HON. MR. CAMPBELL said that, with
the permission of the honorable member who
had the floor (Hon. Mr. CURRIE), he would
offer a few remarks upon one portion of the
scheme of Confederation, to which allusion
had been specially made in the House, and
which, to a limited extent, had occupied the
attention of the country . He referred to the
proposed constitution of the Legislative Council under that scheme ; and in offering
the
reasons which had led the Canadian Government and the other members of the Conference,
which, as honorable members knew, was
composed of the leading men in the legislatures of the several provinces — the leading
men in opposition as well as the leading man in
office—to decide as they had done, he begged
the House to believe that the decision had
not been arrived at hastily, but after prolonged
and anxious discussion, and after a full and
careful consideration of the subject. It was
not to be supposed that the Government of Canada had itself laid down the scheme of
the constitution as embraced in the resolutions
on the table of the House. Honorable gentlemen must not misunderstand him. He did
not mean to say that the Government did not
heartily concur in and adopt the scheme, but
that it was not its work alone, but that of the
delegates from the other provinces as well.
It was the result of deliberation, accommodation and compromise. When it became
necessary for the Government to press the
resolutions, he trusted honorable members
would not suppose that they did so out of
that love which people have for the creation
of their own intellect, but would remember
they were the joint production of the gentlemen to whom he alluded, and that any pertinacity
on his part arose from a sense of the
sacrifices they had made to secure an agreement, and the difficulties which any failure
now would create. He felt it had been impossible for the Conference to arrive at any
other understanding, and he only wished that
those who looked with disfavor upon their
plan, could have witnessed the anxious debates
held at Charlottetown and Quebec before it
was finally settled. The result arrived at
would, he hoped, promote the welfare of the
provinces interested, and be remembered with
gratitude by their inhabitants many long years
hence. And supposing this Chamber and
the other were to come to a different opinion
21
and reject the resolutions, what would
be the effect ? The sacrifices and compromises submitted to by the representatives
of the several provinces would go for
nothing ; the efforts of the eminent men who
had put aside personal and party differences
to accomplish what they deemed a great and
good work would be futile ; and yet, by such
men only could such a scheme have been
devised and matured. Considering then the
earnest efforts made to secure this agreement,
and the improbability that, if rejected, any
other could be attempted with better hope of
success, he felt he had a right to ask the House
to give the subject a fair, patient, and favorable consideration. If an amendment
were
proposed here, and another there, and especially if the provision respecting the constitution
of the House were changed, it was pretty
certain that the whole thing would miscarry,
for he well knew that in respect of this point
the legislatures of the Lower Provinces would
come to a different conclusion. If the elective
principle were insisted upon in Canada, and
its Government bound over to maintain it,
even though another Conference were called,
no agreement could be expected, for as he had
already said, the delegates from the other
provinces would be sure to be charged with
exactly different instructions. And as of this
particular point, so of a hundred others, until
it would be utterly impossible again to arrive
at anything like unanimity. As the honorable
member for Brock had so well said on a previous
evening, any failure now would be extremely
damaging to our credit abroad. It was well
kown that the fact of our public men having
thrown aside their political partisanship for
the purpose of advancing the welfare of the
country, the holding of the Conference, and
the agreement secured, had already done us
a great deal of good at home. But not
only would this first fruit of the work be
forfeited, but an injury more than correspondingly great would follow. (Hear, hear.)
[ The
honorable member elaborated this idea at some
length with the view of showing the beneficial
effect the adoption of the scheme of Confederation had produced, and the disasterous
consequences which its rejection by Parliament must inevitably entail.] He did not
propose to follow his honorable friend the
Premier in the discussion of the merits of the
project as a whole ; the able manner in which
that honorable member had presented it could
not but have commended itself to every candid mind. (Hear, hear.) He (Hon. Mr. CAMPBELL)
would, however, take up the point to
which he had alluded at the commencement,
and from which he had for a moment digressed.
and give the reasons which had induced the
Conference to determine as they had done,
upon the constitution of the Upper House.
And the main reason was to give each of the
provinces adequate security for the protection
of its local interests, a protection which it
was feared might not be found in a House
where the representation was based upon numbers only , as would be the case in the
General
Assembly. The number of representatives
to the Legislative Council under the Federal
constitution would be limited, and they would
be appointed for life instead of elected by the
people. For the purpose of securing equality
in that House, the Confederation would be
divided into two sections, vis. : Upper Canada,
Lower Canada, and the Maritime Provinces,
and each of these sections would send twenty-
four members to the House. In Upper Canada, as had been stated lately by an honorable
member, the population has increased
very rapidly, and would probably go on increasing in a much larger ratio than that
of
Lower Canada or the other provinces, and if
the Legislative Council were elective, the time
might come when the people of that section
would fancy themselves entitled to an increased
representation in the Council, and commerce
to agitate for it. They might object to the
fishing bounties paid the Lower Province, to
the money expended there in fortifications, or
to something else, and claim a representation
in the Council, more in accordance with their
population to enforce their views ; and in view
of such contingencies the delegates from those
provinces conceived it would not be safe to
trust their rights to an elective House. It
was then determined that in one branch
there would be a fixed number of members
nominated by the Crown, to enable it to
act as a counterpoise to the branch in
which the principle of representation according to population would be recognized.
It
might be said that the principle of limitation of numbers could have been adopted,
and
that of election preserved. Well, he did not
say the scheme was perfect, but it was the
best that could be devised, and as the Lower
Provinces felt the danger from their inferiority
of numbers, being only 800,000 against double
that number in Upper Canada alone, it was
essential that the security which a fixed representation in the Council afforded to
them
should be acceded to. The Conference acted
upon the conviction that they were not building a structure for a temporary purpose,
but,
22
as they hoped, for centuries, and knowing
how the doctrine of representation according
to population had operated in distracting the
popular branch of the Legislature in Canada,
they endeavored to provide against a similarly
disturbing cause in the Confederation. And
their precaution appeared to him to be founded
in wisdom and justice. For the sake of argument let it be supposed that the elective
principle is maintained, and that the limit of
numbers now proposed, viz., 24 members for
each of the three grand sections in the Council
is also fixed ; let it be supposed further, that
the population of Upper Canada continues to
augment as in the past, what may not be that
of the Saugeen, Tecumseth and Eastern Divisions (which now have 130,000, 90,000 and
60,000 respectively) forty or fift years hence ?
And is it not possible, nay, would, it not be likely, that these great constituences,
when comparing them with the divisions in Prince Edward
Island, numbering some twenty thousand to
twenty-five thousand souls, would be disposed
to set up claims for additional representation ?
Who that looks to the future will say that with
an elective Upper House the Constitution will
last ? It was the apprehension of danger to
its permanency that decided the Conference
to adopt the principle of nomination to the
superior branch, and it was the only way
which suggested itself for averting it. And
he must say for himself, that he fully and
entirely concurred in the decision. He felt
that the principle of election kept alive a germ
of doubt as to the security of the Lower Provinces, and he was glad at a way was found
of removing it altogether. It was well known
that even in the United States, where there
was so prevalent a disposition to submit
everything to the decision of the people, the
principle of limitation to the Upper House
was so fully recognized and settled by the
Constitution, that no attempt was ever made
to change it. In this way the smallest state,
like Rhode Island, was as fully represented as
the state of New York. And if that was
considered necessary in a country so compact
together as the United States, how much
more would it not be proper in a Confederation, some of the sections of which were
separated from each other by long, narrow strips
of land, or wide estuaries, with small representation in the popular branch, and looking
chiefly to their equality in the Upper Chamber
for security for local rights and interests and
institutions. He was gratified, upon another
ground, that this decision had been attained,
and this was on the ground of the respect he
bore to the life-members of this Chamber. In
the law which had made the House elective
there was no wiser provision than that which
had guaranteed the seat of the members appointed by the Crown, who then composed it.
He had always felt the great advantage of the
presence of those honorable members here.
If the elective system had entirely superseded
the nominated House, removed those gentlemen and brought together forty-eight entirely
new members, the country would have suffered
a grievous loss ; but the old members kept
their places and the new ones came in twelve
at a time, two years apart, so that the change
from one system to the other was effected
without any injury. The nominated members
had retained their influence, and the tone of
calmness and gravity which had obtained in
their deliberations was insensibly acquired by
the elective members as they came in, to the
manifest advantage of the House. We
(speaking of the elected members) had picked
up the spirit of, and the instruction the
Crown members were so fully competent to
give us, and so had been enabled to discharge
our duties in a way we could not possibly
have done if had we been left to ourselves.
If the life-members had been deprived of their
seats, it was not probable that many, if any
of them, would have sought a restoration to
them by the elective process, for they were
generally gentlemen of wealth, position, and
delicacy of feeling, whose habits of mutual
deference, quietness and order, would have
unfitted them, or made them averse to face
the turmoil and excitement of the unfavorable
electioneering contests. These honorable
gentlemen, under an elective system, must have
been deprived of their seats, and their services
have been lost to the country ; whilst under
the nominative system they will stand on the
same footing as the other members of this
House, and have a fair representation along
with the members holding their seats by
election in the Legislative Council of the
Confederate Parliament. (Hear, hear.) Passing on to another point, he would remark
that
some persons had asked what would be done
if the two Chambers of the Confederation
came into collision ? He had already remarked that the Legislative Council was
intended as a counterpoise to the weight
of numbers in the Assembly, but such a
counterpoise did not necessarily imply the
probability of collision. It was not likely that
the two branches would come into such collision
upon minor subjects, or subjects of minor importance, for two such bodies- should
not, for
23
the mere sake of resistance, oppose each other
in such a way ; they would not venture to do
it. He did not remember that there had been
my really difficult matter of this kind for a
long time. This House had rejected the
Squatters' Bill, as it was called, seven or eight
times after it had been passed by the Assembly, but that had not impaired the good
understanding between them. Indeed the effect
had been of the best. The hon. life-member
from Cobourg [Hon. Mr. BOULTON] , whom
he did not see in his place, had, by the force
of reasoning, convinced the House that the
bill was destructive of the rights of property,
and the consequence was that, year by year,
the measure had been pruned of its most offensive features, until now, as he was informed,
it was hardly open to objection. He could not
recall another instance of persistent difference
of opinion between the Chambers. The real
danger of collision would be where one Chamber invaded the prerogatives of the other,
and
that danger, if it existed at all, would be greatly increased were the Legislative
Council made
elective. (Hear, hear.) If the members were
elected they might say, " We come from the
people just as directly as the members of the
Assembly do, and our authority is, therefore, as
full and complete as theirs. Nay, more, for where
we each represent 1000 electors, they only each
represent 300, and we have, therefore, as much
right to initiate money bills and impost bills as
they have." Make the Council purely elective,
and he would not promise that an agitation
of this kind would not spring up. It had
not been a theme as yet on the floor of the
House, but it was well known that it had
been freely discussed in the corridors, and if
the subject had not been formally introduced,
it was probably because it was thought by
those who debated it that they could not
rely upon the life-members. (Hear, hear.)
Let the Council propose to deal with taxation
and the elective system would be sure in the
course of time to urge it on to do so, and immediately the spirit of the Assembly
would
be aroused to resistance. This would be the
way to provoke collisions, and with an elective
Council it was not unlikely at all to be resorted to. In England, where the Upper
House
was composed of a class entirely distinct from
the Commons, and having interests, as a
general thing, diverse from those of the people even there the collisions between
the two
had been but infrequent. Indeed
there had been only one very serious collision
in the course of centuries. When, however,
such conjunctures arose, the crown overcame
them by the appointment of a sufficient number of peers whose political views accorded
with those of the government. The right to
sit in the House of Lords being, however,
hereditary, the son generally inherited the
politics of his father and so the character of
the body was always pretty well understood ;
but be it what it might, and as much as
possible removed from popular influences, it
had yet learned so far to respect the will of the
people as to know when to make concession
of its own opinions. He did not say that it
bowed to every breeze and instantly yielded
to every demand, nor did he think that any
Legislative Upper Chamber should do so, and
be content merely to reflect the temper and
complexion of the other branch. On the contrary, he held that when it had and
sufficient evidence, sufficient to satisfy itself
that a proposed measure was unjust, it was
bound to resist, and public opinion which
generally came out right in the end, would
sustain it in such an attitude. But there was
very much less danger in countries like this
that difference of opinion would even be as
frequent between the Legislative Chambers as
between the Lords and Commons in England,
and the reason was clear : our Legislative
Councillors would not come from so different
a class of society to the general population, as
the peers of the British nation, compared
with the people of that nation. The lords
had ideas of caste and privileges which none of
our people were imbrued with, and the common
sympathy existing between all classes here
would be felt equally by the Legislative
Councillors and the Members of the Assembly.
Both would be equally subjected to popular
influences and be more or less controlled by
them. The interests of the Legislative Councillor, though a nominee of the Crown,
would
be the same as those of the mass, and the
legislation which would be good for them
would, as a general thing, be good for him
too. He would have no ancestral estates,
privileges, immunities and titles to protect,
like the peers of England. He would be
affected by the social changes which affected
others, and would be moved by the same aims
and aspirations as his friends around him.
This being the case, it was not very probable
that his Opinions would even be set in opposition to those of other men as to make
it likely
that he would come in collision with them, or
that, as a House, the Council would be in
danger of a serious quarrel with the Assembly .
Then the changes which time would inevitab1y
bring about in a body like the proposed Legis
24lative Council, would be sufficiently great to
prevent the possibility of a continued antagonism between it and the other branch,
if unhappily it should arise. The demise, the resignation and the loss of seat from
other causes,
would do this, and afford the Government of
the day the opportunity of so reconstructing
the House as to bring it more in harmony
with public sentiment. He did not say it
was desirable that at all times the Legislative
Council should be a reflection of such opinion,
though it was, of course, desirable that it
should not continue violently to shock it. He
would have that House conservative, calm,
considerate and watchful, to prevent the enactment of measures which, in its deliberate
judgment, were not calculated to advance the common weal. Any more rapid changes in
the
composition of the House than those he now
indicated, he did not consider wholesome or
desirable. From the history of the present
Chamber for the last few years, it would be
seen that such changes, whether among the
life members or the elected members, were
much more frequent than might be generally
supposed. According to the present elective
system twelve members went out and twelve
came in every second year. Supposing that a
collision had taken place between the two
branches of the Legislature, and that it was desirable to bring the Council more in
accord with
the representatives of the people, under this
system, the same members might be returned,
not because of the soundness of their political
opinions on the topic which had brought about
the collision, perhaps without the slightest
reference to it, but from their position and
their exertions. One might come back because he was a wealthy man and had a social
position which gave him a large influence,
another because he was an able canvasser and
well versed in election tactics, and others from
causes equally removed from the political
question upon which the two Houses of Parliament were in antagonism. But suppose
the twelve seats were at the disposal of the
Government, and that an irreconcilable difference had existed between the two Houses,
would they not have the opportunity of redress at once and thoroughly by bringing
in
twelve members who would harmonise better
in opinion with them and the country ?
Undoubtedly. Well, within eight years the
changes among the life-members had been as
follows :-—When the House was made elective,
there were 40 such members in it; two years
afterwards, at the call of the House, the number was found reduced to 31 ; two years
after
that again to 26; in two years more, to 24;
and to-day to 21, of which 21, one honorable
member was now seriously indisposed . In
eight ears, then, the number had been diminished by half. Then changes nearly as great
had
occurred among the elected members. There
had been 24 removals and changes by death
and otherwise among these 48 ; and it should
be remembered, that as the elected members
came in by twelves, two years apart, the average time had been only four years. This
was
sufficient to show the opportunity which, even
among younger men than the life-members, the
Government would have of keeping the House
in accord with the true interests of the
country , or of overcoming any unfortunate
misunderstanding between the two branches.
[The honorable member here went minutely
into a statement of the changes effected
by death, acceptance of office, and defeat
at elections, among this class of members,
which, however, we do not deem it necessary to specify.] These changes had certainly
altered, to some extent, the complexion of the House, and the future would,
no doubt, be like the past in this respect.
The Conference had taken all these things
into consideration, and wisely concluded, as
he believed, that while the chances of collision
were much less under the nominative system,
the opportunity of restoring harmonious
action was infinitely more prompt and effective, and that there was no such danger
of
collisons between the two branches of the
General Legislature, as to make it a bar to
the principle of nomination, which principle,
in their judgment, offered the compensating
advantage he had endeavored, in the earlier
part of his observations, to point out. He
sincerely hoped the House would concur in
the views he had expressed, and would accept
the measure now before them, as one which
he believed calculated to promote the best
interests of this country and the other provinces, and to hand down to posterity a
constitution analogous, as nearly as might be, to
that of the empire under whose protection we
had the happiness to live—a Constitution calculated further, as he was fully convinced,
to
perpetuate the connection between these colonies and that mighty nation, to the mutual
benefit of both. ( Hear, hear, and applause.)
HON. MR. VIDAL here inquired from the
honorable member why it was that the selection
of Legislative Councillors from Lower Canada.,
in thé Confederation scheme, was to be left to
the Local Government of that section of the
province, while no such provision existed with
25
respect to Upper Canada or the Lower Provinces.
Among the questions asked was one as to
whether the local governments should be constituted before the Constitution of the
Confederation became law. The resolution concerning this point seemed involved and
contradictory, as it supposed some part of the plan to
be in force, which depended upon the action
of local governments not themselves in existence.]
Cries of six o'clock.
Further debate was then postponed until
the morrow, and the House immediately
afterwards adjourned.
This individual participated in:
