Editorial Note

VOLUME 13 OF Scandinavian-Canadian Studies is a special issue featuring articles from the Colloquium on the North that took place during the Congress of the Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Alberta in the year 2000. In 1999, AASSC suggested to HSSFC (the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada) that “The North” be one of the major themes at this Congress. Our suggestion was accepted, and AASSC subsequently got involved in organizing the International Colloquium on the North. This Colloquium took place on May 27 and 28, 2000. In the preamble to the program of the Colloquium, reference was made to the commitment of Canada and the European Union to facilitate closer co-operation between all the countries of the circumpolar and adjacent northern regions. As an example of such northern co-operation, the Colloquium brought together prominent scholars, community representatives, and policy-makers from northern regions. Among the speakers at the Colloquium were Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, President of Iceland; Mary M. Simon, Canadian Circumpolar Ambassador and Ambassador to Denmark; Honourable Paul Okalik, Premier of Nunavut; and, at the Breakfast on Campus Seminar on Nunavut on May 29, Peter Gzowski, author and broadcaster.

The Colloquium was organized chiefly by Peter Johnson, ACUNS (Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies), and Gurli Woods, AASSC, in co-operation with Paul Ledwell, HSSFC. Generous support was also received from the Nordic Embassies in Ottawa and CINS (the Canadian Institute for Nordic Studies) at the University of Alberta.

Four papers, one from each major panel discussion at the Colloquium, have been prepared for publication in this volume of Scandinavian-Canadian Studies. They are the contributions by Andrei Golovnev, Russia, from the panel on traditional knowledge and governance structures in the North; Lassi Heininen, Finland, from the panel on education in the North; Noel Broadbent, Sweden, from the panel on research in the North; and Marianne Lykke Thomsen, Greenland and Denmark, from the panel on economic development in the North.

In addition to the articles on the North, two articles have been included dealing with the challenges of teaching Icelandic language and literature in Canada—from two very different perspectives: Daisy Neijmann writes about her experience at the University of Manitoba and Christopher English reports on the way he is making Njal's Saga relevant to law students at Memorial University of Newfoundland. These articles were originally presented at AASSC conferences.

Finally, some reviews have been included as well, as is usual for our publication. I hope our readers will enjoy this special issue of Scandinavian-Canadian Studies.

Gurli Woods, Editor
February 2002
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The North has long been the object of research. The focus has been on exploration for access, resource development, and control. Many nations therefore have northern and arctic research policies that are aligned with national security interests. During the Cold War the emphasis was on military security. Today the focus is more on economic and environmental security. The Arctic Ocean and its coastal and delta regions are the object of particular interest in this context because of the vast gas and oil reserves found there. The United States, Canada, Russia, and Norway have rightly recognized that the centre of gravity of hydrocarbon production in the next century will have shifted from the politically unstable Middle East to the North. The CIA Polar Atlas stated this fact over 30 years ago.

For the social sciences and humanities, research has focussed on policies, management and self-determination, social and health conditions, culture, history, languages, and the arts. The circumpolar region shares a common environment, similar adaptations, similar problems, and similar histories. Within this framework it is easy to envision global issues, and the North is, and should continue to be, a major player in global science. While this is widely recognized, research in the North is not necessarily the same thing as northern research—research generated using northern perspectives and based on northern needs. The past, both historic and prehistoric, belongs to those who know and write about it. The past, I argue, is important for the future because our pasts control our views of ourselves, our identities, what we think we can do, and our place in the world. In other words, history is also about power. Archaeology is an especially potent tool for giving history to those who have been seen as low-status and unimportant, and who have remained outside of official historical accounts. Northern Sweden, the focus of this article has long been denied its history and never been seen as really “Swedish,” even though it represents two-thirds of Sweden’s territory and has been the major source of Sweden’s wealth through the centuries.

There has long been a need to formulate an archaeological research program for northern Sweden that casts light on the antiquity and richness of this cultural region. Rather than seeing this vast area as a passive and retarded recipient of southern culture, it is necessary to have a northern perspective that shows how this region has an autonomous heritage, which did not develop in isolation but was closely connected to the wider currents of Eurasian prehistory.
The subject of this article is the prehistory of Northern Fennoscandia, and Northern Sweden in particular. As an archaeologist, I will turn to the deep prehistoric past in an attempt to produce an independent northern paradigm in order to put this region into a more meaningful interpretative context. This effort takes the form of a research project that recently received 10 million Swedish Crowns from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. The four-year project supports nine PhD students and a post-doctoral position at the universities of Umeå, Stockholm, and Lund. The project is entitled Möten i Norr in Swedish, literally “Meetings in the North.” As an English title we chose “Northern Crossroads,” but I will retain the Swedish title in this article. The goal of the project is to utilize the Nordic region’s unique geographic position in northwestern Europe in order to develop an overarching contextual view of the meeting of cultures, human adaptations, and processes of change. The Scandinavian, Finnish, and Saami cultures build on these long-term and complex relations in time and space. The project title refers to the meetings of peoples and cultures, and the meetings of humans and changing environments.

The strength of archaeology is its potential for analysing long time periods using interdisciplinary methods. While the project consists of individual dissertations, it also creates and supports an advanced seminar of students who can work together over the next two to four years. It is unusual for academics in the humanities and social sciences to work in teams. A synergy effect has already occurred, with groups of students forming their own small working groups.

Each individual study will form the basis of a doctoral dissertation. Publication will therefore be in book form and published by the three universities. There will be nine volumes and a final synthesis book. While each study is unique they will all share the wider perspectives of the world-systems approach and work on three scales: local and regional, Nordic, and Eurasian.

The Möten i Norr project encompasses sites and settlement areas in a 1,500 km-long transect covering 7 degrees of latitude from Norrbotten in northernmost Sweden to Mälardalen. The objects of investigation extend in time from the earliest colonization phase of settlement some 9,000 years ago to A.D. 1800.
A main premise of the project is that regional and long-range interactions were extensive in the past and that the prehistory of the Nordic North cannot be understood without this perspective. This “world-systems” paradigm has been used by European social historians in the study of capitalism and precapitalism (Wallerstein 1974, Wolf 1997) and increasingly by archaeologists working outside of the classic Mediterranean (Greek, Middle Eastern, and Egyptian) cultural spheres (Kardulias 1999). The paradigm provides an important framework for discussing and assessing the local impacts of global and regional systems. A global perspective also makes it possible to align interpretation with biogeographical and climate change research. Social science is far behind the geosciences, biology, and atmospheric sciences in attempting this alignment. But there is an even more important gain to be had. In Eric Wolf’s classic work, *Europe and the People Without History* (1997), not only is there an emphasis on interactionism, there is also an understanding of the need to illuminate the “periphery” in history, geographically as well as culturally. Minority groups, such as the Saami, lack for the most part their own documented histories (Schmidt and Patterson 1995; Lundmark 1998). Archaeology can thus play a major role in discovering and documenting an independent historical and pluralistic past.

THE CIRCUMPOLAR NORDEN

When one looks at a circumpolar map projection, the first thing one should note is that the Nordic region (Norden) is located at the intersection of Northern Europe and Western Siberia. Geographically it is therefore not just a northern periphery of Europe; it is the far northwestern corner of Eurasia. As such, it is the continental opposite of Chukotka on the Bering Strait. The spread of people, plants, animals, and even diseases makes up the matrix of this living tapestry. Nowhere else in the circumpolar world is there such a complex and long-term mixture of forces. This, plus the very high latitude and the arctic and subarctic marine and terrestrial environments, make the Nordic North also an indisputable part of the circumpolar world. From a global perspective, this meeting of two worlds, the circumpolar and the European, is, in fact, one of the most important dimensions of Swedish prehistory, and arguably
more significant than any other aspect of the Nordic past. But for historical reasons, such as the Russian Revolution and the Cold War, the Nordic region has for a century been seen as part of Europe and interpreted as a northern outpost of Western European civilization. Cultural, technological, and economic change has therefore been seen as emanating from the south, and as retarded in time and space in the North.

Norrland (northern Sweden) and Norden have also been viewed as passively receiving people and cultural influences from the outside. Newer results put this view into question. The oldest postglacial sites in Scandinavia are found not in southernmost Sweden and Norway, but in northernmost Norway, and they date from ca. 10,300 years before present (Olsen 1994). Pottery and copper appeared several hundred years earlier in Norrbotten in northern Sweden than in Skåne in the far south (Halén 1994). Even iron-working appears to be older in northern and middle Sweden than in the south. All of these examples indicate that important cultural and technological innovations were not only closely tied to development in Siberia, they predate Western European influences. The Nordic North not only has an ancient past, it was established as early as anything in southern Scandinavia. As an example, when one looks at the many Saami metal ritual sites in Lapland dating to the Viking period, it is clear that there is a mixture of objects from Finland, northwest and southern Russia, the East Baltic, and Northwestern Europe (Serning 1956). There can be little doubt that the Saami had their own trade contacts within this vast region and that they were independent of the Viking trading networks in southern Sweden and trading centres such as Birka.

CLIMATE

All these historical manifestations were played out against the background of larger and smaller ecological changes in Eurasia, which can, in turn, be connected with changes in global climate. Nordic climate is part of the North Atlantic ocean-atmosphere system. Ice cores from the Greenland ice sheets render annual and decadal information about temperature, precipitation, sea ice cover, wind directions, and climate over thousands of years. The Nordic region is therefore one of the best places on earth to study human-environment interactions and the effects of climate change on plants, animals, and humans.
Looking again at a Nordic map, one can observe a second important fact: the Nordic region is almost entirely surrounded by water. Furthermore, northern Sweden is transected by some 13 west-east river systems, which extend from the mountains in Norway to the Bothnian coast. The whole Scandinavian Peninsula, from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Bothnia, is only 400 kilometres wide. To understand Nordic prehistory one needs to understand the importance of water communication and, in winter, snow and ice travel and transport. These waterways connected the Nordic North with surrounding regions; their existence helps to explain why it was neither isolated nor behind the main currents of cultural change in Eurasia.

FOUR ADAPTIVE PROCESSES: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

A starting point for analysis in this project is the breaking down of north Swedish prehistory into primary adaptive periods and processes. Cultural identities and traditions are expressed through material culture, constructions, social and belief systems, and the utilization of resources. Within archaeology, the focus is necessarily on objects (artifacts), features such as graves and houses, and cultural environments and landscapes. A major way of approaching this material is through the formulation of Adaptive Processes, which also embody climate and environmental periodicity. These can be used for analysing major changes over long periods of time.

For northern Sweden these adaptive processes are as follows:

*Colonization, 7000–5000 B.C.*
This occurred in the Boreal forest period, directly following deglaciation. People lived in small mobile and flexible social groups, which in time adapted to the new resources, landscapes, and other groups. New annual territories and regional relations were established.

*Expansion and Consolidation 5000–2500 B.C.: Atlantic Climate*
The climate reached average temperatures higher than today’s, and specialized adaptations to coastal and inland resources developed. There were larger and more permanent settlements, increased social and cultural complexity, symbolic expressions, and exchange networks.

*2500–400 B.C.: Subboreal Climate*
Agriculture and animal domestication were introduced in northern Sweden during this drier period, and as far north as 70 degrees lati-
tude in Norway. Metallurgy, new grave rituals, and cosmologies are seen and reflect very wide-reaching communication networks within the Nordic region and in Western Eurasia. The origins of reindeer domestication probably belong to this time period, as does the first systematic use of skis.

Reduction and Restructuring, 400 B.C.–A.D. 400.

The Subatlantic climate deterioration, with lower temperatures and increased precipitation, caused a reduction in terrestrial carrying capacities and led to a reduction in territories and a restructuring of settlement systems. Iron-working replaced bronze use and new social relations were established throughout the Nordic region. Reindeer expanded southward and gained in economic importance.

Regionalization and Exploitation, A.D. 400–1800.

From A.D. 400 there was a major economic and demographic expansion and exploitation of coastal and interior regions, with new grave rituals and cosmologies, increased trade, and mercantilism. There were also periods with regressions and climate deteriorations (The Little Ice Age). This is the period during which modern state systems were formed. Extensive reindeer herding developed through state intervention in the 1500s.

Within this working framework a number of concrete questions have been posed within the project: 1) Where did the first people come from and how was their colonization connected to sea level changes and population pressures in other regions? The sea level rose dramatically following deglaciation and huge land areas were lost in the North Sea. At the same time farming peoples were expanding from the region of the Black Sea and northward along the Danube River. The Nordic North was the only new land area now available in Europe. 2) What kinds of economic, technological, social, and linguistic relations did inland and coastal people have with each other and how did these change over time? There are major differences in the material cultures of inland and coastal groups, but it is uncertain if these represent different people and/or identities. 3) What were the symbolic and ritual systems of these groups and how did these change over time? Graves, rock paintings, and carvings are a major source material for this question. Excavations of settlements adjacent to these places are being carried out and the rock art sites are being studied within the context of cultural landscapes and territories. 4) What factors lie behind the development and regionalization of Finnish, Saami, and
north Scandinavian groups after A.D. 400? These groups developed in the Nordic region and are not viewed as immigrating into the region. All have their most ancient roots in the earliest colonization period.

THE TEN STUDIES OF MÖTEN I NORR

The Möten i Norr project is comprised of ten studies, which can be broken down into three main categories: 1) climate and environmental studies, 2) regional studies, and 3) studies relating to rock art and religion. A short description of each doctoral student project is given below:


The goal is to analyse fossil insect remains for the reconstruction of climate change and the analysis of local environments. The results will be compared with ice-core data from the Greenland Ice Sheet Project. Three bogs and/or lake cores will be taken along the north-south transect of the project. Samples will also be collected at sites being investigated by other members of the project in order to identify any human impacts on the environment.


The goal of this paleobotanical project (using pollen and macrofossils) is to analyse expansions and regressions in farming communities over time as well as changes in wild animal populations and their environments. This project will co-ordinate with the paleoentomology study, although it will primarily carry out investigations on bogs and lakes adjacent to settlements. Land use changes due to fire ecology will also be carried out.


This research project will focus on the animal bones preserved in hunting sites in northern Sweden. Moose (elk) and beaver were of great importance in the interior, and moose are the main subject of rock art. This study will use bone and teeth to study the hunting strategies used by various groups, their mobilities, and the ritual significance of these animals. Of considerable interest in this context are the changes that occurred when reindeer gained in importance.
This project addresses the question of the relationship between coast and interior in northern Norrland. One goal is to problematize the question of archaeological boundaries. This river system has often been identified as a cultural boundary zone. Numerous sites have been excavated by the Central Board of Antiquities and provide a rich source material for study. One important issue is the question of "central places," which have been characterized as meeting places for larger groups for purposes of trade, rituals, and communication. This matter will be examined in a comparative study, and it will include the Nämforsen site, which has thousands of rock engravings and is the largest site of its kind in northern Europe.

"Migration, territories, and contacts in middle Norrland during the mesolithic period." David Loeffler. Umeå University.
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the reasons and mechanisms behind the earliest colonization of middle Norrland at the end of the last ice age. A complex of over 150 sites that reflect this early time period has been registered in Medelpad. The sites have been completely exposed by water erosion in the basins of dammed lakes. They are fully visible for about four weeks every year. Both features and artifacts are exposed, and these finds show connections to both eastern and southwestern regions. This early material is also put in the context of the history of research in northern Sweden.

"Houses and social change in the coastland of Norrbotten between 6000 and 1500 B.C." Erik Norberg. Umeå University.
Since 1980, over 800 house pits have been registered in northern Sweden. These are especially common on the coast of Norrbotten and are distributed in groups (villages) at different elevations above sea level, from the Mesolithic period to the Bronze Age. The structures are very similar to those found in northern Finland and Russia. The thesis seeks to study the social structures reflected by this material, questions of continuity, and internal and external forces of change. Even questions of power and status will be discussed.

"Identities in Hälsingland during the younger iron age." Elisabet Sandquist. Stockholm University.
The goal of this study is to analyse how people manifested their identities through material culture and as expressions of power relations. They are, for instance, expressed in unique runic inscriptions, graves, and other archaeological sources in the coastal area. This time period is
poorly studied in the region, and little attention has been given to ques-
tions of mentality and the role of individuals in Iron Age society.

“The amazon and the hunter. Sex/gender constructions in the North.” Lil-
lian Rathje. Umeå University.

This thesis was defended in September 2001. It will be followed by a post-
doctoral study intended to expand on the themes of the dissertation. Using
archaeological, place-name, and folklore data from the province of
Västerbotten it has been possible to characterize a unique Viking period
settlement region unlike that of Middle Norrland or southern Sweden.
Women were responsible for the farmsteads and a system of shielings, soci-
ety was more egalitarian than in the south, and there was no Asa-belief
system. These people lived by a mixed economy of seal hunting and fishing,
and the settlement region shows considerable continuity over time.


This thesis has two goals. The first is to develop a method for studying
religion using archaeological material. The second is to study archaeo-
logical material from the period A.D. 0–1800. Three questions are to be
addressed: Was Saami religion as uniform as the historical sources from
the 1600s and 1700s imply? What is the connection in this region be-
tween societal changes and religious changes? How has contact with
other societies influenced Saami society and religion? The source mate-
rial extends over four countries: Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia.
This archaeological material can shed completely new light on the na-
ture of Saami ritual and belief systems.

“Animals in stone. The use of animals for understanding humans.” Britta
Lindgren. Umeå University.

The object of this thesis is to study changes in hunting culture in north-
ern Sweden using a gender-critical-symbolic perspective relating to the
connection between humans and animals from 9000 B.P. to 2200 B.P.
Climatic and environmental changes influenced the ways people saw
their world and formulated their cosmologies. Rock art, sculptures, and
animal bones from relevant sites will be used in the study. The
cirumpolar perspective is especially relevant, but the long-term interac-
tions with European agrarian cultures present a unique dimension to
the problems of human-environment relations and cultural contacts.
CONCLUSIONS

I trust I have provided some perspectives on the new visions that are possible in northern research from the point of view of archaeology. This kind of effort is ultimately a form of historical empowerment.

Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland occupy the northwestern corner of the Eurasian land mass. This is an end station for circumpolar and European cultural influences, and the single most unique aspect of Nordic prehistory is the meeting of these two forces. The origins of the Scandinavian, Saami, and Finnish cultures, in all their diversity, can only be understood as a result of this geography and its 12,000-year prehistoric past. The North has been characterized as exotic, young, isolated, dangerous, and rich in resources, a sort of geographical teenager unable to know what is best for him- or herself. In fact, the North can be a very well-connected place of considerable maturity.

I am convinced that archaeology can be aligned with some of the greatest questions of our times: human-environment interactions, sustainability, globalization, identity, and diversity. The long-term historical perspective, which only archaeology can provide, offers scenarios for understanding how humans have evolved, changed, and survived. Today we are seeing the collapse of non-sustainable industries and communities throughout northern Sweden. The people who originally settled this land and made life sustainable are the very people left in the landscape today. The areas where the old archaeological communities were located are the places where settlement survives today. They are small in scale, based on mixed economies, and, above all, located at places with natural lines of communication. This northwestern corner of Eurasia, a geographic periphery linked by land, water, snow, and ice is an ideal place to do archaeology with relevance to northern futures.

REFERENCES

Note: an extensive literature list is provided here for those interested in reading more about the issues discussed in this article.


Phil Buckland (palaeoentomology)
Krister Efverström (palaeobotany)
Anders Fanden (osteology)
Peoples and Borders of the Russian North

Ethnicity in a Political Environment

ANDREI V. GOLOVNEV

ABSTRACT: This article outlines the ethno-historical background of Russian statehood and its relevance to trends in relations between the core and the periphery in the post-Soviet period. Processes of federalization and regionalization correspond, in controversial ways, to the conditions of viability of the various Northern peoples. The entangled pattern of administrative borders and ethnic boundaries, together with a multifaceted bureaucracy, make it difficult for the ethnic leaders to speak for the concerns of their communities. This article suggests that a balance between the federal centre and the regions might be achieved if the inter-regional network were enhanced. A comparison of the Nenets and the Chukchi, respectively from the western and eastern parts of Northern Eurasia, demonstrates a regional tendency toward a convergence of needs among the indigenous peoples and the “local newcomers” to those regions.


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or centuries, and especially during the last decades, the Russian North has endured extreme fluctuations in its natural and political climate. Political tides have been sometimes even less predictable than arctic winds and weather. Ideologically and practically, the North was a challenge to Soviet power; the “subduing” of this forbidding area entailed the exertion of severe pressure over peoples and nature. When the triumphant Soviet North was abruptly turned into the depressed post-Soviet North, with newly-established settlements rapidly emptying and useful mineral resources becoming apparently useless, it seemed that nothing but the advance of a glacier could have done more harm. This post-Soviet decade has demonstrated on the one hand how ephemeral the structures, persistently built and maintained by the centralized regime, could be, and, on the other hand, how tenacious the ethnic cultures were.

The political collapse was followed by an ethnic boom similar to that which had happened once before, during the Revolution of 1917. Those Northern indigenous groups who had kept their traditional lifestyles found themselves on more favourable ground than those who had been strongly involved in the Soviet “modernization process.” Despite the all-embracing devastation created by the rapid crash of the centralized system, some traditional, mostly nomadic, cultures survived, and even partially improved their circumstances. Northerners, both natives and newcomers, learned that they could base their economic and social sustainability on their own requirements and capabilities, for the most part, and on their own cultural potential. This paper will consider the models of governance that have existed historically, and those that are currently considered suitable to the Northern regions of Russia.

TWO TYPES OF RUSSIAN STATEHOOD

In the early Medieval period (at least from the seventh century A.D.), on the threshold of the first Russian (Rus’) state, East Slavs differed so distinctively that a contrast between Northern and Southern groups (see Kirpichnikov et al. 1986, 200) reveals an affiliation with different cultural traditions. Northern Slavic culture was influenced by neighbouring Baltic, Finnish, and Scandinavian cultures, while the Southern Slavic culture was imbued with Scythian-Sarmatian and Turkic features. Archaeologist Dmitry A. Machinski has noted that ancient Slavs migrated widely in the area between the two cultural “volcanoes,” Central Asia and the West Bal-
tic, during periods when one of these cultures was dormant (1981: 113–14). Both Southern and Northern Slavs participated directly in these "eruptions," by being fused in ethnogenetic streams when the initial tremors of volcanic activity occurred. Moreover, the distinction between Southern and Northern groups meant that they would associate with opposite cultural centres, Steppe-Eurasian and North-European respectively, which entailed involvement in their different political systems.

Northern Slavs paid tribute to the Vikings, Southern groups to the Khazars. Several times in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, Vikings and Northern Slavs raided the South along the Baltic-Pontic route, conquering Southern Slavic territories and defeating the Khazars. The Northern Viking-Slavic alliance, or, more precisely, the Viking-Slavic-Finnish-Baltic alliance, known as Rus', spread its power over a vast area that reached the Black Sea, although the political hearth of the state remained in the North, first in Ladoga (Aldeigja) and later in Novgorod (Hólmgaršr). Although the alliance was split by hostile Christian factions, it kept its dominance in the area until the early thirteenth century, when the Central-Asian "volcano" erupted again in the form of the Mongolian-Tartarian invasion.

As a result, a major part of the Rus' became subjugated to the suzerain Steppe state, the Golden Horde, and only the northern area of Russia, Novgorod and Pskov, stayed independent and retained its statehood. The southern power established a political (tax-collecting) centre within Russia, in Moscow, which thereafter became a persistent rival to the adjacent political entities, including Novgorod. During the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, Russia experienced a dramatic confrontation between two political traditions, the "Nordic" tradition (represented by Novgorod) and the "Turkic" tradition (inherited by Moscow). The collision was not only an opposition of centrifugal and centripetal trends (as it is usually presented by official Russian historiography), but also a clash between two different cultural and political models. Moscow's eventual defeat of Novgorod in 1570 was actually a fulfillment of the Horde's mission.

Although defeated politically, however, the "Nordic"-Russian tradition did not disappear totally. It was carried away to the North and to the East by Novgorodian fugitives. The North-Russian "exodus" triggered the emergence of a new cultural entity, the Russian Pomors, who rapidly migrated East across the Urals and Siberia as far as the Pacific, maintaining or even strengthening their opposition to the Central-Russian policy of opposing serfdom and State Religion (most of the Pomors were rigid Old Church-
believers). This sudden migration could be seen, on the one hand, as a consequence of the Pomors' cultural flexibility, ecological compatibility, and economic and social self-reliance, and, on the other, as evidence of their longstanding practice of undertaking lengthy trade voyages. Historically, Novgorod preceded Moscow by half a millennium—it had begun as early as the eleventh century—in its various contacts with Northern and Siberian peoples and territories.

The “Turkic”-Russian tradition encouraged colonial expansion, and, at the same time, Moscow borrowed from the Horde a centripetal political doctrine and the basic tools and terms of governance (e.g., the words for “treasury,” “money,” and “tax” entered the Russian lexicon from Turkic and Mongolian). To cite Nikolai Trubetskoï's words, “The Russian Czar was the heir to the Mongolian Khan,” and the “overthrow of the Tartarian yoke was reduced to the replacement of the Tartarian Khan by the Orthodox Czar, and to the transference of the Khan's headquarters to Moscow” (Trubetskoï 1995: 157). Generally speaking, the “Nordic” and the “Turkic” traditions might be identified respectively as democracy (the Novgorodian Republic) and despotism (Moscow Czar). The principal difference in their colonial methods was that Novgorod produced a multilateral trade network and a chain of autonomous settlements, whereas Moscow produced a centralized administrative system with a vast subservient area controlled in an authoritarian style. The duel between the two political traditions did not end when Moscow defeated Novgorod in 1570. On the contrary, it remains a continuing conflict in Russian political life, that between centralization and regionalization.

BORDERS AND LEADERS

The key component of Moscow's legacy from the Horde was the predominance of the state over private interests with respect to the ownership of land (Mukhamedyarov 2000: 86–88). For a long time, the state's procuring of furs and other goods from the North and from Siberia consistently reinforced the system of administrative dependency for the indigenous peoples and, at the same time, enacted “protective” laws against Russian merchants and traders. Similarly, though more explicitly, the Northern minorities were given the role of “state peoples” in the Soviet epoch in order to restrict any private (non-governmental) activity and spread the state monopoly over all spheres of property in the North. In the 1930s, the heyday of Soviet totalitarianism, the State used northern minorities as
titular nations, whose "national" regions were in fact doomed to be a veil for the domain of the State, the Gulags in particular. Any attempts by the "state peoples" to stand up for their own values and rights (for example, a series of revolts from the 1920s to the 1940s) were used by the authorities as a justification for the strengthening of state rule over Northern territories. In the late Soviet and the post-Soviet period, the issue of "titular nations" has led to frequent arguments between various governmental agencies and state-offspring industrial companies regarding control over Northern areas and resources.

The administrative borders in the North established by the Russian Empire and modified by the Soviet regime had nothing to do with ethnic boundaries. Ethnographically, the indigenous system of ethnic communication provided consolidation rather than dissociation in the arctic territories. The Saami and the Samoyeds covered a vast area along the Arctic Ocean from Scandinavia to the Taymyr peninsula. Intensive horizontal links have unified the Samoyeds (Nenets) into a single cultural entity and have allowed them to keep speaking one dialect despite the fact that their territory stretches over an immeasurable tundra area from the White Sea to the Yenisei River. The boundaries that divided or connected the Saami, the Samoyeds, the Ostiaks, the Tungus, the Chukchi, and others were adequate for traditional activity, but, in addition, were sometimes consecrated by the presence of intertribal centres of trade and by rituals. The natural (Native) boundaries were continuously changing, as the result of migrations, conflicts, epidemics, or climatic fluctuations. The northern system of communication had been considerably broader in the past, or, rather, it had been oriented toward another set of priorities.

In the twentieth century, the policy of centralization and the state-operated economy led to centrally-operated regions and created an ethnic mosaic in the Russian (Soviet) North. The State established artificial borders in the North that split northern territories and peoples; nowadays Nenets, Khanty, Selkup, Evenks, and other minorities are scattered among several administrative units within Russia. Administrative borders ensure that inter-ethnic and even intra-ethnic relations are transmitted through the filter of the central authority. There is a multifaceted structure of authorities—local (city, village, rural settlement, nomadic camp), district (raion), autonomous region (okrug), province (oblast), territory (krai), republic (respublica), recently established federal region (federalnyi okrug), and, most importantly, federal—that functions as an insurmountable barrier for any ethnic, local, or regional initiative. The endless admin-
istrative corridors have become a blind maze for political actors, especially regional and ethnic leaders.

The tangle of intentions and attitudes among the leaders can be seen, for instance, in the current Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and in the State Committee on Social and Economic Development of the Northern Regions (Goskomsever). Both organizations appeared almost simultaneously, in 1990, during the post-Soviet tide of ethnic and regional activity, although both have been established under the aegis of the federal power, and during the past decade they have been unable to overcome the notorious centripetal stereotypes.

The RAIPON consists of about 30 organizations and local subdivisions. Logically, one might expect that these organizations would be tightly correlated with the northern minorities, which are also about 30 in number. Ethnologically, one might expect the same, since the goal of the minorities seems to be to strengthen their own ethnic identities and structures. It might be possible for them to do so, were it not that RAIPON imitates, accidentally or deliberately, the administrative pattern of the Russian Federation. Most of the northern ethnic associations correlate with administrative divisions; the Nenets, for example, are represented in five different regional organizations, the Evens in six, and the Evenks in eleven. Symptomatically, there are no “All-Nenets” or “All-Evenk” associations, either within or outside RAIPON.

Today, the indigenous elite has at least two roots: traditional and political. The Native societies survived in the Soviet regime because of their traditional flexible and egalitarian models of leadership. At the same time, the local ethnic elite was formed in accordance with the policy of the “national” cadres and their representation in various branches of power. Some of these organizations were just showcases, but others became a “social base” of the State by being nurtured in an atmosphere of socialistic “enlightenment,” collectivization, sedentarization, and forced relocation from rural areas into urban or semi-urban settlements. Nowadays, the majority of native leaders are residents of large villages or even towns. They are formally educated and integrated into the government system. From the point of view of their own people, they are to a large extent leaders on behalf of the state. However, from the point of view of the central authorities, they are leaders on behalf of the Natives. The real function of these leaders is to act as intermediaries between two opposing forces, native culture and state policy. The very ability of the Nenets leaders to go back and forth between the city and the tundra, the tent and the
office, is a manifestation of the idea of “having two faces.” This shuttling can be seen as a new type of nomadism that merges traditional and administrative styles of leadership (for more details, see Golovnev 1997).

However, the gap between the two styles is so evident that even the most talented leaders are hardly able to keep them balanced. The only feasible middle link between them would be a reorientation of state policy toward regionalism and, even further, toward interregionalism. Meanwhile, today this political field is crossed by a hot front line between the central power and the regional authorities. Even RAIPON, as an association of associations, cannot manage its position on an interregional level. RAIPON still plays two opposite roles simultaneously, splitting peoples on the regional level and joining the same peoples on the federal level. Sergei Khariuchi and other leaders of RAIPON emphasize the necessity of a shift of the association's activities from the federal to the regional level (Khariuchi 2000: 25). One hopes that this would involve, in practice, the development of intensive interregional co-operation; otherwise RAIPON will likely be gradually reshaped into an explicitly “vertical” institution, with an diminished mission of central-local communication.

The call for interregionalism might also be drawn from the story of the Goskomsever, which was organized as a copy of the Committee of the North, which had existed in the early Soviet period, from 1924 to 1935. For the next thirty years, no particular body controlled the northern minorities, until 1965, when the Department on Issues of Economy and Cultures of Northern Peoples was established within the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation. Founded in 1990, Goskomsever was integrated into the Ministry of Nationality Affairs and Regional Policy, and then, in 1996, it was reestablished as a separate entity (Osherenko et al. 1997: 33). Recently, in the late spring of 2000, the Goskomsever was disbanded again as an authorized body and merged into the Ministry of Trade and Economic Policy.

The liquidation of this governmental body did not entail any substantial negative or positive consequences for whomever it was supposed to serve. It is likely that the Goskomsever was targeted in order to liquidate the agency-on-duty whose ten-year activity was inseparably linked with the overall crisis in the Russian North. From the point of view of the central power, the move also meant that the North is no longer an arena of special attention, and that all its problems should be solved in an ordinary way. From the viewpoint of Northern regions, this signifies the federal state’s avoidance of its responsibility and its
inability to deal with Northern self-reliance, and highlights the necessity for intensive interregional and international co-operation properly based on northern demands and abilities.

POST-SOVIET CASE STUDIES

The old discussion on circumpolar cultures, or models of circumpolar culture, is being updated to take into account the current reality, and the ways in which modern northern cultures are adapting to the natural and the social environment. Indigenous peoples recognize so-called “newcomers” as a major part of the superimposed social and political environment, which is no less challenging than the treacherous arctic weather. Some northern cultures, especially nomadic cultures, managed to develop specific adaptive mechanisms within the severe political environment of the Soviet regime. These cultures survived in spite of the attempts by numerous authorities to dissolve them within the “Soviet nation.” However, the immediate effect of the Soviet regime’s collapse on two similarly enduring cultures, the Nenets and the Chukchi, varied considerably. Today the Nenets regard themselves as winners and the Chukchi as losers.

Both peoples, the Nenets and the Chukchi, are nomadic reindeer herders. They have been considered champions in cultural survival, because of their very high level of social self-sufficiency and economic autonomy. Both cultures made similar choices in reaction to outside sociopolitical intrusions during the Russian and Soviet periods of colonization. They had been subjugated neither by the gun in the seventeenth century, nor by the Cross in the eighteenth century, nor by the law in the nineteenth century. Located far away from each other, the Nenets in the western parts and the Chukchi in the eastern parts of the Russian Arctic, both peoples avoided administrative dependency by changing from hunters into pastoralists. The flight into nomadism allowed the Nenets and the Chukchi to occupy the most forbidden territories and to save and even strengthen their ethnic identity. Until today, the Nenets and the Chukchi have kept their traditional pagan beliefs and customs.

During the twentieth century, the Nenets and the Chukchi represented two strongholds of pastoralism and paganism in the Russian North. Both became so-called “titular nations,” that is, homonymous National/Autonomous Regions. The Nenets (totalling 34,665 in 1989) belonged to the Nenetskii Autonomous Region (6,423 of 53,912, or 11.9% of the Region’s population), the Yamalo-Nenetskii Autonomous Region
(20,917 of 494,844, or 4.2%), and the Dolgano-Nenetskii Autonomous Region (2,549 of 55,803, or 4.6%), whereas the Chukchi (totalling 15,183 in 1989) belonged to the Chukotskii Autonomous Region (12,858 of 163,934, or 7.9%). In 1989, the Chukchi and the Nenets were the wealthiest peoples in the Russian North, and of similar wealth as measured by numbers of reindeer: 499,000 in the Chukotskii Region; 495,900 in the Yamalo-Nenetskii Region; 191,500 in the Nenetskii Region; and 76,888 in the Dolgano-Nenetskii Region (Narody 1992: 186-88, Table 21).

The next shift can be clearly seen by a comparison of the Yamalo-Nenetskii and Chukotskii Regions, central areas of Nenets and Chukchi pastoralism, where in 1990 an almost equal population of domestic reindeer was counted: 490,000 and 491,000 respectively. Five years later, in 1995, the number of reindeer in the Nenets area had increased to 508,000, while in the Chukchi area the number had decreased to 236,000 (see Belikov and Boltunov 1999: 16, Table 4). These trends continued during the next five years, triggering two different crises: overgrazing of the pastures in Yamal and a catastrophic drop in numbers of domestic reindeer in Chukotka. The latter is close to the point of no return, the number of reindeer having dropped to one-third of the 1990 level and continuing to decline in geometric progression. The emptying pastures of Chukotka are being repopulated today by growing herds of wild and feral reindeer, and the Chukchi more and more often invoke the ancient practices of their forefathers, the hunters.

Among the various explanations I have been given by the Nenets and Chukchi concerning these phenomena, the key one relates to the ownership of reindeer. In the Soviet/post-Soviet transition period, the Nenets rushed to enlarge their private herds by all available means, thereby neglecting the so-called “collective” (state) demands, whereas the Chukchi failed in a few similar attempts and eventually remained poor employees, thereby wasting the rest of the herds, which remained ownerless. Today the average number of private reindeer per person among the Chukchi is near zero, and in some cases less than zero—many herders and ex-herders actually owe reindeer to collective farms.

Chukotka has succeeded in demolishing the previous social and political environment first of all by seceding from the Magadan Province and signing the Federal Treaty of 1992 as an equal “constituent unit” of the Russian Federation. As far as the Yamalo-Nenetskii Region is concerned, although it has failed in its attempt to proclaim itself a “republic” and is formally staying within the Tiumen Province, it has retained its financial
and administrative independence. The Yamal Region preserved its social and demographic structure, despite a temporary deflux of mostly Ukrainian newcomers in late 1989 and early 1990. In Chukotka, the drain became massive: by 1996, the newcomer population dropped to an estimated 80,000, which is less than half of the 1989 figure (160,000). The first people to leave were technicians, teachers, doctors, accountants, and other trained workers (Vakhtin and Krupnik 1999: 31). During the whole decade the number of newcomers in Chukotka has fallen to about one-third of the 1990 level.

The simultaneous two-thirds drop in the population of both newcomers and reindeer in Chukotka may be seen as an accidental or even odd coincidence. Several years ago, the general opinion in the North was that Northern tensions are caused by a clash between the newcomers’ activities and the local indigenous peoples’ traditional occupations. One might have expected, then, that the decrease in newcomers would inevitably have facilitated a traditional economy, first and foremost improving reindeer herding, with its demands for vast areas of pasture. This might have been the case if certain devastating circumstances had not hindered the recovery of reindeer husbandry. The Chukchi have lost the social environment to which their culture has been adapted for many years. This multilateral environment has now abruptly been replaced by an atmosphere of havoc and looting. Furthermore, the collapse of the other local economies has led to enormous consumer pressure on reindeer breeding.

Both the Yamal and the Chukotka cases show an apparent regional trend toward a convergence of needs and attitudes between the indigenous peoples and the “local newcomers.” Northern newcomers for the most part no longer enjoy favourable conditions (northern wage increments, retirement benefits, etc.); nowadays they should be seen as hostages rather than invaders. The process of regionalization must take into account the rights of the newcomers to use the land and resources along with the rights of the indigenous peoples. Moreover, the rights of the two groups cannot be resolved separately from one another and without the special attention of non-governmental organizations and regional authorities.

The Yamal and the Chukotka are endowed with comparable resource potentials, based on gas and gold respectively. An obvious reason for the current fiasco with respect to Chukotka gold-mining, as compared with gas development in the Yamal, relates to “difficulties in distant transportation.” The only way to avoid these “difficulties” is to stop
measuring the Russian North according to the “distance” to or from the federal centre. Large-scale interregional co-operation in the Russian North involving regions of neighbouring countries (Finland, Norway, and Sweden) promises to constitute the main channel for solving local economic and transportation problems as well as facilitating northern participation in a macro-economic system.

CONCLUSIONS

Several months ago, the heyday of the Russian centralized regime seemed to be a thing of the past. Political-administrative reforms launched by President Vladimir Putin appeared to be ambiguous. On the one hand, they strengthened “vertical power,” the impulse back to centralization; on the other hand, they corresponded to some aspects of the newly-formed federal regions: that is, they constituted a well-timed move toward interregionalization. The President’s initiatives could be seen by regional leaders as challenges and as touchstones for their ability to maintain a balanced dialogue with central authorities, and, at the same time, as appropriate tools for the promotion of regional and interregional interests.

Until today, the greatest hindrance to interregional co-operation in the Russian North and reasonable dialogue with the federal centre is the depressing ideology of provinciality. In order to overcome this barrier, the regional leaders need to complement their social and political intuition with the historical and cultural knowledge contained in the experience of the Pomors, the Komi, the Samoyeds, the Yakuts, and others—persuasive models of resilience and self-reliance among the cultures of the Russian North.

NOTES

1 In March 1990, the first “Congress of the Numerically-Small Peoples of the North” was held in Moscow, where the RAIPON (Russian Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North) was formed, with Vladimir Sangi (ethnically Nivkh) as its leader. The next Congress, in 1994, replaced Sangi with Yeremei Aipin (Khant), and in 1997 Sergei Khariuchi (Nenets) was elected; the latter remains the Acting President of RAIPON.

2 At the time of the latest (1989) census, there were 26 officially recognized ethnic minorities in the Russian North, with a population of 184,478; at the beginning of 2000 their number had grown to 30. By the Russian Government’s decree of 24
March 2000, the official list of Russia’s minorities contains 45 peoples living in the North, Siberia, and the Far East. The largest by number and territory are the Nenets (34,665), the Evenk (30,238), the Khant (22,521), the Even (17,199), and the Chukchi (15,183); the smallest are the Oroki (190) on the Amur River and the Enets (209) on the Yenisei River (Narody 1992: 13-14, Table 1). Two peoples, the Komi and the Sakha (Yakut), with their large populations (respectively 344,519 and 381,922 in 1989), are not included in the “Northern numerically-small” classificatory group.

3 For example, the Nenets participate in “Yasavei” (in Nenets Autonomous Region), “Yamal-Potomkam” (in Yamal-Nenets AR), the Association of the Native Peoples of Taymyr (in Dolgan-Nenets AR), and “Spasenie Yugry” (in Khanty-Mansi AR). These and other local subdivisions of RAIPON have specific names and programs that are approved by local authorities.

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Finland as a Nordic Country, and as a European State

LASSI HEININEN

ABSTRACT: When talking about the people of Finland and other Nordic countries, we are dealing with identities and concerns that are both European and northern, that is, Nordic. In the early 1990s, Finnish discussions of northern Europe and northern affairs, especially in the European context, first used the term “Nordic dimension” and then the term “northern dimension.” Although there was no specific northern policy until 1997, one can detect a “de facto northern dimension” in Finland’s foreign policy, given that Finland is situated in the middle of Northern Europe on the border between East and West. Finland and the Finns have been influenced by eastern as well as western culture. If the current political status of Finland as an EU member state gives Finland an opportunity to be active and creative in Europe, it is because the Nordic and Northern identity of Finland and the Finns has been in the past, and still is at the turn of the twenty-first century, one of the country’s strengths as an independent state, a European nation, and an international actor.


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When talking about the Nordic countries, we are dealing with identities and concerns that are both European and northern. The people of the five Nordic states, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, situated as they are in Northern Europe between North America and Russia, consider themselves both northerners and Europeans.

This is certainly true of the people of Finland, who, for all their northern interests and expertise on arctic affairs, think of their country not exclusively as an arctic country, but as both Nordic and European. More precisely, the Finns interpret their country first of all as Nordic, and secondly as European, with northern aspects and identity. Here "Nordic" means something secure, even cosy, and modern; above all, it means something of value to the rest of Europe. It is interesting to note that in Finnish discussions of the early 1990s, Northern Europe and northern affairs, especially in the European context, were defined by the term "nordic dimension" (Heininen 1999, 155–157), even before the Finnish government launched its official initiative under the title, the "Northern Dimension."

The point of referring to a "nordic dimension" was to emphasize what the EU would gain from having most of the Nordic states inside the Union, at a time when Finland, Norway, and Sweden were candidate countries, and Denmark was an EU member-state. The Nordic states would bring in "good" Nordic values, such as, for example, environmental policy, equality, social and health policy, strict yet open government, and, finally, "northernness." Furthermore, the Nordic states would bring into Europe the Nordic welfare state and an already integrated community.

FROM COMPETITION AND ISOLATION TO NORDIC CO-OPERATION

In the history books, there are many names for the North. The term "Norden," like "Thule" (an ancient name for remote northern lands such as Greenland and Iceland) and "Nordkalotten" (the North Calotte), represents the ultimate northern part of the world, almost beyond civilization, lands situated under the North Star and the Big Dipper. In Finland there is a saying that "Finland is a nation under the North Star." In the 1990s, this image was used on a map of Finland issued by Foreign Affairs (Heininen 1999, 178–180).

The Vikings, Scandinavians of the period of 750–1100 A.D., travelled across the North Atlantic and around Europe and to the South before any southern power came into the North. These enterprises came about as the
result of regional dynamics in North Europe, as well as strong east-west connections. For example, in the Baltic Sea region a loose market network was in existence hundreds of years before the Hanseatic League, and the Vikings had regular trade connections with Bjarmia in the White Sea region.

Since the Viking Age, and the Christianization of Northern Europe, there have been both coalitions, unions, empires, and other arrangements among the Nordic countries, and states of competition, conflicts of interests, and even wars, between political units. Notable in this history are such moments as the Kalmar Union between Denmark, Sweden, and Norway; Great Sweden, which included Finland, as a European power; the union between Denmark and Norway, which included Iceland; and the Swedish-Norwegian Union.

In the twentieth century, especially between the two world wars, the Nordic states were mostly nation-states. Two of them, Norway and Finland, got their independence, from Denmark and Sweden respectively, early in the century. These Nordic countries were rather isolated, and had, for example, strict language policies for national, ideological, and political reasons. At that time there were not as many interrelationships among the countries as exist today, but there was official inter-governmental co-operation among the five states. Also, people in the border regions, especially in the North Cape region of the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden, and Finland, co-operated across national borders (cf. Kainlauri 1975).

Institutionalized Nordic co-operation was initiated by the Nordic Council during the Cold War. The Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers deal not only with social, cultural, and economic matters, but also with governmental co-operation among the five Nordic countries. The Nordic islands, the Faeroe Islands, Greenland, and the Åland Islands have their own representatives in the Nordic Council, and co-operation also includes regional co-operation between the countries, such as in the case of the North Cape. As a result of this kind of co-operation and friendship, a Nordic identity and common Nordic values have been created step by step.

During the Cold War period, and in spite of Nordic co-operation, the Nordic countries were, however, divided into two or more parts (cf. Tunander 1991): Denmark, Iceland, and Norway joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but Finland and Sweden did not. Finland had the Agreement of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) and close relations with the Soviet Union, and Sweden
had secret military and security agreements with the USA. Finland and Iceland joined their three neighbours as members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in the 1970s, but this common Nordic state of affairs lasted only three years, after which Denmark left EFTA to join the European Community (EC).

Finland and Sweden joined the European Community, the current European Union (EU), in 1995. Just before entering the EU, the Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari presented three challenges to Finland: first, to keep its Nordic culture and identity; second, to create a northern dimension in EU's policy; and finally, to strengthen the policy of co-operation with neighbouring Russia and the Baltic states (Ahtisaari 1995). One of the main strategic starting points of the Finnish government’s EU policy was to resist the establishment of a "Nordic bloc" inside the EU, and it was only after six years of Finnish and Swedish EU membership that there was an agreement in principle between the three Nordic prime ministers to have a discussion on current affairs before the European Council meeting of the EU. However, no trilateral agreement emerged among the three Nordic EU-states. Instead these three states have engaged in mostly pragmatic co-operation, and they have rather different approaches toward the EU and its development.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, with the Cold War period now in the past, all five Nordic countries are part of Europe, especially Northern Europe, where a new kind of institutional identity has emerged, which has, indeed, been described as "the New Northern Europe" (see Heininen and Käkönen 1998). Nordic co-operation is still lively, of course, but in a new context, and spiced by new aspects, such, for example, as co-operation both with the Baltic states, and within the Baltic Sea region and the European North.

In addition to the Nordic Council, which includes all five Nordic countries, a number of international circles of co-operation, and international co-operative organizations, deal mostly with the North, such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Arctic Council, which include the Nordic states and their governments, and the many sub-national and nongovernmental organizations originating in the Nordic countries.

What is interesting, even contradictory, here is the fact that "Norden" is still divided politically in various ways: for instance, three of the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Iceland and Norway, are still members of NATO, and another three, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, are EU member-states. Thus, only Denmark is inside both NATO and EU, but Greenland, which is officially part of Denmark, left the EU after a referen-
In the early 1980s. All five Nordic countries are inside the European Economic Area (EEA), but the Faeroe Islands are outside it.

Given that each of the five Nordic countries has its own interests, for geographical, cultural, national, and linguistic reasons, the aforementioned groupings are understandable. There are also differences that arise from their differing interests and activities in the North (Heininen 1997).

Denmark is a continental European country with a strong interest in the Baltic region. With its historical and current interests in the North, notably with respect to Greenland, its “overseas territory,” it is also an important gateway between Europe and the North Atlantic. Iceland is primarily a northern, even arctic, country between Europe and North America, on the edges of two continental plates. As an island nation, it depends largely on marine resources for its survival. For Norway the North is, and has been historically, a natural focus—sensitive because of issues of sovereignty and important because of many national interests. Sweden is another major and traditionally Baltic state. It has, however, and has had in the past, a strong security and policy interest in North Europe, mostly because of its north-south connection. Finally, there is Finland, under the North Star, between East and West, and the main focus of my article.

FINLAND'S NORTHERN, AND IN-BETWEEN, LOCATION

Finland is situated in the middle of Northern Europe, between East and West and on the border of each. Culturally, Finland, and the Finns, have been influenced by eastern as well as western culture. In fact, it is not possible to understand Finland as a nation without the East, and eastern culture (Salmen 1994).

Finland's foreign policy after the Second World War and during the Cold War period emphasized the importance of a good relationship with the Soviet Union, as represented in the FCMA agreement. This, together with the Peace Treaty of Paris in 1947 and a growing trade with the Soviet Union, formed the basis for the so-called foreign policy of Paasikivi-Kekkonen, and Finland's policy vis à vis the East.

This relationship also made it possible for Finland to have good relationships with the West, the United States, for example; to join in European economic integration; and in general to maintain neutrality in foreign policy while being an actor in the global, international system. During this period Nordic co-operation constituted the closest multilateral, and western, international environment for Finland, an environ-

ment that concretely demonstrated Finland's position between the East and the West.

The geopolitical situation of Northern Europe and its international status have changed greatly in the 1990s, mainly because of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. These events were also a surprise, even a shock, to the political elite of Finland, which was not prepared for them. Later, however, they opened the minds and doors of the elite to European integration (e.g., Kääkönen 1993; Bu'chi 1995).

Since it joined the EU, Finland's geopolitical and security-political position has changed fundamentally: Finland is no longer a neutral country, but an EU member state with the duties and rights of the Union. It maintains its own independent military defence, and does not belong to NATO.

Northernness and the "Arctic ambience" have long been part of the Finland's national identity and history. For example, at the beginning of the twentieth century Finland had strong ambitions to become a major power representing Arctic affairs in the European North, primarily by virtue of its access to the Arctic Ocean via Pechenga. The history of Pechenga is a fascinating one, and it spans about 180 years: it tells how Finland made a strong effort to reach the coast of the Arctic Ocean, and how once it succeeded, and made Pechenga a part of Finland, the Finnish Government lost most of its interest in the region (e.g., Heininen 1999, 132–147; Tanner 1927).

In general, the North has been a rather delicate issue for Finland, in terms of both foreign policy and domestic issues. Finland has used its Nordic, Russian, and European politics as it used its neutrality in its relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike Norway, which has a strong, explicit northern policy that articulates comprehensive national interests, Finland did not have a specific northern policy as a part of its global, European, or EU policy, until the above-mentioned Finnish "northern dimension" initiative of 1997.

However, given Finland's foreign policy and its activities in Northern Europe during the last decade of the Cold War, and even more during the early 1990s, one can detect a "de facto northern dimension" in Finland's foreign policy. It included, among other things, the following elements:

1. Nordic co-operation includes co-operation with respect to the North Calotte, because this region represents the closest circle of international concern for Finland.

2. Finland's policy of neutrality and peace during the Cold War entailed activities in security policy, especially with regard to confidence-building measures concerning Northern Europe and northern oceans. An
example of these activities is President Kekkonen's initiative of a Nuclear-Free Zone for the Nordic states.

3. Finland's traditional policy toward the Soviet Union was reformulated with the Russian Federation in 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finland's new Russia policy also includes co-operation with Finland's neighbouring areas in Russia and the Baltic republics.

4. An arctic policy, especially an arctic environmental policy, inside both the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and the Arctic Council, has been an important, but in the beginning a new, field in Finnish foreign policy since 1989, when Finland launched its initiative for arctic environmental protection.

5. Finland was a founding member of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, which is based on a 1992 Norwegian initiative.

6. The recently developed multilateral co-operation in the Baltic region, though not particularly northern, is a relevant part of Finland's European policy in the neighbouring areas.

NORDIC AND NORTHERN DIMENSIONS IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Finland joined the EU with rather limited capabilities. It was mostly concerned with adapting to the political goals of the other members. However, in its negotiations with the EU Commission, the Finnish government emphasized the importance of Nordic co-operation, and Finland's location in northern Europe.

As an important part of the political process of preparing for future membership of the EU, especially with respect to the referendum, the Finnish political elite "advertised" the EEC to the Finnish public, and Finland to the EEC Commission. In this political rhetoric, Finland's northern location and identity were utilized. In the Finnish Government, for example, Foreign Minister Heikki Haavisto and Prime Minister Esko Aho started to use the terms "Nordic dimension" and "Northern dimension." The significance of the two terms was almost the same: the aim was, on the one hand, to market "good" Nordic values and, on the other, to emphasize the northern identity and the cold, harsh climate of Finland, which in turn expressed the spirit of Finland and the Finns.

The term "Nordic dimension" implied first of all bringing Nordic values, in addition to what was mentioned earlier, such as a belief in a welfare society, openness, and strict environmental protection regulations,
into the EU, thus contributing substantially to the Union. Behind this term can be seen, on the one hand, a belief that the northern location is a positive thing for Finland and, on the other hand, a calculation that a Nordic bloc inside the EU would be beneficial.

Correspondingly, the concept “Northern dimension” reflects the core of Finland’s geopolitical environmental and foreign policy, in that it utilizes the above-mentioned “de facto northern dimension” of Finland. Thus, this term is based on the geopolitical environment of Finland and mainstream Finnish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period.

When Finland joined the EU, the EU Commission expected it make its main contribution in the areas of northern and Russian affairs. Finland was expected to function as a bridge between the EU and the Russian Federation. Expertise in Russian affairs was expected as a result of the more than 1300 kilometres of common border between Finland, and now also the EU, and Russia, and expertise in northern affairs was a product of Finland’s geographic location in Northern Europe, especially in view of the fact that Norway had not joined the EU.

At that time, apparently, a northern dimension and northern cooperation did not rank highly in the national priorities of Finland. This was mainly because the Finnish political priorities were focussed upon relations with Central Europe and the EU. Actually it was not until 1997 that the topic assumed a high priority on the Finnish government’s political agenda. Until then reference to it had consisted largely of political rhetoric.

**THE FINNISH INITIATIVE FOR A NORTHERN DIMENSION**

With the acceptance of Finland and Sweden as members in 1995, the European Union reached almost to the Barents Sea, its natural northern boundaries. Taking into consideration the EU Commission’s expectations, it was clear that Finland and Sweden would get the EU involved in northern affairs and cooperation with northwestern Russia, even without Norway.

Finland had been a member state of the European Union for less than three years when the Finnish government launched an initiative, in September 1997, to create a policy for the Northern Dimension of the EU, also known as the ND (Lipponen 1997; also Heininen and Langlais 1997). Behind the initiative was an understanding that there is a need of such a policy, and, that being the case, that there should be a strategy for it. Since then, the political concept of the ND, and the term itself, have been part of the political discussion in Europe and in the agendas of the EU’s
European Councils. Finally, the European Council accepted the ND Action Plan of the EU in Feira in June of 2000 (Action Plan 2000).

In spite of its short history, the concept of a "northern dimension" has been given several interpretations, and there have been different proposals and hopes about its substance. For example, Canada has recently launched a Northern Dimension to its foreign policy, having the same term as the EU's ND, while giving it its own design, with a strong emphasis on the national interests of Canada in the North (see The Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy 2000). Indeed, the concept of a "northern dimension" has become a central element of the new Finnish foreign policy, especially with respect to the EU (Helsingin Sanomat 10 Feb. 1999, A2; Lapin Kansa 30 May 1999, 15; also Heininen et al. 2000, 69-75).

There is no need to describe in detail either the Finnish initiative or the Action Plan for the ND, but I should like to give a brief explanation of the concept and the main aims of the EU's Northern Dimension (for more details see Lipponen 1997; Action Plan 2000). The main goal of the ND, as well the Finnish initiative, is said to be to increase stability and civic security (although not security or security policy in the traditional sense). Another main goal is sustainable development, especially with respect to the highly vulnerable natural environment of the arctic. A part of this goal is to close the existing social gap between the EU and the Russian regions.

An interesting phenomenon in the ND process has been its most northern features, the "arctic dimension," which has led to co-operation in the North. The arctic dimension was also part of the ND in the original Finnish initiative, and it was supported by the Finnish Government (cf. Halonen 2000), but later on it either vanished or was temporarily moved to the periphery. The arctic dimension, however, did come back into ND policy, and it has since been adopted, at least in principle, as a new item in political discussions between the EU and both Canada and the United States.

The activity of the Northern Dimension is meant to focus on those sectors where the "added value" to the EU is expected to be the greatest, such as infrastructure, including transportation and telecommunication, natural resources, particularly gas and oil, and also forestry, environmental cooperation, nuclear safety, cross-border trade and other trans-boundary cooperation, and fighting against drug trafficking and organized crime.

Geographically, the ND target area is said to include the region "from Iceland on the west across to North-West Russia, from the Norwegian, Barents and Kara Seas in the North to the Southern coast of the Baltic Sea" (Action Plan 2000). The political actors of the ND referred to in the
document are the EU member states, the other states of the Baltic Sea region, the Russian Federation, and Iceland and Norway. The United States and Canada are also mentioned.

The Finnish ND initiative was the Finnish government’s first comprehensive national strategy for a northern policy, and a proposal for the European Union. Though the situation is not the same and the initiatives are not totally comparable, the Finnish initiative may be compared with the Norwegian BEAR initiative of 1992. At the same time, the ND initiative continued the Finnish foreign policy tradition of offering “good services,” such as, for example, the first summit of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, and the summit of President Clinton and President Yeltsin in Helsinki in 1998. These initiatives will strengthen the position of Finland vis à vis the EU.

At the end of the Finnish initiative it is mentioned that “Finnish national interests are very much involved.... Finland will be developed as a business centre for the region, with global opportunities” (Lipponen 1997; see also Finland 1997). This might sound as if it differs from the comprehensive initiative for the European Union as a whole, and as if it were included either for the sake of the domestic audience, or simply as an honest remark on the part of Finland with respect to the reason why this country is launching this kind of an initiative. This emphasis at the Finnish national level has, however, continued. Recently, a “national Northern Dimension Forum to gather experts, scholars, officials and interest groups from all parts of Finland” was established (Lipponen 2000, 14; see also Heininen et al. 2000, 133-144).

All in all, the Finnish initiative, though originating from the experience of Finland, was meant to be a tool for the entire European Union, a tool to increase stability in Northern Europe, which used to be an area of high tension and confrontation, but is now a promising, co-operative region. The initiative was also meant to build more concrete and functional co-operation with the Russian Federation. Ambitiously, the initiative proposed the creation of a EU special policy for Northern Europe and for the North, analogous to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the Barcelona Process in the South.

FINLAND "GOING" INTO EUROPE

There is a general understanding that Finland, as a European and a northern country, in its foreign and security policy not only has an interest in
international affairs as they relate to the North, the peaceful development of Northern Europe, and the relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe, but also sees the possibility of exerting an influence in these areas of concern.

The Finnish initiative has also been seen as an example of the customization of the European Union according to the interests of one member state (e.g., Ojanen 1999). It is, however, useful to remember that the Finnish initiative represents exactly the kind of added value that the EU Commission expected when Finland joined the Union in 1995. It is therefore understandable that the ND reflects a Finnish approach and reflects Finnish national interests. This is also a more general phenomenon, and it illustrates the current dilemma of the EU, which was clearly recognized in the Nice European Council in December 2000: the difficult balance between the EU’s common policies and the national interests of its member-states.

Although there is no real Nordic bloc inside the EU, at least not yet, Finland has been ambitious in its attempts to enter the core of the Union during its first years as an EU member-state. For example, Finland was one of the first states to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the Euro Area. In contrast, Sweden, and especially Denmark, have been sceptical about the deepening of the EU integration, and even partly against it.

The geographical position of Finland in Northern Europe, and Finland’s “de facto northern dimension,” have provided Finland’s foreign policy with a substantial and relevant focus. The political status of Finland as an EU member-state gives the country an opportunity to be active and creative in Europe at the turn of the twenty-first century. The Nordic and northern identity of Finland is one of the country’s strengths as an independent state, an international actor, and a member-state of the EU. It is also, and will continue to be in the future, a natural way to be both northern and European, and to develop Finland’s European identity. It is fascinating to observe that Finland has used a “northern card” to enter the core of Europe: Finland has “gone into” the South via the North.

NOTES

1 The article is based on my presentation in the Panel Discussion, “The Scandinavian Countries as Northern Countries,” at the AASSC/AAESC’s Annual Meeting, in Edmonton, Canada, 24–27 May 2000.

2 Norden in Swedish, and Pohjola in Finnish.
3 The Nordic Council was established in 1952 and the Nordic Council of Ministers in the early 1970s.
4 The Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) was established in 1993 and the Arctic Council in 1996.
5 This chapter is based on my research project, “The European North in the 1990s: A region of multifunctional and conflicting interests” (see Heininen 1999, 126-198, and An [Expanded] English Summary, 373-407).
6 Pechenga, the other “arm” of Finland toward the north-east, was under Finnish rule from 1920 to 1944. Since the end of the Second World War it has been a part of the U.S.S.R. and the Russian Federation.
7 Though it is not well known, Heikki Haavisto was the first Finnish politician who used the term Northern dimension (Heininen 1999, 157).
8 This section is based on my forthcoming article on the Northern Dimension of the EU from the Finnish initiative in 1997 until the Action Plan for the ND in 2000 (see Heininen, forthcoming).
9 The Finnish initiative has a clear focus on the arctic, describing the special features of the northern target area in such terms as “indigenous minorities, the Eskimo and the Saami peoples”; “sparsely populated”; “the climate is harsh”; “area rich in resources.”

REFERENCES


Challenges of Economic Development in Greenland Involving Strategies of International Co-operation

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ABSTRACT: This article will outline the current framework for economic development in Greenland in the context of changing environmental conditions. Some of the major structural political initiatives taken by Greenland after achieving Home Rule (self-government) in 1979 will be addressed. In a wider perspective, the article will discuss how these initiatives place extra responsibilities on the new government structures.

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article décrit le cadre actuel de développement économique adapté aux conditions environnementales changeantes au Groenland. Dans ce contexte nous discutons quelques-unes des principales initiatives politiques structurelles prises par le Groenland à la suite de l’autonomie de 1979. Dans une perspective plus large, nous voyons comment ces initiatives donnent des responsabilités accrues aux nouvelles structures gouvernementales.

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o comment briefly on the economic development of the North, I would like to note that while there is a strong commitment among arctic peoples to safeguard the arctic environment and renewable resources, it would be unfair to suggest that extra responsibilities are, or should be, placed on new government structures. In the arctic region, environmental challenges are already setting limitations to opportunities for economic development for its inhabitants, limitations that are reflected in most sectors of the society, including employment, social conditions, health, and housing. The strong commitment by arctic peoples to protect the environment and ensure the sound management and conservation of renewable resources, indeed, deserves respect. It should not, however, be turned into unrealistic expectations by anyone that the environment will remain untouched and that no development will take place.

Instead of putting unnecessary pressure on the arctic communities to safeguard the environment, the industrial societies outside the arctic region—societies that have unquestionable responsibility for the ongoing environmental degradation that derives from heavy industrial activities and highly polluting transportation systems—should be concentrating on eliminating those sources of pollution.

This very issue is also a central concern in the co-operative efforts of arctic states and arctic peoples in the Arctic Council. Sadly, though, since the establishment of the Arctic Council, the participants have been struggling to find common ground for a sustainable development framework. Such a framework or strategy would enable the Arctic Council to widen its scope to include the economic reality of the arctic community, instead of limiting itself to issues and impacts of pollution beyond the control of arctic peoples.

CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GREENLAND

The business sector of the Greenland economy is often characterized as having four main pillars: 1) the fisheries; 2) the mineral and petroleum industry; 3) tourism; and 4) land-based activities (construction, retail trade, industrial production, etc.).

The Fisheries

The fisheries are by far the most important sector, even though they are extremely vulnerable to changes in the environment, in the resource base,
and in global price structures. The fisheries have been closely monitored from an early stage, and fisheries management is based on internationally recognized regimes, which are carried out in close co-operation between fishermen, scientists, administration, and the companies involved. The strategy for decades to come will be to further refine and market the fisheries and the fishing industry as fully sustainable, not only environmentally, but also economically.

The fishing industry and the related processing industry account for almost 25 percent of total employment and some 92 percent of Greenland’s exports, 70 percent of which is made up of shrimp, followed by a steadily increasing export of Greenland halibut, snow crab, and scallops. Greenland has developed its competence in the shrimp fishery and processing over many years, and Royal Greenland Ltd. is, in fact, the world’s largest producer of cold-water shrimp, which are marketed internationally.

Oil and Minerals

While the mining industry has not been active in Greenland during the past few years, following the closing of the Black Angel zinc and lead mine at Maarmorilik in 1990, there is a broad political consensus to work toward making the mineral and petroleum industries mainstays of the economy. The expectations are based on indications that Greenland and the surrounding continental shelf have economically viable deposits of both minerals and petroleum that have yet to be discovered. Ultimately, the aim is for these industries to make a positive contribution to economic development and to create new jobs in Greenland for the benefit of the community and private business.

In order to increase the chances of locating deposits, the governments of Greenland and Denmark, which jointly administer the mineral resources in Greenland through a joint committee and an administration based in Greenland, are actively promoting exploration activities in both fields. Prerequisites for getting major exploration projects off the ground, however, are international interest, investment, and expertise. Another prerequisite that should be stressed is a clear political one that applies to all mineral resource activities, namely, that they are carried out with due respect for the environment and for safety.

The minerals most sought after include zinc, nickel, copper, gold, and diamonds. However, exploration activities are, as in most places, affected by fluctuations in world market prices for minerals, so that the level of explora-
tion activity has varied considerably from year to year. This year a gold-mining operation is expected to commence in South Greenland. Overall, small-scale prospecting is increasing, as local people with knowledge of the areas are encouraged and supported in their efforts in this field. Following some years of massive seismic testing, combined with on- and offshore exploration for oil and gas, test drilling for oil in a seismically very promising area is planned to take place in the Davis Strait this coming June.

Despite a general awareness of the many environmental issues related to mining and oil exploration, Greenland is keen on the possibility of gaining greater economic independence by way of extracting non-renewable resources. The most important consideration, aside from the environmental concerns, is that all activities should be of maximum benefit to the whole community.

The potential socio-economic impact is great. Taking into account experiences from similar activities in other parts of the world, the Home Rule government is therefore developing strategies to ensure that a) the community is well informed of the activities; b) the local labour force is well integrated; and c) local companies are contracted. Thus, while many of the projects require a very specialized workforce, which is basically international and which travels from operation to operation, a considerable proportion of the exploration budgets already go into buying services and paying wages in Greenland. Greenland Home Rule is, at the same time, looking at ways to prepare the workforce for different types of jobs within the sectors and a possible boom within the next 10 to 15 years.

Tourism

Like fishing and mining, tourism in Greenland is based on the country's natural resources in combination with its human resources and culture. The Home Rule government's objective with respect to tourism builds on the notion that the gains and values should be manifold. It must make Greenland richer with respect to money, work, and cultural understanding, and it must create opportunities and experiences for local people as well as for tourists.

To date the very ambitious plans for the tourism industry have not quite materialized at the expected levels, in spite of huge investments and tremendous efforts. Tourism development, nonetheless, remains a priority with respect to its potential for generating local employment and supporting additional infrastructure improvements.
An overall analysis of the tourism sector shows that it is constrained by a number of factors, which are partly linked to some of the structural paradigms that will be discussed later on. These constraints include the following: it remains very costly to travel, because of a limited infrastructure, despite a number of improvements achieved during the past few years; living costs, and price levels in general, are high; tourist facilities are not fully developed; and the entrepreneurial spirit is still limited. Tourism, nonetheless, has the great potential of marketing Greenland and Greenland products internationally in unique ways. This potential is therefore considered of great economic value outside the sector itself.

**Land-based Business**

The fourth pillar, often referred to as "other land-based business," includes sectors such as construction, retail, services, and industrial production—industries that are mostly directed toward the Greenland market and in which more private sector dynamism can be detected.

This pillar comprises many different activities and is an important area, with a great potential for development, particularly if private initiative and the entrepreneurial spirit are promoted and supported. Many of the enterprises found in this category are very small, employing from one to ten people. It is expected, however, that the gradual build-up of several small enterprises producing a variety of goods and services will help create more jobs, support the development of medium-sized companies, and, overall, contribute positively to a more diversified economy.

Numerous small-scale projects are emerging these years on an experimental basis. Some of them have the potential of hitting it big, if they get proper attention. At this time there is a lot of focus on Greenland's huge resources of clean water and ice, resources that are becoming increasingly scarce elsewhere on the globe.

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN GREENLAND**

During the last two decades, the process toward political and economic independence has evolved through several phases. The period leading up to Home Rule and the actual introduction of the Greenland Home Rule government in 1979 was concentrated on the development of a Greenland political culture as well as the establishment of a central public administration. Concurrently with the foundation of the institutional framework,
Home Rule launched an ambitious plan for a modernization of the economy, making the fisheries the key business sector through heavy investments in a new fishing fleet and new production plants. The implementation of the plan was initiated in 1984, when control over the fisheries was transferred to Home Rule. In this context, it is important to note that in fact Greenland took over a range of areas of responsibility during the 1980s, much more quickly than initially anticipated.

The tremendous task of creating a new economic driving force became a serious financial challenge to the government and the publicly owned fishing company, and in the late 1980s the government decided to put on the brakes, in order to avoid an economic crisis caused by increasing debt. A period of consolidation with tight economic policies followed. New measures of budget control were introduced, plus a long-term policy to ensure financial surpluses. The reorganization of the Home Rule economy and the transformation of the Home Rule-controlled fishing company into a shareholding company were a success.

The financial restructuring phase occurred in the early 1990s, and it was followed by a new business development that aimed at

1. A diversification of the business structure by new investments in three new pillars, tourism, non-renewable resources, and other land-based business, as already mentioned. The reorganization of the fisheries involved a major condemnation of the fishing fleet—both to improve efficiency and to protect the fish stocks.

2. A reduction of costs in the basic infrastructure services through new investments, such as a hydroelectric power plant, containerization of the shipping system, new harbours, new airports and landing strips, and digitalization of the telecommunications system.

3. Transition to a market-oriented economy, which involved abandoning traditional political control over government-owned companies, which have a major influence on the Greenland business sector and on Greenland's macroeconomic performance as a whole.

The initial step in the transition to a market economy was the restructuring of government-run companies into public limited liability companies, ruled by the Companies Act and, as such, though still owned by the government, legally and financially separated from the political/administrative system.

The restructuring of the companies centred around the division of the huge Trading Company KNI (formerly KGH) into Royal Arctic Line, KNI
Pilersuisoq (service), and KNI Pisiffik (retail), an operation that has had a profound impact, because KNI, Greenland Trade, accounted for more than half of the retail turnover in Greenland, with dominance in settlements and rural areas. Later the postal services were transferred to the Greenland telecommunications company, Tele Greenland, and the boat passenger service between the communities was separated from Royal Arctic Line to form the Arctic Umiaq Line.

In the Political Economic Report 2000, recently presented to the Greenland Parliament, the minister of finance made it clear that in order to make the Greenland economy more sustainable, it will be necessary within the coming years to work toward an alteration of the society’s structure. This is the reality with respect to both the business sector and the more fundamental structures of Greenland society. An example is the growing political demand for cost-based pricing of infrastructure services provided by the government itself, and a reform of the countrywide “same-price system” (the uniform or one-tariff system). The price control system has been carried out through the government’s own infrastructure services, such as approval/regulation mechanisms, concessions, for example, with respect to freight rates, telecommunications, and the like, and by subsidizing retail and gross sales of goods in settlements and smaller towns. The government is, however, very cautious, given the complexity of the price liberalization issue and the need to ensure that any new structure remains geographically balanced and fair. One of the major problems with same-price pricing is cross-subsidizing, which reduces transparency and also affects opportunities for competition and contracting.

An important consideration has been the increase of transparency both at a microeconomic level in the business sector and at a macroeconomic level in the national economy. The major goal is to improve economic growth by reducing the public’s engagement in the business sector, cutting subsidies, and putting emphasis on the creation of a more dynamic private sector, which, in turn, is expected to create more employment opportunities. In connection with this process, the government has now decided to examine whether the government-owned companies could be either partly or fully privatized in order to further reinforce a free-market economy, and, if so, how this might be achieved.

In the Political Economic Report 2000, the Greenland Home Rule government emphasizes that in order to secure durable economic growth it is of fundamental importance that the overall level of education be increased. Much effort will therefore be directed to the improvement and
strengthening of the education system, starting at the primary school level, but at the same time promoting education and training at all levels. A reform of primary school is currently underway under the title Atuafitsialak [The Good School], and a Centre for Arctic Technology is being established in co-operation with the Technological University of Denmark and in conjunction with the vocational school (building and construction) at Sisimiut. The Centre will conduct research and provide various forms of secondary and adult education programmes, including technical training.

Another example of a major bottleneck in Greenland society that needs to be remedied is the housing situation. A recent estimate showed a deficit of up to 5,000 housing units. The Home Rule government is currently preparing for a reform of this area aimed at increasing the share of private housing by adjusting the relatively low rent levels in public housing.

The structural adjustment programs, in other words, are intended to accommodate local realities. So far, it has not been acceptable for the government to make changes that would affect the demography, such as those that would promote centralization. On the contrary, most policies and directions to companies and institutions have always emphasized the need for decentralization; however, this may be changing.

The government’s new political and economic initiatives and its long-term strategy are aimed at creating a more economically independent Greenland that can play an active role in the international world.

International Co-operation

It is often noted that small economies are very dependent on international trade and co-operation. This is certainly so in the case of Greenland, where the four pillars representing the business sectors outlined above directly and indirectly depend on international co-operation. Greenland society demonstrated a pronounced international orientation from an early stage. Its courageous commitment to international work as an obligation in a modern democracy has given Greenland a lot of experience and a fair amount of influence, particularly within four broadly defined areas: indigenous rights, fisheries management, wildlife management, and protection of the environment.

In the run up to Home Rule, students and politicians from Greenland were profoundly involved in the formation of the worldwide indigenous movement. The promotion of culture and ethnicity as the foundation for
human rights played a major role in facilitating international activities and co-operation during this period.

In the early 1970s, on the initiative of Greenlanders, among others, indigenous leaders from the arctic region came together in Copenhagen. And in the late 1970s, the formation of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) on the initiative of the Alaskan Inupiat launched strong and lasting international co-operation at the non-governmental level.

On the basis of these previous experiences, the Greenland Home Rule government from an early stage promoted and supported indigenous peoples' struggles to achieve their fundamental rights as peoples. Within the last two decades, involvement in the United Nations and other international bodies has gained high priority. As a result of close co-operation between Denmark and Greenland and with the strong support of indigenous peoples—particularly the Saami—lobbying for the establishment of a high-level Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples within the UN has been very successful. As the result of a major "ice-breaking" effort, a forum is now within sight that will enable indigenous peoples to deal in a comprehensive manner with issues with international implications, such as world trade regulations, environmental concerns, and the like.

Hunting and fishing are considered key aspects of Greenland society and culture, and both have long and rather unique traditions of stringent resource management, based on local knowledge and international standards and regimes. For Greenland, the most economically important sector of the two is clearly the fisheries. In this area, there is a long tradition of active participation and leadership in international fisheries and co-operation in fisheries management through a number of international and regional organizations.

Greenland left the European Union in 1985, in order to maintain control over its own fishing grounds. Membership in the then European Economic Council (EEC) had been forced upon Greenland before the introduction of Home Rule, but after membership was renounced it was replaced by a fisheries agreement and participation in the EU Overseas Countries and Territories Agreement (OCT). The fisheries agreement consists of a framework agreement and a number of fisheries protocols, which are renegotiated every five to six years. Currently, Greenland is in the process of finalizing its fourth round of negotiations with the EU.

While the fisheries agreement with the EU is clearly Greenland's most important one, it has a number of other, mainly bilateral, fisheries agreements with neighbouring countries. Greenland also engages in a number of joint ventures with other nations or foreign companies.
Through a high level of activity and engagement in Nordic co-operation Greenland has achieved a considerable status and influence. This influence is directed at gaining access to a wide range of programs and activities related to economic development. Greenland is also very active in the West Nordic Council, which is becoming an important regional body that deals with issues such as sustainable economic development in outlying regions.

Greenland and Denmark strongly supported Canada’s efforts to establish the Arctic Council on the basis of the former Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). Of particular interest to Greenland is the declared goal to incorporate sustainable economic development into the sphere of arctic co-operation.

Recently Greenland has been successful in promoting the concept of an “arctic window” as a link between the arctic states and the EU Northern Dimension policy. The initiative includes a number of concrete measures to be taken within the EU in relation to its dealings with the arctic region. At the same time, it aims at ensuring that Greenland is not excluded from joint projects of arctic relevance between Canada, the EU, and the United States.

On the regional level, Greenland and the government of Nunavut are preparing a Memorandum of Understanding, based on ongoing co-operation and exchanges of information, first and foremost between the respective public administrations. In the long term, however, it is hoped that more business-to-business co-operation will bring about economic development opportunities as well. This was underlined at a recent Northern Neighbours trade mission by Canada to Greenland, in which both the government of Nunavut and the business communities of Nunavut and Nuuk were represented. Also on this occasion, not, however, as a direct outcome of the trade mission, Royal Arctic Line Ltd. announced a new shipping route connecting Nuuk with Montreal and Iqaluit, and possibly in the future also with Kuujjuuaq. In a similar vein, a subsidiary of Royal Arctic Line, in co-operation with KNI and a Danish company, Herning Shipping Ltd., has been successful in making a charter arrangement with Northern Transportation Company Ltd. to supply oil to Arctic Canada.

Greenland continues to reach out to the world in various ways and in various capacities, in order to create new partnerships and to build on its influence and expertise, and also in the hope of generating the interest of foreign investors. In order to attract the latter, Greenland approached the Territorial Development Service of the OECD in 1998 for an impartial analysis of the state of the Greenland economy, which was released in 1999.
Greenland is also participating in the work of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this forum, it was hoped that at the Seattle conference Greenland-Denmark and other like-minded nations would be successful in promoting the establishment of a special venue in which indigenous peoples could deal with international trade issues.

CONCLUSION

As has been stated above, the Greenland Home Rule government's political and economic initiatives and its long-term strategy are aimed at creating a more economically independent Greenland that can play an active role in the international world. Being dependent on goods and services from outside for modern living, and, in turn, on markets for the sale of its own few products, at an early stage Greenland oriented itself outward to markets and political forums, mainly in Scandinavia and Europe. Connections to indigenous peoples brought Canada, the United States, and other parts of the world into the picture as the movement got underway.

I have tried to illustrate how Greenland politicians have used every opportunity to make Greenland visible, to plot it onto the world map, both for purposes of marketing—of tourism and fisheries, for example, (Greenland’s participation in Expo 2000 in Hanover would be a good example)—and for capacity-building purposes. Greenland is, for example, strongly committed to assisting in the development of democracies and human rights.

Aside from participating in international forums to help set the agenda, Greenland and Denmark have been jointly “marketing” Greenland’s Home Rule system, its capacity-building, and its unique company competences by means of the Danish Development Agency, Danida. This “marketing” project encompasses not only fisheries and telecommunication, but democracy-building as well. Some of this is for commercial purposes, but some is done in the name of partnership and solidarity.

In summing up, the objectives of international orientation and cooperation could be described as being at least twofold, and certainly intertwined: 1) the ongoing exchange of political and cultural values, while at the same time ensuring access to agenda-setting activities, and 2) the ongoing exchange of goods and competences.

ABSTRACT: When the North American Icelandic community decided to raise funds toward the foundation of a separate Department of Icelandic at the University of Manitoba, its main objective was to foster continuing interest in the Icelandic cultural heritage in North America. The choice of an academic institution as the home for a project whose purpose is the preservation of the Icelandic heritage culture has had ramifications not necessarily envisioned by the original community donors, however, and it raises intriguing problems concerning the volatile interface between academic demands on the one hand and minority community interests on the other that have since been echoed in other heritage departments at Canadian universities. Can university departments act as mediators and preservers of minority cultures without loss of academic integrity and loss of support? This article discusses some of the difficulties involved in teaching, in an academic context, a subject that is also a heritage icon.

RÉSUMÉ: Quand la communauté islandaise nord-américaine a décidé de lever des fonds pour financer un département d’islandais séparé à l’Université du Manitoba, son objectif principal était de soutenir et de promouvoir un intérêt continu pour le patrimoine culturel islandais en Amérique du Nord. Le choix d’un cadre universitaire pour préserver la culture ancestrale islandaise a eu des ramifications qui n’ont pas été envisagées par les donateurs originaux de la communauté, cependant, et soulève des problèmes intrigants concernant l’interface changeante entre les demandes universitaires et les intérêts d’une communauté minoritaire qui se sont reproduits dans d’autres départements de langues et de cultures ancestrales dans les universités canadiennes. Les départements d’université peuvent-ils médialiser et préserver les cultures minoritaires sans perdre de leur intégrité académique et de leur appui? Cet article discute certaines difficultés inhérentes à l’enseignement dans un contexte universitaire d’une matière qui est également une icône patrimoniale.

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The Department of Icelandic Language and Literature at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg has the unique status of being the only separate, degree-awarding Icelandic Department outside of Iceland. This unique status lends it a certain visibility. It attracts the attention of many who are interested in any possible aspect of Iceland and Icelandic culture, and this has been increasingly so since the Department has put up its own home page on the University of Manitoba web site. The University itself also likes to make use of the Department's uniqueness and visibility when profiling itself. However, the Department's separate status and small size also make it highly vulnerable. In today's climate of cutbacks and administrative number-crunching, its status as a separate department devoted to one exclusive field of study already small in itself has increasingly turned it into a liability in the eyes of University administrators. The "limited" focus on Icelandic language and literature, signified in the Department's name, translates into small enrolments, and makes it an obvious target for amalgamation, if not closure.

The Icelandic Department in Winnipeg is, however, not an "ordinary" academic language and literature department, devoted exclusively to the teaching and study of Icelandic language and literature, as institutions of a similar name might be elsewhere. It is also what is referred to in the multicultural era as a "heritage department," partly funded by and with close ties to the Icelandic-Canadian community. The Department of Icelandic, founded several decades before the institutionalization of multiculturalism made funds available for the study of minority or "heritage" cultures as part of official government policy, is one of the earliest institutions of its kind in Canada. As is so often the case when dealing with Icelandic Canadians, this Icelandic-Canadian cultural institution thus provides an intriguing test case, an example of the cultural, educational, and academic implications of the very concept of institutionalized "heritage" studies. There can be no doubt that the multicultural policy to institutionalize heritage studies has been an invaluable, and in some respects one might argue a long overdue, boost to the development of a field like Icelandic-Canadian studies. It does, however, also create some very intriguing and unique dynamics in the classroom, as I found out when I entered a Winnipeg classroom for the first time in 1994, an outsider with a long-standing academic interest in Icelandic-Canadian studies, meeting experiential and essentialist conceptions of Icelandic culture, based in nineteenth-century Iceland and often clothed in romantic Viking imagery, head-on.
How does one go about teaching a cultural "heritage"? What happens when the transmission of a cultural heritage is relegated to an academic institution? How can the teaching of a heritage culture remain open and inclusive in a classroom setting, when heritage cultures usually are by their very nature exclusive and closed? What exactly is meant, and, by implication, taught, when we speak of heritage cultures—what is considered relevant: Icelandic culture? Icelandic-Canadian culture? Icelandic culture as it relates to Icelandic-Canadians? Finally, to what extent can what is after all an academic institution serve at the same time as a cultural embassy to the Icelandic-Canadian community, particularly when academic principles and the community are at odds, as at times they inevitably will be? These were the kinds of questions that arose as I taught courses in Icelandic-Canadian cultural history and Icelandic-Canadian literature, and that I tried to tackle directly in the classroom, although I am not sure I ever found any answers.

To put my discussion into a larger context, I will begin by providing a brief survey of the Icelandic Department's mandate, history and program, as its history in many ways reflects the development of Icelandic-Canadian culture over several generations. The Department originated in the form of a Chair in 1951, funded with an endowment created by the Icelandic community in North America. Icelandic courses had been taught at Wesley College, now the University of Winnipeg, as well as at the University of Manitoba, on a fairly regular basis, but the Icelandic community wanted an Icelandic Department, a separate "home" institution, where its heritage culture would be preserved, promoted, and passed on. The preservation of the Icelandic heritage in North America through an educational institution had always been one of the most prominent goals of the North American Icelandic community, from the time of the earliest Icelandic settlements in the western hemisphere in the 1870s. It took a while for this initiative to get off the ground, but by 1944 a campaign was launched to collect funds toward the establishment of a Chair.

The foundation of the Chair was formally announced in 1951 with the following mandate: 1) to provide instruction in Icelandic language, 2) to offer courses in Icelandic literature, 3) to teach Icelandic and North American Icelandic history, 4) to promote and foster scholarly exchange between Iceland and North America, 5) to maintain strong relations with the Icelandic-Canadian community, and 6) to maintain a strong program of research and publication and thereby promote Icelandic studies. Finnbogi Guðmundsson, the first Chair, commenced teaching in 1952, and over the
next several years he developed a program for the Department that would remain largely in place until the late 1980s. The course offerings of the first decades bear testimony to the student body the Department was still able to target at the time: nearly all courses in the general and honours program relied on at least a reading knowledge of Icelandic. Only one Modern Icelandic language course was offered: Introductory Icelandic. In 1956, when Haraldur Bessason took over as Chair, a course in Old Norse Mythology was introduced, the only course on the program at the time that lists a textbook in English. Although enrolments in the Department were never high from the beginning (the average enrolment was 6—9), they were always steady. Finnbogi Guðmundsson emphasized in 1954,

> It is true that the students have been few ... [but] the number of students selecting Icelandic each year is not of prime importance; rather it is the earnestness with which the studies are pursued and the results obtained. A few fine students, who finish their Icelandic studies here, and, for the purposes of illustration, afterwards go on a scholarship to Iceland, and later become teachers in Canadian or American schools, taking at the same time an active part in Icelandic affairs, will in the long run repay many times the sacrifice made in the establishment of the Icelandic Department. (30)

During the 1980s, however, the situation changed significantly. Because the costs of running and maintaining a Department and Chair were increasing rapidly, the Department had become more and more financially dependent on the University, while increased demands of academic Chairs had added significantly to the workload and created the need for a full-time second position. Finally, the composition of the prospective student body had changed dramatically: most students now had no previous knowledge of Icelandic; they took courses as a way of discovering their roots. Extensive changes in the course program were needed to accommodate and attract new students, especially since student enrolments were an increasing concern for administration and were often quoted by those who had begun to doubt the possibility of maintaining a separate Department of Icelandic at the University of Manitoba in the future.

In 1990, the Department received a grant from the Secretary of State for Multiculturalism toward the establishment of a program in Icelandic-Canadian studies. This grant brought a certain measure of security for the Department. By accepting it, the University committed itself to offering a program in Icelandic-Canadian studies. These changes set the stage for a
drastic make-over of the Department's course program to reflect the composition of the prospective student body. The new course program, devised under the dynamic leadership of the new Chair, Kirsten Wolf, emphasized the areas likely to attract most interest among those students: the main areas of teaching and research were divided into Medieval Icelandic language, literature, and culture on the one hand, and on the other Modern and North American Icelandic language, literature, and culture, and the course content was made accessible to people who had no prior knowledge of the Icelandic language. The graduate program, which had formerly been a part of a graduate program in Germanic philology, now became separate: a number of graduate courses proper were introduced, and a thesis on an Icelandic or North American Icelandic subject became part of the requirements for an M.A. in Icelandic. This made the Department the only place outside of Iceland where it is possible to get a graduate degree in Icelandic. Finally, a second full-time position was established in 1992 in the Modern and Icelandic-Canadian field, occupied by Viðar Hreinnsson.

The Department's original mandate and first course program show that Icelandic-Canadian culture had, however, been a component within its program from the very beginning, which testifies to an awareness _avant la lettre_ that Canadians of Icelandic descent had developed their own culture sufficiently distinct from that of Iceland to warrant a separate clause and course in the larger framework of the Icelandic Department. They did not, in other words, look only to the original homeland as a source of community culture and identity, as many minority cultures are wont to do. And over the years, there was a slow but steady development away from a dominant emphasis on Icelandic culture to an increasingly significant emphasis on courses with Icelandic-Canadian content, a development that I believe is still continuing today. In other words, the Icelandic Department had already been developing into a true "heritage" department in Canada, and its name, too, has taken on the common Canadian reference to origins rather than country, "Icelandic" signifying cultural origins within a Canadian context.

But what are the ramifications of this development for the teacher in the classroom? I soon found out that heritage studies in a university setting pose some unique and intriguing, if sometimes also frustrating, challenges; it is certainly nothing like teaching in a traditional language and literature department. One of the first surprises, for me, was the fact that the Modern Icelandic language courses seemed to form the main focus of attraction for students of
Icelandic descent who wanted to learn more about their heritage culture, rather than the courses in Icelandic-Canadian culture. I have had several discussions with students about this over the years, and it became very clear to me that these were students a) who, feeling that their parents had not passed on much of their Icelandic heritage, wanted to learn more about it, and b) who clearly saw language as the key to culture, and not just academically. As they perceived the situation, if only they learned to speak Icelandic, they would be Icelandic, not just genetically, but culturally. The greatest challenge for many of these students, as my predecessor Viðar Hreinsson had observed before me, was to conquer the disillusionment that occurred when they discovered that being of Icelandic descent did not somehow make them genetically predisposed to learn the Icelandic language quickly and easily. I believe that here at least my status as an outsider often proved helpful. Having gone through the process of learning Icelandic as a second language myself, I knew from experience some of the areas of difficulty, where textbooks fell short, and, most importantly perhaps, the frustrations as well as the elation involved in the process of learning Icelandic.

What surprised me about the culture courses offered by the Department was that almost all student interest was focussed on medieval Icelandic culture. The courses in Norse Mythology and Icelandic Sagas in Translation were consistently and by far the most popular courses in the Department, with students of Icelandic descent as well as with other students. As I was not the one teaching these courses, I cannot offer any explanations based on my own teaching experiences, but as a long-standing student of Icelandic-Canadian culture I would suggest that Icelandic antiquity has always constituted a vital symbol of the Icelandic cultural heritage in North America, and that it has the added advantage of projecting the romantic lure of the distant past without all of the cultural complications of the present. Additionally, it offers a set of symbols and stereotypes that are easily identifiable as Icelandic, to a non-Icelandic audience as well as to an Icelandic one. It offers, in other words, what Herbert Gans has termed the “symbolic ethnicity” of later generations from cultural minority groups.

That leaves the courses with Modern Icelandic and North American Icelandic cultural content. Icelandic literature courses, which tended to require a solid reading knowledge of Icelandic, had hardly attracted any students at all for years. Most of the Department’s students take courses individually, as part of a general Arts degree or as an extra, and so hardly any students acquire the required fluency in Icelandic. However, the
course on Icelandic history and culture, which did not require a reading knowledge of Icelandic, was not popular either, although this may be understandable from an Icelandic-Canadian point of view. As I noted before, Icelandic Canadians have developed their own culture that is based in North America.

This brings me to what was probably most surprising to me—the fact that courses with North American Icelandic content consistently attracted so few students, particularly from the Icelandic community. Although there has always been a strong sense within the Icelandic-Canadian community that an academic institution was the desired and most effective way of preserving and promoting Icelandic-Canadian culture, to which the continued existence of the Department bears testimony, this seems to be mostly a theoretical conviction. In practice, few Icelandic-Canadians actually enrol in the Department to take courses with Icelandic-Canadian content, even though they are taught in English.

Why do there seem to be so few Icelandic Canadians, relatively speaking, who are interested in taking courses relating to their own culture? For one thing, minority cultures tend to be exclusionist and closed, to a greater or lesser extent. According to Magnús Einarsson's perceptive analysis, for Icelandic Canadians the cultural boundaries are genealogy and shared community knowledge. These become the tools by which outsiders are made irrelevant and thereby kept "out" when somehow the need arises for community members to pull together as a group and act out a sense of belonging and group identity. Community membership therefore relies not only on ancestry, but also on a certain body of knowledge that constitutes one's cultural credentials or passport, and this body of knowledge is non-negotiable. While the continued existence of the Icelandic-Canadian community and culture obviously depends on the perpetuation of this insider's knowledge—hence the profound concern with its preservation—it also implies that its sharing, for instance in an academic context, either in a classroom setting or through research, particularly when conducted by non-community members, poses a potential threat to its perceived integrity and future survival. Obviously, this is not a hard and fast analysis—cultures are in continual flux, and their boundaries are ultimately quite porous, but it may help one understand certain aspects of Icelandic-Canadian culture and its ambiguous attitude toward Icelandic-Canadian studies. Icelandic-Canadian culture is something lived that not only defines but makes "us" (versus "them"); after all, lacking the political legitimation of the nation state, minority cultures rely on cultural legitimation instead.
This makes Icelandic-Canadian studies a very confusing experience in a classroom setting. Only to outsiders does it seem to be an academic field of study. I taught a course in Icelandic-Canadian cultural history three times, and every year outsiders, that is, non-Icelandic-Canadians, made up 50 percent or more of the student body. The students who were of Icelandic descent were there either because it was part of the requirements for a minor in Icelandic, or because they wanted to learn more about their heritage culture and could not take the language courses, which were taught during the day. With the exception of one, these students were not interested in cultural analysis and hardly even in cultural content. They were primarily interested in acquiring symbolic knowledge that would allow for increased community participation, the capacity to pass their heritage on to future generations, and/or cultural recognition from other Canadians. In other words, they were looking for a crash course in how to be Icelandic Canadian in their daily lives, what it is that “we” do and why, what makes “us” different from other Canadians, and how we display our Icelandicness to other Canadians. For community members who had grown up in an Icelandic community or felt that they were in other ways already full-fledged members of the community, there would be no need to take a course in Icelandic-Canadian culture, since, from their point of view, they already possessed it.

I also taught a course on Icelandic-Canadian literature, which did attract some students, all of them Icelandic-Canadian. This allows for some speculation as to why literature would tend to attract students of Icelandic descent. I suggest that it has a lot to do with the totemic role of literature in Icelandic-Canadian culture. If there is anything that defines the uniqueness of Icelandic-Canadian culture and gives it a certain air of sophistication, it is the fact that it can boast its own impressive literary tradition, which has played a formative role in the development of Icelandic-Canadian culture. Most “practising” Icelandic Canadians can rattle off the names of famous Icelandic-Canadian writers, and present-day Icelandic-Canadian writers are a source of immense pride to the community, and rightly so, for they have been instrumental in putting Icelandic-Canadians on the Canadian multicultural map. Yet not very many community members read Icelandic-Canadian literature any more, particularly not the older literature, although, paradoxically, community initiative and funding have been crucial in the translation of selections of canonized writers such as Stephan G. Stephansson and Guttormur J. Guttormsson, to make them accessible to younger and non-Icelandic-speaking members. This,
again, points to the increasingly symbolic role of culture, also literary culture: it is considered vitally important that the literature is there for all to see, but not necessarily to be read or studied. Nevertheless, literature occupies a special place in Icelandic-Canadian culture, and does motivate at least some to have a closer look at it.

The foundation three years ago of the Lestrarfélág [Reading Society], where community members are invited to meet once a week to discuss an Icelandic-Canadian literary work, bears witness to this. One of the students who took the course in Icelandic-Canadian literature was so enthusiastic about the reading experience that she took the initiative to found the reading society, and asked me to be present as well. However, a recurrent and inherent problem that occurred in the classroom became even more persistent in the free setting of the reading society: the readers' interest was mostly representational, and discussions would revolve around questions as to how "we" are portrayed, and whether that portrayal is perceived to be accurate. Such discussions were usually followed by related community or familial anecdotes. In other words, this was an acting out of a community ritual.

For an academic teacher, this poses a challenging situation. While the portrayal of minority identity in literature is in itself a perfectly valid theme of discussion, it is not the only one, and resentment against certain approaches to literary texts can develop quickly. For instance, the students showed little interest in literary analysis per se, while post-structuralist ideas on the narrative construction of culture and identity met with much opposition. At the undergraduate level, the choice of reading material becomes a problem as well, as it is limited to what is available in English translation, which, in turn, is determined by what the community considers valuable and relevant, since it initiates and funds most translation projects. This means that the reading list has to be fairly traditional. Some of the poems, stories, and novels that present alternative forms and viewpoints to counter the canonized ones cannot be included, and the general overview students get remains of necessity rather one-sided.

In a "mixed" classroom setting, that is, one made up of students from both the Icelandic community and others, a different dynamic and an altogether different set of challenges arises. During the 1990s, the Icelandic Department faced particularly acute financial constraints and considerable pressure to increase its student numbers. As a result, the course program was changed again. Courses that had attracted little attention (mostly Icelandic literature courses that require a solid reading knowledge of
Icelandic) were deleted, and more so-called “cross-listable” courses taught completely in English that appeal to outside students were added. The composition of the student body changed accordingly, with a remarkable increase in the number of students who are not of Icelandic descent, accompanied by a decrease in the students from the Icelandic-Canadian community. The influence of these changes has made itself felt rather powerfully in the classroom.

The following scenario may serve as an example. After discussing with Canadian colleagues the problem of student numbers in heritage courses at a conference, I advertised the course on the cultural history of Icelanders in Canada as a kind of case study in migration, cultural transplantation, and identity construction in a Canadian context. Six students enrolled. Some of these were from the community: one was a young agricultural student looking to find out more about her heritage, and two were mature students who had been actively involved in the Icelandic community. Then there was one non-Icelandic student interested in things Icelandic, one student with an Icelandic spouse, and a student who had no connection to Icelandic at all but was interested in migration history. This mix proved challenging to say the least. Three of the students had no background in Arts or theory and often tended to steer the discussion in the direction of an in-group discussion that excluded the other students. Two of them objected fiercely to anything they perceived as negative, and current ideas about national narratives and cultural identity construction were continually challenged by experiential knowledge—with the result that cultural boundaries were erected within the classroom. The history student, on the other hand, was looking to view the subject matter in its larger Canadian and international contexts from a theoretical perspective. The remaining two were mostly interested in the general Icelandic cultural background. I tried to balance the expectations of all the students, but eventually the history student decided the course was too limited in its focus and not sufficiently challenging, and dropped out.

Even the language courses were beginning to attract more and more students interested in modern Iceland, and others interested in the linguistics of language learning per se, who regard Icelandic as one interesting component in a larger field of study rather than the main focus of their interest. These latter students have considerable experience in the areas of grammar and linguistics, experience that clashes with the needs of the community students, who, more often than not, have no background at all in language learning and need to be taught the most basic of grammatical concepts. References to
Icelandic culture, too, can be a problem, because North American Icelanders, particularly older ones, generally have less interest in contemporary Iceland, while younger students like to hear as much as possible about contemporary Icelandic culture and lifestyles. Obviously, such disparities can create tensions in a classroom, and may leave some students dissatisfied.

Heritage departments depend on the cultural communities whose interests they are expected to serve. On the other hand, they exist and are expected to function in a university context and on an academic level; they employ scholars who are expected to conduct research and publish, and, along with other university departments, they are subject to university policies and financial constraints. The dual demands of attracting outside students and accommodating community interests are sometimes at odds, and this raises questions as to how to accommodate community interests with academic demands, and where to draw the line in the quest for more students. For instance, the undergraduate course program now consists mostly of courses taught in English and using English texts, with the obvious exception of the language courses. Arguably, the Department, when judged by its courses, is not as “Icelandic” as might be expected. How “watered down” should the Icelandic component of the courses be allowed to become in order to make them relevant to at least the number of students that allow for the course in question to be offered and the Department to survive?

The composition of the student body, too, has continued to change, with a remarkable increase in the number of students who are not of Icelandic descent, accompanied by a decrease in the students from the North American Icelandic community. Possibly, and I am only speculating here, the multiculturalist influence has worn off, while the larger exposure of things Icelandic during the last number of years (Björk, Keiko, under-glacier eruptions, avalanches, international films, to name a few examples), combined with the exponentially large presence of Iceland on the Internet seems to attract non-Icelandic students. While this is obviously not in conflict with the Department’s mandate, it does raise a question as to how much of a “heritage” department it still is, and how the different needs and backgrounds of community and non-community students can be balanced. Other departments with larger classes simply set limits and require that students have mastered basic knowledge before they are allowed to register for the course in question, but the Icelandic Department relies on each individual student and certainly cannot afford to turn down community members who wish to take cour-
ses in “their” Department out of interest, even if they do lack a certain academic background.

While having boosted heritage studies, it seems that Canadian multiculturalist policy has also created some unique challenges for heritage departments. Teaching Icelandic-Canadian culture, as both academic subject and heritage icon, meant, at least for me, performing a continual balancing act in the classroom. I experimented over the years, trying to keep my classes open-ended and to organize them on the principle of raising questions rather than answering them or providing information; trying to balance new ideas with preconceptions and stereotypes, while always trying to meet the students’ expectations and welcome them into the subject, and thus, perhaps, encouraging students to question their own preconceptions while remaining respectful toward their heritage. Ethnicity is, after all, a deeply emotive issue. I am not sure I ever found a successful formula or even succeeded in maintaining the balance I sought, but at least the experience raised important questions that still occupy me today—and as a teacher I know that questions are always the first step in any learning process.

NOTES

1 In writing this article I have greatly benefited from the information provided in Kirsten Wolf, “Forty Years of Icelandic at the University of Manitoba.”

REFERENCES


Wolf, Kirsten. 1991. “Forty Years of Icelandic at the University of Manitoba.” The Icelandic Canadian 50, 2. 61–78.
Njal in Vinland

Contextualizing Canadian Law

CHRISTOPHER ENGLISH

ABSTRACT: The absence of formal academic offerings in Nordic studies need not prevent students’ being exposed to some limited aspects of the Nordic heritage. Students in a new interdisciplinary undergraduate program in Law and Society at Memorial University of Newfoundland explore, via individual research, simulation, and collaboration, how Njals Saga reflects eleventh-century Icelandic legal principles and practices and their place in the western legal tradition. This is proposed as a modest model of how discrete aspects of Scandinavian Studies can be introduced to a wider student population.

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What are the current viability and future prospects of the arts and social sciences, given scarce resources, reluctance to ensure faculty renewal, federal withdrawal from designated post-secondary funding, and provincial policies that seem to de-emphasize the need to modernize university offerings? A recurring litany of apprehension and uncertainty accompanies any discussion of our prospects, certainly in Nordic studies.

It is commonly reported from across the country that any proposal for new programs is met with decanal injunctions first to excise current offerings in order to make space and free up resources. Were we ill-informed or naive twenty years ago, when the AASSC was founded, to hope for an expansion of Scandinavian and Nordic studies in Canada? Clearly the fiscal and political context of the time was very different. But since then the record in this country of successful initiatives in these areas has been modest. In large part they have been funded from sources external to the universities or in the form of "soft money"; neither offers commitments for the long term. The qualified scholars who offer these courses depend on reappointment each year and have little or no prospect of becoming tenured in their positions.

With regard to agencies that might act as clearing houses for academics interested in Nordic Studies, the Canadian Institute for Nordic Studies at Alberta is well endowed, but sometimes hard put to spend its resources. Our own organization, AASSC, the Canadian umbrella for a geographically fragmented professional community, grew slowly during its first 15 years, but its membership has been declining. We are aging, and too many of us are now retired. New appointments are slow to appear. So Canadian scholars wishing to increase students' knowledge of the Nordic heritage, especially where no formal programs are in place, are constrained to work along new lines. New initiatives are likely to be modest, but when there is no prospect of even half a loaf, a slice must be preferred.

At Memorial University in the Faculty of Arts we have inaugurated an interdisciplinary minor program in Law and Society, which requires eight courses, no more than two to be drawn from each of the participating disciplines: Anthropology, History, Law and Society, Linguistics, Philosophy, Political Science, and Sociology. Within a diverse, even diffuse, program there is not much time to talk to undergraduate students about pre-Jarnside eleventh-century Iceland. Some might term it "stretching the envelope," despite the extensive and costly publicity that accompanied the European celebration two years ago of the "millennium" of Norse exploration, and seasonal residence at L'Anse aux Mead-
ows. Few Newfoundland students studying in St John’s have made the 1,100-kilometre trip to the eleventh-century Norse site at the tip of the Northern Peninsula. They are headed for careers in criminology, teaching, the civil service, the professions, and business. In an introductory course, how can we make Njal’s Saga interesting and relevant to them, in light of its many protagonists, its byzantine plot, and its alien and, to students, gratuitously violent legal culture?

What can we reasonably expect of students unaccustomed to sustained reading and research, and burdened with part-time jobs and outside responsibilities? I offer three strategies.

First, a group of five or six can work together to reconstruct an episode of legal import from the saga. A straightforward option, well within the range of second-year students, is to enact the story of Unn’s divorce, discussed below. They present to their peers early in the semester in the class before the one in which the saga is formally discussed. The performers take questions and comments from the class and are assessed by it in the form of exit slips in which students record their understanding of the legal issues implicit in the presentation. My resulting evaluation contributes in large part to their grades for class participation.

But a more challenging choice for the more confident and vocal students is a group reconstruction of the trial of Flosi for his role as ring-leader in the death by arson of Njal and his family, a defining event in the saga. These students present to the class late in the semester, lead the class in a discussion of the legal significance of the scene, and receive from each member of the class an exit slip that responds to their performance. This enterprise serves as their formal research paper. I will return to the trial, which leads to the reconciliation of clan rivalries and, in the context of Law and Society 2000, is the most important scene in the saga.

The second approach is the familiar one of offering essay topics that students volunteer individually to research from their reading of the saga.

Third, the rest of the class is encouraged to read the story of Unn’s divorce in order to locate Icelandic law of the independence period on the spectrum of law and legal values stretching from ancient Babylon to the present.

It will come as no surprise that the third option is the one most commonly chosen, so it is worth some brief discussion. The story is straightforward. Counselling by her old father Mord, who is learned in the law, Unn declares before witnesses gathered at the marital bed and again at the threshold of the marital home that she is divorcing her husband Hrut via a legal separation. Mord, as her agent, then assumes carriage of her
case, makes the required declarations before the Law Mount (the Alting in its judicial robes), and the divorce is accomplished.

So far so good. But Hrut refuses to return Unn’s dowry. He challenges Mord to personal combat; the old man has to decline and, for now, Hrut retains the dowry. But the option of recourse through legal process is still open. Gunnar, Unn’s clansman, counselled by Njal, who is by now the pre-eminent legal expert, employs a legal stratagem by which Hrut, in effect, summons himself to the Law Mount. The tables are now turned when Gunnar challenges Hrut to fight. With the acquiescence of his clansmen, Hrut declines and his supporters contribute the funds necessary to return Unn’s dowry.

As a result of reading of Unn’s divorce, possibly reinforced by a group’s presentation, the class identifies at least seven features that link, forward and backward, with other legal regimes:

First, that there were alternative means of dispute resolution: legal process and a hearing at the Law Mount, or personal combat. (Each option had been available in Hammurabi’s Babylon of 1750 B.C., and in early Rome.)

Second, there was clan solidarity and intra-clan assistance and obligation, reflecting the primacy of clan interests locally, at the level of the quarter courts, and all this before the arrival of the centralizing Norwegians in 1261 and their imposition of uniform law and legal procedure from the top down. (The process was to be replicated during the emergence of monarchical absolutism in Europe 500 years later.)

A third lesson: a key role was played by witnesses and the voicing of familiar formulaic declarations. In an oral culture, process must be rigidly adhered to so that witnesses can recall events and so that the requirements of law may be publicly attested to. (In these days of judicial challenges under our 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, every serious reader of the press must be aware of the importance of due process.)

Fourth, women were petitioners of equal standing with men before the courts. (Later in the course we examine two cases from the Newfoundland Supreme Court in 1946: a filiation application, and a charge by an aggrieved husband that a neighbour had enticed his wife away. Both cases sing of patriarchy. In the enticement case the judge did not cite any aspect of the wife’s testimony. He made no comment as to her credibility; perhaps she was not expected to be a reliable witness.)

Fifth, disinterested and therefore unpaid legal counsel was available to all who sought it. Njal advised Gunnar, but he also intervened independently at various points in the saga to act in the public interest. He proposed arbitration when tempers at the Law Mount grew heated and, in
the face of judicial stalemate, suggested that a superior Fifth Court be estab-
lished as a final court of appeal for the island. (In combining the func-
tions of law court and representative assembly, the 
Alting anticipated both the English parliament and the French parlement.)

A sixth lesson is that legal actions lay within the control of private
parties. They might resort to personal combat outside the court system,
but it must be consensual. Mord declined Hrut's challenge, but a legal
route to redress remained open. The preferred remedy was a monetary
settlement. It served the public interest by saving lives, it provided clo-
sure, and it avoided renewed blood feud and vendetta.

And finally, behind the foregrounding of legal process and private consen-
sual settlement (combat, arbitration, or monetary compensation) we discern
equity, elusive and undefined, but undoubtedly there. It was proper that Unn's
dowry should be returned. It was right that Hrut be bound by the same impos-
sible choice that he had imposed on Mord. And, in the long term, it was just,
serving both the private and the public interest, that blood feud be avoided,
and that private combat be replaced by mediated settlements—compounding,
outlawry, or exile—arrived at by agreement, arbitration, or judicial decision.

The writer/compiler of the saga wished to drive home to his audience
the importance of a community-sanctioned rule of law. This aim is evident
in the trial of Flosi and his clansmen for arson and homicide—the illegal
"burning of Njal" and his family—which had triggered a string of killings
that had threatened to run out of control. Unless carefully circumscribed by
consensual rules and procedures, blood feud could descend into anarchy.

At this point in the saga the themes briefly evident in the story of Unn's di-

corce become more prominent. There is respect for procedure: the charge (ho-
micide) must be properly framed and brought before the appropriate court
(here the Law Mount rather than the inferior quarter or district courts). The
charges must be recited publicly, on the spot where the offence is alleged to
have taken place, and in court. Especially important is that all the elements nec-

essary to make the charge legal must be present. Here is Gizur, who had earlier
assumed carriage of a suit brought against Gunnar for the death of Thorgeir:

I give notice of a suit for assault, punishable under the law, against Gunnar
for his assault, punishable under the law, against Thorgeir, in which he in-
flicted upon him an internal wound which became a mortal wound, as a re-
sult of which Thorgeir died. I herewith declare that he should be punished by
outlawry, and I insist that he should not be fed or forwarded nor given any
help or assistance whatsoever.
I declare that his goods and possessions should be forfeited, half to me and half to the men of that Quarter who according to the law are entitled to the confiscated goods and possessions of an outlaw. I give notice of this suit in the Quarter Court to which this charge should be referred according to the law. I give notice according to the law; I give notice so that all men at the Law Mount may hear me; I give notice of a suit of complete outlawry against Gunnar.2

How many elements of the charge can the student identify? Nine? Ten? There is a general charge against an accused, committed on a victim, with general consequences, which translates into a specific charge with specific consequences demanding sanctions permitted by a legal jurisdiction, when all procedural requirements have been followed.

Let us move briefly to Flosi's trial. Eyjolf, a legal expert (like Mord and Njal before him), mounts a brilliant procedural defence of Flosi that turns on the requirement that each party to an action, both prosecution and defence, set aside six of the 48 jurors summoned by the court in order to end up with the predetermined number of 36, who are then legally empowered to return a verdict. In this case the plaintiff excludes its six, but the defendant does not. At this point the prosecution makes a grievous mistake: obliged to exclude a further six, it does not grasp the significance of the defence's omission and fails to intervene to ensure that the jury is limited to the mandatory 36 members. This miscalculation renders the jury illegal and invalidates in advance whatever verdict it might render. Though justice is clearly with the plaintiffs (Njal's heirs), and the trial is going their way, they are stymied by a superior technical defence. In frustration, they take up arms, and bloody mayhem results, until cooler heads intervene to demand arbitration. The resulting settlement provides these outcomes:

- Compensation is paid for lives taken and lost on each side.
- Njal's death brings compensation at three times the normal rate, and that of his wife at twice.
- Flosi is exiled for three years, and his collaborators permanently.
- Recognizing his guilt, he refuses compensation for his wound. (Njal and Gunnar were noble heathens; Flosi is a noble Christian.)
- The feuding clans are thereby reconciled.

But for Eyjolf the outcome is not so happy. He is declared "to have fallen on his trickery and perversion of justice."3 Not his manipulation of legal procedure—that is clearly permitted. What then? His offence is to have accepted payment, a gold ring, from Flosi.
Fans of the popular television series, *Rumpole of the Bailey*, will make the connection. Mord and Njal are servants of the public, freely dispensing legal advice to whoever approaches them. They seek neither fear nor favour. But in accepting payment, which can be termed a bribe, Eyjolf proves untrue to his calling and to his public duty.

Horace Rumpole has an office clerk to grub for business and chase clients who are slow to pay. Barristers in the English common law world still wear court robes that offer a small outside pocket into which grateful clients, after the fact, were once invited to drop their tokens of appreciation. The great man cannot charge for his services. The line runs from Njal through Rumpole to our own Queen's Counsel. All three are sworn servants of the court; they uphold the interests of justice. It is for others to assure their worldly needs!

It is well known that students bring to our classes differences in learning style—an important one being that between global and linear ways of thinking. The global thinker likes scenes, contexts, background to be fleshed out and imaginable in order to proceed with enumerating causes, issues, changes, outcomes. The more linear thinker may have been trained to start by making lists, but sometimes misses the complexities of the situation under analysis. The above approach, or combination of approaches, is an effort to help both types of thinker to tease out the strands of fact and interpretation that are at play and to imagine them fully.

Njal represented the best in the principles and process of Icelandic law in the age of independence. And, having been appropriated after 1261, he provided a bridge to the Norwegian system. In his day he missed the opportunity to come to Newfoundland; in the twenty-first century, through the students' individual reading and research, simulation, and collaborative learning, he has repaired that oversight.

**NOTES**

1 This is the case with discrete offerings under fire at the universities of British Columbia (Swedish), Toronto (Finnish), and Victoria (Icelandic), and in part in Alberta (Danish) and Manitoba (Icelandic). And the practice may well be more widespread. In the case of Norwegian at Camrose College a few years ago the battle was to retain a program that was under threat. Programs like Manitoba's have been reinvented in order to appeal to a wider and more diverse clientele.
3 Ibid., 328.
IN HER CATALOGUE ESSAY ON THE HISTORIOGRAPHY of early nineteenth-century Danish and North German painting, Catherine Johnston recalls that, in 1972, Robert Rosenblum had remarked that conceptions of nineteenth-century European art were centred almost entirely upon France. At that time art historians thought in terms of a stylistic progression from one canonical monument of high art to another, citing examples well represented in the Louvre and London's National Gallery. No one questioned the underlying assumptions that had selected such resources in the first place, the conventions of aesthetics, authenticity, and quality, the predisposition to honour familiar narratives, or the museum curators and historians whose scholarship probed the “horizon of possibility” open at that period. Survey courses on the nineteenth century routinely rehearsed the neoclassicism of Jacques Louis David, debates in the French Academy between the Classicists and the Romantics, the critical discourse issuing from the Paris Salon, and the successive secessionist movements, from Realism to Art Nouveau. Anything outside this paradigm was regarded either as peripheral or as subsidiary.

It made no difference that Fritz Novotny had introduced German and Danish art to mainstream audiences in 1960, in his Pelican history, couching his analysis in terms of canonical relationships to already recognized movements elsewhere in Europe. The appreciation of the Danish golden age outside Scandinavia and Germany developed slowly, beginning in 1972 with the inclusion of Danish works in Hugh Honour's magisterial exhibition on Neoclassicism. Then, in 1977, an exhibition in Rome on Danish artists in Italy began the international recognition of works of the golden age. This breakthrough led, in 1984, to a loan exhibition of early nineteenth-century Danish art from the Statens Museum for Kunst, Copenhagen, which travelled first to London's National Gallery, then to the...
Grand Palais, in Paris. The catalogue of that exhibition presented the Danish works not as "by-products, or uncritical parrotings, of artistic achievements in larger countries," but as "peaceful, innocent, and refined" cultural expressions, with deep roots in the rich soil of their own national heritage, the term "golden age" identifying a period "assumed to express the national soul with particular purity." The so-called margins were staking a claim to their own integrity in the bastions of canonicity, but one of the catalogue's authors still fretted that the works' "status and importance in the larger context of European art [was] open to discussion."3

A decade later, American audiences in Los Angeles and New York were treated to The Golden Age of Danish Painting, seen, this time, as "designed above all for domestic expression ... authentic and distinctive ... [but now understood] to belong to the mainstream of Northern Romanticism."4 Scholarship in the field of German art had, in the meantime, reached a critical mass, capable of providing scholarly refuge, beneath an ever-growing umbrella, to movements previously tarred by the taint of provincialism. The curators remarked upon the unacademic nature of the work, and upon its simplicity, born of neoclassicism, but also spoke of its nationalist spirit, introverted, introspective, and redolent of earlier heroic times: "If we are meant to feel the ancestral spirits lurking there, it is only the more to enjoy the Danish landscape enriched with their associations, the great sky, and the clear Baltic light."5 This was a synthesis proposed by Robert Rosenblum, who first described North European art as inherently Romantic in character, with Neoclassicism and Romanticism understood in this context as but two sides of the same coin.6

Recently, there have been entrees into this field from other directions. In 1996, for example, In the Light of Italy: Corot and Early Open-Air Painting toured Washington, Brooklyn, and St. Louis, with works by forty-eight European artists, who shared the common experience of a period of study in the bright, warm light of Italy.7 In New York, this exhibition ran contemporaneously with the one-man Corot retrospective. The Brooklyn exhibition was complementary, because Corot and the French practitioners of plein-airisme were featured. Despite this canonical focus upon the French school, however, the Danish artists, whose outdoor studies antedated those of the French, were included. The recognition of the Danes' prior claim and the focus upon the transmission of ideas through shared experience established an important precedent for the current Baltic Light exhibition, which accords credit to the artists of Denmark and Germany for work that was not only meritorious in its own right, but also a rich component of their respective national traditions.

Developed in co-operation with the Hamburger Kunsthalle and the
Thorvaldsens Museum in Copenhagen, *Baltic Light* draws together some hundred paintings from Danish, German, Russian, and French collections, all of them executed between the 1790s and the 1840s, a turbulent period encompassing both the Napoleonic Wars and the Industrial Revolution. The National Gallery of Canada catalogue describes this selection as the first to concentrate upon and explore the shared interests of the Baltic region. It is an important definitional beginning, one that recognizes that national boundaries are both moveable and permeable—the Danish border, for example, once extended through the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to the edge of Hamburg and northwest to include Norway, while the region of present-day Germany identified as the birthplace of artist Caspar David Friedrich was then part of Swedish Pomerania. Like the *Metropolis* exhibition of 1991, which brought together 1920s art and design from both Europe and North America, *Baltic Light* allows the visitor to appreciate how ideas developed both within and beyond national boundaries, and how cultural activity in sites previously dismissed as marginal can be no less rewarding a field of study than the mainstream.

The catalogue follows the careers of individual artists, their travels, and their associations, sketching out the intellectual climate that underpinned the production of the works in question. This intellectual micro-history reveals a vivid and varied tapestry more subtly nuanced than broad classifications based exclusively on national schools. The result is a sensitive understanding of the circulation of ideas in one area of Northern Europe and of the figures who were most influential. Christoffer Wilhelm Eckersberg (1783–1857), for example, became Professor at the Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts in Copenhagen in 1818, and encouraged a generation of his own students to travel to Italy, as he had done. His impetus, together with the Academy's mix of Danish and German students, and Eckersberg's own lack of interest, following his appointment, in anything beyond the borders of Denmark, provides an intimate insight into the type of work that emerged at this period. The constellation of friendships, frequently, but not always, determined by national origin, and the lively personal interchange reveal how careers were fostered and how skills matured. Just as contemporary critical discourse has provided the framework within which new questions can be asked about art history, scholars may now adopt methodology according to the particulars of the research problem at hand.

Five catalogue essays, by specialists from leading Danish and German institutions and from the National Gallery of Canada, examine the currents of ideas that informed landscape painting of the Baltic region at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Approaches by the artists ranged from a rational, almost scientific, interest in natural phenomena to the moody, nostalgic brood-
nings of Romanticism. Yet both appear as important aspects of the cultural climate at that period.

Kaspar Monrad, Senior Research Curator at the Statens Museum for Kunst, Copenhagen, details the influence of the Schleswig-born Eckersberg during his professorial tenure, from 1818 to 1850, at the Royal Danish Academy. Eckersberg’s theories, set down in An Attempt at Guidance for Young Painters in the Use and Theory of Perspective, of 1833, combined close observation of nature (a pioneering concept for any Academician of his time) with an idealized selectivity born of his neoclassical training in the Paris studio of Jacques Louis David, and of his three-year sojourn in Rome. This synthesis of naturalism and neoclassicism was communicated to many of his students.

Eckersberg, like many of his contemporaries, regarded Danish and German art as separate but related projects, yet the Copenhagen Academy was a crossroads. The patriarchs of German Romanticism, Caspar David Friedrich (1774–1840) and Philip Otto Runge (1777–1810), were among this Academy’s alumni in the 1790s, as were Hamburg artists Christian Morgenstern (1805–67) and Adolph Vollmer (1806–75) in the 1820s. As a rule, Eckersberg’s students modelled their travels after those of their mentor, but increasingly rejected his advice that Paris be included in their itineraries, preferring instead to visit Hamburg and Berlin, then Dresden, where Friedrich made his home and where Norwegian artist Johan Christian Dahl (1788–1857) had settled in 1821. Such tours usually proceeded to Munich, and finally to Rome, at least until the 1840s, when an epic caesura took place.

In 1848 a simmering conflict over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein boiled over into all-out war. Casualties were both military and cultural. Artist Louis Gurlitt (1812–97), who was born in Holstein and trained both in Hamburg and Copenhagen, had strong links to Scandinavia, because he spent a great deal of time travelling there. But, when forced to choose between the Kingdom of Denmark and a united Germany, his decision for Germany meant that his paintings were stripped from the walls of the Royal Gallery in Copenhagen, and for a century his artistic legacy was not even acknowledged in Denmark. Such incidents demonstrate the fragility of all historical narratives, often assumed to be rationally grounded, to the point of being graven in stone.

Helmut Leppien, former Chief Curator of the Paintings Department at the Hamburger Kunsthalle, in his essay on “Friedrich and Pomerania,” offers a counterpoint in his consideration of the creative concerns of Caspar David Friedrich, whose work has been heralded in recent years as the quintessence of German Romanticism. Friedrich moved from his birthplace in Swedish Pomerania to study until 1798 at the Copenhagen Academy, then went to Dresden, where he remained throughout his life. During his youth he was deeply influenced by
theologian Ludwig Theobul Kosegarten, who preached about divine revelation in nature, a philosophy Friedrich had in mind in his admonition to artists to "close your physical eye, so that you can first see your picture with your spiritual eye." Instead of the acutely detailed *plein-air* studies of Eckersberg and the Norwegian Dahl, who was Friedrich's friend and fellow-lodger in Dresden from the 1820s, Friedrich described "bringing up what you have seen in the darkness so that it reacts upon others from the outside to the inside." Yet Leppien suggests that what Friedrich saw "in the darkness" was not "pictures of hell or horror, no monstrous products of the fantasy, but pictures recollecting the seen and the experienced." Hence, the artist's representation of the natural world, despite its otherworldly appearance, was grounded in his Pomeranian heritage and his relationship with the land. Leppien's emphasis upon Friedrich's conscious observation and his experience of light underlines the rationalism behind the subjectivity, an interpretation that gracefully stands on its head Rosenblum's conclusion that North European art is fundamentally Romantic in character, with Neoclassicism subsumed within Romanticism. Might it be that rationalism indeed lies at the root of the self-conscious subjectivity that is the index of the Romantic spirit?

A third facet, addressed by Helmut Börsch-Supan, former Chief Curator of Painting and Sculpture at Verwaltung Preussische Schlösser und Gärten, Berlin, is the landscape art of Berlin. Initially inspired by foreign influences—the English landscape garden and the work of Parisian artist Watteau in the 1740s—the genre later became a lightning rod for nationalist sentiments, when, in 1799, Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm III called upon artists to create "patriotic" themes. Whatever result he intended, this declaration prompted expositions of mountain scenery, not historical *tableaux* like those of the French Academicians. At the time, Prussia had just concluded a series of campaigns against post-Revolutionary France, only to be overrun, in 1806, by Napoleon's armies. The king's acquisition, in 1810, of two works by Friedrich, *Monk on the Sea* and *Abbey in the Oakwood*, crystallized feelings of Prussian nationalism, soon to be cathartically released in the wars of liberation that led to Napoleon's defeat in 1816.

While Friedrich's Romanticism held deeply symbolic meaning for Prussians, the Berlin scene was dominated, from 1810 through the 1830s, by Karl Friedrich Schinkel's perspectival cityscapes and imaginative dioramas. Notwithstanding the neoclassical appearance of these works, however, Börsch-Supan positions them within the same Romanticist, pro-nationalist ethos as those of Friedrich, suggesting an implicit didacticism, calculated to stimulate national pride. The Berlin Academy, like its Danish counterpart, provided an institutional framework for the articulation of socio-political goals. Academies,
whether civic or royal institutions, whether founded in Italian city states or in Paris, London, Copenhagen, or Berlin, regulated and raised the quality of artistic production in a manner that came to represent nations to and for their citizens, through the medium of high culture.

A second catalogue essay by Leppien describes seven artists in Hamburg, at that time on the border of Denmark, whose diverse educational backgrounds and independent career paths, in his view, make it quite "inaccurate to speak of anything like a Hamburg school." What they had in common, seemingly, were qualities of "precision, rationality, and clarity ... [bourgeois values] ... shared by the craftsmen and merchants of the time." But there were also aristocratic patrons, such as the theoretician Baron Carl Friedrich von Rumohr, who was well connected with the Danish Royal house and the Prussian Crown Prince. He, too, encouraged young artists to paint from nature.

What, as a group, the artists failed to do, in Leppien's view, was to rise beyond the conventions of bourgeois taste, a project said to have been realized first by the French artist Courbet in 1855. Yet, the patrons and the conventions were the parameters within which the art was produced. Perhaps it was Courbet's good fortune to find an institutional setting, a public platform, and a critical climate that both provoked and accommodated his iconoclasm, and then enshrined it as the yardstick by which others should be measured.

Catherine Johnston's contribution on historiography provides the critical context within which to position these debates. She examines both the oscillations of the historical recognition afforded the artists in their own lifetimes, and the varied responses to art of the Baltic region outside their national borders. Past scholarship was guided by the modernist paradigm that differentiated margin and centre, then allotted to the margin an intellectual pigeonhole into which all contents, as a matter of course, were filed and forgotten. This pattern has been changing, however, and since the 1960s the change has accelerated. Johnston's observation that Danish artists of the Golden Age were little recognized outside Scandinavia is particularly significant for Canadians, whose own cultural heritage shares a similar obscurity.

Historical narratives are the means by which individual reputations and cultural identities are developed and sustained. The recent rehabilitation of Caspar David Friedrich as a leading light of German Romanticism makes almost inconceivable the fact that he died forgotten and destitute, when the centre of intellectual gravity shifted from Dresden to Munich and Düsseldorf. The discourse, so often naturalized as a matter of fact and truth, is more accurately revealed as an arbitrary memorial: we only remember what we think important; we only think important what we choose to value. By what criteria do historians decide that
one type of art is more valuable than another? Johnston's approach suggests that cultural production may be fruitfully understood in many ways, not least in relation to the circumstances of its making. By articulating the process of selection that underpins the narrative and the significance of the choices implicit in it, historians make visible their own contributions to the accretions of knowledge.

The catalogue entries themselves offer equally rich avenues for future investigation. It is intriguing to find, for example, a critique of Carl Blechen's work written in 1830 that comments not only upon the merits of the final painting, but also upon "its even more ingenious sketch." In other cases, there are cloud studies by Dahl, his Dresden colleague Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869), Jacob Gensler (1808–45) of Hamburg, and Danish artist Christen Købke (1810–48), bearing notations of specific dates and qualities of light. Meteorology was a subject that fascinated generations of artists across Europe and North America in the wake of Luke Howard's Climate of London, published between 1818 and 1820. His ideas, in turn, entered into German discourse through the writings of Goethe. Such unions of science and art were typical of post-Enlightenment rationalism and its positivist scrutiny of the natural world.

What is most important for North American audiences is that the naturalism and Romanticism of this era in North European art figure largely in the emergence of nineteenth-century landscape traditions on this side of the Atlantic. While the catalogue refers in passing to this fact, one could not tour this exhibition without being confronted by images that remind one to what extent the same sensibility is implicated in Canada's heritage—not so much the neoclassical urban views, but the cloud studies and the wilderness panoramas of Dahl, Blechen, Wilhelm Bendz (1804–32), and Friedrich Wasmann (1805–86). Their work anticipates the Romanticism of the American Hudson River School and the luminists, as well as the art of Lucius O'Brien and John Fraser, and others, in Canada, who conceived of landscape representation as the quintessential foundation of a new national school.

In her discussion of Nature and Culture: American Landscape and Painting, 1825–1875, Barbara Novak analysed American painting in terms not only of British and French influences, but of the North European tradition as well. Her chapter on "The Meteorological Vision," in particular, describes how American artists like Jasper Cropsey shared British artist John Constable's interest in cloud formations, then goes on to describe how Cropsey's essay entitled "Up Among the Clouds," published in The Crayon, in 1855, appeared at a time when many painters were experimenting with the transient effects of light. At the same time, poets and philosophers, conversant with the writings of John Ruskin and Goethe, wrote about nature as a revelation of the
divine. American transcendentalism was the alter ego of scientific positivism. Like the art of Northern Europe, nineteenth-century landscape views in North America gave form to the intangible project Benedict Anderson has described as “imagining” a nation.

Canadian audiences have had a long-standing interest in Scandinavian art, most notably since the 1913 Albright-Knox exhibition of Scandinavian landscape paintings in Buffalo, when J.E.H. MacDonald and Lawren Harris (who had studied in Germany) experienced their first epiphany about the development of an art “as native as the rocks, or the snow, or pine trees.” An earlier Scandinavian exhibition, at the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago, in 1893, had also provoked an enthusiastic Canadian response. By contrast, International Modernism, which enjoyed its North American debut in 1913 at the Armory Show in New York, raised barely a ripple for nearly a decade—until the Société Anonyme exhibition in Toronto, in 1926. Northern landscapes, with their clear, pure light, attracted Canadians far more. The general public continues to see them as uniquely expressive of the country's national destiny, no matter what the critics say. In the Group of Seven's distinctive response to the totalizing vision of the European avant-garde Canadian historians have charted a path to the country's cultural coming of age. More recent scholarship has questioned the made-in-Canada mythology that underpins this narrative, pointing out that the work of the Group was predicated upon both mainstream European ideas and the cultural model of Scandinavia. Today, Canadians aspire to a culture in step with the international scene, but with a distinctive integrity of its own, an ideal that many see fulfilled in the Scandinavian response to International Modernism.

One might ask, in the wake of the *Baltic Light* catalogue, what should be said of Canadian culture in relation to the art of Northern Europe. The solitary tree outlined against the panoramic landscape is as much an icon of Canada as The "Emperor's Pine" in the Park of Kleinglienicke, by Julius Schoppe (1795–1868), of 1827, except that treed landscape subjects in Canada do not include man-made pulpits. The competing strands of scientific literalness and national Romanticism are familiar territory for students of nineteenth-century Canadian art. Contemporary discourse instills a deep skepticism of nineteenth-century nationalism and the role art played in representing it; hence, the close detailing of this period draws the reader back to confront the past with newly critical eyes. Narratives about Northern European art and the historical recognition of it are but common fragments of a shared world view. Thankfully, the time has come when historians have begun to gaze more thoughtfully into the trees.
BOOK REVIEWS / COMPTES RENDUS

NOTES


5 Conisbee et al., The Golden Age of Danish Painting, 46; see also 11, 37–47. Most recently the relationship between Scandinavian art of this period and the development of national consciousness has been examined by Torsten Gunnarson, Head of Collections at the National Museum, Stockholm, in what is described as the first comprehensive study of landscape painting in Scandinavia during its vital period of development in the nineteenth century. See Torsten Gunnarson, Nordic Landscape Painting in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Nancy Adler (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998).


8 Johnston et al., Baltic Light, x.

9 Ibid.


11 Johnston et al., Baltic Light, 12.


14 Roald Nasgaard, The Mystic North: Sym-


17 F.B. Housser, A Canadian Art Movement: The Story of the Group of Seven (Toronto: Macmillan, 1926), written by a former school friend of Group member Lawren Harris, established the mythology of a made-in-Canada movement, which has formed the basis for all subsequent interpretation, whether laudatory or otherwise.

18 Nasgaard, Mystic North, was among the first to question the Housser thesis. Michael Tooby, in True North: Canadian Landscape Painting 1896–1939 (London: Barbican, 1991), is one of the more recent of the many other sceptical interpreters of the Group of Seven.


Review by Seija Paddon
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For scholars and—to a lesser degree—non-scholars alike, translation and translation theory are subjects whose importance and timeliness are naggingly apparent, yet in many areas irritatingly under-researched and under-documented. Hence, Kaisa Koskinen's doctoral dissertation, the avowed focus of which is the question of ethics in translating and translation theory, fills the need to a significant degree. Her subject is particularly opportune within its chosen postmodern context. It is postrnodernity, after all, that many consider the villain responsible for laying ethics and morality under siege. It is easy to predict, then, that this ambitious and intelligent work will be a welcome addition to texts available in the field.

The structure of Koskinen's work tells the reader much about its scope. In addition to a Preface, the text is divided into six chapters, entitled Introduction, Postmodern Ethics, Postmodernity and Translation, Towards a New Ethics of Translation, Directions, and Awakenings, among which the last chapter functions as a kind of epilogue. As an appropriate theoretical approach within the umbrella of postmodernism, Koskinen uses deconstruction as a concept, and the work of Jacques Derrida, in particular, for much of the theoretical material and support for her analysis. Moreover, the reader finds Lawrence Venuti and Anthony Pym, among other theorists, as the foci of Koskinen's deconstructively critical eye. For many readers, Koskinen's two case studies will undoubtedly be equally important; they deal with Manuel Puig's *Boquitas pintadas* in translation, and translation and translated texts as modes of communication within the European Commission. In the latter case, Koskinen looks at the philosophy of translating from and into a minor language such as Finnish, in particular, and the atmosphere surrounding that process. Her focus on the European Commission provides the reader with an insider's view into an increasingly self-empowering (some would say self-indulgent) world.

Among the many underlying traces in Koskinen's text, we are reminded of the fact that we live in textual communities where discourse and social history, along with many other factors, not only interconnect, but continuously evolve and shift, thus effectively problematizing attempts to establish per-
manent rules of ethics in translating, rules that would have general applicability. Rather, translators find themselves part of a decision-making process that, on the whole, seriously challenges the validity of descriptive theorizing. This is particularly noteworthy within postmodern theorizing, which acknowledges that, just as value-free or apolitical views do not exist, neither does true objectivity. While the words ethics and morals were formerly synonymous, they have now evolved into complementary functions, such that ethics is the science of morals, and morals the practice of ethics; the connection of the latter with mores, which are continuously in flux, is inescapable.

In the chapter "Postmodernity and Translation," Koskinen skilfully demonstrates how deconstructive approaches to translation theory have been mutilated, misinterpreted, and misrepresented, as well as (on the plus side) how they have been shown to employ the essential paradox at the heart of language (which deconstruction unveils) to serve the best interests of the theory. Similarly, her discussion in "Beyond dichotomies" makes clear the inherent ambivalence and indeterminacy within the context of ethics. After all, the validity of most binary structures on which ethical structuring rests is unprovable and ambivalent at best. Ultimately, then, Koskinen's treatment of postmodernity in language and in the act of translating first and foremost reaffirms the Heideggerian idea of concealment and unconcealment in language, the idea of words as repositories of both seen meanings and unseen, or submerged, meanings.

Koskinen's personal stand, therefore, against what she calls the "Romantic" division between literary and so-called "mundane" translation expresses a curiously divergent view (notwithstanding Lotbinière-Harwood's and others' silly reasoning, and the coupling—once again—of emotions and crass material gains or their lack), one that is at odds with the tenet of this work as a whole. The rivalry of egos aside, and at the risk of over-simplifying the matter, I suggest that the difference or similarity is not in the qualitative measure of translation's end results (however that is supposedly established); rather, it is determined by the language itself. Here we have under scrutiny literal and literary languages, the latter being rich in metaphoric, symbolic, and other values, which open the text to a variety of different and individually valid translations. If the former, on the other hand, carried equally varied elements, its translation would have chaotic results. Most importantly, perhaps, the question of the difference between the two modes of language, the literary and the "mundane" (the term used in Koskinen's text), as in the case of so many other theoretical disagreements, ultimately turns into a battle between concrete and abstract imaginations. It is a battle that for obvious reasons cannot be won.
In conclusion, Koskinen’s study richly deserves more detailed attention than a review, with its space restrictions, will allow. Her text has made a significant contribution to both translation practice and translation studies, while being fully aware how quickly the scenarios, both practical and theoretical, as well as the discursive boundaries, shift. While Koskinen’s conclusion rightly points out that the incompleteness of a search for theoretical answers in the realm of ethics, in this case, is also the project’s self-renewing hope, much can be gained by understanding the contemporary moment and the postmodern turn(s) it is taking.


Review Article by John Lingard
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ASBJØRN AARSETH IS PROFESSOR OF NORDIC Literature at the University of Bergen. His previous books include Dyret i mennesket [The Animal in Man] (1975), a fascinating approach to imagery in Peer Gynt, Realisme som Myte [Realism as Myth] (1981), essays on Norwegian literary history, and Peer Gynt and Ghosts: Text and Performance (1989). Ibsens samtidsskuespill: en studie i glasskapets dramaturgi [Ibsen’s Modern Plays: A Study in the Dramaturgy of the Glass Cabinet] is the most recent discussion of the complete modern cycle and, as the publishers claim, “den første bok på norsk som behandler disse tolv dramaene systematisk og konsekvent ut fra synsvinkel ‘Ibsen som scenedikter’” [the first book in Norwegian that examines these twelve plays systematically and closely from the viewpoint of “Ibsen as scenic poet”].

The garden-room setting for Pillars of Society is dominated by an upstage

John Lingard, University College of Cape Breton

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picture-frame window that looks out on the Bernicks' garden and the street. In Act 4, Consul Bernick's friends have arranged a procession in his honour, a device intended as a cover-up for some slightly shady business transactions. Rummel tells Lona Hessel that the window will have the same function as the proscenium arch of Ibsen's picture-frame stage: “Når haven er fyldt af den bølgede mængde, går forhængene op, og man skuer indenfor en overrasket og glad familie;—en borgers hjem bør være som et glasskab” [When the garden is full to overflowing with the crowd, the curtains will go up, and people will see inside a surprised and happy family;—a citizen’s home should be like a glass cabinet]. Aarseth defines Rummel's scenario as a double-sided tableau: “det kan betrakes både fra hagen, af småbyens fanebærere, klakørene som ikke er informert om medaljens bakside, og fra salen, hvor tilskuerne har fått informasjon som setter dem i stand til å gjennemskue den glitrende fasaden og oppfatte ironien, den moralske kontrasten mellem det tilsynelatende og det egentlige” (49) [it can be seen both from the garden, by small-town banner-wavers, the members of a claque, who are not informed about the reverse side of the medal, and from the auditorium, where the spectators have obtained information that enables them to see through the glittering façade and understand the irony, the moral contrast between appearance and reality]. This, then, is the first example of “et virkemiddel som vi kan kalle det metasceniske perspektivet” (37) [a technique that we can call the metascenic perspective], defined by Aarseth as “en utvidelse eller fordypning av scenerommet som kan ha en metaforisk eller en metonymisk dimensjon” (36) [a widening or deepening of the scenic space, which can have a metaphoric or a metonymic dimension].

Inside the visual frame of this “metascenic perspective,” Aarseth examines the rhetorical effect of dialogue, speech, and character development. Here he makes use of the term “enthymeme,” which the Oxford English Dictionary glosses as “An argument based on merely probable grounds; a rhetorical argument as distinguished from a demonstrative one.” In Aarseth's words, “Å betrakte det ibsenske dramaet under retorikkens synsvinkel, vil altså si å se det som et enthymem, hvor formålet er å studere personframstillingens og handlingsforløpsets overbevisningskraft som dramatisk illusion” (40-41). [Accordingly, to view the Ibsenite drama from a rhetorical point of view will mean to see it as an enthymeme, and the goal will be to study the convincingness of the representation of characters and the action in progress as dramatic illusion]. To clarify this idea, Aarseth quotes the Russian critic Nicolas Evreinoff:

It is not the naturalness, but the convincingness, of things seen on the stage that gives birth to theatrical illusion. Hence, it is not the subject itself that must be shown in the theatre, but a picture of this subject,
not the action itself, but the representation of the action. (43)

A major advantage of this metascenic and rhetorical approach is that it enables the author to argue persuasively for positive, redemptive endings to plays that have been subjected to the fashionably ironic readings of so much twentieth-century criticism. In Aarseth's view, to read the end of *Pillars of Society* ironically is "sjangerhistorisk uholdbart" (58) [untenable in terms of the history of dramatic genre]. Ibsen shapes the action to establish the convincingness of Consul Bernick's road to "bekjennelse og tilgivelse fra dem i sin ungdom han hadde begått urett mot" (62) [confession and forgiveness from those he had wronged in his youth].

Aarseth writes equally well of two later plays with controversial resolutions. While *The Lady from the Sea* has only one indoor setting, its scenography preserves the opposition "mellom trangt og åbent" (179) [between constricted and open], which is a leitmotif in the modern cycle. Pointing out that the Wangels' carp pond is related to the conservatory in *Ghosts* and the attic in *The Wild Duck* (193), Aarseth goes on to establish the pond as a metaphor for one of two extreme modes of existence, which Ellida initially feels compelled to choose between:

Som metafor er det dammens funksjon å tydeliggjøre innestengtheten og stagnasjon, å danne et scenisk element som indikerer et ytterpunkt. Dermed gir den tilværelsen ved fjorden et perspektiv som går begge veier—utover til det frie havet og innover til den lukkede dammen. Poenget er at det går an å akklimatisere seg, velge en eksistensform mellom de to ytterpunktene. I en viss forstand er dette muligens løsningpen for Ellida, liksom det er for Ballested. (194)

[As metaphor it is the pond's function to embody enclosure and stagnation, to form a scenic element that indicates a point of extremity. In this way it gives existence by the fjord to a perspective that points both ways—out to the freedom of the sea and in to the landlocked pond. The point is that it is possible to acclimatize oneself, to choose a mode of existence between the two points of extremity. In a certain sense, this is a possible solution for Ellida, just as it is for Ballested.]

Aarseth links these two scenic "points of extremity" to the conflict between the rational and the irrational, which occupies so much of the dialogue. Wangel's decision to let Ellida choose her own destiny cures her of a dangerous obsession, but does not lock her, or the audience, into an acceptance of rational domesticity:

At det endelige resultatet skyldes en felles erkjennelse, er selvsagt ikke noen grunn til å tvile på dets holdbarhet i et Ibsen-drama, snarere tvert imot. Det viser jevnbyrdighet mellom ektefellene. (214)

[That the final result is due to a mutual recognition is of course no reason to doubt its convincingness in an Ibsen drama, rath-
er the opposite. It shows an equality between the married partners."

It is difficult to disagree with this reading of the play without a radical distortion of the text. Svein Sturla Hungnes’s 1990 Nationaltheatret production left Ellida and Dr. Wangel completely unreconciled and physically separated in the final tableau, and in doing so revealed something like contempt for Ibsen’s stagecraft and dramatic rhetoric.

Aarseth begins his chapter on *Little Eyolf* by listing the numerous critics who have read the play’s ending in an ironic light, from Hermann J. Weigand in 1925, who felt that Ibsen wrote the final scene “with an almost satanic smile of satisfaction” over his secret knowledge of Alfred Allmers’s “real nature” (284), to Robin Young in 1989, who believes that by the play’s end “the dramatist has manoeuvred himself into an impasse from which no satisfactory outcome is possible” (290). Aarseth’s reaction to these readings is important: “I en viss forstand er det selve begrepet drama, eller egentlig *dramatisk illusjon*, som er på prøve her” (291) [In a certain sense, it is the very concept of drama, or more properly *dramatic illusion*, that is being tested here]. His subsequent defence of *Little Eyolf’*s integrity as “et drama om menneskelig forvandling” (303) [a drama about human change] is exemplary. Using the three settings as a metaphor for the changes that take place in Alfred and Rita Allmers, and subjecting their powerful Act 2 confrontation to perceptive analysis, Aarseth concludes,

Det som bør være klart, er at dramatikeren har ønsket å gjøre forandringen troverdig... Det er vanskelig å finne støtte for en ironisk lesning av avsluttende dialogen i *Lille Eyolf.* At Alfred heiser flagget til topps, markerer at de nå har arbeidet seg gjennom sorgen og har påtatt seg en utadrettet oppgave. De har ingen ilusjoner om at det er en let byrde de tar på seg, men de tror også at strevet vil gi velsignelse. (303–07)

[What should be clear is that the dramatist has wished to make the change believable... It is difficult to find support for an ironic reading of the concluding dialogue in *Little Eyolf.* That Alfred raises the flag to the top indicates that they have now worked their way through sorrow and have undertaken an outwardly directed task. They have no illusions that it is a light burden they are taking on themselves, but they also believe that the effort will bring a blessing.]

Aarseth’s chapter on *Little Eyolf* joins Northam’s 1973 analysis as one of the two best readings of this marvelous play.

I find myself at variance with Aarseth on only two points. In his view, the dramatic enthymeme requires “erkjennelse”—Aristotle’s “recognition”—from the protagonists, and he does not find this at the end of *The Wild Duck* (144). In this
instance, Northam's more open reading seems the preferable one. I am also unconvinced that Ibsen's debt to Nietzsche is as self-evident as Aarseth makes it out to be (271–76). But these are minor points of disagreement. *Ibsens samtidsskuespill* is dramatic criticism at its very best, and will remain a landmark in Ibsen studies for many years to come.

REFERENCES


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