512
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.
TUESDAY, February 28, 1865.
MR. DUNKIN , continuing his speech
from yesterday, said—Mr. SPEAKER, when
the kindness of the House permitted me to
resume my seat last evening, I was comparing
the constitutional system of the proposed
Confederacy with the Constitution of the United States primarily, and with that of
Great
Britain secondarily. I had gone over several
leading points of comparison ; and it will he
in the recollection of the House, no doubt,
513
that I had compared the composition of our
proposed House of Commons with that of
the House of Representatives of the United
States ; and I endeavored to shew, and I
think I had shewn, that we were departing
altogether from the principles upon which
the British House of Commons is constituted,
and taking up mal Ă propos, and unfortunately, the least inviting features of the
composition of the American House of
Representatives. It is proposed to adopt
here a plan which has a direct tendency to
place on the floor of our House of Commons
a number of provincial delegations, and not a
number of independent members of parliament. The tendency is therefore towards a
system antagonistic to, and inconsistent
with, those principles on which the British
Constitution reposes. With provincial
delegations, rather than members of parliament, on the floor of the Federal Legislature,
we are not likely to have that political
longevity, whether of men or parties, without which the British system of government
can hardly exist. Turning then to the
Legislative Council, and comparing its
constitution with that of the Senate of the
United States—the principles governing
the former are diametrically opposite to those
on which the latter is founded. The Senate
of the United States forms an excellent
federal check upon the House of Representatives, partly owing to the way in which
it
is constituted, and partly on account of the
powers given to it, and which are not proposed to be given to our Legislative Council.
All that can be said of it is, that it is proposed to be constituted upon almost the
worst principles that could have been adopted. It seems as if it were so constituted
for
the mere purpose of leading to a dead-lock.
The members of it are not to represent our
provinces at all, but are to be named by the
Federal power itself, for life, and in numbers
to constitute a pretty numerous body, but
without any of the peculiar functions wisely
assigned to the Senate of the United States.
In fact, the federal battle that must be
fought will have to be fought in the House
of Commons and in the Executive Council,
very much more than in the Legislative
Council. Turning then to the Executive
Council, I had shown that it is a necessary
consequence of the proposed system, that
we are to have not merely a House of Commons cut up into sections, but also an Executive
Council cut up in the same unfortunate way. You can get nothing else in the
nature of a real federal check. Your federal
problem will have to be worked out around
the table of the Executive Council. But
this principle, which must enter into the
formation of the Executive Council, is clearly inconsistent with the principle of
the
British Constitution, which holds the whole
Cabinet jointly responsible for every act of the
Government. In our present union of the
Canadas, we have latterly gone upon the
plan of having almost two ministries. The
plan urged upon our acceptance purposes
the experiment of six or more sections in
the Executive Council, instead of the two
that we have found one too many. Among
the difficulties that will grow out of that
plan is this, the absolute necessity of either
having an Executive Council that will be ridiculously too numerous, or else one that
will
represent the different provinces in sections
entirely too small. From this comparison
of these three leading features, I had passed
on to consider the relations of the Federal
Government with the several provinces,
comparing them with the relations subsisting between the United States Government
and the governments of the several states of
the American Union. The several states of
the neighboring republic commenced their
existence as states with all their constitutions constructed on the same general plan
as that of the United States, and in fact the
same republican principles underlie all their
governmental institutions, municipal, state
and federal. But it is here proposed, that
while we are to start with a system of general government, part British, part republican,
part neither, it is to be an open question, left to the decision of each separate
province, what kind of local constitution is
to be constructed for itself. Each province
must, of course, have an elective chamber,
but as to a second chamber, that is to be as
each local legislature may see fit. Some,
probably, will have it elective, while others
may dispense with it entirely. Then, looking
to the appointment of the lieutenant-governors, and the tenure by which they are to
hold office, it becomes about as clear as day that
you cannot carry on responsible government
in the provinces, but must have in them all
a system that is neither British nor republican, and that, I believe, will be found
to
be totally unworkable. Turning to the
assignment of powers to the Federal Government on the one hand, and the local or
provincial governments on the other, we
meet again with the unhappy contrast be
514
tween the wisdom displayed on that point
in the Constitution of the United States,
and the lack of wisdom in the arrangement
proposed for adoption here. There is, in
the United States' system, a clear and distinct line drawn between the functions of
the general and state governments. Some
may not like the idea of state sovereignty,
and many may wish that more power had
been given to the General Government. But
this much is plain, that it is not proposed to
allow anything approaching to state sovereignty here. We have not even an intelligible
statement as to what powers are to be
exercised by the general, and what by the
local legislatures and governments. Several
subjects are specifically given to both ; many
others are confusedly left in doubt between
them ; and there is the strange and anomalous
provision that not only can the General
Government disallow the acts of the provincial legislatures, and control and hamper
and
fetter provincial action in more ways than
one, but that wherever any federal legislation
contravenes or in any way clashes with provincial legislation, as to any matter at
all
common between them, such federal legislation shall override it, and take its place.
It is not too much to say that a continuance
of such a system for any length of time
without serious clashing is absolutely impossible. This is in effect so declared in
the
despatch of Her Majesty's Colonial Secretary,
and it is clearly pointed out in the London
Times and in the Edinburgh Review. It
seems as if our statesmen had sought to
multiply points of collision at every turn.
Then as to the non provision of a permanent
seat of government, and the arrangements
contemplated for the judiciary, we find still
more of the same sort of thing ; and as to
the extraordinary pains that seem to have been
taken to throw up a great wall or hedge round
those institutions of Lower Canada which
of late have been giving us no trouble to
speak of—as to the extraordinary pains, I say,
that seem to have been taken to put a wall
around those institutions, and to give every
possible guarantee about them on this side
and on that ; why, this very machinery, provided for the mere purpose of inducing
people
to agree to the scheme, who would not otherwise countenance it, is calculated, at
no very
distant day, to cause the cry to resound
throughout the land—"To your tents, O,
Israel !" (Hear, hear.) I had reached this
point of my argument, when I was compelled to throw myself on the indulgence of
the House. There is just one consideration
connected with these matters to which I
have been alluding, that I wish to revert to
in few words, because I believe it escaped
me, in part at least, last night. A marked
difference between the history of the United
States just before they framed their constitution, and our late history, is this :
the
adoption of the Constitution of the United
States followed immediately upon their successful war of independence. The men who
adopted it had just gone shoulder to
shoulder through the severest trial that
could have been given to their patience and
other higher qualities. Their entire communities had been, you may say, united as
one man, in the great struggle through
which they had passed, and were then
equally united in their hopes as to the
grand results which their new system was
to bring forth. They had tried the system
of mere confederation, and were agreed that
it was inadequate to meet the wants of their
situation. They were all trying to remove
the evils that they felt and apprehended
from it, and to build up a great nationality
that should endure in the future. That was
the position they occupied. Ours is some
thing very different indeed. We have
not gone through an ordeal such as
that through which they had so proudly
passed. On the contrary, we have ended,
temporarily ended at any rate, a series
of struggles it is true, but struggles of a
very different kind ; struggles that have
just pitted our public men one against
another, and to some extent, I am sorry to
say, even our faiths and races against each
other. (Hear, hear.) For one, I do believe
that these struggles—of the latter class I
mean—were dying out, but for these contemplated changes, which are threatening to
revive them. But, however that may be
struggles there have been amongst us, of
which we have no cause to be proud ; things
have occurred since the union of which we
ought to be ashamed, if we are not. (Hear,
hear.) Of this kind are the only struggles
that we have had ; and when, from such a
past and present, we are told to start with
the idea, so to speak, of at once creating
and developing the character of a new
and united nation, under institutions
giving us a something short of independence, and at the same time any quantity of
matters about which to dispute and come to
trouble, we may as well not shut our eyes to
the fact, that we start with but poor omens
515
of success. (Hear, hear.) But I have to
turn now, Mr. SPEAKER, to another branch
of my comparison—the financial ; and here,
I may at once give the House an assurance,
which I am sure it will be glad to have, that
I will not trouble it with more figures than
are absolutely necessary to my explanation of
the views I have to present, and that I will
not give a single figure as to which there
can be the possibility of a controversy. The
contrast between the financial system as a
whole, with which the framers of the United
States Constitution started, and the financial
system with which it is proposed we shall
start, is as salient as it is possible for the
human intellect to conceive ; and further the
contrast between this proposed financial system, and the financial system of England,
is
just as salient too. The framers of the United
States Constitution started with the principle,
that between the United States and the several
states there should be no financial dealings
at all. They were to have separate financial
systems, separate treasuries, separate debts
—all absolutely distinct. And ever since
the time when the unhappy attempt on the
part of Great Britain to tax the colonies was
given up, almost as absolute a line of demarcation between the Imperial finances and
treasury and the colonial finances and treasuries, has been maintained. We have had
our own separate finances and our own separate treasury, with which the Imperial
Government has had nothing to do. The
Imperial Government may have gone, and
may still go, to some expense on provincial
behalf ; but the British principle is, that
Imperial finance is as distinct from the provincial, as in the United States Federal
finance is from that of any state. Now, the system proposed here for our adoption
is not this
of entire and simple separation of the federal
from the provincial treasuries, but a system
of the most entire and complex confusion
between them. One has to think a good
deal upon the subject, and to study it pretty
closely to see precisely how the confusion
is going to operate ; but there it is, unmistakably, at every turn. I do not mean
to say
that under all the circumstances of the case
something of this sort was not unavoidable.
In the course of debate the other day, I
remember a remark was thrown across the
floor of the House upon this point and the
Hon. Minister of Finance in effect said :
" Yes, indeed, and it would have been a very
pleasant thing for gentlemen opposed to the
scheme, if it had thrown upon the provinces a
necessity of resorting to direct taxation."
Of course, in the mere view of making the
scheme palatable, it was clever to make
the Federal treasury pay for provincial
expenditure ; but the system that had need
be established should bear testimony, not to
cleverness, but to wisdom. Is the system
proposed for our acceptance as good, then, as
statesmen ought to and would have made it ?
I think not ; and the extraordinary thing is,
that it is brought out with a flourish of
trumpets, on the ground that in some undescribable way it is to work most economically
!
(Hear, hear.) Well, to test it, I will take it
up in three points of view—first, as to assets ;
next, as to debts and liabilities ; and, lastly,
as to revenues. As to the asset part of the
question, the tale is soon told. The assets
of these provinces, speaking generally, are of
very little commercial value. They are
much like the assets of an insolvent trader,
with lots of bad debts upon his books ; it is of
small consequence to whom or how they are
assigned. The general principle upon which
the scheme proceeds, is to give the Federal
Government the bulk of these assets. The
only exceptions of any consequence—I am
not going into the details of the scheme,
but still I must present to the House so
much of detail as to show that I am making
no rash statement, not borne out by facts—the
only important exceptions, I say, to this rule
are those I am about to notice. Certain properties such as penitentiaries, prisons,
lunatic asylums, and other public charitable institutions,
and other buildings and properties of the
kind, which, together with those I have just
mentioned, may be characterized as exceptional properties, are to be assigned by the
general to the provincial governments.
Also, with the exception of Newfoundland,
the several provinces are to take the public
lands, mines, minerals and royalties in each,
and all assets connected with them—in common parlance, their territorial revenues.
The General Government is, however, to
have the mines, minerals and public lands of
Newfoundland, paying for them of course.
(Hear, hear.) Then, Upper and Lower
Canada are severally to have those assets
which are connected with the debts, reserved
for payment by them respectively ; but these
will not be worth much, and I shall not take
the trouble of saying much about them. It
is enough to know that the proportion of the
debts to be assumed by the two has not yet,
for some reason, been stated, and that the
assets connected with them amount to very
516
little. Further, I am not quite sure that I
am right, but I understood the Hon. Attorney
General for Lower Canada, the other night,
to intimate that the seigniory of Sorel is to
be somehow a provincial asset of Lower
Canada. If that is not to be the case I will
pass on ; but if it is, perhaps the honorable
gentleman will say so.
MR. DUNKIN—Then, I am to take it
for granted, I suppose, that it is not to be a
provincial asset?
MR. DUNKIN—Well, Mr. SPEAKER, I
did suppose that I should have had an
immediate answer as to whether this seigniory is to be a provincial asset or not;
but
the hon. gentleman does not seem inclined
to give any information upon the point. By
these resolutions it is provided, that all
ordnance properties are to be taken by the
General Government ; and I never heard but
that the seigniory of Sorel is an ordnance
property. But from the statement made
here the other day, it would seem that
although this printed document purports to
be the scheme, it does not give us true information on this point. The wording of
the 55th resolution is, that the " property
transferred by the Imperial Government
and known as ordnance property " is to
belong to the General Government; if any
part of it is really a provincial asset, it must
become so by one of those explanations or
glosses which we are not allowed to insert
in the instrument now, but are to take our
chance of for some future time. (Hear, hear.)
Passing over the mystery that seems to
hang over the subject, I refer then to a matter about which there can be no mistake.
There certainly cannot be a doubt that the
lands, mines, and minerals of Newfoundland
are to be a Federal asset ; and there is not
any doubt either that the Federal Government will have to pay $150,000 a year for
them. It is perfectly certain that these
lands will cost that money; and it is perfectly certain, I think, that the administration
of them will also cost a certain amount of
trouble and dispute, as to the manner in
which it is to be carried on. But if human
nature remains human nature, we may reasonably and probably surmise that they will
not yield so great a revenue to the General
Government as is by some thought. We
shall have Newfoundland delegations in the
Commons House, and in the other House ;
and in order to keep them in anything like
good humor, and to enable the Lieutenant-
Governor of Newfoundland to carry on his
government with anything like ease and comfort, their lands, mines and minerals will
have to be administered, not with a view to
Federal revenue—even though to that end
they are costing the direct payment of
$150,000 a year— but with a view to Newfoundland popularity. In fact, I think it
will be found that the management of these
properties will be carried on more with a
view to the development and profit of
Newfoundland, than for an profit of the
people of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and
Upper and Lower Canada. Every man,
woman and child—from the Lieutenant-
Governor downwards—connected with Newfoundland, will regard it as a fit article of
political faith, that they must he worked
with a special view to the great future of
that great country. And the consequence
will be many little passages between the
province and the Federal Government, not
advantageous to the latter, but illustrative of
the way in which governments too often
have to deal with things for which they
have had to pay. Well, sir, I pass to the
matter of the debts ; and these, it must be
acknowledged are rather more important
than the assets. (Hear, hear.) There is
no mistake about that; though there might
seem to be a mistake about the resolutions
on this subject, were you to take their letter
only. The sixtieth resolution says that the
General Government shall assume all the
debts and liabilities of each province; while
the sixty-first has it, that part of our
Canadian debt is to be borne by Upper and
Lower Canada respectively. In a sense, I
will presently explain. I think the sixtieth
resolution about tells the truth, or rather, I
ought to say, falls short of it. But it
requires one to work the oracle out. to follow
the calculation through, in order to see
that it does so, that these debts will indeed
all—and more than all—fall, directly or
indirectly, on the Federal Government.
Meantime, on our way to that part of my
argument, I set it down that under the
sixty-first resolution there is an amount
of reserved debt which, in a certain manner, is to fall on Upper and Lower Canada
respectively. Pretty much as it was just
now in the ordnance property, so here,
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we cannot get an intelligible answer as to
what these reserved debts are, as against
either province, or what the assets are
that each is to take as an offset to them.
But, for the purpose of constituting the
stated debt of the future Confederation,
Upper and Lower Canada, we are told, are
to throw into it an amount of $62,500,000,
the surplus of their debt being nominally left
to he borne by themselves, after they shall
have become confederated ; Nova Scotia, on
the other hand, is to be allowed to increase
her debt to $8,000,000 ; and Newfoundland
and Prince Edward Island are to throw in
theirs at the nominal figure they stand at
now. But, by an ingenious contrivance,
the aggregate real debt of the country
is to be, in effect, a good deal more
than the aggregation of these figures would
give. Upper and Lower Canada, to begin
with, as we have seen, are, besides, separately
to pretend to bear the weight of their considerable excess of debt over the $62,500,000,
or $25 a head, allowed under this arrangement. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick,
should they not increase their debts to be
assumed up to this figure of $25 a head, are
to be paid interest at five percent on any
amount of shortcoming in that behalf they
may be guilty of. And Newfoundland and
Prince Edward Island are to be paid interest at the same rate, on the amount to
which their smaller debts fall short of this
same normal $25 allowance. For practical
purposes, therefore, the debts of the four
Lower Provinces are thus brought up to this
standard level. The Federal Government
is to pay interest on them to that tune—if
not to creditors of those provinces, then to
the provinces themselve. And we are to start
with a clear, practical debt of $25 a head
for every man, woman, and child in the
Confederacy. Incurred or not, we start with
it as due, and pay accordingly. And there
are besides, those amounts of debt left nominally to the charge of Upper Canada, as
to
which I shall have a word more to say shortly.
Meantime, I proceed to our third head—of
revenues. And here, the first and most
striking fact is, that the Federal Government
is to make yearly grants, payable, by the
way, semi-annually and in advance, to each
province, in proportion to its population as
shown by the census of l861, and at the rate
of 80 cents a head. And the way in which
this 80 cents a head apportionment is come at,
is in itself somewhat edifying. According
to the statements made here by Ministers,
the Finance Ministers of the several provinces were invited at the Conference to
come forward with a statement of their
respective wants. Of course their statements were to be framed with a due regard
to economy. Such things are always to be
done economically. This is a diplomatic
phrase, of which we understand here the
full meaning ; and I was not at all surprised
to hear, that however economically the
statements were made out, they had to be
cut down. Whether they are said to have
been cut down once or twice, or oftener, I
do not distinctly recollect. But last, after
having been duly cut down, they were found
to require this grant or subvention, at the
rate of 80 cents a head all round—subject
always to deduction as against the Canadas,
and to additions in favor of the four
Lower Provinces, as we shall presently
see. With less, the provinces could not
get on at the rate thought necessary, unless
by levying undesired taxes. Well, besides
these subventions, the provinces (all but
Newfoundland) are to have the proceeds of
their lands, mines and minerals ; and Newfoundland is to have, instead, the further
grant from the Federal treasury, of $150,000
a year, forever. They may all, further,
derive some more indirect revenue from
licenses of various sorts ; and Nova Scotia
may add to these an exceptional, and exceptionable, export duty on coal and other
minerals ; and New Brunswick, the like on
lumber. Besides which, on the mere ground
that she cannot do without it, New Brunswick is to have a further Federal grant of
$63,000 a year for ten years ; unless, indeed,
in the event of her not augmenting her debt
to the full amount, in which case, any payment
made to her of interest on that score is
to be deducted from the $63,000—a shrewd
hint, by the way, that she had not best be
too economical—and, lastly, all are to have
the precious right of direct taxation, and the
higher privilege of borrowing without limit.
The Federal power is to have, of course, the
right to tax in all sorts of ways, the special
export duties made over to New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia, alone excepted. Now,
Mr. SPEAKER, taking this whole arranagement together, I must repeat that I see
in it no principle but one. The provinces
are to be able to carry on their operations according to their supposed probable
future exigencies, without danger of direct,
that is to say, oppressive or new taxation.
Well, sir, engineers say that the mea
518
sure of strength of a fortified place is
the strength of its weakest part. And
this principle is here applied to our provinces
in a financial point of view. The need of
the neediest is made the measure of the aid
given to all. The most embarrassed is to
have enough for its purposes, and the rest are
to receive, if not exactly in the same ratio,
at least so nearly up to the mark as that they
shall all be satisfied; while, on the other
hand, the debts of all the provinces are to be,
for all practical ends, raised to the full level
of the most indebted. To show this, sir,
another word or two as to the amount of the
promised subventions to Upper and Lower
Canada. This is to be, as we have seen,
only the 80 cents a head, less some deduction,
I care not what, for the purpose of my present argument; but there is no doubt, I
say,
that they are to receive less than the 80 cents,
because the excess of their debt over $62,500,000, though thrown on them, will have
to
be guaranteed, and the interest on it will have
be paid by the Federal Government, and
that interest will be deducted by the Federal
Government from the subventions payable to
them respectively. The Lower Provinces, on
the other hand, as we have also seen, are
really to get more. Well now, suppose for the
moment the arrangement had been, for the
Confederation to assume at once the whole
debt of Canada, and accordingly to pay proportionably larger amounts of interest to
the
other provinces. The two Canadas would
then have needed, exactly, so much the less
of nominal subvention, and the other provinces too. The cost to the Federal treasury,
in the whole, would still have been exactly
what it is. Indirectly, therefore, I say that
for all practical purposes there is thrown upon
the General Government the whole amount of
the past debts of these provinces, and more;
and the whole burden, too, of the carrying on
of the machinery of government, both Federal
and Provincial; unless, indeed, any of the
provinces should see fit hereafter to undertake
what I may call extraordinary expenditure,
and to defray it themselves. I do not think
they will. It would involve direct taxation.
And I think they can do better. But for all
this part of the plan, sir, it is like the rest,
framed on the mere idea of making things
pleasant—the politician idea of anyhow winning over interests or parties for to-day—not
on any statesmanlike thought as to its future
working and effects. (Hear, hear.) Now,
Mr. SPEAKER, with this outline of the sys
tem, I should be glad to know where the
prospect of economy of administration is to be
found. The Honorable Finance Minister of
the future Federal Government will have to
do—what? To come with a budget, not
merely to cover the outlay of the Federal
Government—that is of course—but with a
budget to cover also all that I may call the
normal outlay, the intended outlay, the foreseen outlay of all the provinces. (Hear,
hear.) The Minister of Finance—if any
there is—of the province, unless he chooses
to outrun the constable; unless, with his lieutenant-governor and local government
and legislature, he chooses to spend more than he
can get out of the Federal Government, by
this system, or by that nice modification of it
which is pretty sure to be soon thought of,
and to which I shall by and by advert, need
have no budget at all. He knows he is to
have about so much from his lands, mines
and minerals, so much from licenses and
so forth, so much from the Federal Government, so many thousand or hundred
thousand dollars in all; and he will of course
make the best he can of that. And by the
way, it is a remarkable fact in this connection, that we find that with one accord
those
who are undertaking to speak to the different provinces in support of Confederation
are agreed in each telling the people of his
own province what a first-rate bargain has
been made for it. (Hear, hear.) My hon.
friend from Hochelaga read us an extract the
other night from a speech of Hon. Mr. TILLEY, of New Brunswick, in which that hon.
gentleman cyphered out, perfectly to his satisfaction, and to that of many who heard
him,
that New Brunswick is guaranteed an excess
over her real needs, of $34,000 a year. If I
am not mistaken, the Hon. Solicitor General for
Lower Canada undertook since, in this House,
to shew us that some $200,000 or more a-
year beyond hers, is in the same way secured
to Lower Canada; even though she does
not receive the full 80 cents a head. I
think I remember that the Hon. President of
the Council—though I have not yet got the
report of his speech to refresh my memory—
made it a point that really Upper Canada,
as well as Lower Canada, is comfortably off
in this respect. One hears too, I think, of
the same song in Nova Scotia; and in Prince
Edward Island certainly, we have the advocates of Confederation telling the people
there—" You, too, have got a capital bargain,
you have so much more to spend, according
519
to this arrangement, than you ever had before."
A strange comment on that earnest desire for
economy, which is claimed to have dictated
the whole of these arrangements. (Hear,
hear.) If that was the intention, the performance has fallen far short of it. (Hear,
hear.) And before I go further, there
occurs to me this consideration, arising out
of this state of things—out of this abundance, not to say plethora, that is meant
to
characterize the provincial exchequers, whatever may be the case with the Federal
exchequer under the system—one consideration, I say, connected with this, which should
not be lost sight of when we are talking about
the application of anything in the least like
responsible government to our provinces. I
never yet heard of an elected legislative body
that had much control over a government,
unless it had hold of the strings of a purse
from which the government wanted to get
something. In the old days, before responsible government was thought of—in the days
when casual and territorial revenues gave
provincial governments all they wanted, or a
little more—provincial legislatures had mighty
little to do with government, and, if they
complained of a grievance, were little likely
to be listened to. It was even the same long
before at home. When the English Crown
had its abundance of resources, English kings
cared little for their parliaments. But when
their resources were exhausted, and they could
not borrow easily, and had to ask for taxes,
then the House of Commons began to acquire
power, and, in course of time, became the
body it is now. I shall be surprised if we do
not find, in the event of this Confederation
taking place, that for some time our provincial legislatures, whether they consist
of
one chamber or of two, will be less powerful
for good than many would wish to have
them, that the machine of state will not be
altogether driven by their means. But there
is another result, about which there can
be no question. With one accord, not in
Newfoundland merely—I was hinting a little
while ago at what would be the case of
Newfoundland, as to its lands, mines and
minerals - not there only, but in all the provinces - the provincial governments
will, in
a quiet way, want money, and the provincial
legislators and people will want it yet more ;
grants for roads and bridges, for schools, for
charities, for salaries, for contingencies of the
legislative body—for all manner of ends they
will be wanting money, and where is it to
come from ? Whether the constitution of
the Provincial Executive savors at all of responsible government or not, be sure it
will
not be anxious to bring itself more under the
control of the legislature, or to make itself
more odious than it can help, and the easiest
way for it to get money will be from the General Government. I am not sure, either,
but
that most members of the provincial legislatures will like it that way the best. (Hear,
hear.) It will not be at all unpopular,
the getting of money so. Quite the contrary.
Gentlemen will go to their constituents with
an easy conscience, telling them : " True, we
had not much to do in the Provincial Legislature, and you need not ask very closely
what else we did ; but I tell you what, we
got the Federal Government to increase the
subvention to our province by five cents a
head, and see what this gives you—$500 to
that road—$1000 to that charity—so much
here, so much there. That we have done ;
and have we not done well ? " (Hear, hear.)
I am afraid in many constituencies the answer would be; " Yes, you have done well
;
go and do it again." I am afraid the provincial constituencies, legislatures and executives
will all show a most calf-like appetite for the
milking of this one most magnificient government cow.
Mr. DUNKIN—Yes, that is one of the
analogies, and there is another even nearer.
Years ago, we in Canada said we would for ever
give a certain fixed sum per annum for an education fund. It was to be divided, in
a certain ratio, between Upper and Lower Canada.
But from time to time, as the census shewed
changes of their relative population, the division was to be altered. In a little
while this
alteration of ratio gave Lower Canada less
money and Upper Canada more. " Oh! but,"
said the Administration, " we cannot do that
with Lower Canada. After having had distributed to her so many thousands a year, she
could
not stand having ever so much less. No, no ;
we cannot do that. What shall we do, then ?
In our estimates we will put in a vote for
Lower Canada, just to keep her figure up to
the mark of what she has been receiving.
And what then ? Why, of course, we must
add a vote for Upper Canada in the same proportion, just to take her so much further
beyond
her former figure. " (Hear, hear.) To be
sure, I do find, with reference to this subvention, a pleasant little expression,
which one
wishes may be carried out. It is to be " in
ull." " Such aid shall be
in full settlement
520
of all future demands upon the General Government for local purposes, and shall be
paid
half-yearly, in advance, to each province."
Yes, sir, so the text runs. But suppose ourselves in the time of our first, or second,
or
third Federal Cabinet, consisting of its six or
more sections, of course ; and, for the sake of
my argument, I will suppose a great deal,
that every one of these sections controls comfortably the delegations from its own
province
in the two Houses of Parliament, that the
machine is working beautifully, that there is
no lieutenant-governor crusty, no provincial administration kicking over the traces,
and no provincial legislature giving any
other trouble than by its anxiety to be well
paid. I will suppose even that this halcyon
state of things has gone on for some time.
But one or two or more of the provinces begin
to feel that they cannot do without having
more money. And the pressure will be such
upon the Provincial Legislature and upon the
Lieutenant-Governor, and upon the delegations
to the General Legislature, and upon the
section of the Federal Executive representing
each such province, that it never can be long
resisted ; there will be trouble if it is, and
things must be kept pleasant. (Hear, hear.)
One mode—the most obvious, though the
least scientific—will be just to increase the subvention from eighty to eighty-five,
or even to
eighty-two or eighty-one cents a head.
An additional cent a head from the Federal
Exchequer would be an object—a few cents
a head would be a boon. Or suppose the
demand took this form : suppose the people
—say of Upper or Lower Canada—should
say, " Those Newfoundlanders are getting
$150,000 a year for their lands, mines, and
minerals ; and the Federal Government is
positively administering those lands, mines,
and minerals, not for Federal profit, but more
for the advantage of that province than we
find we can administer our own ; the General
Government, therefore, must take our lands,
mines, and minerals, and give us also an
equivalent." That is one way of doing the
thing ; and, when the time comes for making
that sort of demand, depend upon it that it
will sound singularly reasonable in the ears of
the provinces whose representatives shall make
it ; and if two or three provinces shall join in
the demand, my word for it, the thing will
soon be done. The same sort of thing may be
looked for in reference to the New Brunswick
timber export duty and the Nova Scotia
mineral export duty. Here is one form of
the cry that may be raised—" You give these
exceptional privileges to New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia ; give them, or some equivalent, to us also." With common ingenuity
lots of such cries may be nicely got up. But
for everything so given, much or little, to whatever province, you will have to do
the like
for all the rest, and the figure will be alarming
before you get to the end. And even this is
not all. Not only will you have these comparatively direct demands—more or less ingeniously,
but always irresistibly—made, but
you will have demands made in a more indirect form which it will be yet easier to
carry,
from their consequences not being so clearly
seen, and which will therefore be still worse
in their effects. I speak of that tremendous
catalogue of outlays which may be gone into
without the appearance of a grant to any particular province—the costly favors which
may
be done in respect of inter-provincial ferries,
steamship lines between or from the provinces,
railways between or through the provinces,
telegraph lines, agriculture, immigration,
quarantine, fisheries, and so forth. There
will be claims of every description under all
these heads ; and besides them there will be
the long roll of internal improvements of all
kinds, whether for the benefit of one or of
more than one of the provinces. For any
local work in which it can be at all pretended
that it is of general interest, pressure may be
brought to bear upon the General Government
and Legislature, and whenever one province
succeeds in getting any such grant, every
other province must be dealt with in the same
way. Compensation must be made all round,
and no human intellect can estimate the
degree of extravagance that before long must
become simply inevitable. (Hear, hear.)
Sir, with our Upper and Lower Canada we
have had pretty good proof of this. We
know that whenever anything has had to be
done for one section of this province, it has
constantly been found necessary to do some
thing of the same or of some other kind for
the other. If either needed anything very
badly, then the ingenuity of the Minister of
Finance had to be exercised to discover something else of like value to give the other.
In
one word, unless I am more mistaken than I
think I can be, these local governments will
be pretty good daughters of the horse-leech,
and their cry will be found to be pretty often
and pretty successfully—" Give, give, give! "
But, sir, there is very little need for our dealing
with considerations of this kind as to a future
about which one may be thought to be in
danger of drawing more or less upon imagin
521
ation. We have in these resolutions a something that is to come upon us, one may say,
at once ; I allude to the expenditure for
our defences - the Intercolonial Railway - the
opening of communication with the North-
West - and the enlargement of our canals.
There is no doubt that all these new sources
of outlay are immediately contemplated.
Their cost is not given us; it could not be
given with any safety to the scheme. I do
not pretend to say, sir, but that some of these
expenditures are necessary ; and this I am
even prepared to say as to one of them —
the outlay for defences—that every province
of the empire is bound to do its full share
towards its own defence. (Hear, hear.) I
never gave a vote or expressed an opinion in
any other sense. I was always ready with
my vote for that purpose. (Hear, hear.)
But looking at the great outlay, I may say
the enormous outlay here understood to be
contemplated, I confess I cannot approach the
subject in this connection without a feeling of
misgiving. I can quite understand our going
to the full limit of our means for all the expense that is necessary for the thorough
maintenance of our militia on an efficient footing
as to instruction and otherwise ; but when we
hear of Imperial engineers, with Imperial
ideas as to cost, laying out grand permanent
works of defence, then I confess I am much
inclined to think that we had need try to
practice what economy we can in that direction. (Hear, hear.) Then, as regards the
Intercolonial Railway, we have in these resolutions a very blind tale indeed. " The
General Government shall secure, without delay,
the completion of the Intercolonial Railway
from Rivière du Loup, through New Brunswick, to Truro in Nova Scotia"— and this
quite irrespectively of the expense. The
vague pledge is, that the General Government
shall at any cost secure the immediate completion of this work. As to its commercial
or
military advantages, I have not a great idea of
them. I believe there has been much exaggeration as to both. Unless with a strong
force to
defend it, in a military point of view, it
would be of just no use at all. (Hear, hear.)
For my own part, as I have often said, I
heartily wish to see the road built ; but unless we can get it done upon terms within
our
means, we had better do without it a little
longer, and develop what other means of
communication are at our command. While
I want to see the thing done, I am not prepared for the declaration I find in these
resolutions, that,
coûte que coûte, we will at once
have it. I doubt the policy of that way of
dealing. (Hear, hear.) Viewed in its political aspects, the work is as much an Imperial
as a provincial work ; is one for which we
have a right to look for aid from the Empire.
I know it is said the Empire is going to aid
us. Well, for a long time we held this language : if the Imperial Government and the
Lower Provinces between them will combine
to do the rest, we are ready with lands and
subsidies, in a certain proportion and to a
certain limited amount. It is unfortunate,
in my opinion, that that proposal led to no
result. I should have been glad to have obtained it on such terms, and even would
have
bid up the limit to the utmost extent of our
means.
MR. DUNKIN—I know it is, but those
since made have left it out of sight. In 1862
the start was made to a larger and not limited
outlay—five-twelfths of an unstated whole—
Great Britain to reduce the cost by endorsing
for us to a stated figure. I regretted that
scheme ; but still it was better for us than
what is now being forced upon us. By this
last scheme, Canada will have to bear some
nine-twelfths—it has been said ten-twelfths—
but some nine-twelfths, at any rate. In fact,
the bulk of the burden is to fall on us; and
it is significant, though I dare say that the
honorable gentlemen who drew up this resolution did not mean it, that it seems to
let the
Imperial Government off from its guarantee.
This is no mere criticism of mine ; my attention was drawn to the point by the article
in
the
Edinburgh Review from which I was
quoting last night. That writer—who is not
a nobody, you may depend upon it—remarks,
in effect, that from the wording of this resolution, the honorable gentlemen of the
Conference do not seem to be holding to the Imperial
guarantee. Should it not be given, the cost
to us will be frightfully increased. And this
it had not need be. For the honorable gentlemen who are running us into it might do
well
to remember the past. We had the Grand
Trunk railway offered us for what was called
next to nothing. The guarantee we were to
give was not for much ; and it was well
secured ; and we were assured it was not
meant to be made use of—was more a form
than a reality. Yet the guarantee was used and
extended, and made a gift of ; every estimate
failed ; the cry ever since has been for more,
more ; and the whole concern is now in such
a state as to be threatening us day by day
522
with yet larger demands on the public purse
than ever, to keep it going. Well, sir, I pass
on from these heavy outlays for permanent defences, and the Intercolonial Railway
; and I
read in these resolutions that " the communications with the North-Western territory,
and the improvements required for the development of the trade of the Great West with
the seaboard, are regarded by this Conference
as subjects of the highest importance to the
Federated Provinces, and shall be prosecuted
at the earliest possible period that the state
of the finances will permit." Well, sir, we
are told that this last phrase is synonymous
with those unqualified words, "without delay," that are used as to the Intercolonial.
I am reminded of a saying current in the
days of Lord SYDENHAM, who was a good
deal in the habit of wanting work done faster
than the workers liked, and of whom it used
to be said that all he ordered had to be done
"immediately, if not sooner." (Hear, hear,
and laughter.) I take it, the Intercolonial
Railway is to be done " immediately, if not
sooner," and these other improvements are
to wait till "immediately, if not later." They
are to be prosecuted as soon as the state of
the finances will permit. I know some hon.
gentlemen think that will be very soon, but
if so, there must be most extraordinary
means taken to borrow or otherwise raise
money. (Hear, hear.) Nothing can be
vaguer than the intimation given as to what
these works are to be. The communications
with the Great North-Western territory,
where are they to begin ; what are they to
be; and where are they to end ? And the
other improvements to be carried out—the
communications with the seaboard—the
enlargement of the canals—how much enlargement, sir, and of how many and what
canals ? An honorable friend near me says
canal enlargement is or should be productive.
No doubt, but at what rate ? I remember
reading in a Lower Province paper the other
day of a late speech of Hon. Mr. TILLEY's,
in which he said that at the Quebec Conference they went into a calculation of the
productive value of the entire outlay of these
provinces upon productive public works,
and found them to be yielding an average
of one and an eighth of one per cent.,
or something like that, of yearly return upon
their cost. I admit there may be in the
widening of these canals a something of productiveness ; but to say that it will be
anything
like proportionate to the outlay, is absurd.
But what I am coming back to is this—we
are to go at once into the outlay of the Intercolonial Railway, and we are to go into
this
other, too ; but yet, almost beyond the shadow
of a doubt, these canals and other communications with the west—which western politicians
think they are to get as their equivalent
—are to be held back a bit. I forgot to bring
here an extract from a late speech of Hon.
Mr. Tilley's, in which he plainly said that an
immediate carrying on of these western works
did not enter into the calculations of the
Conference, that the Intercolonial was unmistakably to be put through at once ; but
that
the Lower Province delegates gave no promise
of the like prosecution of these other works
as the price of that. (Hear, hear.)
An Hon. MEMBER—Where do you find
that ?
Mr. DUNKIN—It is quoted in a late
number of the Toronto
Leader; and if anyone will bring me the fyle of that paper from
below, I will read the words with pleasure.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I am raising no question
of any one's sincerity upon this question.
The politicians of the eastern provinces, I
have no doubt, are thoroughly in earnest in
their demand for the construction of the
Intercolonial road, and are quite willing to
have the western improvements begun about
as soon as they can be ; and I am quite sure
that the friends of this scheme in the west
want their western works instantly gone on
with. I even believe they both think they
will get what they want ; but I am surprised
at their credulity, for I do not see how they
can. I believe they are deceiving themselves
and their friends with the bright pictures
their fancy has been painting, and that my
western friends, at any rate, are doomed to
some disappointment. Whenever a Federal
Parliament shall meet, I fancy it will become
a question of grave interest whether or not
the state of the finances will admit of the
construction of all these works ; and if not,
then what is to be done first—and how—
and when ? And as I have shown, unless
the six majorities are pretty much agreed,
there will be no great deal done in any
hurry.
Mr. DUNKIN—Yes, three times as
bad, to say the least. Well, suppose the
financiers of the Lower Provinces, having
before their eyes the fear of direct taxation by
the Federal Parliament, should come to the
523
conclusion that it will not signify for a few
years, whether these western works are begun
at once or not ; and should propose to sit
down first a little, and count the cost.
  Mr. DUNKIN—Well yes, that would
probably be insisted upon before they would
consent to commit themselves further to the
undertaking. Suppose, then, Lower Canada
to go with the Lower Provinces for staving
off this commencement of these works, how
will it fare with Upper Canada's demand for
them ? And what will not be the indignation
of the people of Upper Canada at being tied
to, and controlled by the non-progressive
people of the east ? Or, suppose that Upper
and Lower Canada should agree, and the
Lower Provinces be seriously angry, at any
over-caution eastward, or over-rashness
westward ; would not they too, so left
out in the cold, be making things quite
unpleasant ? Or again, suppose the more
eastern and the western interests should
continue to push on both plans, careless of
cost, and that Lower Canada, for fear of
direct taxation, should hold back in earnest,
would that make no trouble ? Is not any
one of these suppositions more probable
than the cool assumption, over which western
gentlemen are so happy, that when the time
comes all interests will instantly work together, and by magic do everything, east
and
west, at once ? But, be this as it may, sir,
on all three accounts—defences, Intercolonial
road and western works—we are sure of
cost, as well as of disputes, in plenty. And
there is, besides, a fourth. I shall have
occasion to shew presently that we are going
to be called upon to spend money for yet
another kindred purpose, and a large amount
too—and this, as a part of this scheme.
Our star of empire is to wing its way westward ; and we are to confederate everything
in
its track, from Newfoundland to Vancouver's
Island, this last included. But, between us
and it, there lies the Hudson Bay territory.
So, of course, we must acquire that for
confederation purposes ; and the plan is,
that before we get it we shall have to pay
for the elephant—though, after we get him,
we may find him costly and hard to keep.
It will not be dificult to prove that this is
contemplated by the promoters of this scheme.
Between railways and canals, and western
extension, before we get the scheme carried
out in all its contemplated amplitude, we
shall have bled pretty well, and seen some
sights that we have hardly yet learnt to
anticipate. (Hear, hear.) Well, with this
certain prospect before us of a gigantic
outlay, what is the prospect for a gigantic
income ?
A MEMBER—Oh, never mind that.
Mr. DUNKIN—I quite understand that
many hon. gentlemen take little thought of
where money is to come from, if only it is to
be spent as they wish. But, Mr. Speaker,
before I go further, I am handed the fyle of
the Toronto
Leader, and, with the leave of
the House, I will read from it the extracts
from Hon. Mr. Tilley's speech to which I
was referring some minutes ago. This journal refers to it as follows :—
  Mr. Tilley, we are sorry to say, does not give
us much hope of the speedy enlargement of our
canals. He laughs at the idea of his opponent
quoting Mr. Brown as authority that this work is
to be undertaken at once. " The Conference," says
Mr. Tilley, "agreed to build the railroad without
delay, the canals as soon as the state of the finances
will permit." But he ridicules the idea that the
finances will be held at once to admit of this
being done." Canada," says Mr. Tilley, "could
not have been brought into the union on a promise
to build her canals, for the railroad will cost
$12,000,000, which added to the $22,000,000
for canals, would be an amount far above what
they could have gained them for without Confederation."
 Such is Hon. Mr. Tilley's style of remark, and
I do not think it is at all encouraging to the
very sanguine view of the scheme taken by
some western politicians. It is presumable
that he will take Newfoundland, Prince
Edward Island and Nova Scotia with him,
and along with them he will get much of
Lower Canada. If I should have the honor
of a seat in the House, they may depend
upon it, I shall do what I can to get them
fair play. But I repeat, I do not expect to
see them satisfied with the result. Well,
sir, however this may be, there is going to
be, at any rate, an immense amount of money
required, come from whence it may. Where
is it to come from ? We cannot shut our eyes
to the fact, that the customs tariff must come
down. ( Hear.) There are no two ways about
that. Our tariff is much higher than those
of the Lower Provinces ; and the advocates
of Confederation there have to assure people
that their tariffs will not be materially raised,
in order to get any sort of hearing for the
scheme. To tell them that the tariff of
Canada is to be that of the Confederation,
would be to ruin the chances of getting a
favorable reception for it. (Hear, hear.)
524
We are marching fast and steadily towards
free trade. We must meet the views of the
people of the Lower Provinces, who are hostile to high tariffs, and the demand of
the
Imperial authorities that we should not tax
their manufactures so heavily as—in their
phrase—almost to deprive them of our market. It was distinctly and officially stated
the other day, in Newfoundland, that assurance had been given to the Government of
Newfoundland that the views of the Canadian Government are unmistakably in this
direction. And I do not think there is any
mistake about that, either. To shew how
peeple at home, too, expect our tariff to come
down, I may refer to the speech of Mr.
Hambury Tracy, in seconding the Address
in answer to the Speech from the Throne, in
the House of Commons the other day. He
could not stop, after saying generally that he
was pleased with this Confederation movement, without adding that he trusted it would
result in a very considerable decrease in the
absurdly high and hostile tariff at present
prevailing in Canada. I have not here the
exact words, but that was their purport.
Well, if the customs tariff is to come down
largely, we must look for a decrease of
revenue. I am free to admit that a
reduction of the tariff on certain articles,
or even some measure of reduction all
round, might be no material loss, or might
even be a gain, to the revenue— in
ordinary or prosperous times, that is to say.
But when the object of reducing the tariff
is to meet other exigencies than those of
revenue, one can hardly hope to get such a
tariff as shall give us the largest revenue
attainable. And besides, no one can deny
that we are about entering upon a time,
commercially speaking, that may be termed
hard. We have had, for some time past,
pretty heavy importations, and our best informed and shrewdest commercial men tell
us that we are going to have, for some time
to come, pretty light importations. We are
not to have a plethoric purse, even under
ordinary drafts upon it, for some years.
Mr. DUNKIN—Yes, it is come, or is close
on us, and it rather threatens to last. And if,
with this state of things before us, to oblige
the Imperial authorities and the Lower Provinces, under pressure of an inevitable
state
necessity, we are to reduce our customs
rates, or any number of them, below what I
may call their figure of largest productive
ness, then surely it is little to say that we
cannot look forward to an increase in the
revenue, or even to a continuance of our
present income, and it is rather strange that
we should be called upon, withal, at the
same time so to change our whole system as
to involve ourselves in the enormous extra
vagances here contemplated. No taxing
scheme can ever meet the case. Nothing
can be looked to, but a device of borrowing
without limit—the incurring of an amount
of debt that, in interest and sinking fund,
must prove to be simply unendurable hereafter. (Hear, hear.) But, in fact, we cannot
even borrow to any large amount
unless under false pretenses. We cannot
borrow without telling tales of our condition, resources and expectations, that
will in the end he found out to be lies.
We must awaken hopes in the minds of
money lenders abroad, that cannot but prove
delusive—the memory of which must work
us hereafter an aggravation of punishment
that we shall then scarcely need. And when
that time of reckoning shall have come, then
staggering under the load, without credit at
home or abroad, the country will have to
choose whether it will have heavy direct taxation—for heavy such taxation then must
be
—or have recourse to more or less of repudiation ; or even run some risk of both.
Sir, if ever that time shall come, the public
men of that day and the people on whom the
burthen will then press, will not bless the
memory of those who held out the false hopes
and inducements under which it is now sought
to decoy us into wild expenditure and crushing
debt. (Hear, hear.) Well, Mr. Speaker,
I now pass to another branch of my subject
altogether. There is a further salient contrast between the American system and the
system proposed for our adoption. The
people of the United States, when they
adopted their Constitution, were one of the
nations of the earth. They formed their
whole system with a view to national existence. They had fought for their independence,
and had triumphed ; and still in
the flush of their triumph, they were laying
the foundations of a system absolutely national. Their Federal Government was to
have its relations with other nations, and was
sure to have plenty to do upon entering the
great family of nations. But we—what are
we doing ? Creating a new nationality, according to the advocates of this scheme.
I
hardly know whether we are to take the
phrase for ironical, or not. Is it a reminder
525
that in fact we have no sort of nationality
about us, but are unpleasantly cut up into a
lot of struggling nationalities, as between
ourselves ? Unlike the people of the United
States, we are to have no foreign relations to
look after, or national affairs of any kind ;
and therefore our new nationality, if we could
create it, could be nothing but a name. I
must say that according to my view of the
change we ought to aim at, any idea of Federation that we may entertain had need take
an Imperial direction. Whenever changing
our institutions, we had need develope and
strengthen—not merely maintain, but maintain, develope and strengthen—the tie, not
yet Federal as it ought to be, between us
and the parent state. (Hear, hear.) It is
the entire Empire that should be federalized,
and cemented together as one, and not any
mere limited number of its dependencies here
or there. A general, or so called federal
government, such as we are here proposing
to create, will most certainly be in a false position. As I said just now, the Federal
Government of the United States was to take its
place in the great family of the nations of the
earth ; but what place in that family are we
to occupy ? Simply none. The Imperial
Government will be the head of the Empire as
much as ever, and will alone have to attend
to all foreign relations and national matters ;
while we shall be nothing more than we
are now. Half-a-dozen colonies federated
are but a federated colony after all. Instead of being so many separate provinces
with workable institutions, we are to be one
province most cumbrously organised—nothing
more. How many grades of government are we
going to have under this system ? The Imperial Government, the one great head of the
Empire ; then this Federal Government ; then
our lot of provincial governments ; below them
again, our county municipalities, and, still
below these, our township and other local municipalities. (Hear, hear.) We have thus
five different sets of governmental machinery,
and of these five there is just one too many
in my judgment. You might as well make
six while you are about it, and interpolate between our provincial and county governments
a district governmental machinery. If we did
that we should be doing a thing not a whit
more absurd than we propose to do now, in
erecting a new piece of such machinery between the Imperial and provincial governments.
We do not want a third municipal
government, because there is nothing for it to
do ; and when we propose to create a Federal
Government between the Imperial and Provincial, we are equally proposing to create
a
something which, having nothing of its own
to do, must find work by encroaching on the
functions of the Imperial and provincial governments in turn, with no place among
nations, no relations with other countries, no
foreign policy ; it will stand in just the same
position towards the Imperial Government as
Canada now stands in, or as Upper or Lower
Canada before the union used to occupy.
That intermediate work of government which
is now done by the Province of Canada, the
Province of New Brunswick, the Province of
Nova Scotia, the Province of Prince Edward
Island and the Province of Newfoundland, is
to be done, part by the Federal Government
and part by the provinces. The work is simply divided that is now done by the provincial
legislatures and governments, and in my
opinion there is no use in this subdivision of
work at all. You are putting this fifth wheel
to the coach, merely to find out that a misfitting odd wheel will not serve any useful
purpose, nor so much as work smoothly with the
other four. (Hear, hear.) Your Federal
Government will occupy about as anomalous
a position between the Imperial and provincial governments as I showed, last night,
will
be occupied by your lieutenant governors
between the Federal authority and the provinces. Both will be out of place, and to
find
themselves in work they must give trouble. I
do not see how they can do good, but I do
see how they can do any quantity of harm.
(Hear, hear.) The real difficulty in our position is one that is not met by the machinery
here proposed. What is that difficulty ? In
the larger provinces of the empire we have
the system of responsible government thoroughly accorded by the Imperial Government,
an thoroughly worked out ; and the difficulty of the system that is now pressing,
or
ought to be, upon the attention of our statesmen is just this—that the tie connecting
us
with the Empire, and which ought to be a
federal tie of the strongest kind, is too slight,
is not, properly speaking, so much as a federal
tie at all. These provinces, with local responsible government, are too nearly in
the position of independent communities ; there is not
enough of connection between them and the
parent state to make the relations between
the two work well, or give promise of lasting
long. There is in the machinery too much
of what may be called the centrifugal ten
526
dency. (Hear, hear.) All the great provinces are flying off too much, attending too
exclusively to mere local considerations,
too little to those of the general or Imperial
kind. And at home, as we seem to be flying
off, they, too, are thinking of us and of the
interests they and we have in common less
and less. What is wanting, if one is to look
to the interest of the Empire, which is really
that of all its parts— what is wanting, as I
have said, is an effective federalization of the
Empire as a whole, not a subordinate federation here or there, made up out of parts
of it.
I have neither time nor strength to-night to
go fairly into the question of how this thing
should be done ; but a few words more as to
that, I must be pardoned for. Until latterly
in Canada we have not had, and some colonies have not now, I believe, a Minister of
Militia. Even we have not as yet, in our
Cabinet, a minister to attend to what may be
called Imperial affairs. It is not the business
of any minister, nor is it even distinctly recognized as that of the Ministry as a
whole, in any
of these provinces, to attend to what is really
at the present juncture the most important part
of our whole public business—the regulation
of affairs between them and the Mother
Country. I know it may be said this is in
the hands of the Governor. So are other
things. But for them, we see the need of his
having advisers. And as to this, if a Cabinet
leaves it wholly to him, that practically
amounts to its neglecting these affairs altogether. Let me go back to a point or two
in
the history of affairs in Canada within the recollection of all honorable gentlemen.
In
1862, when the then Militia Bill was before the
House, it was asked over and over again by
gentlemen of the Opposition, what communications, if any, had been received from the
Imperial Government in respect of the defence of
this province ; and the answer invariably was,
that there had been none, none known to the
Administration, as an administration. Now,
if there had then been an officer—the Provincial Secretary, the Minister of Militia,
or
any other member of the Government—
whose duty it had been and was to attend to
that important branch of the public service ;
if the relations between the Mother Country
and this province had been known to be in his
charge, such an answer as that could never
have been given, nor the second reading of
that bill lost in consequence. The other night,
when the Raid Prevention and Alien Bill was
before the House, we did receive the intimation that the Mother Country desired legisla
tion of that kind at our hands ; and it passed
accordingly. But that intimation was then
given us exceptionally. There is a large
class of questions springing up continually
which affect Imperial interests and Imperial
views as well as our own, and we ought to
have—and if our connection with the Empire
is to last, we must have—this department of
our public affairs attended to by a regularly
appointed Minister of the Crown here, who,
whenever occasion requires, may explain them
and who shall be responsible to this Home.
Of course, nobody denies that the Governor
General is the channel of communication
between us and the Imperial Government.
He is the Queen's representative and servant,
and his communications with the Home Government must be of the most confidential
character, except in so far he may see fit
to make them known. But fully admitting
this, still besides these communications of
this character which he may, have and indeed
at all times must have unrestrictedly with
the Imperial Government, there should be
—and, if our Imperial relations are to be
maintained, there must be—a further class of
communications between the two governments,
as to which the Governor should be advised by
a minister whose particular duty it should be
to manage affairs between the Mother Country
and ourselves, and to be in effect a local adviser, as to such matters, of the Imperial
advisers of the Crown in England. In one
word, we have got to develope the Imperial
phase, so to speak, of our provincial system ;
to find the means of keeping our policy and
that of the Mother Country in harmony ; and
if we do not, we cannot long keep up our connection with the Empire. If this were
done—
if we had in our several provincial administrations some member charged with this
department of the public service, as latterly we
have come to have one charged with the cognate subject of the militia and defence
of
the country—if these ministers of Imperial
relations made periodical visits home, so as
there to meet one another and such members
of the Imperial Government or others as the
Crown might charge to meet and confer with
them—if there were thus organised, some sort
of advisory colonial council upon the precedent
(so far, of course, as the analogy might hold)
of the Council for East Indian Affairs lately
created—if, I say, something in this way were
done, then indeed we should be developing
our Imperial relations in the proper direction,
taking at least a step—the first and hardest—
towards the framing of that Imperial feder
527
ation of which we so stand in need. But there
is no provision of that kind in the system here
proposed ; there is no apparent contemplation
of a step of that kind in connection with this
step. On the contrary, this step is all in the
wrong direction. We are here proposing to
create in this part of the Queen's dominions
a mere sub-federation, so to speak, tending,
so far as it tends to anything, towards the
exclusion of this kind of provision. This
other machinery to which I have been alluding, Mr. SPEAKER, if we had had it a few
years ago, would have been of extreme usefulness. Suppose we had had something of
that
kind when the Rebellion Losses Bill was
passed, when so much excitement was thereby
created in the country. Suppose that then
when the indignation of a large class was concentrating itself against Lord ELGIN
for his
supposed purpose of assenting to that bill, he
could have said—" It is idle for you, as you
must see, to require me to listen to you against
the advice of my constitutional advisers ; but
you know there is a tribunal at home, to
which you may appeal from that advice,
where you will be heard and they, and from
which you may be sure of justice if you have
been aggrieved or injured here." Sir, if it had
been possible for the Governor General to have
given such an answer at that time to the angry
remonstrances of those who opposed that measure, the Parliament House would not have
been burnt, nor would we have had to deplore
the long train of consequent disturbances and
troubles which then and ever since have
brought so much discredit and mischief to the
country. Take another case. If such machinery had existed when the fishery treaty
with France was entered into by the Imperial
Government, conditioned upon the consent of
Newfoundland, no such anomalous proceeding
could have taken place. For the representatives of Newfoundland and of the rest of
these
provinces would at once have shown the Imperial Government that it would not meet
approval in that colony, nor indeed for that
matter anywhere else in British America.
Great Britain would have been saved from entering into a treaty that—as matters went—
had to be disallowed, with some discredit to
the Empire, and some risk of a rupture of
its friendly relations with a foreign power.
MR. SCOBLE—Does not the House of
Commons afford that machinery ?
MR. DUNKIN—The House of Commons
knows very little, and cares much less, about
our local affairs. (Hear, hear.) I say, if
there had then been a Colonial Council at
home, where representatives of the different
provincial administrations might have met
and advised with any of Her Majesty's ministers, there would have been no difficulty.
It
would have disposed of any number of other
questions more satisfactorily than they have
been disposed of. The north-eastern boundary question with the States, for instance,
would never have been settled in a way so
little accordant with our views and interests ;
and the question of the western boundary
would have been settled sooner and better, also.
Take another illustration. When the difficulty arose between this country and England
about our tariff, when the Sheffield manufacturers sought to create a feeling at home
against us, because we, mainly to raise revenue, placed duties higher than they liked
on importations of manufactured goods, if
any such machinery had been in operation, no
such wide-spread and mischievous misapprehension as to our acts and purposes could
have arisen, as ever since has been prevalent in
England, and even on the floor of the House
of Commons. In fact, I repeat that without
some such system, I do not see how our relations with the Empire can be maintained
on a satisfactory footing. It is just the want
of it that is leading so many at home now to
think us in a transition state towards separation and independence , when, in truth,
we
have such need to prove to them that we are
in a transition state towards a something very
different indeed — the precise antipodes of
separation. (Hear, hear.) Sir, I was saying that in this scheme there is no such conservative
tendency as this—nothing indicative of a set purpose to develope, strengthen
and perpetuate our connection with the Empire. That end we might indeed better gain
without than with this extra machinery of
local federation ; for disguise it how you may,
the idea that underlies this plan is this, and
nothing else—that we are to create here a
something—kingdom, viceroyalty, or principality—something that will soon stand in
the
same position towards the British Crown that
Scotland and Ireland stood in before they
were legislatively united with England ; a something having no other tie to the Empire
than
the one tie of fealty to the British Crown—a
tie which in the cases, first, of Scotland, and
then of Ireland, was found, when the pinch
came, to be no tie at all ; which did not
restrain either Scotland or Ireland from courses
so inconsistent with that of England as to
have made it necessary that their relations
should be radically changed, and a legislative
528
union formed in place of a merely nominal
union. Suppose you do create here a kingdom
or a principality, bound to the Empire by this
shadow of a tie, the day of trial cannot be far
distant, when this common fealty will be found
of as little use in our case as it was in theirs ;
when, in consequence, the question will force
itself on the Empire and on us between entire
separation on the one hand, and a legislative
union on the other. But a legislative union of
British America with the United Kingdom
must be, in the opinion of, one may say, everybody at home and here, a sheer utter
impossibility ; and when the question shall come to
be whether we are so to be merged in the
United Kingdom or are to separate entirely
from it, the answer can only be—"At whatever cost, we separate." Sir, I believe in
my
conscience that this step now proposed is one
directly and inevitably tending to that other
step ; and for that reason—even if I believed,
as I do not, that it bid fair to answer ever so
well in the other respects—because I am an
Englishman and hold to the connection with
England, I must be against this scheme. Suppose now, on the other hand, this scheme
were not to go into operation, there would be
no earthly difficulty in working out, with this
Canada of ours, the other plan I have been
suggesting for the placing of our relations
with the Empire on a better footing. Nor
would there probably be any material difficulty
either in bringing about a legislative union of
the Lower Provinces, or in developing a
very near approach to free trade, or indeed
absolute free trade between us and them. I
know there are those who say that this mock
Federal union is necessary in order to our
getting that free trade with those provinces.
Well, sir, as to that, all I care to say is this,
that for a number of years past we have had
a near approach to free trade with the United
States—a foreign country ; and I imagine we
can have it with the Lower Provinces as well,
without any very great difficulty. (Hear,
hear.) I say again, we had far better hold
firmly to the policy of thus maintaining and
strengthening our union with the parent state,
than let ourselves, under whatever pretext, be
drawn into this other course, which must inevitably lead to our separation from the
Empire. (Hear, hear.) But, Mr. SPEAKER,
there is still another point of view in which
this scheme requires to be considered. The
people of the United States, when they framed
their institutions, were not only starting as a
nation—they were so starting with no dangerous neighbor-nation near them. If we are
to take the step now urged upon us, not only
are we to be something less than a nation, but
we are to be this with a very dangerous
neighbor-nation indeed. In this connection I
may be allowed to read a few words. The
thirtieth resolution says :—
The General Government and Parliament shall
have all powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations of the Federated
Provinces,
as part of the British Empire, to foreign countries, arising under treaties between
Great Britain and such countries.
It is quite right that the General Government should have such powers ; but the very
fact of our having to make a reservation of
this kind, is an unpleasant recognition of
the fact, in itself the reverse of encouraging ,
of the all darkening neighborhood of the
United States. It is a most singular thing
that we are required on the one hand to go into
this union on this very account—for downright
dread of the United States—and yet that on the
other, we are as confidently assured of our own
immense resources, are told that we are so
wonderfully great and wonderfully rich, that
we are something like—I don't know whether
we are not—the third or fourth power, or
maritime power, one or other, in the world.
Really, I would not undertake to say how
great we are, or are not, according to honorable gentlemen. They startle one. I had
no idea how great we were! (Hear, hear.)
But yet, with all this wonderful magnificence
and greatness, we are told we positively must
not, for very fear of the United States—for
fear of their power—for fear of their hostility, we must not any longer stay disunited,
but must instantly enter into this so-ealled
union. Just as if either their power or their
hostility towards us—taking that to be their
feeling—would be lessened by our doing so.
Just as if they would not be only the more
jealous of us and hostile to us, for our setting
ourselves up ostentatiously as their rivals.
(Hear, hear.) In this connection, it does
seem to me that we have more than one
question to answer. Many honorable gentlemen appear to think they have done all that
need be done, when they have answered to
their own satisfaction the one question,
What is the amount of our resources ?
Starting with the vastness of our territory,
they go into all kinds of statements as to
our trade and so forth, multiplying tonnage impossibly, adding together exports and
imports—those of the Intercolonial trade
and all. I only wonder they do not, on the
same principle, calculate our inter-county and
529
our inter-township tradings, or our dealings
between cities and county, adding exports
and imports of course all round, and so
proving that we have done more trade than all
the rest of the world put together ; unless,
indeed, they were to count up the trade
of the rest of the world by the same
rule ; and then to be sure they would find out
that, after all, the rest of the world do more
business, are more populous, richer, and
stronger, than we. The question is not simply, What are our own resources ? We must
supplement it with a second—What are they
comparatively ? And especially, what are
they as compared with those of the United
States ? And while we are asking this question, we may as well not take it for granted
as
a fact, that the larger our country the stronger we must be. Suppose we are to be
four
millions of people in a country as large as
Europe or larger. I wish to Heaven we were
four millions of people—with all the adjacent
unexposed territory you will—but in a country smaller than England. Why, sir, New
England alone has more population and resources, all told, than the Lower Provinces
and Lower Canada together ; and with her
compactness and advantage of position, she
could alone, presumably, beat both.
MR. DUNKIN—I did not say that ; I said
stronger than Lower Canada and the Lower
Provinces.
HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—It is about
the same in population, two and a half millions, while we have more shipping than
they.
MR. DUNKIN—I fear that if we were to
come into collision, a good deal of shipping
might change hands. At any rate, at the
best, we should have a pretty tight time of
it. (Hear, hear.)
AN HON. MEMBER—Better put a bold
face on it.
MR. DUNKIN—Yes, yes. " Brag is a
good dog, but Holdfast is a better." Then,
there is the State of New York, which would
certainly be more than a match for Upper
Canada—and New York is but one of several
states conterminous with Upper Canada.
Who in his senses, sir, thinks of these
provinces as able, of themselves, to hold
their own against New England, New York
and the rest of the tier of states along our
frontier ? And yet we are talked to as if
Confederation were about to make us the
third or fourth power, or maritime power in
the world ! But what I was saying more
particularly was, that too much of territory,
and above all too much of exposed frontier,
does not increase our strength, but lessens
it. Ours is the ' long thin line of red,"
which is not so well able to receive a charge
as the solid square.
COL. HAULTAIN was understood to
signify dissent to some of the prepositions
here advanced.
MR. DUNKIN—If the hon. member for
Peterborough thinks that in a military point
of view, the length and narrowness of our territory adds to our strength—if he thinks
we
are the stronger for our length of frontier, I
would respectfully recommend him to attend
one of our military schools (Laughter.)
But seriously, sir, if we are to compare our
resources with those of the United States,
we shall find, as I have said, that theirs are
unmistakably, and beyond count, greater.
MR. DUNKIN—That is not the comparison. We are continually hearing of
what Confederation is to do for ourselves,
how it is going to make us a great power in
the world. It is going to do nothing of the
kind. But again—and here is a third question that in this connection we have got to
answer—how is the temper of the United
States going to be affected, on the one hand,
by the policy here urged on us, of what I
may call hostile independent effort—effort
made on our part, with the avowed object of
setting ourselves up as a formidable power
against them ; or on the other hand, by a
policy such as I have been urging, of unobtrusive development of our institutions
in
connection with the British Empire ? In
which of the two cases are they likely to be
the more amiable, or, (which is perhaps more
to the point), the less aggressive or practically
unamiable, as our neighbors? Besides,
there comes up still another question. What
is to be the attitude of Great Britain under
either of these two suppositions? As I have
said, the question is, first, as to our own
resources ; next, as to the comparative resources of the United States ; then, as
to
their attitude and temper towards us, upon
one or other of these two suppositions ; then,
as to the attitude and temper of Great
Britain, in reference to each of these suppositions ; and lastly, as to the reaction
(so to
speak) upon ourselves, of these respective
attitudes of the two countries in either case.
530
If, sir, we are thinking to give other peeple
the idea, that by uniting ourselves together
in any such way as this, we are going to make
ourselves able to take care of ourselves, we
are merely humbugging ourselves, and trying to humbug others. The people of the
United States are stronger than we are, and
are known so to be ; and if we are to hold our
own against or beside them, it can only be
by remaining strongly, avowedly, lastingly,
attached to Great Britain. This is the
firm conclusion I have come to ; and I
believe it is the conclusion to which any
one who will give his thoughtful attention
to the subject must come also. And I
must and do protest against the notion
which seems to prevail among the advocates of this scheme, that somehow or other
it is going so to increase our power, as
to make us a formidable neighbor of the
United States. The danger is, of its making
that peeple more jealous of us and more
hostile towards us than before. And if,
besides that, it is going to give them and
the people of England, or either of them,
the idea that as a result of it we are
to care less for the connection with the
Empire than before—that under it we
are before long to go alone, it is going to
commit us to about the saddest fatal mistake that a people ever made. (Hear, hear.)
Mr. SPEAKER, I must apologize for the
length to which I have wearied the House.
(Cries of " Go on !") I have gone through,
as well as I could, the leading points of my
arguments, so far ; and have indicated a
number of points of contrast between this
system and that of the United States. I trust
I have not been too prolix in my attempts to
shew that the Constitution now offered for
our acceptance presents machinery entirely
unlike that of the United States, and entirely
unlike that of the British Empire—that it
is inconsistent with either—that so far from
its proffering to us all the advantages of both
and the disadvantages of neither, it rather
presents to us the disadvantages of both and
the advantages of neither ; that so far from
its tending to improve our relations either
with the Mother Country or with the
United States, it holds out to us very
little prospect indeed for the future, in
either of these respects. (Hear, hear.)
I shall not attempt to review my argument
on these heads, for I do not think that to
anyone at all willing to reflect, what I have
advanced can require to be proved more
fully. If I am not entirely wrong, the only
way in which this proposed machinery can
be got to work at all, will be by an aggregation, so to speak, in the first Federal
Cabinet,
of the leading men of the different existing
provincial administrations. The attempt
must be made to combine the six majorities,
so as to carry on an administration in harmony with the understood wishes of the six
several provinces, irrespectively of every
consideration of principle, or of sound farseeing policy. I do not see how, although
this thing may be done at starting, it can be
carried on—I was going to say, for any
length of time—I might say, for any time,
long or short, unless by a system of the
most enormous jobbery and corruption.
Whenever any sore spot shall show itself—
and we may rely on it, there will be more
than one such show itself very soon—then
feuds and divisions of the worst sort will
follow, and the machinery will no longer
work. Unfortunately, there are in it none
of those facilities for harmonious workings,
none of those nice adaptations by which
the stronger power is so tempered as
not to fall too harshly on the weaker.
Just so long as the majorities in all the
different provinces work cordially together,
well and good. But they cannot possibly
work harmoniously together long ; and so
soon as they come into collision, there
comes trouble, and with the trouble, the
fabric is at an end. (Hear, hear.) For
myself, I am decidedly of opinion that our
true interest is to hold this machinery
over, to consider it carefully, to see
if something better cannot be devised.
(Hear, hear.) I am sure there can. But
instead of that, we are called upon emphatically and earnestly at once to throw aside
all
considerations to the contrary, and to adopt
the measure ; and we are at the same time
told, in unmistakable language, that we positively cannot—must not—shall not—change
a single word of it. Various considerations
are urged upon us for this unseemly haste ;
considerations connected with the attitude
of the United States, with Great Britain,
with the Lower Provinces, and with our own
domestic affairs. With the permission of
the House, I will touch as briefly as I can
on these four classes of considerations, and
then cease longer to weary the House. I
begin, then, with the considerations connected
with the attitude of the United States, which
are urged upon us as reasons why we should
rush into this measure of Confederation. To
some extent I have already incidentally
531
touched on these in another connexion ; but
they call for some further notice, and in
giving it them, I will try not to repeat myself.
Judging from much of the language which
we have heard on the floor of this House, one
would suppose we must be on the verge of a
war with the United States. For my part, I
believe nothing of the kind. But if we
were, would it be at all the right thing for
us to abstain from the more pressing questions of our defences and the organization
of
the militia, and to be instead discussing here
these plans of a Federal Union, Provincial
Constitutions, and I know not what ? These
we are called upon, I admit, to discuss
in a tremendous hurry, to settle off-hand, in
workable or unworkable shape, nobody seeming to know or to care which, everybody
professing to hope that all will come right
in the end, whether he thinks it will or not.
But, sir, I say again, if war were imminent
with the United States, the one question for
us would be the state of our defences, the
organization of our militia, how much England can do for us, how much we can do for
ourselves, how much England and we, each
of us, are to undertake to do together. That
is not the question at the present time at
all, and I therefore take it that the outcry
raised in connection with this scheme, about
our defences and the militia, is just so much
buncombe. (Hear, hear.) If honorable
gentlemen opposite believed in it, I am certain that the pressing question would be
taken up first. Further, if such danger
were not even pretty far off, I for one
would be disposed to think that the taking up now of this other class of questions
comes a little late in the day. With
any near, real danger of war with the
United States, it would be quite too late
for us to be sitting here, gravely discussing
a political union, to be consummated months
hence, at soonest, and then only to lead to
the construction of railways which will take
years, and defences which cannot be put in
order for months or years, to future
developments of all kinds, which it will take
years on years to carry out. If war, I say,
is imminent, these ulterior undertakings,
though begun now, would be begun all too
late. Whenever there is such danger, our
defence will not be found in the making of
federal or other constitutions, or in paper
display of any kind, but must be found in
the strong arms and determined courage of
our peeple, responding earnestly to the call
of the Mother Country, and backed with all
the power she can bring to bear upon the
conflict. Supposing that time come, we
have plenty of governing machinery for
that defence. We do not need, in order
to it, a viceroy and court, and lieutenant-
governors, and all the complicated political
apparatus of this scheme. We could get
along just as well under our present system,
and I think better. Certainly, if modified
as I have indicated it might be—if improved
by the better development of our relations
to the Empire—the system which would
thence result would be as good as that here
offered for our acceptance—indeed, would be
much better. But, sir, the real danger is
not of war with the United States. It is
from what I may call their pacific hostility
—from trouble to be wrought by them within
this country—trouble to arise out of refusal of
reciprocity—repeal of the bonding system—
custom-house annoyances—passport annoyances ; from their fomenting difficulties
here, and taking advantage of our local
jealousies ; from the multiplied worries
they may cause us by a judicious alternation
of bullying and coaxing, the thousand incidents which may easily be made to happen
if
things are not going on quite well in this
country, and the people and government of the
States are minded to make us feel the consequences of our not getting on quite so
well as
we might. Whether the union of the States
is restored or not, this kind of thing can go on.
The danger is, that either the whole United
States, or those portions of the United States
which are near us, and which are really stronger
than we are, and enterprising enough and ambitious enough, and not very fond of us,
and
not at all fond of the Mother Country, not at
all unwilling to strike a blow at her and to
make us subservient to their own interest and
ambition—the danger is, I say, that the United
States, or those portions of the United States
near us, may avail themselves of every opportunity to perplex us, to embroil us in
trouble,
to make us come within the disturbing influences of their strong local attraction.—
Now, to pretend to tell me that the United
States or the Northern States, whichever you
please, are going to be frightened, from a
policy of that kind, by our taking upon ourselves great airs, and forming ourselves
into a
grand Confederation, is to tell me that their
people are, like the Chinese, a people to be
frightened by loud noises and ugly grimaces.
(Laughter.) I do not believe they are. They
532
are not to be frightened by any union we can
make here. They have among them politicians, to say the least, quite as bold, shrewd
and astute as any we have here. The danger will just be that of our having agitation
of our own going on here, and internal troubles,
while these annoyances on the part of our
neighbors across the border are being multiplied upon us ; and that England may at
the
same time be feeling that the tie between her
and us is more or less relaxed, and that wrong
and humiliation put upon us do not concern
her so much as they would have done when
our connection with her was practically more
intimate. In and before 1840, after the
troubles which had been distracting Canada
were put down, it was declared, and perfectly
well understood, that the Imperial Government
was simply determined to hold on to the connection with this country. And the knowledge
of that expressed determination guaranteed us a pretty long term of comparative
feedom from annoyances and trouble of the
kind to which I have been referring. If,
now, a different idea is to prevail—if the notion is to go abroad that we are, by
creating
ourselves into a new nationality, to be somewhat less connected with the Empire than
these provinces heretofore have been, then I
do apprehend that a very different future is
before us, and that in all sorts of ways, by
vexations of all kinds, by the fomenting of
every trouble within our own borders, whether
originating from abroad, or only reacted on
from abroad, we shall be exposed to dangers
of the most serious kind. And, therefore, so
far from seeing in our relations towards the United States, any reason why we should
assume a
position of semi-independence, an attitude of
seeming defiance towards them, I find in them
the strongest reason why, even while regarding, or affecting to regard them as little
as
possible, we should endeavor to make all the
world see that we are trying to strengthen
our union with the Mother Country—that
we care far less about a mere union with
neighboring provinces, which will frighten no
one in the least, but that we are determined to
maintain at all hazards and draw closer, that
connection with the Mother Country which
alone, so long as it lasts, can and will protect
us from all serious aggression. (Hear, hear.)
But we are told that, on account of a variety
of considerations connected with the state of
opinion at home, and out of deference to that
opinion, we must positively carry out this
scheme. Well, there are two or three questions to be answered here. What is that
opinion at home ? What is it worth ? And
what sort of lesson does it teach us ? There
are some distinctions which, in my judgment,
must be drawn with reference to this. There
are different phases of opinion prevailing at
home, which must be taken into account. I
have great respect for some home opinions.
Many things they know in England much
better than we do. Some things they do not
know so well. They do not know so much
about ourselves as we do ; and they
do not occupy their minds so much with that
class of questions which relate merely to our
interests, as we at any rate ought to do ; and
on these matters I am not sure that we shall
act wisely if we yield at once to the first expressions of opinion at home. But now,
sir,
what is the opinion at home, or rather, what
are the opinions entertained at home, with
reference to this measure ? Of course, I do
not intend to weary the House with a long
detailed statement on this subject. But I
must say this—and I do not think that any
one who knows anything at all about it will
contradict what I state—there is at home a
considerably numerous, and much more loud-
speaking than numerous, class of politicians
who do not hesitate to say that it is not for
the interest of England to keep her colonies
at all.
MR. DUNKIN—Well, I think they are rather numerous and pretty influential, and they
make a good deal of stir ; and some of them
being in pretty high places, there is danger
that their views may exercise a good deal of
influence upon public opinion at home. There
are many influences at work at home, tending
to the prevalence of the idea that the sooner
the colonies leave the Mother Country, the
better—and especially that the sooner these
colonies leave the Mother Country, the better.
There is a very exaggerated notion at home of
danger to the peace of the Empire from the
maintenance of British supremacy in this part
of the world. That is the fact ; and there is no
use in our shutting our eyes to it. We may
just as well take it, uncomfortable and hard
fact as it may be. If we choose to tell ourselves it is not the fact, we are only
humbugging ourselves. (Hear, hear.) That is
one point, as regards public opinion in
England. Another is, as to the appreciation,
at home, of this particular scheme. I take
it, that what we are told on this head by
those who urge this scheme upon us,
about opinion at home, amounts to this
—that at home this scheme is regarded
533
with very great favor, that we are expected to adopt it, and that if we do not
adopt it, it will be the better for us with
reference to home public opinion. Well, the
questions for us are: What is the opinion at
home about this scheme ? What is the opinion entertained in high quarters as to its
goodness or badness ; and if there is an opinion in favor of the scheme being adopted,
from what considerations does that opinion, to
a great extent, prevail ? I am not going into
these questions minutely, but I must be allowed to make a remark or two as to the
opinion expressed by Her Majesty's Government with regard to this scheme. I have a1ready,
to some extent, alluded to the dispatch
of the Colonial Secretary ; but in this connection, I must allude to it a little further.
(Hear, hear.) It is clear from that dispatch that the Colonial Secretary wrote under
these impressions : first of all, he was under
the idea that this scheme had been drawn up
by the representatives of every province,
chosen by the respective governors, without
distinction of party. That was not quite the
case. There were representatives from the
two leading parties in each of the other provinces, but it was not so as regarded
Lower
Canada. (Hear, hear.) The Colonial Secretary was, besides, evidently under the impression
that when these gentlemen came together, they gave the matters before them the
most mature deliberation. He says :—" They
have conducted their deliberations with patient
sagacity, and have arrived at unanimous conclusions on questions involving many difficulties."
The " patient sagacity " was exercised
for seventeen or nineteen days, and the " unanimous conclusions " were, after all,
certainly
not unanimous. The Secretary goes on to
say :—
 Her Majesty's Government have given to your
despatch and to the resolutions of the Conference, their most deliberate consideration.
They
have regarded them as a whole, and as having
been designed by those who framed them, to
establish as complete and perfect a union of the
whole, into one government, as the circumstances
of the case, and a due consideration of existing
interests would admit. They accept them, therefore, as being in the deliberate judgment
of those
best qualified to decide upon the subject, the
best framework of a measure to be passed by
the Imperial Parliament for attaining that most
desirable result.
Her Majesty's Government thus take for
granted a " deliberate " examination, which
most unquestionably never has been given to
this crude project. Now, with all this, with
the impression that men of all parties had
here acted in combination, when in truth they
have done no such thing ; that patient sagacity had been expended on the framing of
the
scheme, when in truth there was nothing of
the kind ; that the conclusions were unanimously arrived at, which again was not the
fact ; with all this, Her Majesty's Government
have only come to the point of giving a very
general, and, as any one who reads the dispatch can see, a very qualified approval
of the
scheme. First, an objection is raised as to
the want of accurate determination of the
limits between the authority of the Central
and that of the local legislatures. I will not
read the words, as I read them last night, but
no one can read the dispatch without seeing
that the language of the Colonial Secretary on
that point is the language of diplomatic disapproval. (Hear, hear.) Though he gives
a general approval, he criticises and evidently does
not approve. He sees an intention, but calls
attention to the fact that that intention is not
clearly and explicitly expressed. He then
goes on and makes another objection—the
financial. His language is this :—
 Her Majesty's Government cannot but express
the earnest hope, that the arrangements which
may be adopted in this respect may not be of
such a nature as to increase—at least in any considerable degree—the whole expenditure,
or to
make any material addition to the taxation, and
thereby retard the internal industry, or tend to
impose new burdens on the commerce of the
country.
The hope that it will not be is the diplomatic
way of hinting a fear that it may be. When
Her Majesty's Government is driven to
"hope" that these arrangements will not increase in any considerable degree the whole
expenditure, or make any material addition
to taxation, and thereby retard internal industry, or tend to impose new burdens on
the
commerce of the country, it is perfectly clear
that they see that in the scheme which makes
them tolerably sure it will. And then we
have a third objection :—
 Her Majesty's Government are anxious to lose
no time in conveying to you their general approval of the proceedings of the Conference.
There are, however, two provisions of great importance which seem to require revision.
The
first of these is the provision contained in the
44th resolution, with respect to the exercise of
the prerogative of pardon.
That is emphatically declared to be entirely
534
wrong. And then comes the fourth objection :
"The second point which Her Majesty's Government desire should be reconsidered"—and
this phrase is positively, so far as words can
give it, a command on the part of Her Majesty's Government that it shall be reconsidered
:—
The second point which Her Majesty's Government desire should be reconsidered is the
constitution of the Legislative Council. They appreciate the considerations which
have influenced the
Conference in determining the mode in which
this body, so important to the constitution of the
Legislature, should be composed. But it appears
to them to require further consideration whether,
if the members be appointed for life, and their
number be fixed, there will be any sufficient
means of restoring harmony between the Legislative Council and the popular Assembly,
if it
shall ever unfortunately happen that a decided
difference of opinion shall arise between them.
These two points, relating to the prerogative of
the Crown and the Constitution of the Upper
Chamber have appeared to require distinct and
separate notice.
Is not that a pretty emphatic dissent ?
Questions of minor consequence and matters of
detailed arrangement may properly be reserved
for a future time, when the provisions of the bill
intended to be submitted to the Imperial Parliament shall come under consideration.
So, sir, there are more objections still which
the Colonial Secretary has not stated. He
gives a general sanction, but specifies four
matters, two of which he distinctly says must
be altered, and the other two he does not approve of, and he says that other matters—
too numerous, I suppose, to specify—must be
reserved for remark at a future time. Well,
just at the time that this despatch made its
appearance, there was an article in the London
Times, a passage from which I will read in
this connection, though it may seem to bear
on a somewhat different branch of the question
from that with which I am just more particularly dealing. The London Times, referring
to this despatch, makes use of these expressions, and I beg the attention of the House
to
them, because they give the key-note of a
great deal of the public opinion at home with
reference to this matter :—
It is true we are not actually giving up the
American colonies,—nay, the despatch we are
quoting does not contain the slightest hint that
such a possibility ever crossed the mind of the
writer ; but yet it is perfectly evident—and there
is no use in concealing the fact—that the Confederation movement considerably diminishes
the
difficulty which would be felt by the colonies in
separating from the Mother Country. Even now
the North American Confederation represents a
state formidable from the numbers of its hardy
and energetic population, and capable, if so
united, of vigorously defending the territories it
possesses. A few years will add greatly to that
population, and place Canada, Hochelaga,
Acadia, or by whatever other name the Confederacy may think fit to call itself, quite
out of the
reach of invasion or conquest. Such a state would
not only be strong against the Mother Country
under the impossible supposition of our seeking to
coerce it by force, but it might be separated from
us without incurring the disgrace of leaving a
small and helpless community at the mercy of
powerful and warlike neighbors.
Here, then, is the somewhat less diplomatic
utterance of the Times, on the occasion of the
appearance of this despatch. It is perfectly
true that no hint was given officially, when
this scheme was sent home, that it contemplated separation. Perfectly true, that in
the
answer there is no hint that separation is contemplated. But it is perfectly true,
also, that
the leading journal instantly sees in it, and
seizes at, the possibility-first, of its greatly
facilitating our going—and, secondly, of its
greatly facilitating, on the part of the Mother
Country, the letting of us go. I shall come
back to this branch of the subject presently,
after I shall have quoted from a much more
important expression of public opinion than
any article in the Times. Meantime, I must
refer to the language of Her Majesty's Speech
from the Throne. It has been read during
this debate already, and has been read as if
it contained the most emphatic approval
possible of this whole scheme—so emphatic
an approval, that even to assume to discuss it
now would seem to amount almost to treason.
This language, of course, it is needless to say,
is that of Her Majesty's Imperial advisers,
and is to be read in connection with what
Her Majesty's Government have said about
this plan in the Colonial Secretary's despatch—that before it is passed into an
enactment, it will require a good deal of
revision. We may be told here that the
document before us is a treaty, on which not
a line or letter of amendment can be made
by us. But Her Majesty's Government
clearly understand that they are not bound
by it, and that they are to alter it as much
as they please. They won't give the pardoning power to these lieutenant governors
; they
won't constitute the Legislative Council in
this way ; they won't look with indifference
to the incurring of unheard-of expenses, and
the hampering of commerce which they
535
consider to be implied in this scheme. No,
they are to look into this thing, to look into
the details of what they evidently think to
be a pretty crude scheme ; while we, who
are most interested, are required by our
local rulers not to look into it at all, but
just to accept it at their hands as a
whole. The language addressed from
the Throne to the Imperial Parliament
is this : " Her Majesty has had great satisfaction in giving Her sanction "—to what
?
—"to the meeting of a conference of delegates from the several North American
Provinces, who, on invitation from Her
Majesty's Governor General, assembled at
Québec." Certainly ; we knew that before ;
they assembled without Her Majesty's sanction, but they got her sanction afterwards
to
their having so assembled. " These delegates adopted resolutions having for their
object a closer union of those provinces
under a central government. If those resolutions shall be approved by the provincial
legislatures, a bill will be laid before you for
carrying this important measure into effect"
—not for giving full effect to the details of
this scheme, but for carrying the measure—
the closer union—in the shape the Imperial
Government may give it, into effect. That
is all. (Hear, hear.) Take this along with
the despatch of the Colonial Secretary. If
it is a declaration that this thing is a treaty,
which may not be amended by us without
flying in the face of Her Majesty's Government, I do not understand the meaning of
words. (Hear, hear.) In connection with
the Speech from the Throne, we had, the
other night, some notice taken, on the floor
of this House, of language used in discussing the address in the Imperial Parliament.
Lords Claremont, Houghton, Granville
and Derby had something to say in respect
of this scheme in the House of Lords ; as
also, Mr. Hanbury Tracy in the House of
Commons. I do not attach great weight to
what was there said, because there really
was little said any way, and that little could
not indicate any great amount of knowledge
upon the subject treated. However, I will
quote first what the mover of the address,
the Earl of Claremont, said. After referring to the war in New Zealand, he went
on :—
 My Lords, although these operations in India,
New Zealand, and Japan, are matters of more or
less interest or concern to the nation, and, as
such, are fully deserving of notice, yet they are
small in comparison to the importance of the
probable change in the constitution of our North
American Colonies. Since the declaration of
independence by the colonies, since known as
the United States of America, so great a scheme
of self-government, or one shadowing forth
so many similar and possible changes, has not
occurred.
Now, I cannot read this sentence without asking what analogy there is between
this project and the declaration of independence. Why should these resolutions
suggest to any one's mind the declaration of independence ? Did the gentlemen
who signed these resolutions in order to
authenticate them—pledge their lives and
fortunes, and I don't know what besides, to
anything, or risk anything, by appending
their signatures to the document? Was it a
great exercise of political heroism? Why,
the men who signed the declaration of
independence qualified themselves in the
eyes of the Imperial Government for the
pleasant operations of heading and hanging.
They knew what they were about. They
were issuing a rebel declaration of war. But
this is a piece of machinery, on the face of it
at least, to perpetuate our connection with the
Mother Country ! Why then does it suggest
the idea that so great a scheme of self-government, or one shadowing forth so many
similar and possible changes, " hardly ever
before occurred ?" It is because there is,
underlying the speaker's thought, just that
idea of the anti-colonial school in England,
that we are going to slip away from our connection with the Mother Country ; and in
this
respect, therefore, it seems to him that it is like
the declaration of independence. The remaining sentence indicates a curious misapprehension
as to the present posture of this
question. " If the delegates of these several
colonies finally agree to the resolutions
framed by their committee, and if these
resolutions be approved by the several legislatures of the several colonies, Parliament
will be asked to consider and complete this
federation of our Northern American possessions." The noble lord, the mover of the
Address, seems to take the resolutions for a
mere report of a committee which (on their
way here) had yet to be submitted to the
consideration of the delegates ! Next, I turn
to the language of Lord Houghton, the
seconder of the Address ; and from his lips
too, we have an almost distinct utterance of
the idea of our coming independence. He
says :—
536
 That impulse which inclines small states to bind
themselves together for the purpose of mutual
protection and for the dignity of empire, has
shewn itself in two remarkable examples, of
which I may be permitted to say a few words. In
Europe it has manifested itself in the case of
Italy, which is not, indeed, alluded to in any part
of Her Majesty's speech, because it is an accomplished fact of European history. A
convention
has lately taken place between the Emperor of
the French and the King of Italy, in which England can take no other interest than
to hope that
it may redound to the prosperity of the one and
the honor of the other. At any rate, one great
advantage has been accomplished. With his
capital in the centre of Italy it is no longer possible to talk of Victor Emmanuel
as King of
Piedmont. He is King of Italy, or nothing. On
the other side of the Atlantic the same impulse-
[that same impulse, which, in the case of Italy,
the speaker characterizes as aiming at the
dignity of empire]—the same impulse had manifested itself in the proposed amalgamation
of
the northern provinces of British America. I
heartily concur in all—[the all being as we
have just seen, not much]—that has been
said by my noble friend the mover of this address in his laudation of that project.
It is,
my lords, a most interesting contemplation
that that project has arisen, and has been
approved by Her Majesty's Government. It is
certainly contrary to what might be considered
the old maxims of government in connection
with the colonies, that we should here express
—and that the Crown itself should express-
satisfaction at a measure which tends to bind
together, in almost independent power, our colonies in North America. We do still
believe that
though thus banded together, they will recognize
the value of British connection, and that while
they will be safer in this amalgamation, we shall
be as safe in their fealty. The measure will no
doubt, my lords, require much prudent consideration and great attention to provincial
susceptibilities.
I repeat, Mr. Speaker, there is in this
quotation a second pretty-plainly-expressed
anticipation of our nearly approaching independence. We are supposed, by one of
these noble lords, to be taking a step analogous to that taken by the authors of the
Declaration of Independence ; and by the
other, to be moved by the same impulse of
empire that has been leading to the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy.
Mr. DUNKIN—Yes, I have no doubt it
is a case of want of correct information,
and not the only one of its kind. And now,
sir, for Lord Derby's remarks, which also
have been quoted here. Certainly, they are
in a different, and to my mind a more satis
factory, tone ; but they are suggestive, for all
that, of an idea that is unwelcome. After
remarking on certain passages indicative, in
his view, of unfriendly feeling on the part of
the United States towards Great Britain and
towards us—their threatened abrogation of
the reciprocity treaty, arming on the lakes,
and so forth—Lord Derby says :—
 Under these circumstances I see with additional
satisfaction—[Meaning of, course, though courtesy may have disallowed the phrase,
"less dissatisfaction," for he certainly did not see those
other matters with any satisfaction at all]—
I see with additional satisfaction the announcement of a contemplated important step.
I mean the
proposed Federation of the British American Provinces. (Hear, hear.) I hope I may
regard that
Federation as a measure tending to constitute a
power strong enough, with the aid of this country,
which I trust may never be withdrawn from those
provinces, to acquire an importance which,
separately, they could not obtain. (Hear, hear.)
If I saw in this Federation a desire to separate
from this country, I should think it a matter of
much more doubtful policy and advantage ; but
I perceive with satisfaction, that no such wish is
entertained. Perhaps it is premature to discuss,
at present, resolutions not yet submitted to the
different provincial legislatures, but I hope I see
in the terms of that Federation an earnest desire
on the part of the provinces to maintain for
themselves the blessing of the connection with
this country, and a determined and deliberate
preference for monarchical over republican institutions.
(Hear, hear.) Now, what I have to say is
this, that while I think no man ought to find
fault with any of the sentiments here uttered,
they are yet the utterances of a statesman
who betrays in those utterances at least, as
they sound to me, a certain amount of
scarcely-concealed apprehension. When a
man in the position of Lord Derby, master
of the whole art of expression, speaks at once
so hypothetically and so guardedly, falls back
upon " I hope I may regard," " I trust may
never be," "I hope I see," and so forth, one
feels that there is an under-current of
thought, not half concealed by such expressions, to the effect that there is too much
danger of the very things so hoped and
trusted against coming to pass at no very
distant period.
Mr. DUNKIN—Well, the hon. gentleman sees differently from what I do. If
there had been no doubt whatever in the
mind of Lord DERBY, as to our want of
strength, the growth of the anti-colonial
party at home, and the tendency of this
537
scheme towards separation, his hope and trust
to the contrary, would either have been
unuttered, or would have been uttered in
another tone. I am well enough satisfied
that Lord DERBY himself has not the most
remote idea of falling in with the views of
the so-called colonial reformers in England,
who desire to see the colonies pay for every
thing or be cast off ; but he knows the hold
that their views have gained at home, and he
speaks accordingly. And there is no doubt,
sir, that this feeling has been got up in England to an extent very much to be regretted.
In this connection I have yet to notice some
passages—and I shall deal with them as
briefly as I can—from the very important
article I quoted last night, which is contained
in the
Edinburgh Review for January, and
which, I am sorry to say, expresses this feeling in the strongest possible form. But
before citing them, I am bound to say that I
by no means believe the views they express
are universally or even generally entertained
at home. I do believe, though, that they are
entertained by many, and that there is much
danger of their doing a vast deal of mischief.
That they are loudly avowed, does not admit
of doubt ; and when we find them set forth
in the pages of so influential an organ of
opinion as the
Edinburgh Review, the case
assumes a very serious aspect. There are
other passages in the article to the same
effect as those I am about to read, and which
might, perhaps, be quoted with advantage,
did time allow. Well, here is one occurring
early in the article :—
 There are problems of colonial policy the solution of which cannot, without peril,
be indefinitely
delayed; and though Imperial England is doing
her best to keep up appearances in the management of her five an forty dependencies,
the
political links which once bound them to each
other and to their common centre are evidently
worn out. Misgivings haunt the public mind as
to the stability of an edifice which seems to be
founded on a reciprocity of deception, and
only to be shored up for the time by obsolete
an meaningless traditions.
When an utterance like this finds its way
into the pages of the Edinburgh Review, a
review which more than almost any other
may be held to speak in the name of a large
class of the ablest statesmen of England, we
have reason to ask what it is all tending to.
I never in my life felt more pain in reading
anything political, than I felt in reading
this article ; and I never discharged a more
painful duty than I am endeavoring to dis
charge at this moment, in commenting on
it. But truth is truth, and must be told.
A little farther on, the same writer proceeds :—
 It is not unnatural that the desire to maintain
a connection with the power and wealth of the
Mother Country should be stronger on the side of
the colonies than it is on that of the British public,
for they owe almost ever thing to us, and we
receive but little from them. Moreover, the
existing system of colonial government enables
them to combine all the advantages of local independence with the strength and dignity
of
a great empire. But the Imperial Government
in the meantime has to decide, not as of old,
whether Great Britain is to tax the colonies,
but to what extent the colonies are to be permitted to tax Great Britain—a question
which
is daily becoming more urgent and less easy of
solution.
Further on, the writer goes on to say :—
 lt might puzzle the wisest of our statesmen, if
he were challenged to put his finger on any
single item of material advantage resulting to
ourselves from our dominions in British North
America, which cost us at this moment about a
million sterling a year.
They do no such thing; but that is neither
here nor there. Then follow these sentences, more galling still :—
 Retainers who will neither give nor accept
notice to quit our service, must, it is assumed,
be kept for our service. There are, nevertheless,
special and exceptional difliculties which beset us
in this portion of our vast field of empire.
Nearly a page follows of description of what
these difficulties are, being mainly those
arising out of apprehended dangers from the
United States, and thereon is based this observation :—
 It is scarcely surprising that any project which
may offer a prospect of escape from a political
situation so undignified and unsatisfactory should
be hailed with a cordial welcome by all parties
concerned.
But one meaning can be put upon all this.
In the opinion of the writer, England does
not believe that these provinces are worth
anything to her, while the connection with
the Mother Country is worth all to us ; and
she would hail with satisfaction any way of
escape from the obligations and dangers
that we are said to cast upon her. I go on
a little further, and I find what are his
views as to the undertakings that, in connection with this project, we are expected
to assume. What I am next quoting forms
538
a foot note ; but a foot note is often, like a
lady's postscript, more important than the
text of the letter :—
A very important question, on which these
papers afford no information, is that relating to
the future condition of those territories and dependencies of the Crown in North America,
which
are not included within the present boundaries of
the five provinces. We allude more particularly
to the territories now held by the Hudson's Bay
Company, under the Crown, by charter or lease.
The Crown is doubtless bound to take care that
the interest of its grantees—[it never seems to
have occurred to our friend that we, too, are
grantees]—are not prejudiced by these changes ;
but, on the other hand, an English trading company is ill qualified to carry on the
government
and provide for the defence of a vast and inaccessible expanse of continental territory.
One would think so, seeing that it is just
this territory which this writer has been
telling us England shrinks herself from
defending :—
Probably, the best and most equitable solution
would be the cession of the whole region to the
Northern Federation for a fair indemnity—[probably enough, from a point of view not
ours—
(hear, hear)]—and this would lead to the execution of the Great Northern Pacific Railway,
under
the auspices of the Federal power.
Would it? (Hear, hear, and laughter.)
Mr. DUNKIN—A little further on, in
the article, I find some amplification of this
grand programme :—
The result of these proposals, if carried into
effect, would be the creation of a new state in
North America, still retaining the name of a
British dependency, comprising an area about
equal to that of Europe, a population of about
four millions, with an aggregate revenue in sterling of about two millions and a half,
and carrying
on a trade (including exports, imports and intercolonial commerce) of about twenty-eight
millions sterling per annum. If we consider the
relative positions of Canada and the Maritime
Provinces—the former possessing good harbors,
but no back country, the former an unlimited
supply of cereals, but few minerals ; the latter
an unlimited supply of iron and coal, but little
agricultural produce. The commercial advantages of union between states so circumstanced,
are too obvious to need comment. The completion
of the Intercoloaial Railway, and the probable
annexation of the fertile portions of the North-
Western territory to the new Confederation,
form a portion only of the probable consequences
of its formation, but in which Europe and the
world at large will eventually participate. When
the—
Hon. Mr. McDOUGALL— The hon.
gentleman should do justice to the reviewer.
He leaves out an important passage.
Hon. Mr. McDOUGALL—After the
word " formation," the following words are
given :—" The benefits of which will not be
limited to the colonies alone, but," &c.
Taken with the context, these words are
important.
Mr. DUNKIN—An ironical cheer is an
easy thing to raise ; but I fancy my character hardly warrants the insinuation that
I
would dishonestly falsify a quotation. I
wrote out these extracts hurriedly, the one
procurable copy of the
Review being sent for
while I was writing, and I had no opportunity of comparing my manuscript. I
am sorry if in my haste I omitted a single
word. [After comparing the passage in the
Review with his manuscript, the hon. member said] : I find I have omitted exactly one
line—certainly by the merest accident ;
indeed, if any one can suppose I did it on
purpose, he must take me for a confounded
fool. (Hear, hear.) But to continue my
quotation, reading again that last sentence,
with its dropped line :—
 The completion of the Intercolonial Railway,
and the probable annexation of the fertile portions of the Great North-Western territory
to the
new Confederation, form a portion only of the
probable consequences of its formation, the
benefits of which will not be limited to the colonies
alone, but in which Europe and the world at
large will eventually participate. When the
Valley of the Saskatchewan shall have been
colonized, the communications between the Red
River Settlement and Lake Superior completed,
and the harbour of Halifax united by one continuous line of railway, with the shores
of Lake
Huron, the three missing links between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans will have been supplied.
Three pretty large links, by the way, and it _
would have been more correct if the writer
had said " three out of four " —the trifle of the
Rocky Mountains being still left for a fourth.
(Hear, hear.)
Mr. DUNKIN—I don't think so ; it's
rather too good. I have read these portions
539
of the article to show what we are expected
by this writer to do. We are to buy the
Hudson's Bay territory, and take care of it,
and make a grand road all across the continent, which Great Britain shrinks from
contemplating herself. And now I will
read just two passages to show how little
sanguine he is of any good to be done by
the scheme as regards ourselves, and in the
conduct of our own affairs. Here is one of
them :—
 What we have to fear, and if possible to guard
against, is the constant peril of a three-fold conflict of authority implied in the
very existence of
a federation of dependencies retaining, as now
proposed, any considerable share of intercolonial
independence.
Rather a suggestive hint, and which, further
on, is expanded and emphasized thus :—
 If, as has been alleged, a legislative union is
unattainable, because inconsistent with due securities for the rights guaranteed to
the French
Canadians, by treaty or by the Quebec Act, and
Federation is therefore the only alternative, the
vital question for the framers of this Constitution
is how the inherent weakness of all federations
can in this instance be cured, and the Central
Government armed with a sovereignty which may
be worthy of the name. It is the essence of all
good governments to have somewhere a true
sovereign power. A sovereignty which ever
eludes your grasp, which has no local habitation,
provincial or imperial, is in fact no government
at all. Sooner or later the shadow of authority
which is reflected from an unsubstantial political
idea must cease to have power among men. It
has been assumed by those who take a sanguine
view of this political experiment, that its authors
have steered clear of the rock on which the
Washington Confederacy has split. But if the
weakness of the Central Government is the rock
alluded to, we fear that unless in clear water and
smooth seas, the pilot who is to steer this new
craft will need a more perfect chart than the
resolutions of the Quebec Conference afford, to
secure him against the risks of navigation.
So far, then, according to the writer of this
article, we have three points settled. He
considers, and those for whom he writes and
speaks consider, and the Edinburgh Review
makes known that it considers—first, that the
retention of these colonies is so manifestly disadvantageous to the parent state,
that it would
puzzle any statesman to find any reason for
keeping us ; next, that a result of this measure is to be the early carrying through
by
us of undertakings too vast now for England
not to shrink from ; and thirdly, that the
measure itself, viewed as a machinery of
government for ourselves, is not going to
work well. There is still a fourth point.
The measure embodies a proffer of fealty to
the British Crown—and with no hint but
that such fealty, and the correlative duty of
protection, are meant both of them to be
perpetual. How does our writer treat of
this ? He says :—
 If the Quebec project were to be regarded as in
any sense a final arrangement, and the equivalent
in honor or power to be derived by the Crown
from the acceptance of so perilous an authority,
were to be weighed in the balance with the
commensurate risks, the safety and dignity of the
proffered position might be very questionable ;
but it is impossible to regard this proposed Federation in any other light than that
of a transition
stage to eventual independence ; and in this view
the precise form which Imperial sovereignty may
for the time being assume, becomes a matter of
comparatively secondary importance.
And, as if this was not warning plain enough.
the article closes thus :—
 The people of England have no desire to snap
asunder abruptly the slender links which still
unite them with their trans-Atlantic fellow-subjects, or to shorten by a single hour
the duration
of their common citizenship. * Â * Â Â * Â Â * Â
We are led irresistibly to the inference that this
stage has been well nigh reached in the history
of our trans-Atlantic provinces. Hence it comes
to pass that we accept, not with fear and trembling, but with unmixed joy and satisfaction,
a
voluntary proclamation, which, though couched
in the accents of loyalty, and proffering an enduring allegiance to our Queen, falls
yet more welcome on our ears as the harbinger of the future
and complete independence of British North
America.
(Hear, hear.) Well. Mr. Speaker, I can
only say that if these are the opinions
which honorable gentlemen opposite are
disposed to " hear, hear" approvingly, they
are not mine. I find in them an unmistakable proof that there is an important
party at home who take up this measure,
and hope to see it carried through with the
mere view to its being a step to absolute
independence on our part, and a cutting of
the tie between these provinces and the
parent state. (Hear, hear.) Sir, I look upon
the early cutting of that tie as a certain
result of this measure ; and of that again, I
hold the inevitable result to be our early
absorption into the republic south of us—the
United States, or the Northern States, be
which it may. (Hear, hear.) It cannot be,
that we can form here an independent state
that shall have a prosperous history. I say
540
again, I am far from believing that this idea
of separation is by any means the dominant
opinion at home ; but I am sure it is entertained by a prominent school of English
politicians. (Cries of " Name, name.") It is
easy to call for names ; but there are too many ;
one can't go over the names of a whole school.
I indicate them well enough when I give
them the well-known name of the Goldwin-
Smith school. There are influential men
enough, and too many, among them —
(Renewed cries of " Name.") Well then, I
rather think Mr. Cobden, Mr. Bright,
and any number more of the Liberal party,
belong to this school—in fact, most of
what are known as the Manchester school.
But, joking apart, if honorable gentlemen in
their simplicity believe that utterances of the
kind I have been reading appear in the
Edinburgh Review without significance, their
simplicity passes mine. I read these utterances, in connection with those of the Times
and of any quantity of other English journals, as
representing the views of an influential portion
of the British public, views which have such
weight with the Imperial Government as may
go some way to account for the acceptance—
the qualified acceptance—which this scheme
has met with at their hands. It is recommended at home—strongly recommended, just
on this account, by those who there most
favor it—as a great step towards the independence of this country. Now, I am not
desirous that our acceptance of the scheme
should go home to be cited (as it would be)
to the people of England, as a proof that we
so view it—a proof that we wish to be
separated from the Empire. I am quite
satisfied separation will never do. We are
simply sure to be overwhelmed the instant
our neighbors and we differ, unless we have
the whole power of the Mother Country to
assist us.
Mr. DUNKIN—I think we shall, if we
maintain and strengthen our relations with
the parent state ; but I do not think we shall,
if we adopt a scheme like this, which must
certainly weaken the tie between us and the
Empire. Our language to England had better be the plain truth—that we are no beggars,
and will shirk no duty ; that we do not
want to go, and of ourselves will not go ; that
our feelings and our interests alike hold us to
her ; that, even apart from feeling, we are not
strong enough, and know our own weakness,
and the strength of the power near us ; and
that the only means by which we can possibly
be kept from absorption by that power, is
the maintaining now—and for all time that
we can look forward to—of our connection with the Mother Land. (Hear,
hear.) We are told, again, that there are
considerations connected with the Lower Provinces which make it necessary for us to
accept this measure, that it is a solemn treaty
entered into with them. Well, a treaty, I
suppose, implies authority on the part of those
who framed it to enter into it.
Hon. Mr. McGEE—Her Majesty says in
her Speech from the Throne at the opening of
the Imperial Parliament, that she approves of
the Conference that framed the treaty. Is
not the royal sanction suficient authority ?
Mr. DUNKIN—Her Majesty's approval
of those gentlemen having met and consulted
together, is not even Her Majesty's approval
—much less is it provincial approval—of
what they did at that meeting. At most, the
resolutions are not a treaty, but the mere draft
of an agreement come to between those gentlemen.
Mr. DUNKIN—Well, it is a draft of a
treaty if you like, but it is not a treaty. Plenipotentiaries, who frame treaties,
have full
authority to act on behalf of their respective
countries.
Hon. Atty. Gen. CARTIER—It is the
same as any other treaty entered into under
the British system. The Government is responsible for it to Parliament, and if this
does
not meet your approval, you can dispossess us
by a vote of want of confidence.
Mr. DUNKIN —The honorable gentleman
may have trouble yet before he is through
with it.
Hon. J. S. MACDONALD—It is not so
long since the honorable gentleman was voted
out, and it may not be long before he is served
the same way again. (Hear, hear, and laughter.
MR. DUNKIN—Well, I was saying that
this is no treaty to which the people either of
Canada or of the Lower Provinces are at all
bound ; and it is very doubtful whether the
people of the Lower Provinces will not reject
it. I am quite satisfied that the people of
Canada ought not to accept it, and I am not
541
so very sure but that before the play is played
out to the end, they will refuse to accept it,
especially the people of Lower Canada, where,
if it is carried at all, it will be by a very
small majority. (Hear, hear.) But the honorable gentleman (Hon. Mr. Cartier) has
come over to my ground that it is not a
treaty, but only the draft of a treaty, subject
to the disapproval of the House and country.
Taking it, however, as a treaty merely between those who entered into it, I am disposed
to make one admission, that it has one
quality such as often attaches to treaties
entered into by duly constituted plenipotentiaries, and that is, that there seem to
be some
secret articles connected with it. (Hear,
hear.)
Hon. Atty. Gen. Cartier—The gentlemen who entered into it represented their
governments, and the governments of all the
provinces were represented. It is therefore a
treaty between these provinces, which will
hold good unless the Government is ousted by
a vote of the House.
Mr. DUNKIN—The honorable gentleman
does not, I suppose, forget that when this
Government was formed there was a distinct
declaration made, that until the plan they
might propose should have been completed in
detail and laid before Parliament, Parliament
was not to be held committed to it in any
way. (Hear, hear.) But I was going on to
something else, and I cannot allow myself to be
carried back. I was saying that, assimilating
this to a treaty like some other treaties, it
seems to have secret articles in it. I find
that one of the gentlemen who took part in
the negotiations, the Hon. Mr. Hathaway,
of New Brunswick—
Mr. DUNKIN—I was under the impression he was ; though I acknowledge I have
not burdened my memory with an exact list
of the thirty-three distinguished gentlemen
who took part in the Conference. At all
events, he was a member of the Government
of New Brunswick, which was a party represented at the Conference. Mr. Hathaway,
at a public meeting lately, said that—
 He occupied a very unenviable position. He
was under peculiar embarrassments, more so
than any other speaker who would address them.
It was well known to most of his audience that
he had been one of the sworn advisers of His
Excellency for the past three years. As such he
could reveal no secrets of Council. It was true
His Excellency had given him permission to
make public the correspondence that had taken
place on the subject of his resignation, but whatever might be the effect upon himself,
there were
secrets connected with the scheme that he could
not divulge.
There were secrets of the scheme that he was
not free to speak of. And we, too, find here that
there are secrets ; many matters as to which
we may ask as much as we like, and can get
no information. But the main point I was
coming to is this. Call this thing what you
like—treaty or whatever you please—it is
not dealt with in the Lower Provinces at
all in the way in which it is proposed
to deal with it here. The Lower Provinces,
we think, are smaller political communities
than ourselves. Their legislative councils,
their Houses of Assembly, we do not call quite
so considerable as our own. We are in the
habit of thinking that among the legislative
bodies in the British Empire, we stand number two ; certainly a great way behind the
House of Commons, but having no other body
between us and them in point of importance.
(Hear, hear.) The Lower Provinces, I say,
are not so big as we are, and yet how differently has our Parliament been treated
from
the way in which their smaller parliaments
have been. And the apology, the reason assigned why we are treated as we are, is,
that
this thing is a binding treaty, if not yet between the provinces, at least between
the
governments of the other provinces and the
Government of Canada. But how does the
Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia address
his houses of parliament ? " It is not my provinces," says he, " and I have no mission
to
do more than afford you the amplest and freest
scope for the consideration of a proposal "
—he does not call it a treaty—he calls it
merely " a proposal, which seriously involves
your own prospects." I suppose it does ; but,
so far from calling it a treaty, he does not
call it even an agreement.
Mr. DUNKIN—Does it? Let me read
the whole passage :—
 It is not my province, and I have no mission to
do more than afford you the amplest and freest
scope for consideration of a proposal which seriously involves your own prospects,
and in reference to which you should be competent to interpret
the wishes and determine the true interests of the
country. I feel assured, however, that whatever
be the result of your deliberations, you will de
542
precate attempts to treat in a narrow spirit, or
otherwise than with dispassionate care and prudence, a question so broad that it in
reality covers
the ground of all parties, and precludes it from
becoming the measure of merely one government
or one party.
He gives his parliament perfect carte blanche
to deal with it as they please.
Mr. DUNKIN—It is a pity the same language was not addressed to us. In that case,
Mr. Speaker, I think the motion put into
your hands would have been, that you should
now leave the chair, in order that we might
go into committee of the whole to give the
matter careful and becoming consideration.
It is not pressed on in Nova Scotia, as it is
here, with undue haste. The Lieutenant-
Governor, in the next paragraph of his speech,
goes on to say :—
 I need only observe further, without in the least
intending thereby to influence your ultimate determination, that it is obviously
convenient, if
not essential, for the legislatures of all the provinces concerned to observe uniformity
in the
mode of ascertaining their respective decisions
on a question common to all. I have, therefore,
desired to be laid before you some correspondence
between the Governor General and myself on that
point.
That correspondence, too, which is to be laid
before the Parliament of Nova Scotia, has not
been laid before us. (Hear, hear.) I have
given the language addressed by this Lieutenant-Governor to his Legislature with reference
to this " proposal." In what language do
the Commons of Nova Scotia reply ? How
will they deal with it?
 The report from the delegates appointed to
confer upon the union of the Maritime Provinces,
and the resolutions of the Conference held at
Quebec, proposing a union of the different provinces of British North America, together
with
the correspondence upon that subject, will obtain
at our hands the deliberate and attentive consideration demanded by a question of
such magnitude and importance, and fraught with consequences so momentous to us and
our posterity.
This, sir, is all that the Government of Nova
Scotia ask the Legislature of that province to
say. And I do not think that this course of
theirs exactly indicates that they think they
have made a treaty by which they must stand
or fall, and to every letter and line of which
they must force their Legislature to adhere.
If they do regard it in that light, they have
a very indirect way of expressing their ideas.
But this is not the case merely in Nova Sco
tia. In Prince Edward Island, every one
knows the Government is not bringing this
down as a treaty; in New Brunswick everybody knows that the Government has been
more or less changed since the Conference,
that a general election is going on, and that
a great deal will depend on the doubtful result of that election. Every one knows
that
the matter is in a very different position in
every one of the Lower Provinces from what
it is in here ; that there is none of this talk
about a treaty anywhere but here. I would
like, however, by the way, to draw the attention of the House for a moment to a case
in which there undoubtedly was a treaty. I
speak of the proceedings which eventuated
in the union between England and Scotland.
In the reign of Queen Anne, at the instance
of the two legislatures, then respectively independent—of England on the one hand,
and of Scotland on the other—Her Majesty
appointed commissioners to represent each of
her two states, and they framed what were
declared to be articles of a treaty. They
took months to frame those articles ; and
twice in the course of their proceedings Her
Majesty came down to assist personally at
their deliberations. Their meeting was authorized by acts of Parliament ; they were
named by Her Majesty; they deliberated for
months; and the Queen attended their deliberations twice. And after they had entered
into this treaty—so called on the face
of it—the Parliament of Scotland departed
from it and insisted on changes which were
approved of by the Parliament of England,
and the treaty as thus changed went into operation. In both parliaments the bills
to
give effect to it passed through every stage ;
originated in Committee of the Whole, and
had their first, second and third readings.
All was done with the utmost formality ;
and yet there was there unmistakably a
treaty solemnly made beforehand. Here we
have an affair got up in seventeen days
by thirty-three gentlemen who met without
the sanction of the Crown, and only got that
sanction afterwards. The document they
agreed upon is full of oversights, as the Colonial Secretary states, and as everyone
knows
who has read it. Yet our Government regard
it as a sacred treaty—though no one but
themselves so regards it—and want to give
it a sacredness which was not claimed even
for that treaty between England and Scotland.
(Hear, hear.) I am at last very near the
close of the remarks I have to offer to the
House ; but I must say a few words as to the
543
domestic consideration urged to force us into this scheme. We are asked, " What are
you
going to do ? You must do something. Are
you going back to our old state of dead-lock ?"
At the risk of falling into an unparliamentary
expression, I cannot help saying that I am reminded of a paragraph I read the other
day
in a Lower Province paper, in which the
editor was dealing with this same cry, which
seems to be raised in Nova Scotia as well as
here—the cry that something must be done,
that things cannot go on as they are. I have
not his words here, but their general effect
was this—" Whenever," says he, " I hear this
cry raised, that something must be done, I
suspect there is a plan on foot to get something very bad done. Things are in a bad
way—desperate, may be. But the remedy
proposed is sure to be desperate. I am put
in mind of a story of two boys who couldn't
swim, but by ill luck had upset their canoe in
deep water, and by good luck had got on the
bottom of it. Says the big boy to the little
one, ' Tom, can you pray ?' Tom confessed
he could not call to mind a prayer suited to
the occasion. ' No, Bill,' says he, ' I don't
know how.' Bill's answer was earnest, but
not parliamentary. It contained a past participle which I won't repeat. It was, '
Well,
something must be done—and that—soon !' "
(Laughter.) Now, seriously, what do honorable gentlemen mean when they raise here
this cry that " something must be done ?"
ls it seriously meant that our past is
so bad that positively, on pain of political annihilation, of utter and hopeless
ruin, of the last, worst consequences, we must
this instant adopt just precisely this scheme ?
If that is so, if really and truly those political institutions which we were in the
habit of
saying we enjoyed, which, at all events, we
have been living under and, for that matter,
are living under now, if they have worked so
ill as all that comes to, or rather if we have
worked them so ill, I think we hold out poor
encouragement to those whom we call upon to
take part with us in trying this new experiment. We Canadians have had a legislative
union and worked it close upon five and twenty years, and under it have got, it is
said, into
such a position of embarrassment among ourselves, are working our political institutions
so very badly, are in such a frightful fix, that,
never mind what the prospects of this particular step may be, it must positively be
taken ;
we cannot help it, we cannot stay as we are,
nor yet go back, nor yet go forward, in any
course but just this one. (Hear, hear.) If
this thing is really this last desperate remedy for a disease past praying for, then
indeed I am desperately afraid, sir, that it will not succeed. The hot haste with
which gentlemen
are pressing it is of ill omen to the deceived
Mother Country, to our deceived sister provinces, and to our most miserably deceived
selves. But the truth is that we are in no such
sad case ; there is no fear of our having to go
back to this bugbear past ; we could not do it
if we would. Things done cannot be undone.
In a certain sense, whatever is past is irrevocable, and it is well it should be.
True we
are told by some of the honorable gentlemen
on the Treasury benches that their present
harmony is not peace, but only a sort of armed
truce, that old party lines are not effaced, nor
going tobe. Well, sir, if so, suppose that
this scheme should be ever so well dropped,
and then that some day soon after these gentlemen should set themselves to the job
of
finding out who is cuckoo and who hedge-
sparrow in the government nest that now shelters them all in such warm quiet, suppose
there should thus soon be every effort made
to revive old cries and feuds—what then ?
Would it be the old game over again, or a
variation of it amounting to a new one ? For
a time at least, sir, a breathing time that happily cannot be got over, those old
cries and
old feuds will not be found to be revivable as
of old. Even representation by population
will be no such spell to conjure with—will fall
on ears far less excitable. It has been adopted by any number of those who might otherwise
be the likeliest to run it down. It will
be found there might be a worse thing in the
minds of many. Give it a new name and
couple it with sufficient safeguard against
legislation of the local stamp being put
through against the vote of the local majority — the principle tacitly held so, and
found to answer in the case of Scotland
—and parliamentary reform may be found
no such bug-bear to speak of after all. And
as for the bug-bears of the personal kind,
why, sir, after seeing all we have seen of the
extent to which gentlemen can set aside or
overcome them when occasion may require, it
is too much to think they will for some little
time go for so very much. Like it or not,
honorable gentlemen, for a time, will have to
be to some extent busy with a game that shall
be not quite the old one. The friends of this
project, Mr. Speaker, never seem to tire of
prophesying to us smooth things, if only it is
once first adopted. To every criticism on
its many and manifest defects, the ready an
544
swer is, that we do not enough count upon
men's good sense, good feeling, forbearance,
and all that sort of thing. But, sir, if the
adoption of this scheme is so to improve our
position, is to make everything so smooth,
to make all our public men so wise, so prudent, and so conscientious, I should like
to
know why a something of the same kind may
not by possibility be hoped for, even though
this project should be set aside. If we are to
be capable of the far harder task of working
out these projected unworkable political institutions, why is it that we must be incapable
of the easier task of going on without
them ? I know well that in all time the temper of those who do not think has been
to put
faith rather in the great thing one cannot do,
than in the smaller thing one can. " If the
prophet had bid thee do some great thing,
wouldest thou not have done it? " And here
too, air, as so often before, if the truth must
be told, the one thing truly needed is what
one may call the smaller thing—not perhaps
easy, but one must hope not impossible—the
exercise by our public men and by our people
of that amount of discretion, good temper and
forbearance which sees something larger and
higher in public life than mere party struggles
and crises without end; of that political sagacity or capacity, call it which you
will, with
which they will surely find the institutions
they have to be quite good enough for
them to use and quietly make better, without which they will as surely find any
that may anyhow be given them, to be
quite bad enough for them to fight over
and make worse.- Mr. SPEAKER, I feel that
I have taken up a great deal of the time of
the House, and that I have presented but
imperfectly the views I am anxious to impress
upon it as to this great question. But for
sheer want of strength, I might have felt it
necessary, at whatever risk of wearying the
House, to go into some matters more thoroughly, and more especially into that branch
of the subject which relates to what I may
call the alternative policy I myself prefer to
this measure, and would wish to see adopted
and carried out. As it is, I have but to say
in conclusion, while warmly thanking the
House for the attention and patience with
which it has for so many hours listened to
me, that I have said nothing but what I
firmly believe, and felt myself bound to say,
and that I trust the sober good sense of the
people of these provinces, after full reflection
and discussion, will decide rightly upon this
the largest question by far that has ever been
before them for decision. (Cheers)
On motion of Hon. Mr. CAUOHON, the
debate was then adjourned.
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