the war approximately 8,000 Japanese were sent back to Japan from the United States, including those who had renounced their US citizenship and those who wished to be repatriated.70

At the end of 1945 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the relocation of Japanese who were American citizens. In 1948 approximately 20,000 of the 120,000 Japanese Americans who had been relocated were given compensation for property loss. It took the next 40 years for Japanese Americans to obtain further compensation from the US government. In 1952 the JACL helped win a repeal of California’s alien land laws,71 and the US ended its policy of total exclusion of Asians from immigration and naturalisation. Some 40,000 Japanese were admitted to the United States in the 8 years after 1952 and many of them became citizens.72 Thousands of long-term resident Issei also became naturalised.73 Daniels wrote:

The year 1952 thus marks the end of an era for the Japanese Americans. Just ten years after the evacuation the last legal discrimination against Americans of Japanese ancestry disappeared. This victory, whatever its price, was surely the last and most significant decoration won by the men of the 442nd.74

During the civil rights movement of the 1960s, Japanese Americans began to speak about their experiences. They were led by the Sansei generation who identified the wartime treatment of their parents and grandparents as a central issue of racial discrimination. Sansei activists formed various groups seeking redress. These groups combined in 1980 to form the National Coalition for Redress and Reparation (NCRR).75 Prior to this, the JACL, a more established and conservative Nisei organisation, had also made a commitment to obtaining redress. By July 1978 they had determined to push for reparation payments of $25,000 per person.76

In 1980, Sansei attorneys began investigating possible constitutional transgressions during the wartime experiences of Japanese Americans. With the aid of more than 100 volunteer lawyers, they forced the reopening of three cases on which the Supreme Court had ruled in 1943 and 1944.77 One of these was the Korematsu case, where a conviction for resisting internment had been upheld. In a 1980 hearing, the US district court in San Francisco overturned the conviction. The ruling declared that “our institutions must protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused”.78

In response, in 1980 the US government decided to establish a commission to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive Order 9066.79 In February 1983 the commission concluded that:

Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, that “grave injustice” had been done to those evacuated, and that the broad historical causes behind the order were “race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership”.80

The commission recommended $20,000 compensation for each victim. In August 1988 the Civil Liberties Bill was enacted as law. It stated that the US congress was to make a public apology for the infringement of basic civil and constitutional rights of Japanese Americans. It also stated that compensation of $20,000 was to be given to victims who were alive on 10 August 1988, the day when the law was instituted.81 If a recipient died after that date, his or her family was to receive the compensation.

According to Okabe, approximately half the Japanese Americans who had been interned during the war had died by 10 August 1988. Virtually all who had been relocated and interned, including citizens and enemy aliens who had been permanent residents, were entitled to this compensation. Those deported to Japan after the war and who had renounced their US citizenship were also included. Only those who had returned to Japan on prisoner exchanges were excluded.82 However, approximately 80 white wives of Japanese who had been in relocation camps were not entitled to receive any compensation as they were not of Japanese origin. Significantly, victims were not required to place claims because the law required the government to locate them.83

The process was to be completed in November 1992. On 9 October 1990 the first payments were made.84 All those compensated received a letter dated October 1990 and signed by President Bush. It read:

A monetary sum and words alone cannot restore lost years or erase painful memories; neither can they fully convey our Nation’s resolve to rectify injustice and to uphold the rights of individuals. We can never fully right the wrongs of the past. But we can take a clear stand for justice and recognize that serious injustices were done to Japanese Americans during World War II.

In enacting a law calling for restitution and offering a sincere apology, your fellow Americans have, in a very real sense, renewed their traditional commitment to the ideals of freedom, equality and justice. You and your family have our best wishes for the future.85

In 1941 there were 23,149 people of Japanese origin in Canada, 95 per cent of whom lived on the west coast in British Columbia. Sixty per cent of all Japanese Canadians were Nisei and Sansei Canadian citizens by birth. About 38 per cent of the remaining Issei were naturalised.86 As in the United States, the Japanese community was well-established with a wide range of voluntary associations to serve the various needs of the immigrant community. These included the Issei-controlled Canadian Japanese Association (CJA) and the Japanese Canadian Citizens League (JCCL) established by the Nisei.87

As the 1930s closed, suspicions about Japanese foreign policy and actions in Manchuria and China caused a hardening in public and political attitudes to the Japanese Canadians.88 When Canada entered the European war many Nisei offered to enlist, but none were allowed to do so.89 By this time the Canadian government thought the risk of war with Japan was serious enough to consider registration of all Canadian Japanese. This process was commenced in March 1941 and was completed 3 months before Pearl Harbor.90 All Japanese Canadians over the age of 16, both aliens and citizens, had to be registered. German and Italian counterparts were not obliged to register.91

On the day of the Pearl Harbor attack, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) immediately arrested 38 Japanese suspected as subversives. They included judo instructors, veterans of the Imperial Japanese Army and minor officials of local Japanese associations.92 All were interned in the POW camp at Kananaskis near Banff, where they were housed with German POWs.93

At the outbreak of war the government confiscated some 1,200 fishing boats owned or operated by naturalised citizens or Nisei. Except for the Nisei newspaper, The New Canadian, Japanese newspapers and schools were closed.94 The government required Japanese nationals to register as enemy aliens and to sign an agreement to be of good behaviour. They were also required to obtain permission for travel. But on 16 December new regulations required everyone of Japanese origin, Canadian citizens or not, to register.95

The Canadian and US governments had agreed to follow parallel policies with respect to their Japanese minorities. According to Sunahara, “The agreement did not require them to consult each other when deciding policy, but only to keep each other informed of policy changes in order to bring about ‘a practical coincidence of policy.’”96 As in the US, within the Canadian government itself the Japanese problem caused some disagreement. In British Columbia anti-Japanese sentiment was strong. Public reaction to the supposed activities of Japanese fifth columnists was high. British Columbian politicians wanted to take drastic action, while some senior Canadian police and military officers were more favourably disposed towards the Japanese.97 The differences between the two groups surfaced at a conference held in Ottawa on 8–9 January 1942. It was chaired by Ian Mackenzie, an MP from British Columbia and “the main engineer of Japanese Canadian policy”.98 Delegates from British Columbia urged the internment of all Japanese nationals. Ian Mackenzie was instrumental in forming this proposal.99 It was opposed by representatives of the armed forces and the RCMP as they were convinced that the measures already undertaken were more than adequate.100 Using his influence in the federal cabinet, MacKenzie stressed the danger of anti-Japanese riots among the white population and the desirability of, in his words, “transfer without being necessarily interned”.101 This euphemism for relocation masked the strong opinions being expressed by the British Columbian delegation.

In January 1942 the federal cabinet decided to carry out partial evacuation. It announced that all male Japanese nationals between 18 and 45 were to be removed from the coast.102 A “protected area” was declared which encompassed all land up to 100 miles from the coast. Any enemy aliens could be excluded from this area.103 It was also decided to utilise some men on national projects. They were sent to road camps near the British Columbia–Alberta border.104 On 24 February 1942 the government passed order-in-council P.C. 1486 which classified all Japanese Canadians as enemy aliens and announced their compulsory removal from the Pacific Coast.105

On 4 March the British Columbia Security Commission (BCSC) was established to oversee this evacuation.106 It was empowered:

to require by order any person of the Japanese race, in any protected area in British Columbia, to remain at his place of residence or to leave his place of residence and to proceed to any place within or without the protected area at such time and in such manner as the Commission may prescribe in any such order, or to order the detention of any such person, and any such order may be enforced by any persons nominated by the Commission to do so.107

On 11 September 1942 this authority was applied to all Japanese living in other areas in Canada, except those married to white Canadians.108 By November 1942, 20,881 Japanese Canadians, 90.9 per cent of the Japanese Canadian population, had been uprooted from their homes and evacuated.109 Those who opposed evacuation were taken into custody and interned in POW camps at Petawawa and Angler in Ontario. During the war, 768 Japanese were interned in these camps.110

There were various relocation schemes, which seemed to imply an element of choice. However, according to Kitagawa, “the removal policy was governed by expediency alone”.111 The great majority of evacuees were sent to isolated detention camps in the interior of British Columbia. The authorities referred to the camps as “interior housing centres”, “relocation centres”, or “interior settlements”. Six camps were located in ghost towns: Greenwood, Kaslo, New Denver, Slocan City, Tashme and Sandon in British Columbia.112 Seventy-five per cent of the Japanese population had been residents of the Vancouver area and they were relocated directly from their homes. Evacuees from other areas in British Columbia were first brought to the Hastings Park Exhibition Grounds in Vancouver, which was used as a clearing centre. The male evacuees were sent from there to road or lumber camps. Two thousand were immediately sent to work on road construction projects.113 Families, however, remained in converted livestock buildings at Hastings Park while waiting for the camps to be prepared.114

Unlike in the US, the detention camps were not fenced with barbed-wire and there were no watchtowers. Each camp was guarded by a detachment of the RCMP which controlled inward and outward traffic. No one was supposed to leave or enter without permits. Abandoned houses were repaired by evacuees for their own use.115 James claims that, compared to the American counterparts, evacuees in Canada were placed under “more severe conditions”.116 Many families were separated as male members were sent to work on the roads. Because of a shortage of labour on the sugar beet farms of the prairies, Japanese families were offered the chance to work there. To avoid separation, about 4,000 chose to travel east and work at harvesting the crop. They went to Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario where they were received with varying degrees of tolerance.117 Housing conditions, designed for itinerant single workers, were often primitive.118 Although sanitation and water supplies were frequently inadequate and the work was physically very demanding, in most areas the families stayed until the end of the war.119

As in the US, the BCSC formulated plans designed to provide evacuees with “a substitute for the life, work, and homes they had given up”.120 It was planned to create “self-supporting agricultural communities” and thus lessen the burden on government funds. However, this did not eventuate.121 The BCSC provided medical care, fuel, housing and education for children up to Grade 8, but, unlike the American evacuees, the Canadians paid for food, clothes and improvements in basic housing from their savings.122 There were about 5,500 Nisei elementary and secondary school children.123 High school students were left to fend for themselves through correspondence courses at their own expense.124 Nisei students hoping to study at university in Canada found it difficult to enrol as few universities would accept them. Records show that the University of Toronto, Queen’s and McGill University all delayed enrolment of Nisei students. By 1945 fewer than 100 evacuees were enrolled in universities or business colleges.125

Some families, approximately 1,400 people, who had the financial resources were able to relocate themselves in family units on a “self-supporting” basis. The BCSC did not offer this choice publicly. It was an option open to some because they were wealthy or had personal influence with the BCSC.126 According to Sunahara, they “avoided most of the restriction imposed on the rest and lived under minimal supervision.”127 One thousand three hundred others managed to secure special permits to leave the “protected area” for guaranteed employment or to go where relatives or friends would be responsible for them.128 Kitagawa argued:

The inconsistency of the government’s actions, and the apparent privileges accorded a few, led many Japanese Canadians to believe that the government’s policies were based, not upon the protection of Canada, but simply upon political expediency.129

According to Adachi, evacuation in Canada was carried out almost without serious incident, largely due to the cooperation of the Japanese.130 By the time the relocation program was complete, the Canadian government had already made plans to control and deal with relocated Japanese Canadians. They set out the following five policies: “Full employment, Self-Support, Maintenance of Family, Dispersion, Community Acceptance”.131 By the end of 1942 the BCSC decided to close road camps and reunite families.132 As the relocation program ended, in February 1943 the BCSC was closed and Japanese Canadians were placed under the administration of the Japanese Affairs Branch of the Department of Labour.133

Under this new administration, the Minister of Labour was given extensive powers. Order-in-council P.C. 946 empowered the minister “to require, by order, any person of the Japanese race in any place in Canada to proceed to any other place in Canada at such times and in such manner as he may prescribe” and “to determine from time to time the localities in which persons of the Japanese race may reside”.134 The introduction of a National Selective Service (NSS) plan meant unmarried Nisei and naturalised Issei could be required to work in eastern Canada to help ease the labour shortage.135 Japanese Canadians strongly resisted the NSS plan. They held meetings in the camps and sent petitions to government officials questioning the right of the government to deny the Japanese Canadians their rights as Canadians on the one hand, while demanding that they work for the greater good of the Canadian war effort on the other.136

In January 1943 the federal government agreed to the dispossession of Japanese Canadians.137 Order-in-council P.C. 469 gave the Custodian of Enemy Alien Property the power to sell all property and belongings of Japanese Canadians without the consent of the owners.138 By December 1942 most of the fishing boats confiscated at the outbreak of war had been sold.139 MacKenzie was determined to see farming land owned by Japanese made available to soldier-settlers. To that end, he proposed the dispersion of Japanese throughout Canada, and the prevention of their return to the west coast.140 In Sunahara’s words, “Pacific Coast politicians saw the sale of Japanese property as a means of discouraging the return of the uprooted Japanese after the war.”141 By 1947 Japanese land and property to the estimated value of $11.5 million had been disposed of.142

As the property sales progressed, those who received payment began to move to Montreal, Winnipeg and southern Ontario. They realised that there would be nothing to go back to on the west coast.143 Many who did not have capital also moved east seeking employment. By late 1944 the camps were largely inhabited only by those who saw no point in moving east. These included the elderly, young families, those too unwell to travel and those Japanese Canadians who showed support for Japan.144

Before Pearl Harbor, 30 Nisei, mostly from east of the Rockies, had enlisted in the Canadian Armed Forces.145 However, it was general policy during World War II that persons of Japanese origin would not be accepted for voluntary enlistment. Exceptions were made for special categories, such as interpreters. In January 1941 the government debated whether or not Canadian citizens of Japanese origin could claim the right to be given military training and to serve in the armed forces.146 In the same month the Cabinet War Committee reported, “Many Japanese Canadians have in fact expressed their desire to serve, and some have definitely stated that they are even prepared to fight against other Japanese in the unhappy event of war against Japan.”147 However, in the face of such opposition as was found in British Columbia, the federal government decided not to proceed.148 This policy remained unchanged until February 1945.149 While American Nisei were able to prove their patriotism and loyalty by their military service, Canadian Nisei were, in Adachi’s words, “denied the opportunity for combat and hence had no impressive evidence of loyalty which they could use to convince a confused and sceptical public”.150

Canada was the only country in the British Commonwealth with a large Japanese population. As the need for interpreters in the Pacific region grew, other Commonwealth countries approached the Canadian government requesting assistance.151 In March 1944 the first request came from Australian Military Intelligence, which required Japanese linguists.152 Later in 1944 the British also requested the assistance of Canadian interpreters. These requests lead the Canadian government to consider seriously the recruitment of Nisei. On 10 July 1944 the Minister of National Defence reported:

on purely military grounds it would be advantageous to enlist Canadian-born Japanese, more particularly those who can not only speak but also write Japanese … lending them for service in India and Australia.153

Thereafter, 119 Canadian Nisei were enlisted as linguists. Sixty-one of them finished training and served in South-East Asia, Australia, Japan, Washington and within Canada.154

There was controversy regarding the postwar treatment of Japanese. Strong pressure came from British Columbia for the mass deportation of Japanese Canadians, but others argued that discrimination based on race would be a denial of basic rights and favoured the deportation of Japanese aliens only.155 Those who urged a moderate policy were in the majority.156 The Canadian authorities were anxious to develop postwar policies on Japanese Canadians that were consistent with those in the United States.157 In August 1944 Prime Minister King announced a “reconstruction” policy of permanent postwar dispersal of the Japanese throughout the country. He also announced that the government was to examine the background, loyalties and attitudes of all Japanese Canadians. Those found to be disloyal were to be deported to Japan.158

Wartime controls and restrictions remained in effect until March 1949,159 probably because the government wanted to deport or “repatriate” as many Japanese Canadians as possible. Surveys were conducted asking all Japanese Canadians over 16 to signify their attitude to “repatriation” to Japan. By August 1945, 10,347 opted for repatriation to Japan – 6,844 adults and 3,503 children. Of the 6,844 adults, 2,933 were Japanese nationals, 1,461 were naturalised Canadians and 2,460 were Canadian born.160 Subsequently, many of those who had opted for repatriation realised that resettling in Canada would be a better option than life in a defeated Japan. By April 1946, 4,527 of the 6,844 adult repatriates had requested cancellation of their applications.161

Those intent on the immediate deportation of Japanese Canadians were forced to wait at the end of the war because conditions in Japan were such that the occupying forces’ administration requested the delay of any repatriations.162 A protracted legal battle developed over the right of the government to deport not only Japanese aliens, but also naturalised Canadians and Nisei.163 During the summer of 1946 five ships carrying 3,965 Japanese returned to Japan.164 By December 1946 the legal battle was decided in favour of deportation, but public opposition had increased to the stage where the government had lost interest in enforcing it.165 It compromised by dropping the deportation order and placing restrictions on Japanese Canadians for another 2 years to force resettlement.166

From 1947 the National Japanese Canadian Citizens’ Association (NJCCA) pursued claims for compensation to Japanese whose property had been sold at artificially low prices. After a protracted legal battle, in April 1950 the Canadian government paid $1,222,829 as property settlements.167 Legal discrimination against Asians in Canada had been eliminated by 1962, but it was not until October 1967 that the Canadian government abolished discrimination on the basis of colour in immigration law.168 Between the end of the war and 1966, 2,665 Japanese emigrated from Japan to Canada.169 Japanese immigration after 1967 remained modest.170

In the 1970s there were more moves for compensation. Increased awareness of civil rights among Sansei, influenced by their American counterparts, was an important factor. In 1980 the National Association of Japanese Canadians (NAJC) was established to replace the NJCCA, which was not active on this issue. On 21 November 1984 the NAJC released Democracy Betrayed: The Case for Redress, which documented the injustices suffered by Japanese Canadians during and after the war.171 The NAJC requested the Canadian government to admit it had a responsibility to compensate Japanese Canadians and to enter into negotiations. It also proposed “changes to the War Measures Act, under which everything that happened to Japanese Canadians was perfectly legal”.172 As pressure mounted in the US for redress, the Japanese Canadians were able to press their own case further. Because the Canadian government had almost totally excluded Japanese Canadians from serving in the armed forces there was no equivalent to the influential Japanese American veterans lobby. This further hindered the Japanese Canadian case and was another reason for depending on US initiatives.173 The signing of the Civil Liberties Act by President Reagan was used to pressure the Canadian government to settle the case for Japanese Canadians. According to Omatsu:

because we lacked clout, redress in Canada followed a completely different tack than in the United States … we remain a community without representation in the Canadian power elite … Out of necessity ours was a grassroots movement that piggy-backed on the success of our American cousins.174

On 22 September 1988 Prime Minister Mulroney apologised to the Japanese Canadian community for the injustices they suffered during and after World War II,175 and signed the Redress Agreement.176 Mulroney said:

The Redress Settlement included individual compensation of $21,000 to surviving Japanese Canadians directly affected by the injustices, a community fund to assist in rebuilding the community that was destroyed and the establishment of a Canadian Racial Relations Foundation to combat racism.177 While in the United States the payment of compensation was legislated for, the Canadian government arrived at an agreement with the NAJC as the representative of all Japanese Canadians.178

On 17 May 1990 a cheque for $21,000 was sent to each person to be compensated with a copy of the Certificate of Acknowledgement from Prime Minister Mulroney. It included the following:

The acknowledgement of these injustices serves notice to all Canadians that the excesses of the past are condemned and that the principles of justice and equality in Canada are reaffirmed.

Therefore, the Government of Canada, on behalf of all Canadians, does hereby:

  1. acknowledge that the treatment of Japanese Canadians during and after World War II was unjust and violated principles of human rights as they are understood today;
  2. pledge to ensure, to the full extent that its powers allow, that such events will not happen again and;
  3. recognize, with great respect, the fortitude and determination of Japanese Canadians who, despite great stress and hardship, retain their commitment and loyalty to Canada and contribute so richly to the development of the Canadian nation.179

The effects of wartime dispersal on the distribution of the Japanese population in North America were only temporary.180 By 1960 prewar patterns of settlement started to reassert themselves. In 1970 approximately four-fifths of the 600,000 Japanese Americans lived in Hawaii, California, Oregon and Washington.181 The Canadian policy of resettlement east of the Rocky Mountains affected the postwar distribution of Japanese Canadians more significantly. In 1971 approximately 42 per cent of 37,260 Japanese Canadians resided in Ontario, where only 1 per cent had lived in 1941. The percentage in British Columbia dropped from 95.5 per cent in 1941 to 36 per cent in 1971.182 Vancouver was the prewar centre of the Japanese Canadian community, but Toronto replaced it after the war. Toronto became the main centre of Japanese Canadian influence and activity.

Today both American and Canadian Japanese have secured their positions in society as a prosperous minority with higher than average levels of education and income.183 Most are urban dwellers. Although on the surface they appear to have recovered, many have found it hard to rationalise their experiences during the war. Adachi, in describing the Canadian experience, could be speaking for all North American Japanese:

It is impossible to assess the psychological effects of the evacuation on the Nisei … an indelible scar which is generally carefully concealed from the public eye, puzzling researchers and Sansei who find Nisei reluctant to talk of the past.184

Lorrie A. M. Okuma, a 33-year-old Yonsei (fourth generation) writer in California, wrote about her Sansei parents in 1984:

After they were released from the camp, they had no chance in American society … they had to accept lowly jobs … My father was a university student when the war broke out … He worked in a factory and my mother did house cleaning … They are now financially secure, but the scars they received from internment still hurt. They were deprived of their educational opportunities and because of that they value education for their children.185

As with some of their Australian counterparts, some Japanese Americans reject their Japanese ancestry. A Sansei congressman, Robert Matsui, interned as a 1-year- old, said, “I remember about age 14 sitting on the back porch with a friend. He said, ‘Gee I wish I weren’t Japanese.’ I said, ‘Yeah, me too.’”186

Before the war the Japanese communities in the United States and Canada were distinctly different to mainstream society with well-preserved cultural traditions and language. After the war Japanese in both countries generally tried to blend into mainstream society and to prove they were not very different from other citizens. Adachi claims that the Sansei generation is disgusted with the Nisei “for having forsaken their cultural and racial heritage in order to be accepted as Canadians; that is for disappearing into the fabric of the wider society”.187 Daniels goes further by suggesting that the American Nisei have become very conservative and show “an alignment with dominant middle-class institutions and an opposition to what is felt are disruptive elements within American society”.188 This position was perhaps epitomised by Senator Hayakawa, a Vancouver-born member of the US senate, who said:

Racially I stand in the middle. I’m not white, I’m not black. Perhaps being an Oriental … may provide me ameliatory channels that whites and blacks don’t have.189

In 1993 Mitsue Yamada, relocated as a child in the United States and active in the campaign for compensation, said that the success of Japanese Americans in their campaign for redress also had negative effects. It caused a revival of old hatreds relating to atrocities committed by the Japanese military against Americans during World War II.190 Because of the current trade difficulties between the United States and Japan,191 there are fears that a new wave of anti-Japanese sentiment may escalate to something approaching the intensity it reached during World War II. In 1993 Maryka Omatsu, a Canadian Japanese who was one of the negotiators of the final redress agreement, wrote in her book Bittersweet Passage:

Today I read that seventy-five per cent of Americans regard the Japanese as their country’s number one enemy. In San Francisco and Los Angeles, the Japanese American Citizens’ League offices have recently been vandalised. History is repeating itself. Buck-teeth-grinning wartime posters have been dusted off, warning that the yellow menace is invading America and winning. Daily the growing animosity to the land of the rising sun, and thus to me, fills me with fear and apprehension.192

It is not hard to imagine that Americans of Japanese descent before World War II experienced similar trepidations. The gradual escalation of racial vilification is a common prelude to the committing of racial atrocities. The revival of old hatreds is always a possibility, as can be seen with the recent193 Neo-Fascist attacks on immigrants in Germany and “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia – echoes of the Holocaust and the internecine conflicts of the former Yugoslavia.

Notes

  1. Luebke, F.C., Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I, Northern Illinois University Press, p. 256; Thompson, J.H., Ethnic Minorities during Two World Wars, The Canadian Historical Association, 1991, p. 7. ↩
  2. Girdner, A. & Loftis, A., The Great Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese Americans During World War II, London, The MacMillan Company, 1969, pp. 13–14; McLaughlin, K.M., The Germans in Canada, Ottawa Canadian Historical Society, 1985, p. 16, and Ramirez, B., The Italians in Canada, Ottawa, Canadian Historical Society, 1989, p. 19. ↩
  3. Thomas, D.S. & Nishimoto, R.S., The Spoilage: Japanese-American Evacuation and Resettlement during World War II, University of California Press, 1946, p. 2. ↩
  4. Ibid., pp. 1B2. ↩
  5. Hraba, J., American Ethnicity, Illinois, F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1979, p. 317. ↩
  6. Ibid., pp. 316–318. ↩
  7. Sowel, T., Ethnic America, New York, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1981, pp. 161–163. ↩
  8. Bahr, H., Chadwick, B., and Stauss, J., American Ethnicity, D.C. Heath and Company, 1979, p. 86. ↩
  9. Sowel, p. 165. ↩
  10. Bahr, Chadwick & Stauss, p. 86. ↩
  11. Sowel, p. 166. ↩
  12. Hraba, p. 322. ↩
  13. Sowell, p. 167. ↩
  14. Sowell, p. 171. ↩
  15. Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 5. ↩
  16. Ibid., p. 5. ↩
  17. Konno, T. and Fujisaki, Y., Iminshi, Vol III, Tokyo, Shinsensha, 1986, p. 297. Two prisoner exchanges took place between the US and Japan. Approximately 1,000, including consular officials, left on the first exchange in June 1942 and further 1,500 internees left in September 1943. ↩
  18. Konno and Fujisaki, p. 296. ↩
  19. Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 5. ↩
  20. Ibid., p. 6. ↩
  21. Hosokawa, B., Nisei: The Quiet Americans, New York, William Morrow and Company, 1969, pp. 259–260. ↩
  22. Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 7. ↩
  23. Ibid., p. 9. ↩
  24. Ibid. ↩
  25. Ibid. ↩
  26. Ibid., p. 26. ↩
  27. Ibid., p. 11. ↩
  28. Ibid., p. 13. ↩
  29. Utsumi, A., Koshida, A., Tanaka, H. and Tobita, Y., ed., Sengo Hoshoo [Postwar Compensation], Nashinokisha, Tokyo, 1992, p. 184. ↩
  30. Zich, A., “Home at last: Japanese Americans”, National Geographic, April 1986, p. 528. ↩
  31. Konno and Fujisaki, p. 295. ↩
  32. Adachi, p. 205. ↩
  33. Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 26. ↩
  34. Miki, R. and Kobayashi, C., Justice in Our Time: The Japanese Canadian Redress Settlement, Winnipeg, The National Association of Japanese Canadians, 1991, p. 51. ↩
  35. Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 27. ↩
  36. Myer, D.S., Uprooted Americans: The Japanese Americans and the War Relocation Authority during World War II, Tucson, The University of Arizona Press, 1971, pp. 31–32. ↩
  37. Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 33. ↩
  38. Myer, p. 48. ↩
  39. Ibid. ↩
  40. Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 37. ↩
  41. Adachi, p. 266. ↩
  42. Murakawa, Y., “Nikkei Amerikajin of Saiteijuu ni kansuru Kenkyu” [Study about resettlement of Japanese American], Kokusaikankei Kenkyujo Ho, Tsudajuku University, Vol. 13, 1983, p. 4. ↩
  43. Spicer, E. H., Hansen A.T., Luamala, K., & Opler, M.K., Impounded People: Japanese-Americans in the Relocation Centers, The University of Arizona Press, p. 6. ↩
  44. Ibid. ↩
  45. Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 53. ↩
  46. Kikuchi, p. 4. ↩
  47. Myer, p. 160. ↩
  48. Ibid., p. 46. ↩
  49. Ibid., p. 144. ↩
  50. Ibid., p. 145. ↩
  51. Ibid., p. 145. ↩
  52. Ibid., p. xxvii. ↩
  53. Ibid., p. 146. ↩
  54. Itoh, R., We Went to War: The Story of the Japanese Canadians who Served during the First and Second World Wars, Ontario, Canada’s Wings, 1984, p. 161. ↩
  55. Zich, p. 532. ↩
  56. Myer, p. 148. ↩
  57. Ibid., p. 149. ↩
  58. Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 57. ↩
  59. Ibid., p. 60. ↩
  60. Ibid., p. 63. ↩
  61. Ibid. ↩
  62. Myer, p. xxviii. ↩
  63. Konno and Fujisaki, p. 264. ↩
  64. Myer, p. 168. ↩
  65. Sunahara, p. 118. ↩
  66. Kikuchi, p. 4. ↩
  67. Konno and Fujisaki, pp. 307–309. ↩
  68. Myer, p. 224. ↩
  69. Ibid., p. 161. ↩
  70. Konno and Fujisaki, p. 264. ↩
  71. Zich, p. 533. ↩
  72. Daniels, R., Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, p. 170. ↩
  73. Ibid. ↩
  74. Ibid. ↩
  75. Okabe, K., Nikkei Amerikajin: Kyooseishuyoo kara Sengohoshoo e [Japanese Americans: From Internment to Postwar Compensation], Tokyo, Iwanami Booklet, No. 234, 1991, p. 35. ↩
  76. Utsumi, Koshida, Tanaka & Tobita, pp. 184–185. ↩
  77. Zich, p. 538. ↩
  78. Ibid. ↩
  79. Ibid. ↩
  80. Ibid. ↩
  81. Utsumi, Koshida, Tanaka & Tobita, p. 185. ↩
  82. Okabe, p. 51. ↩
  83. Ibid., pp. 49B52. ↩
  84. Japanese Citizens League, press release, San Franciso, 9 Oct. 1990. ↩
  85. Utsumi, Koshida, Tanaka and Tobita, Appendix, p. 44. ↩
  86. Sunahara, pp. 7–8. Also see Konno and Fujisaki, p. 378. ↩
  87. Adachi, p. 157–159. ↩
  88. Ibid., p. 187. ↩
  89. Ibid., p. 187. ↩
  90. Ibid., p. 192. ↩
  91. Ibid., pp. 191–192. ↩
  92. Sunahara, p. 28. ↩
  93. Konno and Fujisaki, p. 372. ↩
  94. Adachi, p. 200. ↩
  95. Ibid., p. 200. ↩
  96. Sunahara, p. 36. ↩
  97. Ibid., p. 32. ↩
  98. Ibid., p. 18. ↩
  99. Ibid., p. 18. ↩
  100. Kitagawa, M., ed. by Roy Miki, This is My Own: Letters to Wes & Other Writings on Japanese Canadians, 1941–1948, Vancouver, Talonbooks, 1985, pp. 56–57. ↩
  101. Sunahara, p. 35. ↩
  102. Adachi, p. 208. ↩
  103. Ibid., p. 209. ↩
  104. Konno and Fujisaki, p. 364. ↩
  105. Adachi, p. 215. ↩
  106. Ibid., p. 217. ↩
  107. Ibid. ↩
  108. Ibid., p. 224. ↩
  109. Konno and Fujisaki, p. 367. ↩
  110. Ibid., p. 371. ↩
  111. Kitagawa, p. 12. ↩
  112. Adachi, p. 251. ↩
  113. Ward, P., The Japanese in Canada, Canadian Historical Association, Ottawa, 1982, p. 14. ↩
  114. Kitagawa, p. 13. ↩
  115. Adachi, p. 257. ↩
  116. James, T., Exile Within: The Schooling of Japanese Americans 1942–1945, Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 167. ↩
  117. Adachi, pp. 280–284. ↩
  118. Ibid., p. 281. ↩
  119. Adachi, p. 283. ↩
  120. Ibid., p. 259. ↩
  121. Ibid., p. 259. ↩
  122. Miki and Kobayashi, p. 51. ↩
  123. Adachi, p. 263. ↩
  124. Ibid., p. 264. ↩
  125. Ibid., p. 255–266. ↩
  126. Kitagawa, p. 13. ↩
  127. Sunahara, p. 78. ↩
  128. Kitagawa, p. 14. ↩
  129. Ibid., p. 14. ↩
  130. Adachi, p. 225. ↩
  131. Konno and Fujisaki, pp. 370–371. ↩
  132. Ibid., p. 373. ↩
  133. Ibid., pp. 370–371. ↩
  134. Adachi, p. 261. ↩
  135. Ibid., p. 261. ↩
  136. Ibid., pp. 261–262. ↩
  137. Sunahara, p. 105. ↩
  138. Kitagawa, p. 62. ↩
  139. Konno and Fujisaki, p. 375. ↩
  140. Sunahara, p. 101. ↩
  141. Ibid., p. 104. ↩
  142. Ibid., p. 110. ↩
  143. Ibid., p. 111. ↩
  144. Ibid., p. 111. ↩
  145. Itoh, p. 156. ↩
  146. Itoh, p. 116. ↩
  147. Ibid. ↩
  148. Ibid., pp. 116–117. ↩
  149. Adachi, p. 295. ↩
  150. Ibid., p. 296. ↩
  151. Ibid., p. 293. ↩
  152. Itho, p. 164. ↩
  153. Itho, p. 169. ↩
  154. Ibid., p. 232. ↩
  155. Sunahara, p. 116. ↩
  156. Ibid. ↩
  157. Ibid., p. 115. ↩
  158. Adachi, p. 276. ↩
  159. Kitagawa, p. 54. ↩
  160. A 437/1, 46/6/55, 27 Oct. 1945. ↩
  161. Sunahara, p. 124. ↩
  162. Ibid., p. 125. ↩
  163. Ibid., p. 126. ↩
  164. Ibid., p. 143. ↩
  165. Ibid., p. 145. ↩
  166. Ibid., p. 145. ↩
  167. Sunahara, p. 159. ↩
  168. Adachi, p. 351. ↩
  169. Ibid., p. 352. ↩
  170. Ibid., p. 352. ↩
  171. Kitagawa, p. 62. ↩
  172. The Vancouver Sun, 20 May 1987. ↩
  173. Omatsu, M., Bittersweet Passage: Redress and the Japanese Canadian Experience, Toronto, Between The Lines, 1992, p. 150. ↩
  174. Omatsu, p. 146. ↩
  175. Miki and Kobayashi, p. 9. ↩
  176. Ibid., p. 11. ↩
  177. Ibid., pp. 19–20. ↩
  178. Utsumi, Koshida, Tanaka and Tobita, p. 186. ↩
  179. Miki and Kobayashi, p. 7. ↩
  180. Girdner and Loftis, p. 456. ↩
  181. Bahr, Chadwick and Stauss, p. 89. ↩
  182. Ward, p. 7. ↩
  183. Bahr, Chadwick and Stauss, p. 90; Ward, p. 17. ↩
  184. Adachi, p. 361. ↩
  185. In “Nikkeibeijin: Watashitachi wa kaku ikitekita” [American Japanese: We have survived this way], Bungei Shinjuu, No. 6, 1984, p. 201. ↩
  186. Zich, p. 537. ↩
  187. Adachi, p. 362. ↩
  188. Daniels, p. 171. ↩
  189. Adachi, p. 361. ↩
  190. Mitsue Yamada, 30 June 1993. ↩
  191. 191 This references the timing of the book’s first edition in 1996 ↩
  192. Omatsu, p. 180 ↩
  193. 193 This references the timing of the book’s first edition in 1996 ↩